THE NEAPOLITAN CAMORRA:
CRIME AND POLITICS IN POST-WAR NAPLES (1950-92)

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

by

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Abstract

In the post-war period, Italy has been plagued by different forms of organised crime (such as the Sicilian *Mafia*, the Neapolitan *Camorra*, the Calabrian '*Ndrangheta* and the Pugliese *Sacra Corona Unità*) which have managed in their individual ways to infiltrate both the State (in the form of political parties and local administrations) and society (businesses, cultural and voluntary organisations). In Campania, until 1991, the relationship between the Camorra and the local political elite (based on the exchange of votes for state contracts and protection) was tacitly accepted by the population and could not be studied by political scientists due to the lack of reliable source material. In 1991, a law was introduced which gave generous remission of sentences to criminals who became state-witness. Many members of the Camorra revealed important aspects of criminal, economic and political activities in Campania. This new material permitted a reexamination of the Camorra.

This thesis on the Camorra hopes to fill a gap in the study of the relationship between politics and criminal organisations which so far has concentrated on the Sicilian Mafia. Part One is a general introduction and presents the theoretical model and methods adopted. The documentation available allowed us to adopt an agency-structure approach derived from Giddens's structuration theory (1984). This was complemented by Easton's systems analysis (1965) to understand the wider, macro-environment. We elaborated an 'interaction model' to analyse the changing nature of the Camorra's activities: from a simple social-criminal practice in the 1950s to a dynamic and secret cartel enacting a political-criminal practice in the 1980s. To test this model we applied it to case-studies of criminals using original judicial documents. In Part Two we look at the possible motives of people who join the Camorra. We analysed the agent's internal and external structure in both decades and concluded that the macro-environment as an influencing factor had changed more than the individual-agent. Part Three examines the lives of *camorristi* in the 1950s and 1980s in order to determine how far their criminal practice has been transformed. Part Four investigates the wider picture of system-interaction between the Camorra's social sub-system and the political system. Focussing on the relationship between *camorristi* and the political elite in the 1950s and 1980s we highlight the radical changes that occurred.

This thesis presents a theoretical discussion of how to study organised crime and social behaviour in general and at the same time a detailed empirical study, in particular of the political role of a criminal organisation in a concrete historical situation, that of Naples over the last forty years.

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"Nessun popolo sulla terra ha mai tanto sofferto quanto il popolo napoletano.Soffre la fame e la shiavitù da venti secoli, e non si lamenta. Non maledice nessuno, non odia nessuno: neppure la miseria. Cristo era napoletano"

Malaparte (1991:7).

"Napule è nu sole amaro
Napule è addore e' mare
Napule è na' carta sporca e nisciuno
se ne importa e
ognuno aspetta a' ciotta
Napule e na' camminata
inte viche miezo all'alto
Napule è tutto un suonno e a' sape tutti
o' munno ma
nun sanno a' verità"

Pino Daniele, *Napule è*

MAP OF ITALY

Map 1: Italy and Campania

"Ora sapevo che si poteva, che si doveva frodare; la frode mi possedeva via via che tentavo di espellerla; tutto era organizzato perché il credito potesse esercitarsi nei margini predisposti di una frode"

Bernari (1964:107).

Preamble: Scope and Aims of the Thesis

If, walking down Vico Mondragone and crossing Via S. Caterina da Siena in the direction of the take-away *'Da Nennella'* at the corner of Via Mortelle, a foreign visitor to Naples catches a glimpse of two youngsters zooming along on a powerful motorbike, holding a Kalashnikov, and feels for the first time a moment of fear and tension, with people looking down and trying to ignore the whole scene as if it had not happened, s/he may become aware of an invisible reality and a form of powerful control or, to use Graham Greene's words, 'the dark side of the city' (1982). Obviously like all capitals and major towns, Naples (see Map 1) has its underworld and its *malavita*. But one also remembers the numerous references in newspapers and studies of Naples to a more structured and formidable form of organised crime, the Neapolitan Camorra,[1] which in the 1980s was most present in the form of *La Nuova Camorra Organizzata* [NCO] led by Raffaele Cutolo and the alliance of rival gangs, *La Nuova Famiglia* [NF].

In a much discussed pamphlet on the French town of Nice, *J'Accuse,* Graham Greene made a powerful indictment against organised crime: "I am not exaggerating when I write that there is a network in the Nice region which links the *milieu* with some of the most respected professional circles. Money of course plays its corrupting role, but it is not an affair of money only. [...] *J' accuse* - yes, I accuse - but it's not merely a petty criminal I am accusing, a man unbalanced, perhaps paranoiac, even pitiable. He would be powerless without support, and the support which he has been given by certain

[1] For a historical overview of the Neapolitan Camorra's development see Appendix One.

without support, and the support which he has been given by certain police officers, magistrates and lawyers gives him good reason to believe that he can obtain any immunity he may need. He feels fully justified in his corrupt view of the world" (1982:7-26).

These could be the words of the first Camorra state-witness of the 1990s, the *pentito* Pasquale Galasso, against the political ruling elite (and in particular, Antonio Gava[2]) in Campania: "I have touched with my own hands this social reality, believe me this group of politicians which I have mentioned [...] is organised like our gang. The only difference is that in our gang, we risk our lives in the streets. If tomorrow morning there was a Camorra war, we are in the front line whereas these politicians, they hide behind their desks in their comfortable offices" (CPA1.1:81).

However, if one reads the classic text on Naples in the 1950s and 1960s (Allum, 1973a), the Camorra appears much less organised and powerful. This explains why a comparative analysis of the Camorra in the 1950s and 1980s is necessary. The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the changing nature of the Camorra's impact on Neapolitan politics in the post-war period, thus allowing us to answer questions such as: what type of 'organisation' was and is the Camorra? Why did and do people 'join'? What type of relationship did and does it have with politics and business? In short, how can its changing relationship with the political elite, from a subordinate to a supraordinate position, be explained? Why did it happen at that precise historical moment and in those areas? In order to do this, three fundamental issues are discussed and analysed: (1) the changing motivations for individual membership; (2) the changing objectives, activities and organisation of the Camorra and (3) the changing role and presence of the Camorra in politics.

This requires an analytical framework which does three things: firstly, which distinguishes the various 'systems' in which the Camorra operates (social, economic and political); secondly, which shows the articulation and connection between these systems and finally, which

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[2] See Appendix Eight.

shows how interaction between structural factors and agency is important to tell the Camorra's story of change. Our analytical framework draws on Easton's systems analysis and a modified version of Giddens's structuration theory. In other words, in this thesis, Naples is conceived of as a set of interconnecting sub-systems (see Figure P.1) within which behaviour, in our case the Camorra and its activities, is the outcome of an interaction between structural factors and individual agency.

Figure P.1: System Interaction



PART ONE: INTRODUCTION

Chapter One:
Defining and Studying Organised Crime

"Whether researching or investigating organised crime, one is faced with the problem of defining the phenomenon. Oddly enough,a great many works on organised crime avoid this problem, as if the obvious need not be defined"

Abadinsky (1990:2)

1.1 Definitions

The next three chapters are dedicated to the theoretical model adopted and the methods used. However, before presenting them, it is necessary to define organised crime and to consider the existing literature on the subject.

Certainly, defining organised crime is essential to any study of the Camorra. However, it soon becomes apparent, when looking at the various definitions of organised crime, that, as Albanese points out, "there seem to be as many descriptions [definitions] of organised crime as there are authors" (1985:4); hence, this is not a simple and straightforward task (Ryan, 1995:4): "[the term] 'organised crime' has long been a source of controversy and contention, probably because of differences in the ways of approaching various features of the problem" (United Nations, E/CONF.88/1, 1994:4). Michetek (1994[3]) reinforces this view when pointing out that "organised crime is a highly complex but not well defined phenomenon". Indeed, the problem of definition may primarily lie in the definition one employs for criminals and crime in each country.

Therefore, attempting to define and study organised crime is like trying to define such complex and abstract notions as 'democracy', 'common good' and 'liberty', in that it provokes a contentious and polemical debate depending on national conceptions and histories[4].

The difficulty seems to arise for three principal reasons: firstly,

[3] Nikolaus Michalek, Austrian Minister for Justice addressing the UN conference on fighting organised crime which took place in Naples, Italy 2-11-1994; Soc/cp/135.
[4] Private discussion with the sociologist Dr K. Robertson, Reading University, 1995.

The difficulty seems to arise for three principal reasons: firstly, because of its multi-faceted nature: all the activities ranging from white-collar crime, drug dealing, extortion, prostitution, kidnapping and monopoly of the black market can go under the general label of "organised crime". This leads us to ask whether what we are talking about is "organised crime" (D. C. Smith, jr 1991), "professional crime" (Cressey, 1972:46), "white-collar crime" (Dwight. C. Smith, jr, 1982, Ruggiero, 1996) "transnational crime" (Savona, 1995), "repressive crime" (Hess, 1986) "broker capitalism" (Schneider and Schneider, 1973), "capitalist enterprise" (McIntosh, 1973), "criminal enterprise" (Maltz, 1985:24) or "cartels" (Burin des Roziers, 1995). These different labels show how many varied visions there are, making it difficult to agree on one general coherent definition of organised crime.

Secondly, the academic and ideological biases[5] of the different approaches that have been adopted complicate the definition of organised crime. Should it be studied as a "[...] social phenomenon to be analysed and understood; as an illegally defined act, or state of being for which a person can be prosecuted; or as a popular concept to be communicated to the public?" (Dwight. C. Smith, jr; 1975:4) ?

Thirdly, it is not clear *a priori* which elements need to be analysed in depth to understand this complex phenomenon: its structural characteristics, the professionalism of its participants or the type of client involved? For example, both Merton (1968) and Gambetta (1993) choose to concentrate on the predominant type of business activities that organised crime groups undertake. The large number of possible research aspects of organised crime led Ryan to argue that "[...] as hard as researchers try to solve the problem of defining organised

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[5] This ideological bias can be noted in the definition employed by the US President's *Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice*: Organised crime is "a society that seeks to operate outside the control of the American people and their governments. It involves thousands of criminals working within structures as complex as those of any large corporation, subject to laws more rigidly enforced than those of legitimate governments. Its actions are not impulsive but rather the result of intricate conspiracies, carried on over many years and aimed at gaining control over whole fields of activity in order to amass huge profits" *(The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice.* Task Force Report: Organised Crime, Annotations and Consultant Papers, Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, 1967:1).

crime, some people believe that there is no such thing, saying that because the evidence presented is not airtight, organised crime is not a problem" (1995:5).

As a result of these potential problems, Albanese sought to elaborate a possible definition "based on the consensus of writers of the last 15 years" which managed to highlight its main tenets: "organised crime is a continuing criminal enterprise that rationally works to profit from illicit activities that are in great public demand. Its continuing existence is maintained through the use of force, threats and/or the corruption of public officials" (1989:5).

In contrast, Maltz developed an all-encompassing "tentative typology" (1976:338) based on a functional conception of organised crime, highlighting the means, objectives and particular political and economic manifestations of organised crime[6]. In 1985, although he doubted "whether it is worthwhile to attempt to define organised crime generally" (1985:24), he readdressed the question, endeavouring to be more specific: "we should focus", he wrote, "on the nature of those criminal enterprises agreed by most observers to be part of organised crime" (*ibid*).

Consequently, he studied the attributes of organised crime groups[7] and concluded "we need something more balanced based on the characteristics (of organised crime) [...]"; he, therefore, avoided tautological (such as "organised crime is crime that is organised") and

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[6] He wrote: "A crime consists of a transaction proscribed by the criminal law between offender(s) and victim(s). It is not necessary for the victim to be a complainant or to consider himself victimised for a crime to be committed. An organised crime is a crime committed by two or more offenders who are or intend to remain associated for the purpose of committing crime. The means of execution of the crime include violence, theft, corruption, economic power, deception and victim collusion or participation, which are not mutually exclusive categories; any organised crime may employ a number of means. The objective of most organised criminals is power, either political or economic. These objectives too are not mutually exclusive and may co-exist in any organised crime. The objectives may take a number of different manifestations when the objective is political power, it may be of two types: overthrow of the existing order or illegal use of the political process when the objective is economic power, it may manifest itself in three ways: through common crime (made in se), through illegal business (made in prohibita) or through legitimate business (white collar crime)" (1976:342).

[7] He highlighted the characteristics that he believes are either central or peripheral to organised crime; these are corruption, structure, discipline, multiple enterprise, violence, sophistication, continuity, legitimate business, and bonding.

narrow definitions ("the Mafia is organised crime") (1985:34). Maltz, therefore, belongs to the school of thought which believes that "[...] organised crime is best defined by its structural features" (Ryan, 1995:5).

Furthermore, Abadinsky made an interesting contribution when he followed up this line of thought and looked at the attributes of organised crime and its organisational models. Indeed, what he tried to do was to produce a workable definition which concentrated on "a certain type of behaviour rather than a distinct form of crime - what it does, rather than what it is" (Ryan, 1995:6).

He pinpointed eight attributes which give a clear definitional framework to organised crime because he believed that they "(a) provide a basis for determining if a particular group of criminals constitutes organised crime and therefore (b) needs to be approached in a different way than one would approach other groups of criminals" (1990:4). These attributes are worth examining because they help us understand generally what forms of crime we are dealing with.

Thus, according to Abadinsky, the eight basic attributes of organised crime are: 1) non-ideological: organised crime has no ideological beliefs or objectives, but is interested in money and power; as a result, it usually seeks political protection for its illegal activities; 2) hierarchical: it has a clear vertical power structure from which authority flows; there may be different ranks between the top boss, the lieutenants and soldiers; 3) limited or exclusive membership: There tend to be some strict requirements for membership of an organised crime group, such as ethnic background, kinship or criminal record; this attribute is needed for the group to be successful; 4) perpetuitous: this means that the group is on-going, and that people join to ensure the group's continuity; 5) illegal violence and bribery: in these groups, violence is a readily available and accepted resource; bribes are used to protect its operations and members; 6) specialisation/division of labour: the division of labour occurs for functional reasons to make the group more efficient and therefore,

successful; 7) monopolistic: these groups seek domination over a particular territory or industry; to do this they must eliminate competition and form a monopoly-restraining free trade and increasing profit; such a monopolistic position can be maintained by the organised crime groups because of their use of violence and their relationship with police and law enforcement agencies; 8) government by rules and regulations: this means that like all types of legitimate organisation, these groups have rules and regulations which must be respected by all members. Abadinsky believes that these attributes are to be found in organised crime groups and thus enable them to pursue their goals of money and power.

Both Maltz's (1985) and Abadinsky's (1990) approaches of looking at the characteristics and attributes of organised crime groups are useful because they distinguish between an organised crime group and other social and political groups such as trade unions, church groups, motor bike groups, sports clubs and political parties. Indeed, the positive aspect of these approaches is that they both manage to outline and propose a working definition based on the features of organised crime.

In addition, note must be taken of the development of a modern school of thought on organised crime which argues that national boundaries are no longer applicable as crimes have become transnational. Therefore, they must be understood, studied and fought as international phenomena. Indeed, it is argued that regional labels are no longer appropriate and that the word 'Mafia' should apply to all forms of organised crime wherever it develops. Moreover, this definition is now adopted by the UN[8] which defines transnational crime as "[...] the movement of information, money, physical objects, people or other tangible or intangible items across state boundaries when at least one of the actors involved in this movement is non-governmental [...]. Criminal organisations are also increasingly engaged in activities that tend to cross national boundaries" (United Nations, 1994:5).

[8] This definition was elaborated by professor Ernesto Savona of the Criminal Law Department of the University of Trento, Italy, for the United Nations.

In conclusion, these definitions remain very general and all-inclusive which is constructive but does not help answer the more fundamental questions about organised crime groups and politics (such as why organised crime groups exist, how they work, how they operate in their environment and what type of relationship they have with economic and political groups) which are the subject of this thesis.

1.2 How Should the Neapolitan Camorra be Studied: A Review of Theoretical Approaches.

We have seen that organised crime is a highly complex social, economic and political phenomenon, consisting of organisations, structured or unstructured, with families, gangs, clans, bosses, (*padrini*), that undertake secretive, violent and pervasive social practices, legal, illegal, paralegal and semi-legal, with political protection. This definitional complexity also renders problematic the search for the right approach to our study of the Camorra and its relationship with politics in the post-war period.

Journalists (Sterling 1990, Faenza 1993a, and Longrigg 1997), politicians (Sales, 1988), historians (Marmo, 1990, Barbagallo, 1990, 1998, 1999), economists, sociologists (Arlacchi, 1983, Lamberti, 1987, Ruggiero, 1993) and judges (Mancuso, 1990, Narducci and Marino, 1990) have among others, all attempted to explain and interpret the Camorra phenomenon. But, at the same time, they have contributed to "a recurring problem in the study of organised crime [...] that is, the tension between 'rational' and 'irrational' explanations for its rise and operations" (Galeotti, 1997:99-101), in other words, the contrast between the 'irrational' or sociological approach (subcultural theory) and the 'rational' or economic approach (rational choice theory). Indeed, both these approaches have explanatory potential for analysing the Neapolitan Camorra in the post-war period.

The so-called 'irrational', sociological or subcultural, approach

seeks to explain organised crime in terms of local variables: it emphasises the need to look at historical, social, economic, political, generational and psychological systems which over time become part of a sub-culture.[9] It enables us to study these different systems, how they interact and how they may produce other cultural and social phenomena. A concrete example of this is, for example, how illegal activities have been tolerated in Naples for centuries because the police force has felt that this is the best form of social control; this contrasts with Genoa, where law and order have been much more evident. This indicates a distinct difference between two Mediterranean cultures.

However, this subcultural approach does not explain short-term criminal change; it cannot explain the Camorra's rapid transformation in the form of its quantum leap, (*salto di qualità*), in the 1970-80s, its great expansion and transformation from "racketeering clans" into a "business Camorra" working also in the legal sector of the economy. It gives no indication of how and why the Camorra moved into the legitimate business sector in the late 1970s. In addition, it does not explain the Camorra's changing relationship with the political and business worlds.

Furthermore, it cannot explain the bitter Camorra wars of the 1980s which were fought for dominance over the region. The subcultural approach may help to explain the origin of the use of extreme violence and *omertà*, but it cannot explain this sudden irruption of brutal and strategic in-fighting between clans. Therefore, it explains certain aspects of the Camorra but not others.

The same can be said of the rational choice approach. The standard utilitarian rational choice theory is one which applies an economic analysis of cost effectiveness to human behaviour and politics. Thus, organised crime, murders, illegal business deals and political corruption, are explained in terms of rational human behaviour: individuals are perceived as rational, always seeking to maximise their self-interest above and beyond collective action to be

[9] See Hess and his classical study of the Sicilian Mafia (1973).

cost-effective, calculating the potential rewards from their actions and acting accordingly; therefore, they always make individual strategic decisions, thinking of the individual outcomes rather than the collective good. In simple terms, this approach assumes "that individuals are rational actors who seek to maximise returns and minimise costs in any course of action they undertake" (Seyd and Whiteley, 1992:57).

Gambetta perfected this narrow economic theory to explain the Sicilian Mafia. Indeed, he argued that the Sicilian Mafia is "a specific economic enterprise, an industry which produces, promotes and sells private protection" (1993:1) which rational citizens, realising that the Italian state is failing to provide, turn to in order to protect themselves. He believes that it is the lack of authority of the Italian state which creates a demand for security, a space in the market, for the Mafia to fill. The individuals respond to a potentially dangerous situation (the chaos deriving from the lack of an authoritarian state) and calculate rationally that they need the Mafia to protect them.

The positive aspect of this type of theory, as Ward points out is that "it can help to illuminate how structures arise and are transformed" (1995:93), therefore, it can account for short-term change and transformation: why certain social movements, associations and businesses undergo change and why individuals make certain decisions and choices. These are aspects of organised crime which otherwise would be difficult to explain, especially the change in Camorra businesses and their relationships with politicians in the 1980s; why, for example, votes were exchanged for state contracts.

However, Ward suggests that a rational choice theory must include some notion of the social structure if it is to have explanatory validity: it is not possible, he argues, to "[...] conceive of any rational choice model that does not introduce some premise about social structure from outside" (1995:93). Indeed, this is where the pure rational choice model encounters severe difficulties; if applied to the Camorra, it could handicap our analysis by ignoring the social system

of which the Camorra is part.

This type of approach has four basic limitations: firstly, it is based on methodological individualism and as a result, produces reductive and maybe simplistic explanations. Ostrom (1991) has described this as a "deductive" and "normative" approach which applies a micro-analysis to a macro-phenomenon in order to understand different areas of politics but ends up reducing its explanatory value and ignoring other important variables.

Secondly, it could be argued that rationality is more complex and intricate than the mainstream model describes, in that individuals will not always be consistent in their rationality; that other psychological elements may intervene and dominate. Indeed, psychologists criticise the notion of rationality and argue that individuals may not always act or react in simple utility-maximising terms because they are much more psychologically complex and motivated. Thirdly, as a consequence of this, some political scientists argue that the rational choice approach ends up making some general and implausible conclusions which may turn out to be not very helpful or correct.

Finally, the sociological critique argues that the rational choice model ignores the importance of social structures and their influence on individual behaviour: "[...] individual behaviour is largely a function of social structures" (Ward, 1995:82). Therefore, while these sociologists accept that individuals do things on the basis of self-interest, they argue, that it is "an individual's structural location that generates their interests and does most of the explanatory work [...]" *(ibid)*. The social and structural context of an individual are thus, just as important as his/her rational self interest, if not more, in explaining human behaviour.

We can see the tension between sociological and economic explanations resurface within the recently influential new institutionalist paradigm. This new institutional approach still forms part of an ongoing debate, in that "it is far from coherent or consistent; it is not completely legitimate; but neither can it be entirely ignored" (March and Olsen; 1984:734) and would appear to offer a new

way of looking at the tensions which exist in trying to explain organised crime.

New institutionalism is a developing approach which "[...] conceptualises the connection between institutional structures and human behaviour in a multidimensional way" (Hall and Taylor, 1994:3) and tries to understand the significance of institutional variables for explaining outcomes. The approach is interested primarily in the "outcome-oriented conception of collective action" (March and Olsen, 1984). In fact, as Thelen and Steinmo point out: "[...] in general, institutionalists are interested in the whole range of state and societal institutions that shape how political actors define their interests and that structure their relations of power to other groups" (1992:2).

New institutionalists[10] put institutions, in their varying forms, back at the core of the political, economic and social analysis to explain the extent to which they influence different outcomes and relationships in society. They concentrate on several important features which may not all be present in other approaches, including: "interdependence between relatively autonomous social and political institutions;[...] relatively complex processes and historical inefficiency; [...] other logics of action and the centrality of meaning and symbolic action" (March and Olsen, 1984:738).

As a result, new institutionalism seeks to be less normative and descriptive than the old institutionalism. According to Hall and Taylor (1994) new institutionalism is made up of four distinct schools of thought: historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, economic institutionalism and sociological institutionalism.

Sociological institutionalism is the most useful for the present analysis and differs from historical institutionalism in that it stresses the significance of culture much more. It accepts that culture is just as important as rational choice: "the new institutionalists in sociology

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[10] This new analysis can be seen as a reaction against the behavioural revolution of the 1950-60s in America and in comparative politics. Behaviourism ignored the role institutions had played in society and politics and which if studied would explain the fuller picture of socioeconomic and political structures that shape human behaviour in such different ways.

began to argue that many of the formal attributes of organisations were not the expression of a superordinate rationality but a collection of culturally-specific practices assimilated into these organisations for reasons that often had little to do with the specific functions of the organisation itself. [...] Instead, they saw them as cultural artifacts, akin to the myths and ceremonies adopted in other cultural spheres and liable to take on a multiplicity of historically-specific forms" (*ibid*, 1994:11). In addition, institutional features and change in particular, must be seen as a product of culture. Thus, this theory highlights the importance of culture in the formation of the organisation, in its interaction and constraint of outcomes, so that "faced with a situation, the individual must find a way to recognise it, using the symbols and scripts familiar to him and to act searching for and if necessary, adapting the routines that seem most appropriate. This involves a kind of 'practical reasoning' whereby the individual works with the available institutional templates to devise a course of action" (*ibid*:13).

This theory can help us understand how the Camorra, as a social institution, affects individual action and collective outcomes. It accepts that culture plays a part in explaining outcomes; that culture can constrain and restrict individual choices and mass-outcomes, goals and strategies as it conceives culture "in more expansive terms, as a network of routines, symbols or scripts providing a web for meaning, for behaviour and multiple strategies for action" (*ibid*:12). Aspects of this 'institutional' consideration will form part of the analysis.

All three approaches are interesting because they can give us an important insight and understanding into the way different Mafias work. However, adopting "a single-factor approach" maybe limiting and render our analysis and instruments of research rigid. Dearlove and Saunders stress how important it is to accept and use a variety of approaches in political and social analysis since:

> no one perspective enjoys a monopoly over explanatory wisdom; nor can understanding be advanced if we are

constrained by the limits of any single discipline. [...] This is because theories, perspectives and even disciplines often differ in what it is they are trying to explain. [...] Certainly there is no reason to assume that, if we draw on one of these perspectives this rules out the possibility of drawing on any other. [...] It is clearly the case that different theories which focus on different questions posed at different levels of generality may in fact turn out to be to some extent complementary. [...] Some theories are more valid than others in respect of the specific questions which they address (1991:10-11).

Indeed, the great disadvantage of the single-factor approach is that it 'does not tell the whole story' and contains some explanatory gaps. It tends to analyse and describe moments in time, particular events and general characteristics rather than drawing a complete picture which takes into account different general aspects.

These lacunae can be perceived in Gambetta's approach, which, while producing an elaborate explanation of the Sicilian Mafia's activities, does not really explain as coherently its political-administrative-business relationship because, as Chubb points out: "by focusing primarily on a micro-analysis of Mafia intermediation in economic transactions and dispute settlement at the local level, Gambetta disregards the broader structural context within which the Mafia has flourished and which until very recently guaranteed immunity. Thus, [he] provides no basis for understanding the central role played by the Mafia in the power structure of postwar Italy. The relationship between the Mafia and politics is only briefly mentioned, and is reduced to but another link in the patronage system of exchange votes for favours which cuts across all sectors of Southern Italian society" (1996:280). On the other hand, Hess (1973) also explains the Sicilian Mafia as a product of a particular subculture, but does not manage to account for its economic political business activities. However, Arlacchi (1986), by adopting a flexible multi-factor approach, has avoided these problems. He portrays the mafioso, as Chubb points out, "as a rational economic actor, combining modern entrepreneurial activities in the legal sector with traditional cultural

values which give Mafia firms important competitive advantages over their rivals" (1996:275).

Looking at these different approaches has been helpful: the sociological approach highlights the important role which culture plays in producing organised crime; the rational choice theory shows how economic rational choices can explain human behaviour at the individual level, while new institutionalism explains behaviour in terms of institutions and their influence on individuals. The shortcomings of the single-factor approaches have helped us understand the fundamental need for a multi- factor approach which allows theoretical pluralism. As our interest is in the Camorra, its transformation and its relationship with politics, this kind of approach should give us enough flexibility to deal with *camorristi's* interaction with politicians as well as with their environment and other criminal, economic and political groups. In other words, we need "an analysis of the interaction between the micro (individual) and macro (structural) dimensions of the phenomenon -an analysis which clarifies the passage from structural precondition to individual behaviour" (Della Porta, 1996a:350).

Chapter Two:
The Interaction Model

"You have no choice: either you succeed in making us civilised, or we shall succeed in making you barbarians"
Villari (1885)

2.1 The Interaction Model

While the previously outlined approaches can be helpful for analysing the Camorra, it is important to adopt a model which deals with the interaction between a *camorrista* and his/her environment to understand the Camorra's relationship with politics in the post-war period. In particular, the model needs to allow for the impact of both the micro-structural and the macro-structural factors in the environment, because while we are concerned with the action by individual agents we must also be aware of the broader environment within which the Camorra operates and how it can influence and constrain the behaviour of individuals.

Giddens's structuration theory (1984) and Easton's systems analysis (1965) are both valuable in constructing such a model which can be referred to as the interaction model. This model combines elements of Giddens's micro-level analysis, particularly his concept of the agent influenced by 'structure', and Easton's concept of a system interacting with its macro-environment. It is a central contention of this thesis that this model will help explain the 1950s and 1980s Camorras and their relationships with politics in a way other theories fail to do.

The model gives greater emphasis to the importance of the macro-environment than Giddens does by integrating Easton's broader notion of systems. By studying both the agent and the macro-environment we seek to understand how they interact to produce the

Camorra and its activities. It is hoped that this model can also be applied to other forms of social behaviour; for example terrorist groups because, as Sibeon points out, "an area of investigation that opens up exciting new opportunities for interdisciplinary research is the the study of interaction [...] between agency, structure and social chance" (1999:143).

Before developing this model, we need to present the theories which inspired it; here we will develop the notion of agent and structure which are taken from Giddens's structuration theory (1984) and later in the chapter, we will discuss our use of Easton's systems analysis (1965).

2.2 The 'Agent' and Agency

Many social theorists have up until now studied the role of individuals in terms of groups and group dynamics without theorising about their own individuality. Giddens tackles this problem and identifies the analytical space of the individual which he calls 'the agent'; this allows him to concentrate on different types of micro-behaviour (motivations, actions, reactions and consequences) and to insist on the role of the 'agent' and especially, its transformative capacity in the social process.

In order to understand the nature of the agent, Giddens constructs a stratification model (Figure 2.1) in which he distinguishes two different forms of action: (1) the "reflexive-monitoring of action", the different monitoring of conduct by individuals of people around them and of their physical, social and economic environment; (2) the "rationalisation of action", in which the agent knows, understands and can explain why s/he is undertaking a course of action and its possible consequences. These two forms of behaviour empower the agent by giving him/her the potential and capability for action.

This is a new type of action in social theory because it is one which focuses on micro behaviour rather than trying "[...] to provide a

Figure 2.1: Giddens's Stratification Model



systematic guide to the totality of the social system and history" (Cassell, 1993:7); it tries to understand how the agent can interact with other agents and the environment while being able to explain this action. The agent in this theory is therefore not passive but active in relation to the surrounding world and can explain his/her action.

Giddens also identifies what produces agent-motivation, which is another particular form of action. Motives are different from reasons and intentions behind actions because there are a whole series of motivations which cannot be explained or rationalised. In this aspect, Giddens was much inspired by Goffman's work on the psyche (1968) (see below 2.5). Thus, the notion of human agency which Giddens elaborates is rather complex in the sense that he seeks to understand whether it is to be defined in terms of intentional action or unintended consequences. This is a complicated but interesting philosophical debate.

The simple differences between intentional action and unintended consequences are that in the first case, the agent knows what is going to happen and in the second, s/he does not. Human agency can thus be defined in terms of acts "of which an individual is the perpetrator, in the sense that the individual could, at any phase in a given sequence of conduct, have acted differently. Whatever happened would not have happened if that individual had not intervened" (in Cassell, 1993:96). Human agency produces social practices which,according to Giddens, occur "under conditions of 'mixed intentionality', which involve both intended and unintended elements of social action" (Tucker, 1998:85). An individual undertakes a social practice without knowing what its consequences may or may not be. This initial social practice might cause a 'domino effect' of acts which the individual did not foresee, Giddens perceives these acts as being "regularly 'distributed' as a by-product of regularized behaviour reflexively sustained as such by its participants" (in Cassell, 1993:101).

In short, the innovative aspect of Giddens's theory lies in his concept of the 'agent' where he has constructed an 'agent' which has an autonomous capacity for interaction with the macro-environment.

2.3 The Production of a 'Recurring Social Practice'

In Giddens's theory, the wider environment which produces the social practice can be analysed at three different levels: (1) 'the structure' - in the shape of rules and resources which exist as internal memory traces; (2) 'the social system' - the overall social practice; and (3) 'structuration' - the overall global context in which continuity and change of the social practice takes place (see Figure 2.2).

Giddens calls **'structure'** the first level of analysis. This is made up of 'structuring properties' which are the ingredients and composing elements making up the social practice. According to Giddens, the key 'structuring properties' are 'rules' and 'resources' which compose the fuller social system and the social relations which
produce the social practice: he argues that "these properties can be understood as rules and resources, recursively implicated in the reproduction of social systems" (in Cassell, 1993:117).

Giddens's 'rules' structure action. The two main features of these social 'rules' are important as they are both 'constitutive' and 'regulative'; in other words, they have both enabling and constraining powers which influence the agent. On the other hand, 'resources' make the execution of power possible. By using and distributing these 'resources' power is also being distributed among the agents. These 'rules' and 'resources' are fundamental in his theory but they must be interpreted and understood by the agent through accepted meanings and norms if they are to produce a social practice. Thus, rules and resources in this sense are the potential instruments of power which must be used by agents to interact and reproduce social practices. Without them social practices cannot exist. However, what is important to note is that these 'structuring properties' are not visible, they are in-built in the agents like a form of consciousness: structuring properties are "'internal' to agents in the form of memory traces" (Cassell, 1993:12).

These 'structuring properties' in the shape of generative rules and resources applied by agents internally in a context of unintended outcomes produce what Giddens calls 'structure'. His notion of

Figure 2.2: Giddens's Main Concepts in his *Structuration theory* (1984)



'structure' differs from previous ones and is rather specific. He is against the static notion of 'structure' where the agents are either passive or free to act in the present and future without taking into consideration the past.

'Structure' is invisible and in-built in the agent, a form of historical memory trace: "it has no reality [...] it is agents who bring 'structure' into being and it is 'structure' which produces the possibility of agency" (*ibid*). It is not the wider socioeconomic consciousness but individual experiences assimilated by the agent which produce Giddens's 'structure' and consequently the social practice.

The second level of analysis is the **social system**. A social system, according to Giddens is the result of interaction between actors and 'structure' which produces recurring social practices. He emphasises three necessary elements that make the reproduction of social practices and the existence of a social system possible: (1) the constitution of a social practice needs to be meaningful, (2) it needs to be part of a moral order and (3) it needs to operate as relations of power. What Giddens means by a social practice being 'meaningful' is that behaviour not only needs to be understood by all but that it cannot be taken for granted. Behaviour needs to be continuously negotiated, never relying on set meanings; thus, meanings always need to be verified and negotiated. This in turn means that actors are continuously producing and reproducing new meanings in their lives. For example, in the Camorra, intimidation and violence are forms of behaviour which have very clear meanings.

Secondly, Giddens maintains that the interaction of social practices has to be part of a moral order: it needs to contain norms, rights, claims, negotiations and sanctions which, subsequently, have an impact on interaction. By accepting that the constitution of social practices must form part of a moral order, Giddens is arguing that we must understand this as the actualisation of rights and the enactment of obligations (ie - a system of 'rules' of behaviour for society which has a clear morality).

In this system of moral behaviour Giddens includes: 'norms' (as

defined as actions which are both constraining and enabling - different from 'moral rules' which are found making up the structure); 'normative sanctions' (different from transgression of technical or utilitarian prescriptions); 'normative claims' (which may be binding as the agent will seek to avoid the bad action); 'moral claims' (the same as transgression claims, as the individual 'calculates the risk'); 'moral obligation' (necessarily implying moral commitment); 'common norms' and 'sanctions' (which follow transgression and therefore, involve the reaction of others). The social system, thus, has a clear moral order whereby the different moral behavioural rules are interconnected and must be respected.

Lastly, the social practice implies as relations of 'power'. Giddens's notion of action is linked to that of 'power' because "power represents the capacity of the agent to mobilise resources". For Giddens, 'power' therefore means "the transformative capacity of human action". He adopts the Marxian term of 'power': "power in the sense of the transformative capacity of human agency is the capability of the actor to intervene in a series of events so as to alter their course; as such it is the 'can' which mediates between intentions or wants and the actual realisation of the outcomes sought after" (in Cassell, 1993:110). 'Power', in this sense, therefore means capabilities and in particular the possibility of using resources, facilities and skills. Agents with this type of 'power' obviously have an advantage over others and this leads to an imbalance in society. However, this concept of 'power' is an important one in social practices and social systems because of the distribution of resources in society.

The last level of analysis is called by Giddens **'structuration'.** 'Structuration' represents the general situation, the wider context within which the social system exists and, therefore, it is here that the continuity or transformation of a social system can be perceived. It is at this level that the conditions which affect the reproduction of a social system in terms of continuity or change can be pinpointed. This is a useful concept because it allows one to understand the general

tendencies of continuity and change.

These three concepts are relevant for analysing the Camorra: for example, the rules and resources, the 'structuring properties', which enable and constrain behaviour are violence, poverty and silence. Moreover, the distribution, use and manipulation of these rules, resources, facilities and skills have made the Camorra a powerful and dominating force in Campania and in the world. Lastly, the notion of 'structuration' can help us understand the Camorra's post-war transformation; that is show how it has undergone dramatic change and become greatly specialised; so that the Camorra is no longer dealing in simple rackets but in recycling money and winning public contracts.

2.4 The Interaction Model Applied to the Camorra

Giddens's structuration theory will be used and adapted to illustrate the hypothesis that the Neapolitan Camorra in the 1980s was a criminal sub-system (in the form of an association, business and cartel) which enacted recurring social-criminal, economic-criminal and political-criminal practices whereas in the 1950s, the Camorra was a loose network of isolated criminal agents, *guappi*, in the social system, who enacted a simple recurring social-criminal practice.

To do this, certain differences from Giddens's theory need to be explained, and the interaction model elaborated. The starting point for the model is Giddens's definition and analysis of a 'recurring social practice'. This is how, in a key passage, he defines it: "social systems involve regularised relations of interdependence between individuals or groups, that typically can be best analysed as recurrent social practices. Social systems are systems of social interaction; as such they involve the situated activities of human subjects, and exist syntagmatically in the flow of time. Systems, in this terminology, have structures, or more accurately, have structural properties; they are not structures in themselves. Structures are necessarily (logically) properties of systems, or of collectivities and are characterised by

the absence of a subject" (Cassell, 1993: 118-9). Examples of 'recurring social practices' are "the daily trip to work on the train, the general election, the weekly seminar, the perfunctory chat, the football fixture and so on (*ibid*:9).

Giddens's theory attempts to understand how these social practices are developed and reproduced through time and space; he does this by analysing the structuration of a social system in terms of a social practice; therefore, "to study the structuration of a social system is to study the ways in which that system, via the application of generative rules and resources, and in the context of unintended outcomes is produced and reproduced in interaction" (*ibid*:119). The key to this structuration theory is the relationship and interaction between the "application of generative rules and resources" and the agent within the context of intended and unintended outcomes which produces and reproduces social practices.

In our model, rules and resources ('structuring properties') constitute our recurring social-criminal practice but at the same time, they are the inputs from the macro-environment into the social system. This practice forms the criminal sub-system, which is the Camorra, and is formed by agents from the social system using their rules and resources. Inspired by Easton (1965), our macro-environment is made up of different systems. Each system is made up of different sub-systems which all enact different 'recurring practices' that produce them. Moreover, the recurring social-criminal practice is the end-product of the interaction between the agent and the 'general structure'. Such practices will be behavioural and decisional outcomes.

The role of 'structure' in our model is also different from Giddens's. The 'structure' in our model is a more general notion referred to as 'general structure' which only comes into being through the agent. The agent, we must remember, is autonomous as s/he has the transformative capacity for action. Returning to our notion of 'general structure', it has a unique characteristic as it is both the internalised and acquired elements of the agent (mainly psychological

and personal memory traces, education and past experiences up until that moment), 'internal structure' and the 'external structure' which is the concrete macro-environment, other agents, different systems and institutions. The general structure only exits through the agent. Action, is, therefore, the interaction between the agent and this 'general structure'. In this way, we have sought to emphasise the role of macro-environment (external structure) to a larger extent. This 'general structure' is both visible and invisible and plays a major role in influencing and shaping agent behaviour (see Figure 2.3). We also use Giddens's notion of structuration in order to understand the overall change and modification through time and space. This will be investigated in part three.

Moreover, we must also note that this action does not take place in a "context of unintended consequences" but in a mixed context of intentional and unintentional consequences where it is possible to know the reactions which some acts will provoke, but not possible to know the consequence of other acts. For example, a boss might know the likely consequences of some important strategic business, political and criminal decisions.

We may note that this kind of approach has already been adopted by others who have stressed the role of the agent/structure relationship to understand complex situations. Pardo (1996) for example, sought to analyse the Neapolitan sub-proletariat, the so-called 'popolino', and its economic survival strategy. But, but it has been criticised (Behan, 1996) as limiting and narrow because it over-stresses the importance of the agent.

However, this new model stresses the significance of both the macro-environment and micro-structures because the notion of 'general structure' provides us with a more solid framework within which to understand the various aspects of the Camorra than if we had used a one discipline approach. It enables us to understand: (1) why people adopt this practice (their motivations); (2) how it is reproduced, how it changes and is transformed; and (3) what elements make up this social practice. This new model gives us flexibility and

Figure 2.3: The Interaction Model



thereby a greater understanding of the agent/structure relationship which will hopefully permit us to test our hypothesis and answer our questions.

2.5 Motives for Enacting a 'Social-Criminal Practice'

Another useful aspect of Giddens's structuration theory is his explanation of agent motivation for enacting social practices. This is interesting since it facilitates the understanding of the motives behind individual agents enacting a recurring social-criminal practice in the 1950s and in the 1980s. The empirical detail is discussed in part two of this thesis.

I believe that the 'general structure' influences agent motivation in the initial phase of action. Unlike Giddens, and as I have already contended, the 'general structure' is made up of two spheres, these are: (1) the 'internal structure', the agent's past experiences, subjectivity or psychological sphere and (2) the 'external structure', the collective macro-environment, the sociological sphere.

Human behaviour, using Giddens's categorisation of action, can be split into two forms of behaviour: (1) the agent pre-action, where motives can be diagnosed; and (2) the agent in action. We are interested in the agent as s/he is about to undertake action and the motives for this; this is pre-action or in our model, the initial phase of action when motives are also produced. This we have modified from Giddens's theory. Giddens presents and analyses the agent in terms of his psyche, that is to say the internal functioning of his brain which produces his/her way of thinking and behaving. He elaborates a picture of the agent's psyche, distinguishing three different sub-levels of pre-action as the agent goes into action; in the initial phase of action: at level (1) the unconscious motives; at level (2) the practical consciousness; and at level (3) the discursive consciousness. The latter two are flexible and can influence each other, but there exists a clearer barrier between these forms of consciousness and the unconscious motives.

The first level of the motivation is the 'unconscious motives'. The 'unconscious' is an abstract concept found in psychology that was originally researched by Freud who analysed certain aspects of human behaviour which could not be directly and visibly explained. He carried out important tests on individuals to show that when they were, for example, daydreaming, sleeping, forgetting things, or mispronouncing a word, this could not be explained by anything else but the unconscious. The unconscious, is, thus, "the part of the psychic apparatus that does not ordinarily enter the individual's awareness and that is manifested especially by slips of the tongue or dissociated acts or in dreams" (*the Webster*, 1991:1285). It is a system within individuals which "may affect [their] behaviour even though [they] cannot report on them" or "are unaware of them" (*Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 1975:254).

It is assumed that the unconscious retains a lot of different information (or example, details, historical facts and memories) which may manifest itself through different forms of behaviour but which the individual will not be able to explain rationally. For example, an individual may go to the bank instead of the post office, as planned, (an *acte manqué*) because he wants some money and not to send his letter.

In Giddens's theory the 'unconscious' refers to motives which are "within an individual that proceed without his awareness" (*the Webster*, 1991:1285) or his possible rational explanation; they are thus feelings and desires that the individual cannot explain or express. They can be very complex or very vague which means that we must be very careful when trying to pinpoint unconscious motives as we can be criticised for inventing what we want or read the meanings we want to into certain forms of behaviour. The particular types of unconscious motives could be, for example: the influence of the environment, the desire for survival, a violent temperament or weak personality.

The second and third levels are practical and discursive consciousness. By consciousness, we understand "the quality [...] of being aware especially something within oneself" (*the Webster*,

1991:279). Practical consciousness is complex to define as it is not what an individual says about but what s/he does practically. Therefore, it is a level of action which is simply enacted without being explained. It is more complicated to define and give examples of discursive consciousness (see Figure 2.4).

Figure 2.4: Agent Motivation



Discursive consciousness is what an individual can say, what he can talk about, what can be said. For example, individuals can talk about their feelings of hatred towards a person, a feeling of vendetta or the sense of loss after the death of someone. It is important to note that discursive consciousness is closely connected with an individual's culture. In the case of the Camorra, its sub-culture draws heavily on Neapolitan culture but represents a distortion of it. As Judge Falcone has argued there exists no straightforward criminal organisation, but a general "ideology" which, has many elements in common with the rest of civil society (1992; 1993) but is a clear distortion of it. Siebert reinforces this when she argues that organised

crime gangs have "a mechanism of appropriation, perversion and manipulation (...) [of] popular cultural codes" (1996:38).

Practical consciousness will reflect certain implicit cultural values which are difficult to articulate, whereas discursive consciousness will reflect to a greater extent the dominant cultural values that individuals explicitly respect such as hate, love, the family, loyalty, revenge, etc. For example, at times killing an individual is an act which is committed without discussion.

Giddens's notions of practical and discursive consciousness are distinct but useful as in the case of the Camorra, whose members live and work in a world of *omertà* and secrecy, and cannot openly talk about their social-criminal practice. *Omertà* and secrecy (not verbalising their social-criminal practice) is part of the Camorra's survival strategy which needs to be perpetuated among members if the Camorra is to persist and prosper.

It would seem that practical consciousness can at times transform itself into discursive consciousness when *camorristi* turn state-witness, *pentito* and develop a coherent relationship with their criminal past. This obliges them to articulate publicly discursive consciousness. Much more information is available on their discursive consciousness than on the other two forms of consciousness because a lot of the material that will be used in this thesis comes from oral interrogations of state witnesses who have thought about their situation and tried to explain it. Practical consciousness will be explored both through oral testimonies during trials and an analysis of behaviour described in newspaper articles and legal documents.

In Chapter Five, these two different levels of the agent's psyche are analysed to highlight the internal structure in the initial phase of action which explains agent motivation. To do this we use trial transcripts and interrogations to examine both discursive and practical consciousness to understand agents' motives and potential for action. Discursive consciousness is what they clearly say whereas practical consciousness will be the acts that they describe. For example, when they do not answer the question directly but describe

the situation, this will be taken as practical consciousness. For obvious reasons, unconscious motivations cannot be studied. It should be noted that these possible explanations are not exclusive, but inclusive, which is to say that possible motives may overlap and there may not be only one motive but many emerging from the different levels of the agent's psyche as well as the external structure.

Chapter Six examines the weight of the macro-environment and in particular, the *milieu* within which the agent's motives are produced. This is the aspect of Giddens's theory which we have modified. The agent in our analysis does not move, live or become motivated in a vacuum but in a specific macro-structure which is important for us to study, in this case Neapolitan society in the 1950s and 1980s. Giddens pinpoints three different aspects of the agent's relationship with the macro-environment, which we will elaborate and adapt: (1) the agent has 'knowledge' (both practical and discursive) of institutional practices); (2) the agent is one among others in society; and (3) the parameters of practical and discursive consciousness are bounded by and connected to agents' activities. Thus, the agent interacts with the context. These three aspects, especially the context, are just as important as the agent and as each other. However, in this thesis, the focus is on two areas of the macro-environment (external structure): (1) the general context which includes other systems and sub-systems (made up of agents, practices, history, ideologies etc); and (2) the institutional practices present in the different systems that function in society.

The general context which surrounds agents has a huge impact on their behaviour. By the context, we mean that which is part of the social, economic and political systems that lie outside the boundaries of our criminal sub-system, the Camorra and yet that which is within the same society and influences the Camorra. Easton calls this the 'intrasocietal' part of the environment. Indeed, the interaction between the agent and society plays a significant role in explaining motives. It is important to stress that the agent is completely aware of his/her surroundings and knows them well. Furthermore, all actors have some

understanding of the rules of society, the power games and relationships that exist. Moreover, not only do they co-habit with other agents in society, but they also have knowledge of their history and time, and know more than just their day-to-day activities. In this sense, they are very knowledgeable.

The general context in our analysis is organised as the properties of the different systems. By properties, we mean the diverse elements which make up the different systems and interactions which exist in society. For our analysis, it is the general context with all its properties within which the agent moves. This is fundamental to the whole theory and here is taken to include the general social, economic and political systems of society and their sub-systems. More specifically, the general properties of the context are the social, economic and political systems of Naples in 1950s and 1980s. This is different from the dominant institutional practices because it is the overall framework within which agents and institutions operate.

In addition, agents are also aware of the key institutional practices which surround them because they have "knowledge", built upon their discursive and practical consciousness which means that they have a very good understanding of the different institutional practices. Society in our model is made up of different systems which contain institutions. Therefore, institutional practices are the other element which we believe have a role in the agents's motives and action: the agent is conscious and knows his/her surroundings well: s/he understands the functioning of institutional practices, their implications and can be influenced by them.

By institutional practices, we mean a set of social practices which over time have become institutionalised within their different systems, that is to say, as that which "includes both formal organisations and informal rules and procedures that structure conduct" (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992:3). We may note that institutional practices have a varying impact on different individuals, therefore, not all institutional practices will be relevant for all agents. In our case, the predominant institutional practices present in the different systems are the state

from the political system and the family and the Camorra from the social system. By the 1980s, we can see the Camorra acting as a social institution and having the same kind of impact as the family. We believe that these are important and influential institutional practices that can constrain agent motivation.

In conclusion, this discussion has allowed us to understand and explain the agent motivation aspect of our model. We have seen how the agent interacts with the 'general structure' (both internal and external 'structure' made up of criminal values and the macro-environment) which influences possible motives for joining the Camorra (see Figure 2.5). In Chapters Five and Six, we apply this model and look at the possible motives for becoming a *camorrista* in the 1950s and 1980s.

2.6 The Camorra's Interaction with Politics

Part three tackles the question of the Camorra's relationship with the political elite in the 1950s and 1980s to see whether these relationships have changed in any way. To examine these different relationships, the interaction model is extended by the application of systems analysis. This should allow us to move beyond the social sub-system.

We are no longer dealing with the agent's interaction with the social system or other criminal agents from the criminal sub-system to produce a 'recurring' social-criminal practice, but with the interaction of agents' within and across different sub-systems: mainly the political and the economic systems. These systems are similar to the social system in so far as they comprise different recurring practices and sub-systems as explained in the previous sections.

In theoretical terms, we wish to understand the nature of the relationship across systems and the type of exchanges which took place. In our model the Camorra's relationship with the political elite is what we call 'systems interaction': in other words, the interaction between a representative of a criminal sub-system, a *camorrista* and a

Figure 2.5: Our Explanation of Agent Motivation



Key:

: Other agents

: Institutional practices

: Systems

politician from a political sub-system (see Figure P.1). This relationship changes as the systems themselves change and this is what we are interested in understanding.

Chapter Three:
Data and Method

"Les faits sociaux consistent en représentations" mais
"il faut traiter les faits sociaux comme des choses"
Durkheim (1895 in Combessie, 1996:3)

3.1 Methodological Questions

The majority of studies which deal with organised crime and the Mafia have been carried out by anthropologists and sociologists who have sought to understand these phenomena as social and cultural problems. In these studies, they encountered key social research problems such as accessibility to material, representativity and bias. Although this study will concentrate on the political perspective, some of these sociological problems are also relevant.

Researchers who have undertaken this type of investigation (see Ianni and Reuss Ianni, 1972; Kelly, 1982; Reuter, 1984) have noted important methodological difficulties, and in particular that of access to material because of the secrecy cultivated by such organisations. This creates a dual problem: firstly, information on members, their activities and infiltration into markets is protected by magistrates who are reluctant to furnish material; secondly, the other major sources tend to be official government documents which usually have a political bias.

Kelly notes that "technical advances in the study of organised crime have progressed. Innovations and sophisticated research techniques such as network analysis, computer simulations and application of macroeconomic models of illegal market dynamics, among others have appeared to augment rather than replace more traditional treatment based on law enforcement pictures of organised crime" (1982/6b:10). Gambetta cautions that: "it is difficult to approach the best direct sources or to gain access to the most interesting areas of inquiry. This is one of the reasons why virtually no

study of the mafia is based on field work" (1993:9). Hence, the most traditional research technique used by anthropologists to study organised crime is the participant observation method, even if it is considered dangerous.

In general terms, the success of anthropological studies would seem to be based largely on chance. While Ianni (1972) and Kelly (1982) encountered difficulties integrating into their targeted community, W. Foote Whyte (1981) managed to overcome his moral dilemmas (see his annex 1) to produce a classic and unique example of a successful participant observation study of the political machine in the Italian slums of Boston in the late 1930s. Blok (1974) also managed to live in a rural Sicilian village for about two and half years for his study.

However, it would appear that Reuter (1984) changed the nature of his study in anticipation of methodological problems. Indeed, he chose not to focus on a group or its activities but rather on their potential market which he argues would be more stable over the long term. He points out the three main difficulties he encountered: in the first place, contact with individuals who are members of criminal clans. He insists that it depends on pure chance or opportunity to make that initial contact with a clan member and then be able to build upon it. In the second place, the need for more information than the participants can provide. Clearly, it is very dangerous for a member of a clan to give detailed information about its illegal activities and its contacts with politicians. Finally, his greatest difficulty concerned the representativity of the group. He was aware of the possible instability and unrepresentativity of the group he wished to study. Consequently, he decided to study an illegal market believing that it would be less challenging in terms of accessibility, representativity and personal safety.

In this analysis of the Camorra in the 1950s and 1980s, the main problems have also been of access to material, representativity and bias. In this respect, we have been rather fortunate in meeting Public Prosecutors who were keen to distribute as much material as possible about this form of organised crime in order to combat the *omertà*

which surrounds it. As a result of this good contact with the legal community in Naples, I have had access to good primary sources on the 1980s: four in-depth interviews with *pentiti*[11], official testimonies (*verbali*[12]), trial transcripts, judgments (*sentenze*) and other legal and police documents. This was helpful because, as Hufton stresses, "to read and interpret a text like a lawsuit or a set of memoirs can shed immense light on how ideas [...] influenced an individual life or a particular event in the field of micro-history" (1997:4).

I have also visited the Naples Courthouse many times during my research visits to attend trials, to observe the proceedings, the pentiti, the prisoners and their families. For material on the 1950s, I have consulted both the Naples Courthouse archive[13] and *l'Emeroteca*, the Newspaper and Periodical Library.[14] Moreover, we have used in-depth interviews with judges, public prosecutors, politicians, journalists, privileged and personal observers[15] and consulted daily newspapers and the National Library. We were also fortunate[16] that the Parliamentary Antimafia Committee and Parliamentary Archive were very efficient in their distribution of material.

Representativity and bias are problematic. Representativity because it is generally difficult to have access to criminals, let alone a good sample. I have interviewed in-depth four *ex-camorristi* and feel that this has given me a good insight into their criminal visions and culture. Bias is also a problem because there are two opposite views: the criminal's vision and that of the magistrates who pursue the

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11 See bibliography.

12 *Verbali* are of particular interest in so far as they are the documents in which *pentiti* tell their detailed criminal life story, confess their crimes and reveal their clan's intimate relationships with the political and business world (see the importance of the Sicilian Mafia state witness Tommaso Buscetta in the early 1980s). It is these documents which will allow us to produce a fuller picture of the Camorra, its behaviour and structures.

13 Access to this State archive required a long and very bureaucratic process which I managed to overcome.

14 Access to 1950s newspapers was also difficult because one could only consult 2 months of newspapers in a visit (between 15.00-18.00 hrs) that required an official letter explaining the newspapers required. Spontaneous research and requesting a different newspaper was thus limited.

15 See bibliography.

16 I have also been very fortunate to have had access to the personal archive of Vito Faenza, Naples correspondent of L'Unità .

official government line. Monzini points out the possible limitations of using judicial material (1999:28-9). However, even in the official documents the criminal's view point tends to appear clearly and can be juxtaposed with further evidence, such as in-depth interviews, as we have done, to produce a full and balanced picture of the situation.

Not only is collecting material problematic but so is the analysing and studying of this form of criminal activity. Indeed, one has to ask oneself which is the best way to tackle this delicate subject-matter and to maximise the analytical output from the material available. Sutherland and Cressey (1960) suggest that there are two main ways of doing this: (1) the general method; and (2) the detailed method.

The first method seeks to gain a general picture from collecting and studying significant data from a set group. This method, used by historians and social scientists, tends however, to be "impressionistic and deal with general tendencies rather than with specific interpretations" (1960:62). The second method is one which concentrates on studying systematically statistics of crimes and convicts. It tends to be "'more precise' and 'scientific' than the first; it deals with specific variables and, usually, specific types of criminal behaviour" (1960:62-3). However, this method has the limitation of being narrowly quantitative and not qualitative, therefore helps us to understand who the criminals are, but not why they are criminals.

Choosing the most suitable method for studying and analysing crime is, at best, a difficult methodological task. In order to decide, it is necessary to consider the material available; the main objective of our study (the Camorra in the 1950s and the 1980s and its relationship with politics); and our interaction model (which stresses the agent-structure dimension).

With this in mind, the method adopted will be that which Sunderland and Cressey (1960) highlight as producing an overall vision of behaviour: the "case-studies method" is the main instrument of research[17] complemented by two other methods: statistical data to

[17] I would like to thank Prof Lello Mezzacane, Professor of Anthropology at Naples University for this suggestion and a general discussion about methods and approaches towards organised crime (meeting on 3 January 1997).

back-up explanations where possible[18] and interviews (on family, work values and attitudes towards politics) to confirm impressions already derived from anthropological studies (for example, Parsons (1969), Belmonte (1979) and Goddard (1996)).

Sunderland and Cressey explained of the case-study approach:

> the method involves case studies, directed by explicit hypotheses, of rigorously defined categories of behaviour [...] It combines the individual case-study method and the method of statistical examination of traits of criminals, for it examines individual cases of criminality in the light of a hypothesis and then, for purposes of proof, attempts to determine whether or not that hypothesis also pertains to cases of non-criminality. At the same time, however, it differs from either of these methods: it does not attempt to secure a general picture of the person but only such facts as bear on the hypothesis, and it attempts to go beyond statistical tendencies to a theoretical explanation" (1960:68-9).

Nonetheless, the method has been criticised for not concentrating enough on causal explanations of behaviour, an aspect which needs to be borne in mind. We could also be criticised for, and accused of, looking only at micro-behaviour and not explaining the macro and collective behaviour of the Camorra. This criticism is considered below in 3.3.

3.2 Using Case-Studies: "the Biographical Tale"

There are many different types of case-study which can be used as Lijphart's classification (1971) demonstrates: atheoretical case-studies; interpretative case-studies; hypothesis-generating case-studies; theory-confirming case-studies; theory-infirming case-studies and deviant case-studies. Most relevant to this thesis is the "theory-confirming case-study" because "the case-study is a test of the proposition, which may turn out to be confirmed or infirmed" (1971:692), so we will test the theory that the Camorra in the 1950s consisted of relatively isolated criminals undertaking a social-criminal

[18] In particular in relation to socioeconomic factors like age, education or crime statistics like murder-rates.

practice, whereas by the 1980s it had become an association, business or cartel which enacted a recurring social, economic, and political-criminal practice and which had a functional exchange with politicians. The use of case-studies will either confirm or infirm this hypothesis. Thus, we have endeavoured to avoid choosing case-studies simply to confirm our hypotheses because this would make our case-studies "one shot case-studies" which are of almost no scientific value.

The use of case-studies of *camorristi* as a research tool is an important step forward as it makes the complex, ever-changing and multi-faceted phenomenon of the Camorra manageable. Based mainly on oral material, the case-studies are the life stories (Marcus, 1995) of *camorristi.* They combine the 'biographical method' (*la méthode biographique*) with 'the biographical approach' (*l'approche biographique*) (Peneff, 1995): these incorporate both precise personal facts (background, education, job, marriage, etc) and the subject's emotions, values, and opinions about life.

In this way, we are 'letting the agent back in' in order to gain a fuller and more balanced vision of the Camorra and its relations with politics, as Preston did to understand the Spanish Civil war, its "calamitous process of the breakdown of peace, the course of the war, and its appalling consequences" (1999:5). Landesco (1968) also used this method with success in his chapter *'The Gangster's apologia pro vita sua'*: thus, we understand the gangster (his values, motives, education) in the context of his macro-environment. These combined approaches should allow us to explain many aspects of the Camorras.

In Part Two, we study the lives and backgrounds of specific *camorristi* because we wish to understand their motives for becoming involved with the Camorra. These case-studies are elaborated on the basis of oral interrogations of *camorristi* where they explain their lives and motives, their responses to the questions of judges who ask them to explain their motives and life stories, and a variety of newspapers and court documents. The oral material is analysed in a retrospective mode considering the *camorristi's* criminal life as a life in

the past, a closed life from which we can understand their motives, value systems and life stories. Here, we have used as many case-studies as possible to generate some general findings. Obviously, more material was available for the 1980s than the 1950s.[19] But, the general findings of this thesis are confirmed by other studies.

For Part Three, which tackles the transformation of the Camorra in the post-war period, we concentrate on the life stories of *camorristi* because

> biographic history, above all, allows us to highlight the 'generational' aspects of the development of the 'mafioso', his life experience within a specific culture, which also takes place within his family and which allows him to have relationships and behave in a certain way expressing values, traditions, customs, language and memories. [...] In this sense the biography runs along the spatio-temporal axis of a more complex reality which isn't the reality of the single individual. Indeed, the individual's history can always be identified in terms of collective history in the sense that an individual episode is also social and can therefore be conceived in terms of its continuous interaction with all that expresses it, over and above the simple event (Casarrubea and Blandano, 1991:54-55).

We have chosen specific *camorristi* because of the significant role they played in the Camorra but also because they represent different zones, grades and affiliations. Each *camorrista* here encapsulates some characteristic of their Camorra and is representative of many *camorristi.* Thus, the choice was not arbitrary. We looked at their adolescence, their social background, their first criminal and prison experience, their joining the clan, their different roles and activities undertaken in the clan and their relations with politicians. By studying these different lives, it is hoped to provide a different perspective and insight on the Camorra's transformation in terms of social, economic and political activities: "When seen from this perspective, we can treat the biographies as a useful starting point in that they illustrate the transition from rural society to a technically orientated industrial society. I have argued that when seen through the

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[19] See Appendix Two.

biographies this transition was no longer a mere abstract concept or a purely analytical term, but rather, so to speak, a term which was personified and embodied by 'specific types' from which the biographical elements provided specific sociological subject matter. This subject matter was provided by the biographies which I consider to be illustrative" (Ferrarotti, 1981:28). The lives recounted here are used to relate their personal experience to the collective Camorra experience and its transformation, or to use Le Goff's words "we must use biographies as [...] a globalising object" (*Libération*, 7-11-99:IX) which enables us to illustrate aspects of the Neapolitan Camorra on the basis of a single subject of study. In part four, we concentrate less on life stories of individuals than on case-studies of political events and elections, in other words, concrete examples of the Camorra's exchange with politics in the 1950s and 1980s.

All the case-studies used in this thesis, like that of Jacquemet's, are "a personal collage and patchwork" (1996:66) which will vary according to the importance of the criminal in the clan and material available: some case-studies are very detailed from adolescence while others are more sketchy. As he warns there must be "a great deal of latitude allowed in the reconstruction of hagiographies" (*ibid*).

3.3 Methodological Problems and Limitations of Material

As has already been mentioned, the material and method adopted do pose some serious methodological problems. Three are of particular note: (1) the potential for subjective interpretation; (2) the reliability, bias and credibility of the sources; and (3) the representativity of the material/sample.

First, how far can the researcher remain objective and not feel sympathy for these case-studies? There is no doubt that during this study there have been moments when the criminal agent became a friendlier and more positive agent that he probably should have been. But, an effort has been made to use as many sources as possible to present each case-study with a balanced vision, to find the golden

mean between the "insensitivity, of treating people as objects, of hearing words but not the music [...]" and the "impressionism, of treating people as puppets, of hearing music that does not exist [...]" (Geertz, 1989:10).

Another serious problem is the reliability, bias and credibility of the main source: the interrogations of *pentiti* during the investigative phase and trials. For example, how far do pentiti tell the truth, rewrite history or wrongly accuse other *camorristi?* How far are they manipulated by public prosecutors to say what they want them to say? For instance, in one case, a *camorrista*, (Domenico Cuomo), accuses another *camorrista* (Luigi Moccia) who answers by stating that he has never met his accuser (CD'A17p). Who are we to believe?

In this respect, Allum (1997b) has pinpointed three of the problems which *pentiti* present us and the Italian legal system: first, *pentiti* tend to talk about episodes of which they have no direct knowledge, that is, it is only second hand knowledge from other criminals; second, many *pentiti*, who are only soldiers, are told all the information by the leaders, thus, they tend to reduce facts and events according to their cultural codes. Lastly, and more damagingly, some *mafiosi* like Giovanni Brusca have started to invent stories and wrongly accuse politicians (Lodato, 1999). They thus manipulate the situation and at the same time lose credibility. This threatens the generality of the research findings. But we must also remember the words of one *pentito* and important witness to certain events, Mannoia, who during the Andreotti trial in 1996 when asked whether he had the monopoly of the truth, answered "no, sir, I do not claim to have a monopoly of the truth. I know that I have a monopoly of knowledge (in Allum 1997b:232).

These are significant problems which could damage the conclusions of this research but I have sought to overcome them by using *pentiti* material as a starting point on which I built with newspaper articles, in-depth interviews, and statistical data. I have also used judgments to act as a filter to what has been said and confirm or reject the information. This applies particularly to Part

Four. As far as the *pentiti's* own personal stories are concerned, there is no real reason to question their values, emotions and interpretation because it is their direct experiences they are verbalising. In some instances, they may exaggerate slightly when they recount heroic episodes but it is their direct experience and visions which we are interested in, however distorted and exaggerated.

Gribaudi and Musella (1997) have raised another question regarding *pentiti* material and the Gava trial (see Chapters Eleven and Twelve): they argue that judges set up an explanatory framework for understanding the links between the Camorra and politics before they had the instruments and *pentiti* to prove that this intricate relationship actually existed. This objection is refuted if only because judges had many other sources of evidence: for example, many politicians have confirmed these episodes; moreover, concrete evidence such as election results sometimes come into play as corroboration.

The representativity and sample of the case-studies which have been used is also a potential problem. How can we be sure that the *camorristi* who were chosen are representative of a group of criminals? In Parts Two and Three, we have sought to use as many criminals as possible to confirm the 'interaction model'. There are 15 case-studies of the 1950s and 40 of the 1980s. In section three, the same number were chosen from each clan with a representative from each rank and zone.

3.4 General Conclusion

These three chapters have explained the theoretical model on which this thesis is based, the interaction model. We have explained why and how this model is applied to case-studies to analyse the motives for joining the Camorra in the 1950s and 1980s, its post-war transformation and relationship with politics. We also discussed the methodological problems we encountered. Having established the theoretical and methodological framework of this thesis, we now turn to a description of the general macro-environment of Campania to

provide a general background to our study before we deal with our first area of interest, motives for joining the Camorra in the 1950s and 1980s in Chapter Five.

PART TWO: MOTIVES FOR CAMORRA MEMBERSHIP IN THE 1950s AND THE 1980s

Chapter Four
The Macro-Environment: the Place, Identity and Territory

"Despite these contradictions, in spite of disintegration, Neapolitan society appears to have changed little over the centuries, because its continuity is founded on the very instability of its component parts, on a sort of balance between unstable components"

Allum (1973a:19)

4.1 Introduction

In his analysis of a district in Naples, where he seeks to understand the relationship between social morality, individual choice and action, Pardo stresses that "if micro-level evidence is to have theoretical value, more than simply being detailed and accurate, it must be set in the broader historical and sociological context" (1997:3). It is clear that to have a full understanding of why people join the Camorra, its structure and activities, the macro-environment in which it developed must be analysed in broad historical and geo-sociological terms: the place, territory and identity. With towns such as Naples and Caserta and their hinterland (the whole of Campania) - which have become the Camorra's stronghold from the 1970s onwards (see Map 2) - the general macro-environment has to be assessed, but this is not such a straightforward task. As Sales insisted: "it has rightly been said that it is not the Camorra which explains Naples; if anything, it is Naples and the Campania's recent history which explain the Camorra" (1993a:3).

To understand the Neapolitan macro-environment and its main structural aspects Easton's systems analysis (1965) was adopted. Three key systems, which make up the

REGIONE CAMPANIA

Map 2: The Main areas of Camorra concentration in the 1980s



Camorra concentration

Neapolitan macro-environment, were identified as relevant to the present enquiry: the social system, the economic system and the political system. This chapter thus discusses the main structural aspects of Neapolitan society, economy and politics as a general background for this study.

In this process, this chapter constructs also an overall sense of *Napoletanità*; in other words, clarifies what it means to *"fare i napoletani"*, 'to be Neapolitan' (Golino, 1986:7) and provides a background to the analysis of the development of organised crime in the region using as wide a range of reference books as possible.[1]

4.2 The Contradictions of the Ecological, Social and Economic Systems.

As many studies have shown (Parsons, 1969, Allum, 1973a, Belmonte, 1979, Goddard, 1996, Pardo, 1996), the Campania region has been beset by a number of contradictions in the post-war period. Geographically, it has barren mountains (the Matese) with a dying pastoral economy and the most fertile plains *(Campania felix)* with intensive market-gardening and horticulture (tomatoes, citrus fruit, vineyards and fruit trees) (see map 3). It is, agriculturally, the most productive region of Italy and yet in the 1950s, its peasantry remained chronically poor because of the extreme fragmentation of the land and the high proportion of landless labourers and tenant-farmers subjected to iniquitous lease-arrangements. Moreover, they have often had to cope with the difficulties and burden of large-family responsibilities. Far from the idyllic images of the Neapolitan family banqueting in bucolic circumstances, they lived in very basic stark conditions, often

[1] Parsons, 1969; Allum, 1973a; Belmonte, 1979; Goddard, 1996, Pardo, 1996 as well as statistics and interviews.

Map 3: Campania and its Geography



locked into a master/servant relationship with their landlords. And even when they owned their land, small farmers were vulnerable, at the mercy of the weather and of market-prices and prey to middlemen and racketeers for the sale of their produce.

As a result, there has been, from the 1950s onwards, a clear population movement from the mountains and the countryside to Naples, to the province capitals of Caserta and Salerno, and to the coastal towns of Torre Annunziata, Castellammare di Stabia or Torre del Greco, which have become densely and often over-populated areas. Naples, for instance, houses over half of the population of its province and experienced a population growth of 5 % between 1951 and 1991.[2] This important demographic growth created a problem for the economy as employment in the region could not keep pace with the increase in population, thus exacerbating an already serious unemployment problem.

Industrially, another contradiction must be noted in the immediate post-war period period: on the one hand, there were a few large modern industrial plants, employing highly paid workers (Italsider, *Società Meridionale d' eletricità*) while on the other, there remained a large number of small artisanal family workshops employing many (underpaid) relatives and feeding even more. Again, the same fragmentation in this small type of industry and the same vulnerability has been found as in the agricultural sector.

However, the major feature of the Neapolitan economy since the 1950s is the existence of a large stratum of 'officially' unemployed people, most of them unskilled workers, who have

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[2] Even so, population growth has not been as important as that of other big Italian industrial cities (Turin, Milan and Rome). Indeed, during the 1950s and 1960s, Neapolitans emigrated to the industrial North and abroad and in the 1980s, the immigrants from the hinterland and mountainous areas only came to Naples as 'a temporary destination' before moving on to the North (Montroni, 1990).

to moonlight to survive, in what has been called by Allum, "the slum economy" (1973a:40). Borelli argues that this was due to the fact that Naples changed too rapidly from being a preindustrial to an industrial city in the first half of the century, some socioeconomic features of the preindustrial era persisting, while others were transformed and modernised. "Changes are taking place which are pushing the sub-proletariat into a worse position than before the breaking up of the traditional forms of subsistence, with the consequent incapacity to take part in the economic life of the city" (1972:18).

The changing nature of goods and types of exchanges did not change attitudes and behaviour greatly in the 1960s, apart from the fact that they could no longer guarantee survival. Therefore, an 'immersed or black economy', 'the slum economy'[3] persisted among "all these unskilled, unregimented and endlessly resourceful masses, labouring here one day and there another, idle and then not idle, starving and not starving and alternating always between today's life and tomorrow's despair [...]" (Belmonte, 1979:139-40). It is this stratum of the population which, finding itself economically marginalised, was likely to respond to offers from that local 'work agency', the Camorra. As Lamberti has pointed out, "officially, in the South, there are hundreds of thousands unemployed. In reality, there are hundreds of thousands underemployed or employed in the black or criminal market" (1999:29).

All these contradictions concurred to create a situation of precariousness and fragmentation, of vulnerability, marginalisation and poverty among the larger part of the population in the post-war period and yet, the last but not least of contradictions, Neapolitans have always had a wealth

[3] For a description of the slum economy in the 1950s, see Allum (1973a: 40-1).

of liveliness and creativity and a very strong sense of historically derived identity.

4.3 Historical Heritage and Culture.

Giuseppe Galasso has written: "overall, no former Italian capital (apart maybe from Palermo and in some respects Venice) feels so much the weight of its political and social past as Naples (1987:xi-xii). In a similar vein, Belmonte says: "the poor boys of Naples are the living symbols of its history and the carriers of its tradition, much as altar boys mediate the flow of grace from deity to worshipper" (1979:6). Indeed, the history of Naples and its region is that of the large capital of the Bourbon kingdom of the two Sicilies and its hinterland. It has shaped the topographical and architectural appearance of the town, with its wealth of palaces, villas and monuments but, above all, it has shaped the attitudes and beliefs of all Neapolitans, *popolino* and *bourgeois* alike.

Many historians attribute the Neapolitans' hostility towards the Italian State and Rome to the bitterness they experienced after losing their status at the time of Unification (1861). "The decay of Naples, after Unification, was due", Barbagallo noted, "essentially to its loss of identity as a capital and to its incapacity to forge for itself a new identity as a bourgeois city characterised by industry and trade, to transform itself into a modern urban centre, capable of taking an active and leading role in the development of the region" (1990b:218). This could also explain the predominant feeling of alienation from central government and the lack of trust in its slow, inefficient and bureaucratic agencies which encouraged the recourse to aggressive survival strategies, *'l' arte dell' arrangiarsi'* (the art of making do), based on personal wits and

resources, rather than participation, regulated collective and public organisations. In the 1970s, sport and leisure clubs, community centres or political associations did not manage to recruit many members and when they did, they never really succeeded in mustering up much enthusiasm. Indeed, this lack of 'associational spirit' was shared by many Southerners and can be explained by the lack of education, of information, of free time, and too much physical hard work and moonlighting usually undertaken to survive.

In this turning away from the collective public sphere, individuals exhibit "inner strength, determination and quickness of mind (that rejects ruthlessness)" (Pardo, 1996:64), continuously negotiating the boundaries between individual freedom and collective discipline. This vital energy is accompanied, in a somewhat contradictory way, by a negative and pessimistic vision of the world. Combined with a sense of individual powerlessness in the social system, it creates a very strong sense of 'private collectivity' which Brandon-Albini defined as "the solidarity between poor [which] comes from the awareness of their weakness and from their need to help each other" (1963:40). This sense of 'private collectivity' was present throughout the period under consideration. However, one could argue that from the 1980s onwards, there were signs of change with the general increase of many voluntary associations, community centres and sport clubs due to the rise in education, information, etc (see Diamanti, Ramella and Trigilia, 1995).

This intimate 'private collectivity' generated its own kind of social interaction; in particular, the well-known street conviviality of Neapolitans. The streets become a very lively and theatrical place, full of conversations and story telling. Brandon-Albini observed this conviviality and noted: "in the

evening, the families chat in the *vicolo*, on the *piazza*, with the next door neighbour, with those across the road, in an atmosphere of trust, gossip, melancholy, cheerful naivete and secrecy [...]" (1963:35). In contrast to the chaotic public sphere, the private sphere is highly structured around the family. The philosopher Norberto Bobbio recently insisted on the differences between public and private spheres: "for the family, you give a lot of your time, energy and courage and little is left for society and the State" (in *L' Europeo* of 28 December 1998, n 52:107). Although the extended family has evolved in postwar Campania towards a more nuclear structure the traditional form of familism has nevertheless survived or even, as Ginsborg has argued, prospered (1998:187).

During the post-war period, the family remained the key structure in the private sphere: it ordered and regulated all activities, provided safety and psychological support (Drago, 1971; Lay, 1981), a wide range of social skills and opportunities (Brancaccio, 1987), and a pooling system for economic survival (artisanal or entrepreneurial skills, network of contacts and financial support in the case of unemployment) (Goddard, 1996). It is clear that this type of family network facilitated the development of clientelism in the public sphere (see below) but may have also had, as Brancaccio argued (1987), a counter-productive influence acting as an obstacle to social mobility, by limiting the potential of each individual, his/her spirit of independence and adventure and by holding him/her back, in the majority of cases, within the confines of a well-known structure .

In any event, the family codes are well-known and respected by all those involved. On the surface, it would appear that all Neapolitan families - proletariat and petty bourgeois - are 'patriarchal' (Gribaudi, 1998), but, in reality, as

Parsons already noted in 1969, this is not really the case, not even in the 1980s. It is the mother who is the "home secretary" (Dunglas, 1998:117) of this "family state", to use Sciascia's expression (1987:95). The father may be the "foreign minister" (Dunglas, *ibid*) but it is the mother who, "through nurturing and in particular through providing food, a 'gift' that extends beyond childhood and, through hospitality, beyond the household as well" (Goddard, 1996:201), orchestrates family activities: using and distributing resources, creating a sense of collective togetherness and joyful well-being even in the case of the poorest of households (Belmonte, 1979).

Beyond the boundaries of the family which, in fact, extends still quite widely among cousins and relatives, the private sphere brims with a sense of solidarity, complicity and lively participation, in stark contrast to the hostile, aggressive and disrespectful attitudes demonstrated in the public sphere; on the one hand, a private sphere full of loyal friends and kinsmen who help each other to understand and survive in the chaos of everyday life (Alvino, 1993; Gribaudi, 1993); on the other, a public sphere full of dangers and incomprehension, a dichotomy, to use Goddard's expression (1996:220), characteristic of Neapolitan culture.

This overview of Neapolitan culture during the post-war period, and in particular the relationship of the individual to the state and to the family, might be considered too static and there is no doubt that one could find elements of change, especially in the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, it clearly points to important features of Neapolitan life which have remained relatively unchanged during the period under consideration: a blatant indifference to the constraints of the public sphere, a silent toleration of personal clientelistic methods and a prevalence of family structures, so that, for

example, when a local friendly figure replaces the impersonal state agencies and provides work and welfare for the local community, he will be gratefully valued and, if he happens to be a criminal, his illicit activities will be ignored, if not accepted. In short, the "general cultural conditions [...] (of) the whole social system", Signorelli has argued, "constitute the premise for the blossoming of a delinquent culture, in our case, the Camorra's subculture" (1988:143).

4.4. Politics

With regard to the political system, one is able to emphasise a number of specific conditions and mechanisms which may have also favoured the development of the Camorra. In 1945, as a result of the Second World War settlement, the Cold War created two ideological blocks in Europe with Italy caught in the middle, in a strategically vulnerable position which was then reproduced at the level of national politics and civil society, in the form of "a bipolar, ideologically charged state-system" (Therborn, 1996:29). Thus, the country came to symbolise the world-wide division: the cleavage between the USA and the USSR was translated into the DC (Christian Democrat Party)- PCI (Communist Party) cleavage.

At the national level, the alliances were clear: from 1948, the DC was strongly supported and financed by the USA and helped by the Vatican, especially at election times (when priests would tell their congregation how to vote), while the PCI was supported and financed by the USSR. The PCI and neo-Fascists (MSI), being considered anti-system (ie.anti-democratic) parties, were excluded from government. There was no alternation in power, the democratic process was

blocked and the governments led by the DC were more interested in preventing others from gaining power than promoting effective programmes of action especially against organised crime. Judge Falcone has argued:

> Since the Liberation, a single party, the Christian Democrats, has monopolised power, above all in Sicily, occasionally flanked by its allies. In the fight against the Mafia, the opposition has not always shown itself to be an ally as it has had a tendency to confuse its political battle against the Christian Democrats with the legal battle against *Cosa Nostra*: 'We will not be able to do anything against the Mafia while this government and these men remain in power'.
> So there was paralysis on all fronts. The politicians, aware of the many problems and difficulties posed by a frontal attack on the Mafia, and in any case without any guarantee of immediate success, understood that in the short term they had everything to lose and little to gain by committing themselves to an all-out battle. Instead they faced this unprecedented crime problem with the same old feeble remedies, without a well thought-out plan which would have involved the full State apparatus in an unremitting and long-term commitment, and without the support of the people (1993:140-1).

In response to Mussolini's authoritarian regime, the new Italian Constitution of 1948 had chosen to avoid the concentration of power in the hands of a powerful leader by adopting a classic parliamentary system.[4] Moreover, the electoral system adopted was the proportional representation [PR] list system.[5] This system was initially chosen for its democratic representativity and flexibility and to give greater weight to organised opinion at the expense of individual personality. But the adoption of a preference vote within this list PR system had the opposite effect of allowing a political elite to use it

[4] A bicameral system, a Head of State, elected by both Chambers every 7 years, and a Prime Minister, as head of Government, who had to have the confidence of both Chambers too.

5 The country was divided into large constituencies and each voter had two votes: one for the party and the other for candidates (preference vote), of which up to 4 could be indicated.

increasingly to develop its own private interests at the expense of collective programmes. This produced great governmental instability[6] with many governments falling due to internal disagreements, but reforming with the same parties and new protagonists soon after.

In Naples, this system could only thrive given the existing 'paternalistic' system of patronage and clientelistic relations which had survived from the Bourbon period (Allum, 1973a[7]). It had developed some positive aspects, providing security and protection for the client and recognition and legitimacy for the patron, but also given rise to widespread political corruption (Allum and Allum, 1996; Ginsborg, 1990). Graziano emphasised the negative effects of clientelism on the political process at large: "even when it generates support, patronage does so in such a way as to weaken political legitimacy. The reason is that clientelistic consensus and political legitimacy imply two mutually exclusive sets of solidarities, instrumental and highly particularistic in the case of clientelism, normative and collective in the case of institutionalised authority" (1978:1).

It must be remembered that in Naples strong personalities, reminiscent of the father-king figure, have always been popular (Naples voted in favour of the Monarchy in 1946 and idolised the Monarchist Mayor and millionaire ship-owner Achille Lauro in the 1950s[8]) and 'personalised' forms of

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[6] Between 1948 and 93, Italy had more than 50 governments.

[7] Clientelism has been defined as a "private, informal and unwritten relationship between two people" (Flynn, 1984:135), a patron and a client, "who exchange goods, services or favours to the advantage of the patron who is, more often than the client, free to withdraw his/her favours and services" (*Ibid*). This system prospered in Southern Italy but also in 18th century England and 19th century France Many commentators have stressed the influence of living conditions in Naples. Until the beginning of the 20th century, contrary to other capitals, Naples did not have distinct popular and residential districts. All the social classes lived together sharing in a strong communal spirit and culture: the poor lived in the *bassi*, on the ground floor of the residences, while the rich occupied the *piani nobili*, upstairs.

[8] As today with the former Communist Mayor, Antonio Bassolino.

behaviour remain widespread in Neapolitan political life because of the clientelistic system.

It is easy to see that a PR-list system with preference votes would appeal to the Neapolitan political class and be accepted in general. By the 1950s, the party vote had stabilised between the main parties and thus Neapolitan politicians concentrated on cultivating, in full legality, networks of friends and clients, with promise of jobs and protection in return for votes (Piselli, 1995) in order to get their preference votes out at election times.

The question is, however, whether this system gave specific opportunities to the Camorra. It is sufficient, at this stage, to stress the importance of clientelism in the Neapolitan political system, to note that it played a significant role in law-abiding citizens' lives, let alone in less scrupulous ones', until the early 1990s when there was a general change in the national political climate (thanks to the *Tangentopoli*[9], 'Bribesville' or 'Kick-back city 'crisis) and to highlight the fact that the post-war transformation of the Camorra took place in a political system dominated by clientelism, with a PR-list system which permitted, if not encouraged, individual patronage and corruption.

4.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, we have sought to draw out the main characteristics of post-war Campania, in other words, we have examined its geography, social-economic situation and political life in order to understand the general context of the Camorra. This chapter has been a necessary step in our study as it has

[9] The *Mani pulite* ('Clean hands') program of investigation of political corruption in Milan spread to the whole of Italy when judges took upon themselves to eradicate bad practices and corruption from all areas of public life. One of most famous trials was the Enimont trial.

allowed us to describe the general and chaotic background within which the Camorra has developed. Now, we turn to our first area of interest, possible motives for becoming *a camorrista* in the 1950s and 1980s.

Chapter Five
The Agent's Motivation

"Io sono uno che non ha mai avuto la possibilità di scegliere"

Antonio Spavone (Faenza, 13-6-97).

"Principalmente, quando io sono stato delinquente, e non mi ritengo tale nato, però ci sono diventato".

Pasquale Galasso (S7a:133).

5.1 Introduction

In an important study on *l'Educazione Mafiosa* ('Training to become a Mafioso') Casarubea and Blandano (1991) attempt to distinguish the different moments of commitment, in particular, of criminal commitment. First, the 'conversion phase' is "[...the] moment in which a free choice is asserted, that is to say, when the individual measures and decides the validity of his actions in terms of convenience and risk [...]" (1991:104). Next comes the 'affiliation phase', "[...] the process through which the subject *converts* his decision into a new form of behaviour" (*ibid*). The scope of the next two chapters is to try and document these moments of conversion and affiliation for those who join the Camorra. Through this, we might better understand the psychological and sociological reasons for becoming a *camorrista.*

Elucidating the possible motivations for joining any association, organisation or group raises many difficulties (see Seyd and Whiteley, 1992; Dunleavy, 1991) to the extent that some political sociologists have resorted to the blanket expression of "the mysteries of commitment". These problems are exacerbated when studying a criminal subsystem like the Camorra which is, as a rule, enveloped in secrecy in Neapolitan

society. Motivations vary greatly, following each individual's perceptions of the association, its role and main aims. For example, people may join a political party for ideological reasons (to fight for their political beliefs), for reasons of self-interest (to improve their economic well-being or social life) or for altruistic reasons (to improve other people's lives).

So why does an individual join the Camorra? To what extent do his/her culture, education, environment, reference groups influence his/her choices? And which values, verbalised in his/her discursive consciousness, explain such choices?. These questions raise a number of important analytical issues: firstly, we are clearly moving away from political science *stricto sensu* and into the territory of criminology, sociology and psychology. This unfamiliar territory for the political scientist requires great clarity and care in the use of terms, concepts and assumptions. The rewards lie in a more subtle view of an organisation which tends to be seen as a mass of people. Secondly, in dealing with two historical periods, the aim is to discover whether time has had any influence on agents' motivations.

Methodologically, there is a disparity of available primary sources. For the 1950s, we have a relatively small number of case-studies to review (about 10) based on judicial documents (interrogations, trial transcripts, and *sentenze*) and interviews, whereas for the 1980s, we have a larger number of well-documented case-studies (about 30[1]) reconstructed mainly from trial transcripts, official confessions and in-depth interviews of former criminals *(pentiti)* which make the agent's discursive consciousness more accessible and easier to analyse.

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[1] See Appendix Two.

5.1.1 Review of the Literature

Sociologists and criminologists, as already noted, have long been interested in deviant behaviour and what motivates it. Merton, Sutherland and Bell, among others, have proposed different interpretations of deviant behaviour in America in the 1950s. Merton (1968), for example, adopted a functionalist approach; for him, deviant behaviour in America in the 1900s was the result of pressures that the social structure bought to bear on individuals. It glorified values such as 'money' and 'success' which meant that individuals were tempted to take up crime in order to attain these values, as they were seen to be worth fighting for. Sutherland (1972), on the other hand, stressed the importance of the environment as the learning centre for criminal techniques, whereas Bell (1967) suggested that crime was a system of opportunities offering social mobility to the poor and immigrants who became the clients of racketeers and political machines.

Some of these approaches have been incorporated into studies of the Mafia and the Camorra. However, they do not look at the agents' reasons for joining because of the secrecy, intrigue and violence which surround these organisations and the consequent difficulty of access to the necessary information. Therefore, they focus on the conditions the postulants have to fulfil, the rituals that they have to follow in order to become a *mafioso/camorrista* and the nature of this form of membership rather than trying to understand the unique attraction that these institutions hold for individuals or the factors that may influence them into joining.

For example, Falcone describes in detail the rules and rituals that future 'men of honour' have to obey such as "not to desire the woman of another man of honour, not to profit

from prostitution, not to kill other men of honour, except in cases of absolute necessity, not to talk to the police, not to seek conflict with other men of honour [...]" (1993:86) and states that "not everyone can join *Cosa Nostra*" (*ibid*:88). Some very precise qualities are needed, in particular courage, capacity to commit violence and having relatives who are already members of Cosa nostra. These qualities crystallise criminal values and produce "a culture of belonging" (*ibid*:65) which give *mafiosi* a clear sense of identity. Normally, potential members have to prove these qualities before joining fully, they have to show that they are "men of stomach" (men who can resist police questioning [Ianni and Ianni, 1972:38]) and are ready to use violence.

Hess (1973) also highlights the qualities needed to have a career in the Mafia: to be able to use violence and build authority upon it; to be able to clash with the state's judicial system and be acquitted; to be acknowledged by other *mafiosi* and lastly, to have all the qualities ascribed by the social environment (to be the protector, mediator and law giver). In short, the *mafioso's* prestige is based, according to Hess, on three factors: "his own actions, the attribution to him of further qualities [...] and the authority and respect enjoyed by the *mafioso* type and now transferred to the individual" (1973:53).

Siebert also addresses the question of membership in explaining how the Mafia is entirely a "man-made society", and how women perceive the institution and live with it. She analyses membership in terms of an almost religious, quasi-mystical form of male bonding, and not in terms of motivation as she believes that "material factors, such as income and status, are not enough to justify the extraordinary fascination which the Mafia obviously exerts over young and not so young

men who are prepared to do anything to join this exclusive organisation. [...] You don't choose to join the Honoured society, you have to go about being chosen [...]. Membership of the Mafia is something absolute. The bond is severed only with death, and after the initiation oath both the private and public live of the *mafioso* is within the compass of the organisation. It is well and truly a pact with the devil (1996:14-18).

Studies devoted to the Camorra have been slightly more specific on this topic. They stress the social and economic conditions of Campania which may explain the motivations for individuals to join, and also the fact that, as Violante pointed out, there seems to be "no particular selection criteria before an individual can join a Camorra group" (1994: 59-60).

Sales (1988) for example focuses on two important social problems which he believes were exploited by the Camorra and the NCO in particular, to expand its membership: 1) youth delinquency; and 2) bad urban planning and housing. He argues that these social problems had been identified by the NCO as producing a mass of young unemployed with no concrete future. Therefore, the NCO presented itself as the only viable alternative "for a lot of these young people, the Camorra has almost become an ideological belief, an opportunity of becoming rich fast which is otherwise impossible, at times a simple chance of a job and success for an enormous mass of young people of the large and small towns of Campania" (1988:155). Concentrating on these problems might indeed help to explain some of the motivations for joining the Camorra.

Arlacchi (1983) notes two important statistics for Campania: the young age of people murdered and/or involved in Camorra-type crimes; and their geographical origins (poor areas, run-down suburbs and isolated hinterland towns). He

believes that this explains the presence of two types of criminals in Naples: on the one hand, the traditional organised crime 'families' and, on the other, 'clans' *(bande)* of young gangsters which he compares to those of the South Bronx. A typical young gangster

> comes from a rural immigrant or sub-proletarian family. His family of origin is characterised by a high level of instability or disorganisation. He has not frequented school often and has had some experience in under-age work as helper in tourism, as a shop worker or as a mechanic. He started very early to get into small local delinquent crime: stealing from shops and cars[...] Therefore, he has been educated in the street, by the gang, by the district, by the bar, by the external world of family relations. An important role in their criminal socialisation has been played by his contact with reforming institutions and then youth prison (1983:158-9).

According to Arlacchi, these two groups of criminals come into close contact and the youngsters can easily become attracted to the sophisticated Camorra: "we are in the presence of a first generation of professional delinquents who have recently left adolescence and have become adults, who find themselves surrounded directly or indirectly by the elite of Camorra leaders who are older and better organised" (*ibid*:158). This type of analysis gives us some idea as to why young people, as a social category, may want to join an institution like the Camorra. But in general it does not give any insight into the possible motives of an individual for joining the Mafia or Camorra. On the other hand, our interaction model, which deals with agent motivation, can help us gauge more precisely some of the motives and combination of motives that moved individual agents to join the Camorra in the 1950s and in the 1980s.

5.2. The Agent's Criminal Values in the 1950s and the 1980s

As outlined in part one, Giddens's theory presents three distinct but interconnected psychological levels for analysing the agent's motivation: unconscious, discursive and practical consciousness. It is clear that 'unconscious motives' are impossible to know but the material available allows one to outline elements of practical and discursive consciousness which should be helpful in analysing the agent's motivation. At times, they are finely interconnected and difficult to distinguish but the fact that the material is predominantly oral makes it easier to draw out the significant elements of the agent's discursive consciousness. On the other hand, the more spontaneous forms of behaviour which emerge from the agent's practical consciousness are fewer and less clear-cut.

The agent's discursive and practical consciousness ('internal structure') obviously reflect the dominant criminal values of the time. In fact, in the 1950s, the agent's discursive consciousness reflects isolated criminal values; what we can call an emerging 'Camorra ethos', in the sense that it is not yet a coherent accepted group of values (see Figure 5.1) whereas in the 1980s, it reflects the much more precise and solid 'subculture' (Arnold, 1970) and 'ideology'[2] (Siebert, 1996) of an organised criminal sub-system within the dominant culture (see Figure 5.2). The core fundamental criminal values of both these periods were: honour, family and friendship.

5.2.1 Core Values: Honour, Family and Friendship

The Camorra's 'criminal mentality' reflects the social values of civil society; it manipulates and interprets them on a

[2] It is interesting to note that Falcone argues you do not necessarily need to be a member of the Mafia to have a 'Mafia mentality' (1993:67).

Figure 5.1: Criminal values in the 1950s



Figure 5.2: Camorra values in the 1980s



criminal mode. One of the values dominant both in civil and criminal society in Southern Europe throughout the two periods was that of ***honour.*** This notion can be defined as a form of respect and esteem shown to others which can be tarnished by one's own acts or others' behaviour. Honour is a traditional cultural value which has persisted compared to Northern Europe. Indeed, honour has formed part of everyday life in Naples for centuries; it has regulated all social interactions, especially since the legal system and the police force were unreliable, slow and inefficient and did not provide a prompt and fair restoration of one's reputation when needed.

Siebert explained in more precise terms the role of honour in civil society generally:

> the concept of *honour*, as John Davis has clearly argued, designates a system of stratification, marking off dominant positions and subordinate positions. It presents itself as an absolute system, so that 'each competitor occupies a unique position in the hierarchy. One of the weapons in such discrimination is the distinction between honour-virtue and honour-status. The weapon is used by rivals'. The terrain on which rivalries are played out is a man's good name, or reputation [...]. The outcome of these rivalries assails the man in his entire being, that is to say his honour (1996:36).

In the immediate post-war period in the South of Italy, honour was an important social value for all law-abiding citizens, but especially for the poor, as Brandon-Albini made clear "the poor have neither knowledge, money nor freedom. They have only their 'honour'" (1963:41). Indeed, when people did not respect the code of honour, they could be marginalised and rejected by the whole community for not defending their honour and self-respect. Lewis recalled that when visiting Poggioreale, Naples prison, in 1944, he met some prisoners: "[...] they were *ergastolani* - lifers, and [...] having completed their first year in

solitary confinement, they were being taken to the island of Procida to complete their sentences [...]" they explained to him that "I did it for honour'. The others agreed, they'd killed for the same reason.'Would you do it again?' I asked them. 'In the same circumstances, we'd have to. It stands to reason" (1978:89).

The code of honour was therefore a form of social control which persisted until the 1980s and determined how different relationships should be lived in civil society. It has clearly overflowed into the criminal sphere: the *Bella Società Riformata* (see Appendix One) as well as *Cosa Nostra,* incorporated it into their rules of conduct to be respected by all. An emerging *guappo* would be judged by how well he defended his honour and that of his family; if he failed he have would no future in crime.

Defending one's honour and that of one's family can thus be a powerful motive for becoming a *guappo* or a *camorrista* as illustrated by the case of Antonio Spavone[3] who, after his older brother, Carmine - a young emerging *guappo* - was murdered in 1945, sought revenge on his killer, Giovanni Mormone. This act of revenge was to determine his future: not only did it send him to prison but it also made him prestigious and popular among the criminal community (Jouakim, 1979:41), clearly setting him on the road to becoming an important *guappo.*

The agent does not necessarily see revenge *per se* as the key motivating factor for his involvement in the Camorra but prefers to rationalise his action in terms of defending his honour. Vito Faenza recalled an interview he had with Spavone in 1979 when this was stressed:

> *I wrote an article which ended with the question: "but who really is Spavone?. In court, he called me over and said*

[3] See his life story in Chapter Seven.

"Dottor Faenza, you wrote the best article ever because you ended by asking "who really is Antonio Spavone?". Will you have coffee with me?." So, I went and had coffee with him; he explained to me what a camorrista is, what responsibility is. He had been forced to make a choice, he had had to kill according to the code of honour which stated that you have to kill your brother's murderers and so he had inherited his brother's position and nickname, 'O' Malommo'. He added "I am a person who has never really had the chance to choose".[4]

This example clearly illustrates the central importance of the code of honour in the agent's discursive consciousness, although revenge appears to be his practical consciousness. It is one case, among many, which highlights the significance of respecting honour as part of the criminal code of conduct.

In the 1980s, defending one's honour and that of one's family was still a strong social value; it was a specific rule which protected the private sphere, particularly the all-important sphere of the family, in a way law-enforcing institutions did not and could not do. Despite the industrialisation of Naples, this social value still plays a fundamental role in civil society and continues also to be respected by criminal organisations. Internalised by both the NCO and NF families as part of their ethos, honour remained a significant part of the criminal code of conduct. The new leaders controlled the behaviour of their members by expecting them implicitly to respect this social rule: if they wanted to be respected within the clan, members *must* defend their honour and that of their family when it was violated, with at times murderous consequences.

In a slightly different context, we can see this concept of honour clearly expressed by Gerardo Intagliatore who, when deciding to turn state witness, was told by his disapproving

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[4] Interview with Vito Faenza in Naples on 13 June, 1997. *Italics* are used to indicate original oral material.

mother[5]: *"think of us: if you are a man make a decision, kill yourself right away, do not make us all suffer [...] From now on, it is up to you, you chose this life, either you carry on as before or you find a solution by killing yourself"* (CD'A18c:12-13). Therefore, though it seemed to contradict his decision to collaborate with the authorities, he attempted suicide, explaining his gesture in terms of 'saving' the family's honour: *"If I had killed myself, I would have resolved my family's problem, a question of honour,[6] because my family still would have had a member who had collaborated, but who also had had the courage to kill him*self; *therefore I would have saved my mother, my brothers and all my family" (ibid*:18).

Honour can therefore still be seen playing a fundamental role in controlling and conditioning people's behaviour - either at an individual, a collective or a family level. But can it still be presented as a motivating factor as was the case in the 1950s? From our case-studies, the agent's discursive consciousness of the 1980s does not explain honour as a motive for joining the Camorra. Indeed, the discursive consciousness of agents in the 1980s appears to be shifting away from the code of honour towards that of fear, vendetta and profitable deals when their practical consciousness could still be explained in terms of the traditional code of honour. It would seem that the notion of honour is still important to modern *camorristi* in terms of a criminal value to respect (in particular, they use it to defend their families and clan members, or as in the Siani case, defend their criminal

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[5] His wife, Monica, also had the same reaction although she later backed his decision to collaborate with the authorities. Another example can be seen when a state witness recounts the episode of the wife of his boss who became a state witness: *"the fact that the wife of the boss of Acerra went to the Police and collaborated with the judges was a scandal, it was an insult to the rules of honour of the clan "*(see CD'A19).

[6] My emphasis.

reputation[7]), but it is no longer a motive for joining the Camorra as it was in the 1950s, other values predominate.

It is interesting to note here that the notion of honour is closely associated with that of the importance of **family** and **friendship.** The Italian family has long played a significant role in civil society (see Brancaccio, 1987): it was the family's honour which had always been defended whatever the cost and by whomever, be they young delinquents or aristocrats. In a Catholic country like Italy, the biological family was of paramount importance not only in the private sphere where it operated as the emotional and socioeconomic centre for its members, but also in the public sphere where it acted as a clear reference point for all activities. During the whole of the post-war period, t he extended family networks, *parentela,* formed the backbone of civil society creating in turn networks of patronage and clientelism *(raccomandazione)* which regulated social activities. This family as a value was naturally appropriated by organised crime groups for both its emotional and functional value. It is this criminal value of the family which interests us here, rather than its role as a social institution.

In the 1950s, for the Camorra, the family existed as a normal civil society institution and we find the murder of a relative as a strong motive[8] for saving one's honour and thus becoming involved in the Camorra, whereas in the 1980s, the

[7] This is the case of the murder of a young reporter, Siani, from the daily Neapolitan paper, *Il Mattino,* who had insinuated that the Nuvoletta clan had denounced one of their allies, Valentino Gionta, to the police. This was considered by both clans and their Sicilian Godfathers to be an insult and to have offended their honour: "Angelo [Nuvoletta] and the others insisted on the fact that this reporter had to die because "he was making us look like traitors" [...]. Donnarumma [a *camorrista-mafioso* from the Gionta clan] was asked by them to go and speak to Gionta's brother-in-law to tell him that he had to die for what he had written. [...] I went to Valentino and said: "Listen, Valentino, here Angelo, Maurizio and Lorenzo have had orders from the Uncle [Toto Riina] in Sicily saying that he [Siani] must die" (CD'A14).

[8] In the case of Spavone, it is his brother's death which motivates his involvement in the Camorra and in the case of Pupetta Maresca (see Chapter Seven), it is her husband's.

family has grown considerably in importance as an organisational value[9].

Raffaele Cutolo's *Nuova Camorra Organizzata* [NCO] was never called 'a family', as later clans were, but the concept of the family was of paramount importance. It was the rallying symbol of the organisation as a home which Cutolo used to recruit around him a mass of "poor lost souls" (Marrazzo, 1984:48) to create one large extended family group: "they were boys without ideals, without identities, without objectives, to whom Raffaele Cutolo gave the possibility to feel part of a concrete, working and winning structure" (*ibid*:65). In his organisation, there was a place for everyone: "from the road-thief to the drug- pusher, from the extortionist to the money recycler, from the drug -dealer to the businessman, from the scam organiser to the burglar" (Sales, 1988:154). And Cutolo portrayed himself as their 'father figure': "he was a father to them, they regarded him like a God, they wanted to be like him (*Ibid*:158); his home, Ottaviano Castle, was their home, *'la casa madre di Ottaviano'* (Marino, 1986:642). Following the tradition of the old Camorra, Cutolo looked after his 'sons' by setting up a system of social assistance for members and their families especially when they were in prison, distributing money and legal advice when necessary. Although Cutolo did have close relatives working with him[10], his organisation was not based on blood ties and marriage but on criminal solidarity.

Following the rules of the old Camorra and also the strong symbolic image of the 'family' in the Catholic religion, Cutolo required all new members to be christened into the

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9 Gribaudi believes that the family of businessmen *(famiglia di commercianti)* has some aspects in common with the camorra family model *(famiglia camorrista)* (1993:33).

10 His sister, Rosetta and brother Pasquale as well as his son Robert took part in NCO activities. See her life story in Chapter Eight.

organisation (as in the Sicilian Mafia) and to be personally linked to a 'godparent'. This forced individuals to make personal commitments to each other and create loyal alliances. NCO members called each other *"Cumpà, Cumparìe"*[11], godfather and companion, within the broad ideological vision of Cutolo's project.

Although this organisation appealed to new members, it was very difficult for it to have a monopoly over the territory as it did not have deep blood ties and roots in the community; rather, loyal gangs spread out across the territory, and could change allegiances and join other families. For example, Nicola and Giovanni Nuzzo from Acerra as well Carmine di Girolanco and Giuseppe Cacciapuoti from the Casertano transferred from the NCO to the NF once the NCO started to decline (SO12). Many criminals did so in order to survive.

As its name itself suggests *la Nuova Famiglia* [NF] gave even more importance to the value of the family. The various clans were actual blood families (the Nuvoletta family, the Gionta family, the Zaza family, the D'Alessandro family, the Alfieri family, the Galasso family, the Mallardo family, the Bardellino family, the Schiavone family, the Graziano family, the Moccia family and so on). Directly influenced by the Sicilian model, the NF Families remedied the weaknesses of the previous model in the 1980s. For the Sicilian Mafia, as Siebert explains: "applauded as a *value*[12] and rigidly defended on the basis of formal and functional criteria, the family takes on a dual aspect: it is on the one hand a pivotal means of

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[11] Tarrow explains "Family-linked roles of a secondary nature play an important role in the South. The compare system is similar to the *compadrazo* of rural Spain, but far less important. The godfather in southern Italy is usually a friend of the parent who does not have business ties with the family. He is a protector and confidant to the godchild, but his role may extend eventual economic or political patronage" (1967:68).

[12] My emphasis.

exercising territorial sovereignty, on the other an organisational model for criminal activities. This second aspect, moreover, promotes the reproduction of an ideology which matches up criminal organisation with family, conferring on the former a halo of protectiveness and benevolence that is altogether familial" (1996:28).

For the NF clans, the family, both nuclear and extended, was a safe, closed, totally dependable unit of protectiveness and benevolence which was propelled into important strategic activities and business decisions. The biological relationships of family ties were transformed into alliances and working relationships with set functional ends, in order to maximise profit. In the Nuvoletta family, for example, the core organisational structure was essentially based on blood ties be they wives, sisters, brothers, daughters, sons, brothers-in-law or sisters-in law.[13] Both its criminal and non-criminal activities were managed by family members. The same is true for the Fabbrocino family "the brothers, brothers-in-laws and children of the arrested boss all contributed to the family business: Adele, the eldest child, married an important linen exporter; Giovanni, the youngest son, in turn, manages a few 'confectionery' factories. Other relatives of the arrested are owners of important butchers [...]. All these activities, according to the investigators, are a fragile cover used to hide the real business of the family: drugs, extortion and subcontracts" (*Il Corriere del Mezzogiorno* of 4 September, 1997:2-3).

Marriage was a key way of making Camorra alliances and avoiding rivalry and conflicts: Gabriele Donnarumma's two sisters, Gemma and Francesca, married Valentino Gionta and Ciro Paduano respectively; Francesco Mallardo of the Mallardo

13 See the family structure of the Nuvoletta clan, Picture 3 in Chapter Eight.

clan married one of three sisters, the others being married to the boss of San Carlo all' Arena, Eduardo Contini, *'O Romano*, and to another important *camorrista*, Patrizio Bosti (*La Repubblica* of 2 March, 1996:II). Marianna Giuliano and Michele Mazzarella,[14] children of two important Camorra families were married in 1996, uniting "two Camorra families who [had] been at war intermittently for over a decade" (Longrigg, 1997:55).

These intermarriages created ever expanding loyal networks and had the added advantage of providing a self-contained recruitment policy. Mothers, sisters and wives, who were otherwise important reference points in terms of emotional energy in the family, had by the 1980s also become front men and nominal business partners in Camorra companies covering the men's illegal dealings and money-laundering schemes. This shows us how close personal relationships can be exploited within the framework of the clan. It was often the case that while the boss was in prison the women outside continued to run the organisation and business as an extension of the family. This was typical of the Moccia (see Longrigg, 1997[15]) and Nuvoletta clans where the

[14] The daughter of Luigi Guiliano and grand daughter of Pio Vittorio Guiliano (see Chapter Seven) from Forcella who married in the 1996 the son of Ciro Mazzarella from the Pallonetto, cousin of Michele Zaza and member of Cosa Nostra. See Sergio De Gregorio (1981) for an explanation of both clans, their origins, history and activities.

[15] We can see how involved Anna Mazza 'the black widow of the Camorra', mother of the Moccia brothers, was with her sons' criminal activities and legal battles: not only is she believed to be the leader of the clan which was heavily involved in drug dealing (see Quaderni 1, *Osservatorio Sulla Camorra,* 1989:114) but she attended all her sons' trials and wrote letters to the President of the Republic, to the Minister for justice and the local priests to explain her sons' criminal situation and attack *pentiti* close to the clan (see *La Repubblica*, Naples pages of 14 of July 1996).

mother, sisters[16] and daughters[17] kept the clan together when their sons, brothers and fathers were in prison. The same case was made on behalf of the wife of Valentino Gionta, boss of Torre Annunziata, Gemma Donnarumma, who was charged with Mafia association because, while her husband was in prison, she replaced him as leader in the clan's activities (see SO15).

The NF clans combined the Sicilian model, with its strict hierarchical structure and *pater familias,* with the horizontal generational model which organised around brothers, sisters and their respective spouses guaranteeing territorial sovereignty, expansion and loyalty. Around the family itself gravitated numerous friends of the same generation, bonded together by a feeling of criminal solidarity (Gribaudi, 1993). They were the more vulnerable circles in case of danger as Matteo Graziano's case illustrates: it was in his interest to turn state witness, *pentito,* because he felt at risk. The leaders of the clan faced with his denunciation were threatening to *"eliminate some of the members who were "not part of the most intimate circle,"* (Pr14:2) that is, those who were not part of the blood family. Thus, the 'generational family' was constituted by a blend of blood ties and criminal solidarity, with the former at the core of the organisation while the latter was at the margin.

Carmine Alfieri's criminal organisation was not based on the Sicilian family model but it appears to have been a dynamic model of the 'generational family', what can be described as a 'Confederation model'. Judge Troncone explained this dual

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[16] For example, the sister of two important members of the Nuvoletta clan (Francesco and Mattia Simeoli) Iolanda Simeoli, was arrested for keeping guns and explosive material in her flat in 1995. We could suggest that she was looking after them for her brothers *(La Repubblica,* Naples pages of 29 November 1995:5).

[17] Tatiana Imparato, daughter of Mario Imparato, boss of Castellammare di Stabia, friend and then rival of Michele D'Alessandro killed in a police shot out on the 15th of March 1993, is also believed to "have looked after the clan's business activities" (*La Repubblica,* Naples pages of 17 April 1993:VII).

level Confederation model: *"on the one hand, we can note the existence of a small, compact and intimate group working in close contact and under the constant direction of Carmine Alfieri and on the other, other groups which have developed through the years, working in the orbit of Alfieri but with a certain degree of independence and of territorial control"* (S7:102). Indeed, Alfieri himself argues that his clan was formed and based on the close friendship which he developed with fellow criminals as they defended themselves against Raffaele Cutolo:*"our group was based on friendship"* (S7d:10)).

In conclusion, we can say that one of the major developments in the Camorra's ethos in the post-war period was the way in which the family had evolved: in the 1950s, the concept of criminal family did not exist, *guappi* were loners or gangs of casual criminals, but in the 1980s, the emotional value of the family was extended into a strategic and functional one, creating the criminal family: family relationships were now exploited not only to provide protection for members on the run but also to make money and to recycle illegal earnings. A good example of this is Domenico Galasso (1962 -), cousin of Pasquale Galasso, who was marginal to the criminal family until Pasquale *"called me to one side and said: 'the time has come for you to make yourself useful and help us'"* (CD'A17r:23).

Some people became *camorristi* and seriously involved in illegal activities out of friendship. Friendship is an important socio-cultural value in Italy (as elsewhere) especially among urban men. This was true and has remained true throughout the period under consideration, in particular, of young Neapolitan men who live in the *quartieri,* or in the suburbs among their numerous brothers or peers, socialising in the streets *(i vicoli)* and in the case of the upper classes, in very

closed circles of family homes, sharing common activities and opinions, united by ritual habits. This evokes "the Street Corner Society" of W. Foote Whyte (1981). The same applies to older men creating therefore a type of society where strong friendship and loyalties are a necessary part of everyday life.

In the 1950s, these values were not particularly apparent among the *guappi.* One knows of a few cases of friendship among them, such as Alfredo Maisto and Vittorio Nappi, but fierce rivalries were more common than close friendships.[18] What was in civil society solid, loyal and reciprocal male bonding was by the 1970s taken over by the Camorra and transformed into precarious friendships which often turned out to be superficial and dangerous relationships based on devious manipulation.

However, it would be a serious misrepresentation to argue that there were no sincere feelings of friendships or comradeship among *camorristi.* For Alfieri explained that *"we became friends because of the common problems we faced"* (S7d:10), especially among men who had been close childhood friends or cell companions. Indeed, many *camorristi* have explained their initial Camorra contact and activities through friends. Thus friendship can act as a motivating factor. Antonio Tarallo[19] of the Limelli family clan clearly explains his affiliation in these terms: *"it was for emotive reasons, not economic. I was very close to people who were involved with this family. I became involved because of the friendship that I shared with these people".*[20] This was also true of Domenico Cuomo (1962 -), Pasquale Loreto (1961 -), Costantino Laiola (1960-), Gennaro Brasiello (1959 -), Alfonso Annunziata (1956 -) and Antonio Gaglione.

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18 *Pasqualone 'e Nola* was the known rival of both Alfredo Maisto (see CD'A2) and Antonio Esposito (who ordered his murder).

19 See his life story in Chapter Eight.

20 Interview on 10 July,1998, *Procura di Napoli,* Naples.

The sense of fraternity, however, could easily dissolve during fights for the leadership and control of the clan or when it was a question of sharing the spoils or of murder strategies, as was the case of Gionta and Gallo[21] in 1988 who split over strategies and the allocation of money (CD'A14:106) or D'Alessandro and Imparato who split in 1990 over territory and strategies. Even Alfieri, who preached the notion and virtues of friendship, eliminated three of his close lieutenants, Malventi, Ruoco and Sarmino, who had become too independent and thus, threatening.

In the Camorra families of the 1980s, friendship and trust were very precarious values as the widow of Raffaele Nuzzo (the boss of Acerra and brother of Nicola Nuzzo) Alessandra Mainetti, explained: *"they pretended to be friends when all they wanted to do was to kill each other"* (CD'A17g). In the 1950s, there was no such value among gangsters; in the 1980s, it was more an apparent value than a true, solid one, masking double dealing and conniving.

Friendship also forms part of practical consciousness. For example, Salvatore Rosa (1945 -), a shopkeeper, did not acknowledge his involvement in the Camorra out of friendship, although it is quite obvious that it was through friends that he became involved. He explained his initial contact with a notorious *camorrista,* Fiore D'Avino, thus: *"it took place by chance, one day in a bar, in Somma Vesuviana, the Alaia Bar, I was with a certain Agostino Fiore, an acquaintance of mine, having a coffee; at that moment, Fiore D'Avino who had a shop above the bar entered. We said "hello" and D'Avino complained that he had had problems with the police of Pomigliano D'Arco. [...] If I am not mistaken it was in early 1991. Agostino Fiore said*

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[21] This happened when a close friend of the boss Valentino Gionta (who was in prison), Gallo, started to take care of all the illegal activities and felt insulted enough to set up his own independent group when the boss from prison requested to see proof of the money the clan was making

that he knew the policemen in question and that he could intervene [..] Subsequently, Agostino Fiore called me to meet these policemen and help him to resolve these problems" (CD'A17i:1-2). From then on, Rosa's shop became the meeting place for Fiore D'Avino, the *camorrista,* and corrupt policemen. In this case, the agent's consciousness does not articulate the main motivation for joining but his practical consciousness clearly indicates the role of friends and friends' acquaintances in his initial involvement.

The same happened in the case of Mario Pepe.[22] Asked how and when he became involved in the Alfieri clan, he answered: *"I met Alfieri through Sale and Citarella"* (S7e:3). It was Antonio Sale, a chartered surveyor with Camorra connections, who introduced him as 'a trustworthy' person to Alfieri *"because he needed a bit of company and moral support"* (*ibid*:7) after a particularly gruelling crime, *la strage di Torre Annunziata.*

Or again Federico Giovanni (1946 -) who met Pasquale Forino, a *camorrista,* by pure chance, became his friend and chauffeur. When Pasquale Forino became involved with the drugs baron Umberto Ammaturo, so did Federico Giovanni: *"it was Pasquale Forino who introduced me to Ammaturo"* (CD'A19c). Here, the agent's practical and discursive consciousness almost coincide and indicate clearly that friendship played a determining role in the agent's involvement in the Camorra.

Less spontaneous, and distinctly more manipulative, uses of friendship, bordering on a form of blackmail, appear in many *camorristi's* explanations: *"I was a prisoner in Avellino prison. In that period, during an animated discussion, I smacked Giacomo Cavalcanti. At the time, I was forced to associate myself with Ciro Mariano because he took my side during the*

[22] See his life story in Chapter Eight.

argument. [...] Giacomo Cavalcanti was a boss of the zone of Fuorigrotta, I did not know this. During the argument, I found myself isolated because I took orders from no one. Ciro Mariano, therefore, took my defence and I, to show him my friendship and my gratitude, became his faithful follower" (CD'A15a).

This is how Umberto Bernasconi, a small time delinquent, recounted his entering the Mariano clan of the Spanish Quarters (*Quartieri Spagnoli*). Here the notion of friendship is somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, it is the result of a personal debt of gratitude and therefore an obligation made up of both loyalty and fear. On the other, the *camorrista boss* used and manipulated this 'new' friendship as a way of bringing the agent into his organisation making him *"one of his men"* (*ibid*) while he was in prison and then later, using him as a killer.[23] Bernasconi added: "*I did everything Ciro Mariano ordered me to do"* (*ibid*). Pasquale Frajase, another killer of the Mariano clan, was also recruited through criminal friendship but he does not articulate it in this way (CD'A15c[24]). Therefore, the agent's discursive consciousness clearly articulates a feeling of friendship which was real in human terms, but which in Camorra terms was manipulated, making him subordinate and subject to the *camorrista*. This analysis of motives owes a great deal to the availability of first hand documents which have given a voice (discursive consciousness) to agents whose actions had up until then been assessed on their criminal behaviour (practical consciousness).

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[23] Another example of this manipulation of the value of friendship is described by the drug baron, Umberto Ammaturo, when he explains the recruitment of one of his right hand men, Pasquale Forino. He recounts: *"When I was arrested in 1987, I was taken to Avellino prison. There, there was Pasquale Forino sentenced on an extortion charge. I like this person, serious, thoughtful and mature, I proposed to him to join. He, after a few months, was released, I put him in touch with my gang outside prison, Marotta Alberto, Pirelli, etc and he became involved [...]"* (CD'A19b).

[24] He only describes how he was recruited without clearly stating that it was through 'friendship: *"I was the friend of Raffaele Iacovelli. In March/April 1987, Iacovelli introduced me to Nicola Liguori [...]"* (CD'A15c).

5.2.2 Vendetta, Violence andOmertà

Among the important reasons given by criminals for engaging in criminal action - a recurring theme of the agent's discursive consciousness and clearly of his practical consciousness and closely bound up with the notions of honour, family and friendship - was the notion of vendetta. Anger at having been insulted, clearing one's own name, avenging one's or one's family's honour, are all common reasons for revenge. These values are respected and applied in the 1980s with the same means as in the 1950s: vendetta, violence and *omertà.*

In southern Mediterranean countries, vendetta was and has remained a strongly respected value, especially to defend family and friendship. As part of folk culture, vendetta is "a cultural response, set up in defence and against the threat of being killed, containing the risk of loss of presence, just as the avoidance of the right/duty of vendetta contains the risk of the loss of social presence" (Lombardi Sartriani and Meligrana in Siebert, 1996:38). It is clear that this archaic form of behaviour survived the establishment of other forms of authority in areas where these forms of law and order were weak and inefficient. In a system where the state agencies, for example the police and judicial system, were failing to perform their duties within the community, private vendettas continued to be a desirable form of revenge[25]. As part of a retaliation process[26] vendetta was closely associated with violence as it was its most common means of action. In practical terms, as a violent act of revenge, it has remained a persistent social

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[25] It could be suggested that the lack of efficient legal solutions helped vendetta persist. For example, Carlo Gaetano Orlando maintains that the late introduction of a divorce law meant that for a long time, men were sent to prison after committing a crime which this law could have avoided (1989).

[26] The mourning period of the first act of violence lasts as long as the vendetta is not accomplished.

value within civil society during the whole of the post-war period from the 1950s to the 1980s and was easily adopted by all forms of organised crime. The act and value of vendetta became an important part of the Camorra ethos in some cases to put a wrong right, in others not to lose respect[27].

In the 1950s, vendettas were a central part of the *guappo*'s code of conduct: taking revenge or retaliating was not only necessary to repair one's honour but also was a way of exerting a form of social control and of power in the community which in turn enhanced the *guappo*'s social standing. In many cases, vendetta explained the motive of a crime but also the agent's involvement in regular camorra activities. For instance, in 1955 Assunta Maresca killed the instigator of her husband's murder "*right from the beginning, it was clear that he had been killed as an act of vendetta on the part of Maresca Assunta*" (CD'A6:11). During the trial, she explained that "she had to take revenge for her husband's murder, she had had no alternative" (Longrigg, 1997:4; La *Stampa of* 5 April 1959[28]). She was sentenced to fourteen years imprisonment which proved the beginning of her subsequent Camorra career. Therefore, in this case the discursive consciousness pinpoints vendetta as the motive for Pupetta's involvement with these criminal activities[29].

In the 1980s, similar examples can be found. The major clan leaders Carmine Alfieri[30] and his elder brother Salvatore appear to have become involved in criminal or Camorra

27 See Appendix Five.

28 Pupetta Maresca during the whole trial presented herself as a victim who had no alternative (*La Stampa,* 5-4-59). The vendetta was her only solution and the police proved very unhelpful.

29 We could also suggest that her practical consciousness in the form of the influence of her family as an institution had an impact on her behaviour. One could argue that if her husband had not been murdered, she would not have got so fully involved in these activities, and eventually met Umberto Ammaturo, a young drug baron when she came out of prison in the judge's office

30 See his life story in Chapter Eight.

activities because of their need to fulfil vendettas. Salvatore avenged his father's killers (who had not been punished by the normal legal procedures) at the age of 17 in 1956. He was sent to prison and this fuelled the Alfieri family's *"negative reputation"* in the community and underworld. Carmine Alfieri explained that his full involvement in Camorra activities dates back to the day when he had eliminated his brother's murders: *"Alfonso Catapano was murdered, after having been interrogated I think. I think that it was actually me, Carmine Alfieri who killed him, with my own hands because I had to avenge Salvatore's death personally. This was the point of the vendetta"* (P10:46:46). In the words of one of his accomplices: *"in a symbolical gesture, he took off the black tie which he had worn in mourning for his brother, showing that he had avenged him and thus acquired real power in the criminal underworld"* (P10:127). Although other motives played a part in Alfieri's motivation vendetta was probably in his discursive consciousness the determining one.

The same value of vendetta is linked to Angelo Moccia's, 'Enzo', and his brothers' criminal development. Their father, Gennaro Moccia, was the local boss, *"il super boss di Afragola" (Il Mattino* of 1 June 1976) in the 1960-70s but when he was murdered in 1976 by his rivals, his sons sought vendetta and

sought to eliminate the culprits,[31] this turned into a full blown territorial Camorra war. Angelo Moccia explains *"I live in this environment because I need to protect my family and I needed to vindicate the death of my father"* (CD'A17s:42). The same pattern applies to the Mallardo brothers when their father was murdered in 1967. These values form part of the discursive and practical consciousness.

There are also numerous examples of people becoming involved in criminal activities as a result of a more complicated form of vendetta, *'una vendetta transversale'*, 'collateral-indirect vendetta'. During the first Camorra war when an escalation of violent killings took place, many people were caught in this spiral, having to avenge the death of a relative who happened to be a *camorrista.* Automatically, they then enjoyed the protection of the clan to which the *camorrista* belonged. On a large scale, this not only created a network of obligations and protection but also brought in individuals who had no previous Camorra affiliation as can be seen in the case of Domenico Esposito.

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[31] Claire Longrigg recalls the famous episode:
"Anna Mazza's husband Gennaro Moccia was an old style *camorrista,* boss of Afragola, a small town in the Naples hinterland. [...] A bitter territorial feud with a rival clan came to a crisis when, on 31 May, 1976, Moccia was shot in the face and died at the wheel of his car. The family was decapitated and the remaining members had to fight or run. They decided to fight.
Their first target was Moccia's number one rival, Antonio Giugliano, who was charged with his murder, and then, to the family's disgust, acquitted. A few days later after the verdict, on 29 May, 1978, Giugliano was walking down the old Naples courthouse in discussion with his lawyer. People were pouring down the staircases and crisscrossing the cobbled internal courtyard; defendants chained together were taking halting steps towards the cells. A young lad ran through the crowd, a pistol in each hand. and shot Giugliano several times. Carabineri brought the boy down with a shot in the side. He was Antonio Moccia, aged 13. He was dragged off and interrogated, but he was too young, by a matter of weeks to be prosecuted. and they had to let him go. They next day they arrested the mother.
[...] Interrogated by the police, she denied instructing the boy to *avenge* the father, but showed no remorse for what her son had done. As prosecutors later pointed out, the boy was merely *'avenged the murder of his father in the only way acceptable to, and recognised by, his culture"* (1997:17).

Domenico Esposito[32] argues that it was the murder of his father by *camorristi* killers on 30th August 1982 which *"changed his life"* (A). His father had aided and abetted an important NCO boss, Nicola Nuzzo of Acerra. Esposito avenged his father and became an associate of Nicola Nuzzo. In his interview, there was direct discursive evidence that vendetta was Esposito's motive for becoming a *camorrista.*

Naturally, vendetta commonly involves the use of violence. Violence or the threat of violence was a major resource both in civil society and within the Camorra. Normally, in Western societies, violence is controlled and monopolised by the state through laws, the police and the military and used to maintain law and order among citizens. In Naples, after fascism and the war, as the State failed to a large extent to reestablish its authority in the city and in the region, the *guappi* and *camorristi* moved in and took on this role. As such they used violence if, and when, necessary. Their activities in the community were wide-ranging: bullying shopkeepers to give food to a family in need, avenging personal insults and settling disputes. This, in turn, created and reinforced their reputation as powerful and prestigious individuals: "Pascalone is a man who decides what is right, even his *guapperie* are used for positive ends, like the time when he intervened to resolve a conflict, to defend seduced girls. Who would refuse to be a groom when Pascalone offered to be the best man?" (De Jaco, 1959 quoted in De Jaco, 1982). Traditionally, the old *guappi* used violence in a very public way. Galdo defines this as "'open, fearless crime' - ie, the classical punishment by the boss of the traitor, guilty of an insult (*un sgarro*), in a public piazza with even some people witnessing his powerful deed" (Galdo, 1981:207).

But, the presence of the American allies and easier

[32] See his life story in Chapter Eight.

access to guns, increased the use of 'Americanised violence', that is to say, gratuitous acts of violence in hidden alleyways. Sales (1988) believes that the 'Maresca murder' in 1955 was the last public murder *à l'ancienne*, of controlled and meaningful violence, whereas from the 1960s onwards violence was used *à l'américaine*, violence for violence sake on the part of men who acquired a violent reputation without the good intentions of the traditional *guappi*. The violent natures of criminals like Francesco Fabbrocino (1930-1982[33]) and Antonio Orlando (1924 -) may explain why they became easily involved in illegal and violent activities.

During his stay in the slums of Naples in the 1970s, Belmonte noted that this raw resource of violence was a common commodity in civil society: "violence was endemic to all the lives which touched mine" (1979:18). Moreover, he observed the effect of violence on those around them: "the volatility and brute force of Lorenzo's action repelled me, as did the admiration which the other men subsequently bestowed upon him (*ibid*:17-8). Violence, therefore, was a means of gaining a reputation in non-criminal or criminal spheres. This frequent use of violence increased during the 1980s both in civil society and the Camorra.

During the 1980s, the use of violence by Camorra gangs was very Americanised in nature: widespread massacres in quiet areas for the smallest of conflicts or insults, threats and intimidation; and murders to resolve power struggles with increasingly sophisticated weapons: bombs and foreign guns.[34] The widespread use of violence by Camorra groups meant that they were constantly on the lookout for young violent

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33 He was murdered by the NCO but his younger brother Mario Fabbrocino would become an important NF *Camorrista* in the 1980-90s. He was finally arrested in 1997 in South America. Francesco Fabbrocino in the 1950s was a fearless individual who intimidated individuals (see CD'A3).

34 For example, the murder of Ciro Nuvoletta in Marano in 1983 and *La Strage di Torre Annunziata* in 1984.

small-time delinquents, for "people who were capable, who had the guts to kill" (CD'A19b:77). Thus, as a motive, violence was an outlet for aggressive individuals and exerted a great deal of attraction for ambitious young delinquents who wanted to make a career in the Camorra, gaining a reputation and becoming powerful: "[with violence you can] become somebody": [...] And most importantly, [Cutolo] gave them the conviction that with violence you were not alienated, but you were *somebody*[35], you were not a reject, but a *camorrista* and received dignity and prestige from this title" (Sales, 1988:155).

A violent nature can, therefore, be a motive for membership, when young men got involved in the Camorra because they had violent tendencies and could kill easily. The Camorra was an outlet for violence, the NCO and the NF alike; it structured these young people's lives, giving them a future which they otherwise would not have. This can be seen in the case of the Mercurio brothers, two violent streetwise brothers who were used as killers by bosses such as Umberto Ammaturo and Carmine Alfieri. There are many examples of extremely violent young men who were used by Camorra leaders to carrying out their violence. Most of them could not verbalise this in their discursive consciousness but some have done so like Umberto Ammaturo (see CD'A19a +b).

It is clear that the general rules of conduct which appear in the practical and discursive consciousness are as in the case of values closely linked to those of civil society as a whole. This is particularly the case for the law of silence, *omertà*, which has prevailed in Southern Italy all through the period under consideration among ordinary law-abiding citizens and criminals alike. In general, historians explain the origin of *omertà* in Southern Italy in terms of foreign occupation. Confronted by foreign rulers (such as the

35 My emphasis.

Spaniards or the Austrians) considered as the enemy by the local population, silence was used as an invisible weapon, as a clear marker of the 'them against us' mentality, thus producing a collective feeling of solidarity against the outsiders. Sterling sums up the historical development of *omertà* in Sicily but it also applies to Naples and Campania: "silence is a race memory in Sicily. Two thousand years of foreign occupation and despotic rule have taught the five million inhabitants of this Mediterranean island to keep their mouths shut. The state is the enemy, whether in the guise of the Norman conquerors or Bourbon kings or Modern Italy [...]. They have a word for this code of conduct: *omertà*, to be a man. Hardly a soul in Sicily would inform on the Mafia up to the 1980s. Fear held people back - stark terror often - but so did pride and fierce ethnic loyalty [...] By and large, however, the ancient Sicilian code of *omertà* held a whole populace in bond. secret by nature, the Mafia was doubly secret as a result of this great popular wall of silence around it (1990:45-6).

This code of conduct pervaded in the whole of society: on the one hand, criminal groups (*Cosa Nostra* and the Neapolitan *guappi*) used it as an internal code imposing silence on its members and on the other, *omertà*, was respected by people who belong to civil society (civil *omertà*) "promote[ing] obedience to *mafioso* dictates and sometimes, also motivate[ing] opposition to the workings of the State (Siebert, 1996:139). To use the words of Judge Perrella "culprits and victims follow the most rigorous rules of *omertà*" (CD'A2:298-99). It provokes thus both in civil and criminal society loyalty and fear, or as Lewis calls it, "the conspirational silence of the South" (Lewis, 1978:72) which protects the illegal activities of the *Cosa Nostra* in Sicily and of the *guappi* of Naples and guarantees their survival. This can be seen for example when

Pasquale Simonetti, '*Pascalone e' Nola*', an important *guappo*, was murdered in broad day light in *Piazza Mercato*, the busy market place of Naples in July 1955: "when the police arrived in *Corso Novara* after a few minutes, they looked at the traces of blood, they started to interrogate those 'who had not seen anything'[36]" (De Jaco, 1959 quoted in De Jaco, 1982). Guarino noted that the classic mental and psychological state of Southern *omertà* thus continued to persist (1955); the endurance of this value means that important criminal acts have never been explained and that *guappi* were able sometimes to commit serious illegal acts in full impunity. As was the case for Alfredo Maisto.

Thus, this general law of silence helps create favourable conditions of implicit social control and undiscussed alliances. In some cases, this has encouraged people to become accomplices by being silent and not denouncing visible criminal activities. Moreover, while other forms of *omertà* have declined, this form of *omertà* has persisted through out the post-war period and was as strong in the 1950s as in the 1980s.

Omertà is a rule which was still very powerful among *camorristi* in the 1980s. In fact, it was still present in two forms: internal and external *omertà.* The internal *omertà* present in the 1980s was still as consistent as that in the 1950s, if not more so, in the sense that both the NCO and NF clans adopted it as a clear and imperative code of conduct to be respected. As Ryan explains: "[the] code of silence, [is] a protective mechanism used to discipline and control the members of the Mafia [the Camorra]. By threatening death for violation of the code, the Mafias [the Camorra] are able to maintain loyalty and avoid prosecution" (1995:276). In the case

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[36] This makes us think of the classic scenario of Sciascia's *Giorno della Civetta* (1986).

of the NCO, it reincarnated the rules of the *Società Onorata* (for example, "the glorification of *omertà*" is used to start the initiation oath: "*Omertà bella come m'insegnasti [...]*" (beautiful *omertà*, you who taught me) and in the case of the NF families, they also used *omertà* following *Cosa Nostra's* rule of silence (silence and secrecy about organisation) were sacred rules of *Cosa Nostra*[37]). In both cases, those who spoke too much were silenced usually with murder as was the case with NCO member Antonio Cuomo[38] and Eduardo De Ronza[39] of the Gionta Clan.

In the mid-1980s, the predominance of this internal *omertà* started to fade, as some criminals started to talk, becoming *pentiti,* and distancing themselves from their criminal past). This phenomenon of *pentitismo* initially hit the NCO worst of all (Jacquemet, 1996) as the organisation was not based on blood ties and because it suffered defeat at the hands of the new rising Camorra, the NF clans However, by the 1990s, the leaders and members of important NF clans also started to talk after being arrested, in return for protection and a new life.

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37 The three mafia-Camorra *pentiti* which I interviewed stressed how important this value of omerta was, especially not speaking of the organisation to others. See also the film, *Il Sasso in Bocca*, (dir :Giuseppe Ferrara, 1970) which deals with the theme of *omertà* in Sicily and how Cosa Nostra uses it as a social rule to impose itself on criminal and civil society.

38 He was murdered in Naples Prison because Cutolo believed that he had talked to the police to give away his cover. His murder is vividly recounted in the book *Il Camorrista* by Giuseppe Marrazzo in 1985 (Pironti: Napoli) and the film which was based on it, *Il Camorrista* (director: Giuseppe Tornatore, 1986, Mondatori Video). Antonio Cuomo was murdered in prison by fellow *camorrista*, Pasquale Barra and his wife was also murdered, leaving their child an orphan. Cutolo dedicated a poem to the child to explain why they had been murdered because Antonio Cuomo had broken the law of violence (see Cutolo's book and newspaper articles). See his life story in chapter seven (page 140).

39 The same thing happened to him as to Cuomo, he was perceived as a liability because he talked. De Ronza, a member of the Gionta clan, was murdered by his own clan and friends because it was believed that he was getting too friendly with the local *carabinieri* and give them some of the clans' secrets.

So, even the family with its strong blood ties was succumbing to the state's fight against crime and the control system of *omertà* was breaking down. However, even when *camorristi* talked and revealed important secrets, *omertà* still ruled partially as the *pentiti* did not go into great depths about their family or friend's crime or when, as in the Cirillo affair,[40] there was a lot who gave conflicting information, which made it impossible to know whether the truth had been told.

As already pointed out, the Camorra still imposed external civil *omertà*, that which exists when the population sees and hears things but does no speak or help the police find the culprits. Pasquale Galasso was amazed: *"to think that we acted openly in the presence of many people and nobody ever talked to the police"* (Pr7:21-2-92:11). Alfieri maintained that this form of *omertà* protected him: *"my protection was provided, above, all by the people of the region"* (S7b:63). One can see this *omertà* present and alive during Camorra trials in Naples when victims and witnesses stated that they knew and had seen nothing, contradicting at times statements they had made earlier to the police. Contrary to internal *omertà*, thus external civil *omertà* has persisted through out the post-war period and is more alive than ever. With this form of external *omertà*, of passive collective behaviour to what is happening around, one could also explain how some people got caught up in Camorra projects without necessarily intending to. .

5.2.3 Money, Social Prestige and Power

Vendetta and *omertà* are two fundamental social values which are imposed through the use of violence in order to dominate the territory. By the 1980s, violence was no longer the only means of imposing Camorra domination, even if it

[40] See Appendix Eight.

remained the most effective one. Two of the objectives of the Camorra on a large scale was to enforce its domination and defend its criminal ethos; as Galasso said *"I understood perfectly how the aim of our clan was money and power, aims which would be achieved in any way possible, even the reckless and most inhuman"* (Pr7:4/97).

By the 1980s, the majority of the Camorra gangs had made their fortune through extortion[41] or smuggling and drugs[42] and were now dealing with huge sums of money completely unknown to the earlier *guappi*. This money gave them an enormous amount of freedom and choice. With such money and violence at their disposal, the Camorra made inroads into centres of political power very easily to defend their values and more particularly the schemes they were interested in. They could bribe and threaten politicians to secure the decisions they wanted. For example, money enabled the NF clans in the mid-1980s to undertake a quantum leap in terms of business and contracts: they could start to set up legal businesses to recycle illegal money and corrupt politicians to secure important public contracts in the post-earthquake economy. This money made them extremely powerful.

The huge sums of money, available both the NCO and the NF became a strong incentive for young delinquents. Such was the case of Luciano Aviello: "my cousin was a member of the Mariano Clan.[43] [...] I was born and grew up in the Spanish Quarters and was straight away judged as an intelligent child. My cousin, whom I spent time with, said so. I was fascinated by his ways, the easy money which he had in his pocket, by the things he could buy: women, television, fun. I have always

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41 As was the case with the NCO.

42 As was the case with the NF families whose main activity in the 1960s was smuggling and helping the Sicilians.

43 Clan in the old centre of Naples (see Appendix Six).

wanted to dress properly. I think that it is better to dress in a certain way and this was appreciated by the group" (Di Fiore, 1993:247). This fascination for money can be pinpointed as the motive which led him to become increasingly involved in Camorra activities.

The NCO also used money to attract young delinquents by setting itself out as a social alternative to the state. It employed a massive number of unemployed youngsters for illegal activities.[44] Like a State agency, the NCO set up a social assistance system whereby its members were financially secure and had lawyers to defend them as well as guaranteeing their families welfare if they were in prison. The NF families also set up a salary system making sure that all members were looked after.

Money, fast cars, good suits, women and a sense of security can therefore be seen as a motive for becoming a *camorrista* in the 1980s. Such was the case of Carmine Schiavone[45]: his discursive consciousness shows that it was money which intrigued him and attracted him to organised crime, to the NF clans. The same can be said of Luciano Fiorillo, the son of a respected Neapolitan family, who was attracted to the camorra for its easy money: *"Fiorillo asked to become a drug courier to pay his debts or make investments"* (CD'A19:61). Money is an important motivating factor although rarely emphasised as such. It is more the social prestige of belonging to such an organisation which is clear in the agent's discursive consciousness. The *mafioso* Francesco Marino Mannoia told the magistrate Roberto Scarpinato: "a lot of people think you join *Cosa Nostra* for the money....You know

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[44] For example, members were paid easy money to carry out murders or smuggle cigarettes: Cataldo, member of Gionta clan, at the beginning of his career in the 1980s was paid 2 milioni a month for his work for the clan (D).

[45] See his life story in Chapter Eight

why I became a man of honour? Because before in Palermo I was Mr Nobody. Afterward, wherever I went people bowed their heads. No money could have got me that (in Robb, 1996: 263), Moreover, as Siebert points out: "when all is said and done, beyond the craving for wealth which is undoubtedly an important motive in criminal activities, the Mafia's paramount aim is *power*[46] (1996:61). The same can be said of the Camorra. 'Power' for an organised crime group means 'territorial sovereignty': total control over the area, over the lives of the people, of the social and political activities, over everything: "[...] in its abrogation of absolute power to itself, the power over life and death (*ibid*:62).

The Camorra's strategic agenda might not be so obviously focused on power as that of *Cosa nostra*, but it does in its own way also seek to be all-powerful and dominant by controlling its territory, the money-making activities and the political decisions as Pasquale Galasso noted *"I then understood how the objectives of this organisation were money*[47] *and power, objectives to be attained, however possible, even in the most savage and inhumane ways"* (Pr7:17-3-93:4). What is interesting to note is that this notion of power attracts individuals to join and become involved in organised crime groups; as Siebert stresses: "yet, I am convinced that close involvement and active participation in the mafia organisation demands that the individual concerned cultivate a psychological predisposition for violence, *power* and unnatural death" (1996:67). Some individuals may be fascinated by this notion of power and becoming powerful: being the leader of a group of delinquents who make a lot of money fast and control politicians and businessmen; thus, have a form of psychological predisposition, an inclination towards wanting to

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[46] My emphasis.

[47] Indeed, Galasso did very well for himself. See Appendix Three.

dominate. This may explain why some people, especially those who became important leaders, got involved. Ammaturo highlights this aspect of showing off and in a sense, wanting the power that comes with being the centre of attention: *"unfortunately, pathologically, we are exhibitionists, real exhibitionists, you do not undertake a crime if you do not want people to talk about it, I feel you lose something otherwise"* (S7d). It may also explain the attraction for weak individuals who are drawn to a clan because this gives them the possibility of becoming somebody, of becoming important and gaining social recognition.

This value rarely formed part of the discursive consciousness, more that of the practical consciousness. It had become predominant by the 1980s. It can explain the behaviour of criminals like Alfredo Maisto and Raffaele Cutolo, both power hungry criminals.

5.3 Conclusion

Having outlined the discursive and practical consciousness of the agent in both periods, we can conclude that while in the 1950s motives were substantially based on a notion of criminality for survival; in the 1980s, motives were still rational but in a more sophisticated way. Now, motives were more focused on organisation and on using all possible values (the family, violence, friendship, *omertà*, vendetta and power), weapons and means for ends which were conducive to the money-making schemes of the business Camorra.

Our evidence also illustrates that there were basic criminal values and motives for joining based around the traditional code of conduct: defending one's honour, respect for all, prestige, survival, personal vendetta and power. But, by

the 1980s, many of these basic values had been manipulated, transformed and based around a business: respect for power and money, strategic use of friends and family, greed. Now, we look at the influence of the macro-environment.

Chapter Six
The Weight of the Macro-Environment

"Mafiosi non si nasce, si diventa."
Casarrubea and Blandano (1991:51).

"Tranne pochi casi patologici l'uomo non nasce col desiderio di fare del male. Ma se è costretto a farlo lo fa. E un suo diritto sacrosanto di sopravivenza."
Torre (1993:XIV).

"It follows that the gangster is a product of his surroundings in the same way in which the good citizen is a product of his environment"
Landesco (1968:123).

6.1 Introduction

So far, the major factors that are part of the agent's discursive and practical consciousness on the theme of becoming a member of the Camorra have been explained. Now, we examine different structural components of the macro-environment and how they have constrained agent's choices by looking at precise case-studies. This will help to illustrate the influence of the different components of macro-environment on the agent's motives for joining the Camorra.

6.2 The Context in the 1950s and 1980s

The socioeconomic situation in which Neapolitans have made their life choices have been desperate throughout the post-war period. Naples and the Campania region suffered greatly during and after the war, in particular, from Allied carpet bombing, German sabotage in September in 1943 and military occupation in 1943-6. Norman Lewis recalls the city in 1943: "the city of Naples smells of charred wood, with ruins everywhere, sometimes completely blocking the streets, bomb craters and abandoned trams. [...] To complete the Allies' work of destruction, German demolition squads have gone

round blowing up anything of value to the city that still worked (1978:26).

Maurizio Valenzi's first impressions were similar: "the thing which really upset me was my encounter with Naples. Until then, the image I had was rather conventional, a picture post-card image, folk-picture in the worst sense of the word. [...] Certainly, it was not easy to get on, in the midst of the war ruins - there was not one building, not one home which was spared by the bombs and added to this dire starvation and abject poverty" (1978, quoted in De Jaco, 1982:200). A young Monarchist historian, Degli Espinosa, added: "all public services, commerce and honourable occupations had broken down and the population which had previously lived in an orderly manner was now transformed into a mass of people determined to survive at all cost (1946, quoted in De Jaco, 1982:202). These, and other testimonies, confirm the disastrous effects of the war on Naples.[1] Consequently, the population resorted to all types of activity, legal or illegal in order to subsist. Black market and smuggling became "a 'regular job' for hundreds of Neapolitan families" (Coletti, 1995:115). The culture of illegality which is so often associated with Neapolitan life flourished: "the storm of the war and of the post-war period caused the extension of illegal markets giving renewed vigour to violent crooks and to their role as mediators above and against the law (Scarpino, 1995:54). These illegal activities were so essential to everyday survival that they were tolerated by the public authorities; any repression would have caused a mass revolt. Thus, delinquent individuals and groups were able to organise seriously and take over these illegal markets (Guarino, 1955, 1961).

It has been suggested that this situation was facilitated by two further factors: first, the black market and smuggling were facilitated by the fact that many young American soldiers were of sons of Neapolitan immigrants and therefore sympathetic to the local population; in addition, some important American Mafia bosses (Vito

[1] There are also the notorious descriptions of Malaparte in his novels *Kaputt* (1944) and *La Pelle* (1949). There is also Paolo Di Marco's book *Polvere di Piselli, La Vita Quotidiana a Napoli durante l'Occupazione Alleata (1943-44)*, 1996, Napoli: Liguori.

Genovese and Lucky Luciano), after having been recruited by the US Army to help in the liberation of Sicily (see Campbell, 1977) and expelled from the USA as 'undesirable', settled in Naples to serve a punitive sentence. It has been argued that their presence in Naples encouraged local criminality (Sales, 1988).

In any event, it is crucial to understand the nature of local politics in the 1950s. It showed a tolerance of illegal practices especially towards the black market and petty crime. The Monarchist Mayor Lauro considered the Camorra not as a problem but rather as a folk-characteristic of Neapolitan life: "the Camorra had aspects of generosity and chivalry" (D'Avino[2], D'Ascoli, 1974:117). It intensified clientelistic and corrupt practices particularly in the profitable building speculation schemes (Galasso, 1978:251). The illegal sphere inserted itself into the legal one.

Thus, Naples in the 1950s was a turbulent place where the slow and chaotic reconstruction of economic activities and of normal living conditions allowed the culture of illegality and criminality to thrive with the complicity of the public authorities. This culture of illegality may explain why many young men started smuggling in the 1950s in order to survive and make money. This then developed into a full time and lucrative activity.

In the 1980s, the circumstances remained as desperate if not worse than in the 1950s, especially for the poorer classes. Robb's description on his arrival Naples in 1978 is vividly accurate:

> Naples in 1978 was, after nearly three millennia, showing her age. The unutterable scenic beauty of the bay and the city hardly bore a closer look. A lot of it was a filthy, polluted slum standing on the foulest sea in Christendom. Twelve rats for every human, someone had calculated. Its schools, libraries, hospitals, universities, museums, prisons must have been worst in Europe. Visits to a bank, a post office, the town hall were hallucinatory experiences. The *res publica*, taken to include health, education, transport, politics, communications, entertainment, sport, personal safety, was a lost cause. By the usual measures of social wellbeing Naples was a disaster area. Five years earlier there had been an outbreak

[2] One of his supporters, the journalist Alberto Consiglio wrote a book, *La Camorra* (1959, Milano: Cino del Duca) in this vein.

> of cholera. The incidence of hepatitis was the second highest in the world, as I found when I became infected myself. A wave of infant deaths panicked poorer districts for much of my first year. There was a lot of talk about a mystery illness but there was nothing mysterious about the squalor that bred infection. The third world begins in Naples, people used to say, and a lot of statistics were third world (1996:156-7).

Besides a small well-to-do-class with large apartments in Posillipo, a summer house in Capri or Ischia and an expensive life style, there is a mass of unemployed (about 25% in Naples), often illiterate, living in bad overcrowded conditions in the *bassi,* hardly making ends meet, engaging in casual labour, moon lighting, *lavoro nero*) and, whenever necessary, in illegal activities in order to survive. These were the "two cities" (*due città)* or "two societies" described by Domenico Rea (1955): "two populations who live in the same districts, the same streets, the same buildings but have two different languages, two different visions of life, of work, of society, of customs, of morality which are totally distinct (Nobile, 2-1998:26[3]).

Belmonte, in his description of the Neapolitan sub-proletariat stressed the precariousness of life and the lack of opportunities for young people that prevailed even in the 1980s:

> in an economic sense, they live at the edge of the world. Their social behaviour reflects the precariousness of their position. They call and cling to one another to keep from falling off, but just as often they push and trample one another down in their frenzy to survive. Poverty and scarcity bear down hard and provide the keynote for the pace and activity of their lives. [...]
> Politically, they are just cynical. Long familiar with the parasitism and corruption of established bureaucratic power, they are hesitant to align themselves with the revolutionary programs and rising fortunes of other powerful classes, whether liberal bourgeois or proletarian. They remain attached to the personalistic hierarchies of traditional authority. [...] In a cultural sense, they are at once excluded and highly selective. By preference, they speak and pass on to their children their own language and are content to learn some fragmentary standard Italian in a few years at primary

[3] Echoing Vincenzo Cuoco's famous explanation for the failure of the 1799 revolution, "the patriots' views were not those of the people, they had different ideas" (quoted in Allum, 1973a:50).

> school. They preserve a catholic ritual facade but prefer their many Madonna-goddesses to Christ and maintain an active belief in myriad local house-spirits, reminiscent of a pre-Christian epoch. They take from the media only that which is relevant to their lives. But the mass entertainment of escapism, in music, television and film appeals to them as to all oppressed peoples as a coca to numb the hunger pangs of the mind (1979:140-41).

We must also remember that to make things worse, an earthquake hit Campania in 1980. This is the context which constrained the choices of many individuals such as Gerardo Intagliatore[4] and Piero Pugliese of whom we have the confessions.

In the case of Gerardo Intagliatore, this environment seems to have been a major influence on his 'life-choices' like the gangster in Landesco's study on organised crime in Chicago: "the gangster has lived his life in a region of law breaking, of graft, and of "fixing" (1968:223). He was "a natural product of his environment" (*ibid*). Born in Torre Annunziata in 1963, he never went to school and therefore remained illiterate: *"I worked with my father-in-law, I was a craftsman - bulletproof doors, aluminium windows, [...] brick laying, any type of work [...] I was a loner and tried my luck at stealing. [...] Some Camorra members noticed me"* (CD'A18c:7). As a young man with no education in a society where crime was a major occupation and the Camorra one of the major employers, his involvement was normal. The Contact with the local Camorra boss opened new possibilities: *"they gave me 300.000 lire in 1983, I was with Di Ronza, I was Di Ronza's or Gionta Ernesto's bodyguard. Then, little by little, from what was a cigarette ring, we got into murders, other things, hold ups because we had to organise when they had to kill, we had to steal a motorbike or a car, whatever they asked me to do I did. Then, little by little, we entered the big time taking orders directly from Gionta Valentino and becoming more or less part of the Gionta clan"* (*ibid*:21).

Piero Pugliese (1954 -) is another clear example of the weight of the environment on the agent's choices and behaviour. His discursive

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[4] See his life story in Chapter Eight.

consciousness spells out the influence of the context in his joining the Camorra; he maintains that for a long time he was friendly with 'these people': *"I think I can say that, for my misfortune, although I must admit that I really wanted to do it, that already in 1978-79-80, I was close to people like Ciruzzi 'O Compagno, Paolo Di Lauro at Secondigliano. I lived in Casavatore so I knew the Lorusso of Secondigliano but not that well, only acquaintances"* (CD'A17b:3). What he called in his confessions his *"evil occupation, his activity as a camorrista"* (CD'A17b:1), he directly attributes to his social environment. Martusciello Ciro (1969 -), an illegal mechanic from Secondigliano, also became involved in local Camorra activities because he lived in the close vicinity of these criminals: *"I knew Araniello Vincenzo because his brother lived next door to me"* (S11a). He started frequenting the clan and would keep drugs for them. This was the beginning of a small time criminal career. Salvatore Migliorino[5] went even further when he said *"I wish I had been born elsewhere"* (B). He believes that it was his environment, his gang of friends and the lack of competent structures such as school which influenced his life choices and his criminal career.

From these case-studies, we perceive the influence of the social context on the discursive consciousness of the agent. This reinforces the American criminological literature which considers the environment, the collective, as a fundamental influence (see Landesco, 1968; Merton, 1968). The pressure of circumstance in the 1980s was greater than in the 1950s as mass unemployment and bad living conditions had worsened.

6.3 The Institutions in the 1950s and 1980s

Another facet of the external structure to be studied in this are the institutions which existed in the different systems; the primary referents of this institutional framework within which the *guappi* and the Camorra operated were (a) the family in the private sphere in the

[5] See his life story in Chapter Eight.

social system and (b) the state authorities in the public sphere in the political system. In the 1980s, however, the Camorra acquired such extensive power and influence over Neapolitan society that one can define it as a new 'institution' emanating from the social system. It was an institution in the sense that it had set rules and regulations which all members respected even if there existed no written formal rules. However, it was a 'cyclical' institution because it could appear as easily as it could disappear and its non-linear history has proved this.

6.3.1 The Family in the 1950s and 1980s

In the previous the role of the family as a criminal value was shown to be crucial in the formation of the Camorra's modern organisational structure. The family can also be looked at as an institution which, with its position at the centre of the private sphere, provided social practices such as reproduction, kinship, protection towards their women folk and economic strategies. It is the importance of this institution in determining the choices of would-be criminals which needs to be assessed here as for example in the case of Vincenzo O' Franfellicaro[6] who followed in his father and grandfather's criminal footsteps (De Majo, 1998).

In Southern Italy, the family, with its strong blood ties, was a highly respected institution. Banfield (1958) has stressed that it was the key institution in civil society preventing the formation of other civil associations; especially as, in the post-war period, the Roman Catholic church and the DC united to reinforce its role (Goddard, 1996). Individuals looked to the family as the only solid and secure reference point for affective, social and economic support. Belmonte explained:

> In the economic sense, the family is for sharing and pooling and distributing. The family is an organisational innovation to facilitate feeding and by the (implicit) directives of the incest

6 For his life story see Chapter Seven.

taboo to insure the species a steady supply of genetically vigorous and politically useful mates. But the family is more than a set of arrangements for food sharing and alliance formation, more than a corporation for the husbandry of reproductive potentials. The family is the crucible of every human identity. Like each person, every family has a distinctive quality. Each family imposes its own collective being upon the isolate being of each of its members (1979:59).

With the development of consumerism throughout the 1980s and worsening economic conditions the economic role of the family was reinforced: "in the South, families still face difficult objective circumstances and the relatively larger family units could reflect the persistence of strategies aimed at maximising the work and income of as many family members as possible. Furthermore, given the hostile social environment of Southern cities, the family could be seen as a refuge from the outside world [...]" (Ginsborg in Goddard, 1996:164). Therefore it produced a strong collective identity and sense of belonging. It also produced a sense of protectiveness not only within the traditional relationship of the mother towards her children but also of the men towards their women folk. Carmine Alfieri spoke in very affectionate terms of his mother *"a mother is unique and irreplaceable and when you lose your mother, you lose the only person who really cares about you!"* (S7b:121); and Salvatore Migliorino insisted that *"you do anything for your loved ones"* (B). As the family was the dominant social unit in civil society, it monopolised, determined and exerted control over the behaviour of its members. As a result, the opinions of the family were very important: the behaviour of sisters and daughters was closely scrutinised and judged according to the social codes which were acceptable to the family. It was thus a tight affective network where the exchange of feelings and opinions mattered and influenced individual behaviour.

This kind of close-knit family may explain why some individuals became involved in the Camorra: the fact that some agents were born into a Camorra family may have led them to be influenced by a close

relative, a father or brother and to follow in their criminal footsteps. Pasquale Galasso explained his potential role in influencing his children's future within his family when he told judges what they said to him: *"Father, the Carabinieri are your enemies, they should be killed"* (CAP1.2:36). *"I was becoming even for my children a role model and a hero because of my clashes with the police"* (Pr7:6-25). It may explain Domenico Rosa Cutolo's[7] involvement in the NCO. As the eldest sister of Raffaele Cutolo, who bought him up because their mother was too old, it is clear that it was under his influence and out of affection for him that she engaged in Camorra activities. Similarly, we may explain the involvement of Martino Galasso, Pasquale Galasso's younger brother, in the clan: *"In a certain way, I was always very close to my brother Pasquale after 1982, after the murder of our brother Nino"* (CD'A17q:6)

The family has had this strong influence on many children and nephews of criminals as seems to have been the case for the *pentiti* Alfonso Ferrara Rosanova jr (1960 -), son of Alfonso Rosanova and the D'Avino brothers. Ferrara Rosanova junior in no way accepted that his father was a criminal and does not consider himself one at all (CD'A17x+y). Yet all the evidence suggests that his father was an important boss and that he and his brothers, were members of the family clan. Fiore D'Avino does not explain the role of his father whereas his younger brother, Luigi, (1956 -) does: *"I remember that from my early childhood, my father had had some difficulties with the law and had met Salvatore Alfieri, Carmine Alfieri, Raffaele Cutolo and I have always lived in this social criminal context from an early age"* (CD'A17t:6-7). Whereas in the case of Stefano Reccia (1958 -) it was his uncle, Mario Iovine, the boss of Aversa, who influenced: "the influence which his uncle has had on him, has conditioned in a decisive way, his criminal behaviour" (SO12:513)

Hence, on the one hand the Neapolitan family can be described as the nurturing ground for the young it can also be seen as the force which drives young men out into the world in order to seek out other

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[7] See her life story in Chapter Eight.

young men (their peer group) to counterbalance the influence of the family. The family was in fact dominated by women, mainly mothers: "as housekeepers and carers of the children, it is on them that all the responsibilities of the family rests. This is why in the South, poor women, as soon as they marry, become very powerful; men (husbands, sons, grandsons) fear and respect them" (Brandon-Albini, 1963:38).

The importance of mothers in the Neapolitan family, despite stereotypes which may suggest otherwise (Gribaudi, 1996:89), has been analysed accurately by Anne Parsons.[8] She came to the conclusion that in the sub proletariat,[9] because men (husband and/or father) could not rely on economic security and on the prestige of a regular job, due to long periods of unemployment, power devolved to the mother (wife and/or mother). So having lost authority over their family, in particular in relation to their sons, husbands became dissatisfied and sought extramarital affairs, leaving the private sphere completely to the authority of the mother/wife.

She discovered that this family structure caused important psychological personality problems for young male sons. Whereas daughters developed close and intimate relationships with their mothers from whom they learnt how to be good wives, cooks, cleaners and mothers, enjoying the protection of their brothers and father, the young males felt gradually marginalised. Their private world was dominated by women and mother figures; in the absence of a strong father figure, they had to find a vehicle and form of expression for their masculine identity elsewhere, outside the family. According to Parsons the "social mechanism" which responded to these problems

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8 Parsons developed this analysis to try and understand the structure of and "[...] the social dynamics of the Neapolitan family among the proletariat and sub-proletariat" (1969:70). In a multiple-disciplinary, cross-cultural approach combining anthropology, psychology and sociology she carried out a projectile test (TAT), in which subjects were asked to relate stories about a series of interpersonal scenes in order to obtain "[...] an idea of the meaning that the concept of family had for the informants" (1969:71). These tests revealed firstly, the importance of mothers in the Neapolitan family,and secondly, the difficulties of young males within the family, both phenomena having strong social implications.

9 The matrilinear tendency seems more pro-dominant in the sub-proletariat where men were unemployed for long periods of time whereas in families where the father had a secure occupational status he retained his paternal authority. This was the case in most middle-class families (Parsons, 1969:93).

and where their masculine identity was learnt and expressed, was the "male gang", which was part of the public sphere. The gang, she believed, was "a social compensating device in that it accentuate[d] masculinity for the boy, often by defining it as participation in group-encouraged delinquency or otherwise physically aggressive action" (*ibid*:94). Thus, it was in their peer group, on the street-corner, that they received their street 'cred' education with its macho values, its use of violence and its emphasis on power and personal prestige.

In the 1950s, she argued that young men found their masculine identity and awareness in a kind of loosely organised network of masculine friendships (1969) whereas when the "Camorra" was fully established as was the case in the 1980s, it was the ideal "self-reinforcing masculine society" which incarnated their needs. The well organised criminal groups of the 1980s offered a better 'family' than previously, reminiscent for them of their biological one, yet on an exclusively male basis, exalting exclusively masculine values. This may explain to some extent the Camorra involvement of Antonio Tarallo,[10] a member of the Limelli clan, although he verbalises it differently (see Chapter Five). He was a single child with an absent father. Although he went to an American religious school in Portici which tried to give him some solid values, his absent father would appear to have had an impact on his unconscious decisions. His environment attracted him away from his family. We have a different example which shows that the lack of solid family can also push agents towards criminality: this is the case of Umberto Ammaturo whose mother died when he was seven and left his father to look after seven small children. Ammaturo was a bright child who learnt crime on the streets (CD'A19a+b).

In conclusion, our analysis shows that the family as a institution influenced, or to use Alfieri's own discursive expression *"contaminated"*, the agent and led him/her to become involved in illegal activities.

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[10] See his life story in Chapter Eight.

6.3.2 The State Authorities in the 1950s and 1980s

The lack of state identification in Naples, and consequently the lack of a civic culture (Almond and Verba, 1963), pushes individuals from the public sphere to the private sphere where they organise around the family unit. This lack of a 'state' presence is a historical condition which has developed over the centuries and in the post-war period has been as significant as ever due to the inefficiency of public administration, politicians and the legal system: *la Camorra avance là où l'Etat recule* - in other words, the Camorra takes over the space left vacant by the state.

Factors such as underdeveloped public infrastructures, personalisation of power and clientelistic practices in all walks of life have alienated individuals from public life and undermined a clear sense of belonging: "It is the institutions that still dictate the sense of community, the values, the models of behaviour of civil society, but the 'pervasive state' has produced a very low sense of the state" (Sales, 1985:19).

It translates itself into indifference towards the state authorities, its rules and regulations. This may not be a direct motive for becoming a *camorrista* but it can reinforce decisions. Migliorino speaks vividly of the lack of state and how he did not care for the law (B). Moreover, even if criminals were sent to prison, often they would not fully serve their sentences because the effective implementation of sentences is weak in the Italian legal system.

6.3.3 The Camorra as an institutionalised sub-system in the 1980s

In the 1950s, the word "Camorra" was used when referring to the criminal activities of individual *guappi*; probably for historical reasons; the Camorra was evoked but it was not the secret society of late 19th century, since the individual *guappi* were not organised among themselves and did not form a structured organisation. The name was therefore used only as a synonym for local criminality *(la malavità locale)*. By the mid 1960s, the term "Camorra" was used to describe

organised smuggling gangs with a leader and clear rules of conduct. But by the 1980s, an important transformation seems to have occurred: the social-criminal practices which the Camorra undertook had acquired such systematic proportions and pervasive influence that it would be legitimate to say that they had become *'institutionalised'* as organised crime. Arlacchi makes a similar case concerning the transformation of the Sicilian Mafia when he says that the personal code of honour "[...] transformed into *power* acknowledged as legitimate" could be considered as *institutionalised* (1983:21). In fact, the Camorra had reached this stage of development in the late 1970s and early 1980s by establishing formal rules and defined positions, with set recruitment policies, clear rules of conduct and forms of business which had implications on agents' choices. It was able to recruit and socialise its members into a strong organisation, shape their incentives and sanction their behaviour with authority, as systems do according to Easton's paradigm (1965 and 1990).

Thus, the Camorra became a well-established institution within the social system by feeding off the incompetence of state authorities: as such it has been seen by a number of investigating magistrates (Giovanni Falcone, GianCarlo Caselli, Paolo Mancuso and Armando D'Altiero) as constituting a real Counter-State in the sense of being an alternative centre of authority. Indeed, we would argue that the Camorra needs the state authorities in order to thrive, as *a state within a state*. In other words, the Camorra needs the state to exist and expand. It is the state's shadow and literally sucks blood from it. But without the state as a base, the Camorra cannot exist. In this way, it presents itself as an alternative to the state within the state structure: *a state within a state.*

The empirical data highlights the various facets of the Camorra as an institution. First and foremost, there is the matter of recruitment and socialisation into the organisation. One of the main recruitment centres for the Camorra was, as it had been a century earlier, prison (Di Fiore, 1993:158): Poggioreale, Avellino, Secondigliano,

Santa Maria Capua Vetere. A lot of well-known gangsters spent many years in prison acquiring a prestigious reputation both inside and outside. They shared cells and exchanged experiences, becoming friends. The NCO was in fact formed in prison (Marino, 1986) and its membership was recruited predominantly there. This was the case of Cutolo and the businessmen Alfonso Rosanova and Corrado Iacolare,[11] both of whom he met in prison. Iacolare claims that he wanted to *"live on the edge"*. Asked about his role within the NCO, Iacolare's discursive consciousness pinpoints prison as the place where they met: *"we spent a couple of days together at Poggioreale [...] and the relationship had ended there"* (Pr1: 4-6).

Other examples of the importance of prison come from the NF clans. Giovanni Labonia was a young delinquent who in 1989, after a history of robberies, murders and youth detention centres, was already an experienced small-time criminal living off his criminal activities. He joined the Camorra, after having shared his cell with a *camorrista*, Giuseppe Castaldi: *"I met him at Cavinola prison, we shared the same prison-cell, It was August 1989. [...] I met him in prison, we became good friends and a close friendship developed between us. We talked about a lot of things and he told me that he was a member of the Mariano clan. I told him my stories, he asked me if I would like to join the clan [...]. He promised me that if everything went OK as he hoped it would - I would be a member of the organisation on my release* (Cd'A15b). Giovanni Ferriero (1958 -) was also recruited while in Santa Maria Capua Vetere prison in 1983 by the boss, Sandokan. He became his driver and bodyguard, earning 2 milion lire a month (SO12:413). Thus, prison brought together unattached delinquents and highly organised Camorra bosses who took advantage of the situation.

Sometimes gentle methods were used. For example, Giuseppe Palillo, who was sent to the same prison as Cutolo (Ascoli Piceno) on a murder charge, was singled out by Cutolo as a potential and useful member. The investigating judge recalled Cutolo's recruitment of Palillo as typical: *"once again, [...], Cutolo used a winning formula.*

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[11] For his life story see Chapter Seven.

Favouritism towards a new prisoner (as was already seen with Medda and Pesce Vito) encouraged, or even imposed membership" (S4:65-6). This was also true of Antonio Cuomo[12] and Michele Guardato. Recruitment was particularly intense during the first Camorra war (1977-82) when prison blocks were organised according to Camorra affiliation (NCO versus NF) in a similar way to the notorious 'H Blocks' in Northern Ireland which were organised according to terrorist-group affiliation. Michele Guardato has explained how, when he entered Poggioreale, he was assigned to the pro-Cutolo block because he was born in the same town as Cutolo, Ottaviano: *"in the time necessary for the director of the prison block to take down my information, I was affiliated to the association without understanding why"* (letter 2.1).

The other recruitment method used by the NCO both inside and outside prison was much more brutal and in some cases counter-productive: they intimidated small time criminals to join the organisation. Threats, bombs and general violence were used.[13] These techniques were so alienating that for example, Filippo Savino, Pasquale Galasso and Carmine Alfieri were deterred from joining the NCO in favour of rival clans which provided protection. This was also the case for Andrea delli Paoli[14] as he explained: *In late 1980, 1981, I was invited by Simone Luigi, member of Pasquale Scotti's group, who wanted me to join his group. I refused and after a while I fell into an ambush organised by NCO. After a while, I met Gaglione[15], who told me what had happened and he explained to me that it was Esposito Aniello, called "Zambeletta", a member of Pasquale Scotti's group operating in Caviano who had done it"* (CD'A17f:52). After this he decided to join a rival clan, the Magulio-Moccia clan, which provided him with protection. Salvatore Mele, a small-time criminal from S. Antimo, was murdered

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12 For his life story see Chapter Seven.

13 Businessmen were also threatened and in order to protect themselves joined a Camorra clan. One example of this is Vincenzo Casillo, he was a businessman who was the victim of extortion and in order to protect himself, he sought the help of Cutolo. This was the beginning of their criminal friendship (see CD'A17). Another example is that the Engineer Sale who joined the Alfieri confederation as protective measure as he was being threatened and extorted by the NCO (see S7c:57).

14 See his life story in Chapter Seven.

15 Known to him as a simple thief.

because he had refused to join the Camorra clan of his ex-cell mate, Pasquale Puca: "he had been explicitly threatened on that occasion by Puca [Camorra boss close to Bardellino but ex-NCO] who had said to him: 'if you do not work with me and you are not my friend I must thus consider you my enemy and I can also kill you [...].[whereas] Mele had refused the offer of working with them stating '[...] that he wanted the quiet life and wanted to be the friend of everyone'" (CD'A11:2-29).

As the NF clan was a different type of institution, being decentralised and family-based, the recruitment process was less formalised. Families and close networks of friends were the backbone of the organisation and only informal initiation rituals were required to confirm membership. The Neapolitan NF families which were affiliated to the Sicilian Mafia operated the sophisticated Sicilian initiation ritual (Migliorino, B; Tarallo, C). But the process of socialisation was similar, in so far as all members of all families had to respect the unwritten rules.[16] The Alfieri Confederation adopted a more flexible model whereby authority and decisions still stemmed from the boss, Carmine Alfieri, but the individual gangs retained a certain amount of autonomy. In some cases, Alfieri also adopted the NCO's threatening strategy of bullying criminals into joining his organisation. There are many examples of this but the case of Pietro Pianese illustrates particularly well. He was a shady character who was approached by a certain Antonio*'a Masseria* who said to him, *"Pierino, Don Carmine wants to meet and talk to you". I know how these criminals think and said: If I don't go to Don Carmine, I must leave here!. I knew that I needed to go and speak with him"* (CD'A17w:56). In this way, he became involved in Alfieri's Confederation.

As well as recruiting individuals, the Camorra as a social institution influences agents and shapes choices as it provides jobs, money, protection and a sense of belonging. In many cases, it provided jobs: Gabriele Donnarumma (1956 -) explains 'work' as the motive for becoming involved: "*Question: do you remember whether*

[16] Pasquale Galasso describes how the Sicilian families rejected a young criminal, Fiore D'Avino, because his father had abandoned his mother. This behaviour was considered socially unacceptable.

there was a presentation or a precise moment when you entered the organisation? Answer: No. Question: What does that mean? Answer: Gionta already worked in smuggled cigarettes and I started to work with him smuggling cigarettes" P7:31-4). Oreste Lettieri (1952 -) too was given a job *"At the end of 1979-80, when I was unemployed [...] I met Nicola Nuzzo, alias Carusiello, after a while I joined the NCO and met Enzo Casillo. In March 1980, he asked Nuzzo whether I could work for him as his driver and bodyguard"* (Pr13c:1).

The Camorra also provided money to those who had economic problems: *"This is why I got involved. That is to say, I got sucked into criminal activities because I had difficulties, my 'friends' from Castellammare di Stabia* [the D'Alessandro clan] *offered to resolve my economic problem [...] They lent me money and I took advantage of this for a few years"* explains Mario Fenga (1951[17] -) (Pr1b:14).

The case of Aniello Prudente (1956 -) is also representative of the Camorra acting as an illegal bank in exchange for commitment to the clan. His father who was a gambler had got involved with the Camorra and accumulated debts which he could only pay in kind (hiding a car full of guns in his garage for example). The family company went bankrupt and Prudente had to borrow money from the D'Alessandro clan from Castellammare di Stabia: *"I was buying cocaine from a cocaine addict and gave it to De Rosa who himself was an addict. This was a way to pay back the money that I owed him and also hid his addiction from the clan bosses who, if they had known of this, would not have trusted him with the role of money lender"* (Pr12c:5). Thus, his involvement with the drug activities of the clan started from this repayment of debts. The institution also provided an important sense of belonging which bought all members together but which few

[17] Mario Fenga born in 1951 in Meta served as an officer in the Italian merchant navy looking after the engines from 1977 to 1980. After which, he decided to start up a spare parts and car accessories business in Piano di Sorrento. His business was not very successful and led him into serious financial. As a consequence, he turned to the Camorra for help. At the beginning, it would seem that his concrete relationship with the Camorra started purely for financial reasons. After this initial contact, he became fascinated by some of the leaders, especially Renato Raffone and Michele D'Alessandro, whom he started to frequent. This allowed him to attempt a political career and organise the import of cocaine from South America with some other international drug pushers.

verbalised.

6.4 Interaction between the Agent and Macro-Environment in the 1950s and 1980s

Before examining the interaction between agent and structure in the 1950s and 1980s, let us stress once again the importance of the macro-environment and the institutional framework in the life choices of the would-be *camorristi*. The macro-environment and institutions placed limits and constraints on the agents; they determined a number of possibilities within which the agent acted. The family in particular proposed models and institutionalised forms of behaviour which effectively limited his/her freedom of choice. In the same way, the Camorra having reached a new level of organisation and sophistication in the 1980s placed additional constraints, either by enticing or by threatening the agent to join the clan. Thus, the macro-environment forced the agent in a certain direction, providing him/her with a limited range of action-alternatives. The macro-environment is thus broadly part of the 'reason' why people joined the Camorra, though it does not account for individual 'motivations'. Of course, it is impossible to provide a general explanations which adequately account for every individual's decision, but the evidence of trial data and interview material points to the conclusion reached here.

We have chosen two case-studies to illustrate schematically what we mean by the interaction between the agent and the macro-environment: one from the 1950s (Carlo Gaetano Orlando[18]) and one from the 1980s (Pasquale Galasso[19]). These cases have been chosen because the data and material available allowed us to identify more clearly than in most other cases the specific areas of the macro-environment and agents's motivation and to evaluate their relative weight in determining behaviour. However, we believe that these cases

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18 See life story in Chapter Seven and Picture 5 in Chapter Eight.

19 See life story in Chapter Eight.

are representative enough[20] to draw some general conclusions from them.

In the case of Orlando, the structure appears to be that of a well-respected local Marano family whose father, Angelo Orlando, was a prosperous fruit and vegetable wholesaler who had been elected mayor of Marano on the communist list in 1952. He encouraged his children to become hard-working and successful citizens. Other sources, however, indicate the presence of less scrupulous relatives in his family, in particular his father's brother and sister, Antonio and Maria Orlando.[21] But, in his autobiography, *La Verità di Gaetano Orlando sull' Omicidio di Pascalone 'e Nola* (1989) (which represents his discursive consciousness), Carlo Gaetano Orlando stresses the sense of honour within his close family. He went to school and started to work for his father in the family business. Therefore, there is nothing in his family background which might explain his future criminal activity, except that he argues a personal trauma was significant: he was born out of wedlock and only went to live with his parents at the age of three when they got married (1989:39-40)

Orlando was then influenced by business friends, people he met in Naples fruit market, such as Antonio Esposito (*Tonnonno 'e Pomigliano*) and his associates, as well as his cousin Gaetano Nuvoletta. He was impressed by their money and life style and decided to become a killer on behalf of Antonio Esposito. Orlando's association with crime stems more from his personal values than the direct influence of the macro-environment. This confirms my hypothesis that in the 1950s motives could be relatively autonomous of structural constrains.

Indeed, the case of Pasquale Galasso demonstrates, in a rather

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[20] For the 1950s, the case-studies of Antonio Esposito and Pasquale Simonetti can also be analysed as interaction between the agent and the macro-environment where the agent's motives are dominant.
For the 1980s: Rosario Giugliano, Raffaele Palmieri (1965) and Pasquale Frajase can also be analysed as interaction between the agent and the macro-environment where the macro-environment is dominant.

21 Maria Orlando married Giovanni Nuvoletta and was the mother of the emerging clan leaders from Marano: Lorenzo, Ciro, Angelo and Gaetano Nuvoletta (see Chapter Eight and Picture 5).

complex way the influence of the macro-environment over the agents' motivations. From all accounts, his father, Sabato Galasso, despite his FIAT business, was involved in illegal activities in his early days:

> Sabato was not satisfied with sweating in the fields. The war had taught him a lot. It had made him understand that in order to survive properly, you had to be cunning: he started with a bit of smuggling. In those days, it was not easy to find raw material. As with grain, for example: Sabatino bought it and would resell it at a profit.Then, big profits came. To increase this capital, he discovered how to do business. To sell at staggering prices goods which were then impossible to find became a profitable (business) transaction. On the other hand, the war had recently ended, the state and its laws still needed to be redefined. This was exactly the confusion that was necessary: very soon this flow of money became consistent.
> Sabato was still not satisfied with all this. He discovered that buying some old tractors, trucks unused by the Americans or abandoned jeeps, he could make money. As scrap you could buy it for nothing then you could rebuild it as if new, and you resold it at an enormous profit. A simple discovery. [...]
> In the space of a few years, [...] Sabato Galasso, the simple man from a peasant family educated in the fields of Poggiomarino, became a *'Don'*. He was the real notable of the area, a point of reference for those who needed money. You needed money to buy a tractor? And who better placed than *Don* Sabato? Interest rates were exorbitant. Some called it loan-sharking but for Sabato Galasso that activity was "doing good for the poor". Who cared if in selling a car by instalments, his interest reached 20% [...]
> With money came also prestige. The Camorra imposing itself? Don Sabato only considered himself a wealthy notable of the town, who became rich out of nothing, without having studied. From nothing, more or less. For the rest, his mind had remained that of plain old peasant" (Di Fiore, 1994:12-3).

But he had ambitions for his sons to do well. He sent Pasquale to university to read medicine. Pasquale Galassso emphasises: *"I was not born a delinquent like Cutolo"* (Pr7:11-13-93:55). *"My father wanted me to have a university degree"* (CPA1.1). He therefore adopts his father's view of him and of himself, repeating more than once that he was from a good family: *"my father [...] initially was a cereal merchant in the years which immediately preceded the war. Then, through his own*

hard work and speculation, with building investments he created a fortune which enabled us to live comfortably" (CPA1.1). He also argued that his father was a hard-working businessman caring for his family who was unfortunately threatened and racketeered by the local Camorra gangs. The agent's motive was to defend his father and revenge his honour. This value, vendetta, would be apparent again when the NCO killed his disabled brother, Nino (Pr7:17-3-93:16-20). He was forced to act against his inclinations: *"I became a delinquent despite my education and personality"* (Pr7:11-3-93:55) and again, when he states: *"I do not believe I was born a delinquent but I became one"* (S7a:133). So one can say that despite a good start in life, he was eventually influenced by the macro-environment of illegality which surrounded him and became a cold, calculating and fearsome killer (S7e[22]), interested in power and money.

6.5 Conclusion

From our general discussion of motives for Camorra membership in the 1950s and 1980s, we can come to several conclusions about the differences and similarities which exist. First of all, we can note that the predominant values which form the agent's discursive and practical consciousness in the 1950s, and which we have pinpointed as explaining the motives for becoming a *guappo*, were still present in the 1980s, but have been interpreted and developed in different ways. The main values which explain the agent's motives and which are manifest in the 1950s show that the *guappo* was a lonely and isolated individual who became a criminal because of his honour, reputation, personal ambition, survival, vendetta, or violence whereas the values and motives manifested in the 1980s show individuals joining the Camorra for the same reasons but also because it was now part of a business, a collective organisation which not only influenced individual behaviour but looked after its members. This can be seen both in the

[22] Although, the newspapers and books about him present him as an intelligent and well-mannered gentleman.

case of Giuseppe Palillo who was clearly looking for a group to identify with and which cared for him and Luciano Aviello who was attracted by the money the clan gave its members. In the 1950s, it was thus the individual level (internal structure) which influenced agent motives whereas in the 1980s, it was the collective level in the macro-environment (external structure).

Secondly, the way in which the macro-environment (external structure) influenced the agent's behaviour has also changed. In the 1950s, both the context and the institutions were in a state of disarray: this meant that adventurous, ambitious and opportunist agents could set up illegal scams in order to survive and become heavily involved in criminal activities. In the 1980s, the macro-environment was still in a state of turmoil, but the Camorra has become an institutionalised social subsystem, which conditions many agents' daily lives as well as politics and business. The family continues to act as an institution which has an impact on agent's motives and behaviour. Lastly, we can say that the interaction between the agent and the external structure still had a determining role in influencing agent motives and behaviour. So, there are less changes in the case of the discursive consciousness of *camorristi* than in the macro-environment.

PART THREE: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE CAMORRA IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD

Chapter Seven
The Camorras in the 1950s

"Mio nonno ci parla pure della miseria nera dei tempi suoi, delle scarpe che non teneva, delle mani pieni di calli, del fuculare, sei centesimi e della guerra. Lui mi fa penna quanto ci racconta questa vita sua!"

in D'Orta (1990:37).

7.1 Introduction

During the post-war period, the Camorra succeeded in taking a 'great leap forward' (Allum and Allum, 1996:236). It is important to understand how and why, "even though it has disappeared for long periods since its first appearance at the beginning of the last century, it is perhaps the only criminal organisation based on unemployed or underemployed workers that has managed to become part of the local political elite" (Behan,1996:7). This major qualitative transformation (*salto di qualità)* took place in a relatively short time. Sales points out that "those who study mafia-type criminality are struck by the quick transformation of the Camorra, a form of criminality which had been given up for dead, having disappeared at the end of the 1960s, and which managed instead, in the space of only two decades, to 'Mafiarise' itself and to assume a primary role in the sphere of major criminal activity at national and international levels" (1988:3). This part of the thesis will attempt to answer these questions.

However, constructing a satisfactory explanation is not an easy task as this study has to take into account a number of interrelating variables[1] which not only obscure the description but also complicate the analysis. So, this chapter examines the existing literature on the topic and explains the use of Giddens's structuration theory (see Chapter Two) before applying it to the evidence of the 1950s. In Chapter Eight the analysis shifts to the modern Camorra of the 1980s.

[1] Social changes in civil society, international economic crises and local internal Camorra wars, for example.

By examining the life stories of a number of *camorristi* in two precise historical periods, we will seek to understand whether the 'structuration' of the Camorra's social criminal practice (in particular its rules and resources) has changed. Particular emphasis will be placed on a comparison of the nature and of the extent of change in terms of membership, activities and relations with the political and economic systems.

For the 1950s, we consider fourteen case-studies, five of urban *camorristi* and nine of rural *camorristi* prominent in the 1950s. This then serves as a basis for comparison with the 20 cases selected from the 1980-90s. From this, it is hoped to infer conclusions that will enable us to understand the Camorra's post-war transformation better.

7.2 Review of the Literature

Whereas there is an extensive literature on the Sicilian Mafia and its development in the post-war period (Pantaleone, 1966; Hess, 1973; Arlacchi, 1986; Catanzaro, 1989; Gambetta, 1993 and Lupo, 1993a, etc), there are fewer in-depth studies of the Camorra's post-war transformation. This may be due to the fact that until the 1990s,[2] there was a lack of material. However, two specialists (Sales and Arlacchi) have endeavoured to pinpoint the factors which could explain this rapid evolution during which, as Galdo points out, "everything has changed: the type of activities, the code of conduct, the organisation, the methods. Even the age of the delinquents" (1981:205).

Sales is interested in answering the question: "what circumstances, factors and situations have permitted the successful modernisation of the Camorra to take place?" (1993c:3). He highlights

2 The 1990s mark the beginning of a new phase of the state's fight against the Camorra : as a direct consequence of a change in the law (law 81/91) in 1991, some criminals decided to turn 'state-witness', become a *pentito*, receiving important compensation for their collaboration. They revealed important details about the different Camorras' structures, activities, murders, organisation, membership and contacts with politicians for example.

various factors which he believes can help explain this process. Firstly, the involvement of the Camorra in smuggling and, more importantly, in the expanding international drug trade in the 1960s and 1970s he believes to be a central reason, though not the only one. Secondly, there is the presence of important Sicilian Mafia bosses in Campania who, due to the legal form of punishment known as 'imposed residence' (*soggiorno obbligato),* served their sentences in the region. This had the effect of assisting the development of business relationships between the poorly organised smuggling gangs of Campania and the highly efficient and resourceful Sicilian Mafia. See for example, the relationships between the Neapolitan Alfredo Maisto and the Sicilian Stefano Bontate or the Neapolitan Nuvoletta gang and the Sicilian Corleone 'family' (Buscetta, 23-7-84:21). Thirdly, the political and cultural processes of modernisation in Southern Italy enabled the Camorra to infiltrate every section of civil society.

Politically, the South functioned on the basis of massive state aid controlled by a political elite which promoted the notion of 'power', 'patronage' and 'clientelism; so the Camorra, by using corruption, had easy access to the political system and to the state institutions. In addition the securing of important national posts by the Neapolitan political elite in the 1980s meant that the Camorra had an even easier access to the highest levels of government for the distribution of important public contracts. For example, Antonio Gava as interior minister in 1989 and Paolo Cirino Pomicino as budget minister in the early 1990s.

Culturally, the fact that Neapolitan society accepted values such as patronage, clientelism and violence meant that the Camorra expanded without much public outrage. Sales talks of *'the tolerance of illegality'* (1988:22) and believes that it is an important explanatory factor. The 1980 earthquake gave the Camorra the opportunity to hijack billions of *lire* which were supposed to assist the reconstruction. Moreover, indeed, he believes that[3] "without the

[3] Faenza (1997) disagrees with this explanation: he argues that the Camorra's transformation would have probably taken more time, but it would still have developed into this omnipresent organisation in time.

economy of the earthquake (and without the drugs trade) the Camorra would not be what it is today in Naples and Campania. The contemporary explosion of the Camorra coincided with the assumption of national responsibilities (in the governing parties and government) by the highest echelons of the Neapolitan and Campania political class" (1993c:8).

Arlacchi (1983), a Mafia specialist, applied his understanding of the development of the Mafia to that of the Camorra; for him, the transformation of the Camorra (from the traditional Camorra to the Mafia-type Camorra) is closely connected with the transformation of Italian and especially Southern society, in particular the 'cultural revolution' which took place in the 1960s. He argues that these social, political and economic changes had repercussions for the Camorra and allowed it to assume its new role in the post-war period. For example, the state's declining monopoly over 'public order' in the 1950s and 1960s meant that the Camorra (and also terrorists) found space in new areas and roles in the new markets and businesses, while maintaining the old clientelistic practices which were by then well established at the local level. In addition, he emphasises how profit accumulated in the 1970s and 1980s was invested in traditional activities but also in new legal and semi-legal activities, especially after the 1980 earthquake.

Others, like the former judge and MP Imposimato (1993), the sociologist Lamberti (1987), and journalist Faenza (1993a) have pointed to the important role played by prisons as providing a meeting point for criminals, both a graduate school of crime and an employment centre. We refer extensively to these studies in this part, but by further utilising new material, it is hoped to be able to provide a more complete understanding not only in terms of changing Camorra activities but also of structures.

7.3 Theoretical Reminder

To evaluate the Camorra's transformation between the 1950s and 1980s, the two historical periods are studied separately. This allows

us to look at the structuration in each period and at the conditions governing the structures, in particular at the rules and resources. It might be helpful here to recall Giddens's structuration theory (1984).

The aspect of Giddens's theory which deals with the notion of overall social change is his precise notion of *structuration.* By *structuration,* he means the "conditions governing the continuity or transformation of structures, and therefore, the reproduction of systems" (1993:118). Thus, in this analysis, it will be necessary to "analyse the structuration of social systems" in each of the historical periods which "means studying the modes in which such systems grounded in the knowledgeable activities of situated actors who draw upon rules and resources in the diversity of action contexts are produced and reproduced in interaction" (1984:25). Doing this should allow us to determine whether the "conditions governing the structures" of the social criminal systems have changed: specifically, this entails investigation of how the nature of rules and resources changed. Hopefully, by establishing the nature of change in this way, we will be able to understand the reasons for change.

7.4 Five Representatives of the Urban Camorras

In the Eighteenth Century, the Camorra was mainly an urban phenomenon (see Monnier, 1994 and Marmo, 1990) and in the 1950s, there were still some old traditional *quartiere guappi* (district bandits/gangsters): Giuseppe Navara, alias '*il Re di Poggioreale*' (the king of Poggioreale), Francesco Iasevoli alias '*Ciccio l'acquaiolo*' (Ciccio, the water carrier) or our first case-studies, ***'Vincenzo l'Americano***[4] and **Vincenzo Esposito** who all replaced the lack of state authority in the local community. But, at the same time, a more modern form of urban criminal was developing who dealt in more profitable activities - selling petrol on the black market, smuggling tobacco, dealing in light and hard drugs - while still respecting values of the past (family,

[4] This is our first case-study for the period mainly because of the availability of first hand information found in Gribaudi (1999).

honour and duty - right and wrong). Such were Francesco Fucci alias *'Mano 'e pece'* (Slippery Fingers), *'Zuzu di Santa Lucia'* (Zuzu of Santa Lucia), Francesco Rossi alias *'O figlio 'e donna Giulia'*, (the son of Dame Giulia), the well-known **Antonio Spavone**, one of his protégés **Pio Vittorio Giuliano** and the famous Italo-American gangster **Salvatore Lucania**, alias 'Lucky Luciano", who are the other three case-studies chosen to illustrate the urban Camorra of the 1950s.

Vincenzo *l'Americano,* (1910 - ?) (Vincent the American) is a representative of the old traditional urban Camorra of the beginning of the century, who played an important social and political role in the *quartiere,* reminiscent of the members of *La Bella Società Reformata.* Gribaudi (1999) recounts his life-story: born in the *Porto* district of Naples to a father who was a part-time docker, he, together with his brothers, undertook precarious and illegal activities around the harbour surviving on their wits. From their *basso,* with his wife Fortuna, the daughter of illegal street-vendors, they would sell, among other things, coffee, sugar, liquor and contraband cigarettes, as well as practising different forms of loan-sharking. In their district, they not only controlled the various illegal activities (which his sons also undertook[5]) but also ran the various feast-days as *'masti di festa'* (masters of ceremonies), organising activities and stalls as well as selling the required goods (food, fireworks, etc). From this we can see that Vincenzo *l'Americano* performed unsophisticated social and criminal practices in the local community but within a very limited economic scope. Moreover, these practices and activities were always performed with the aim of gaining legitimacy and respect from the community; this he would truly gain as a vote-collector for the Monarchist ship owner Achille Lauro in the local elections in 1956 (see chapter nine).

Another example of a traditional city *guappo* is **Vincenzo Esposito,** (1908-?) *Vincenzo 'o Franfellicaro* (son of *Franfellicaro).* Both his grandfather and father were *guappi* who controlled the *Quartieri Spagnoli* district (Monteoliveto, towards Piazza Cavour). At the age of

[5] One son, Generoso, was a 'gigolo', another, Salvatore, was a criminal and is believed to be have been a member of the NCO (Gribaudi, 1999:68).

14, he already showed his potential when his father was arrested for setting up a factory for making counterfeit money. Vincenzo was intensively interrogated by the police who believed that he knew much about his father's activities, but he refused to talk. This showed his use of *omertà* to protect his father. He had many encounters with the police as he was violent and a good knife fighter. In 1943, he became president of the carters as he had a cart and shop (Ricci, 1989). He was president but also benefactor and protector of the Neapolitan carters. But in 1944, at a mature age, he fought another famous *guappo* on several occasions until he finally marked his rival's face with his knife (de Majo, 1998:104-5). This episode illustrates his violent nature, but how he also exemplified values such as respect, honour, generosity, kindness to the poor. He represents the old *guappo* who lived in semi-legal world looking after the local community and adhering to traditional values.

Antonio Spavone (1926- 198?), alias *'O Malommo'* ('Strong Man'), on the other hand is emblematic of the more modern urban *guappo* of the 1950s. Thinking and acting in the old Camorra manner, following basic traditional rules and resources - honour, respect, duty, generosity, *omertà*, intimidation, physical force used with style and gentlemanly charisma -he embarked on more challenging and economically profitable activities. It was the beginning of a new era when individual gangsters sought to become competent criminals and to make money rather than merely survive on a day-to-day basis.

Spavone was born into a well-established fisherman's family, based in the *Santa Lucia* district of Naples; his grandfather Ciro[6] was not a *guappo* but a highly respected local figure to whom the community turned for advice (Jouakim, 1979:23-4). Antonio, like many others, was an ordinary street-urchin (*scugnizzo)* who grew up during the Fascist period at a time when poverty and hunger were widespread in Naples. He became a strong, energetic and tough boy, street-wise and already cruel with sparks of generosity, who was fascinated by older boys. At

[6] He was the captain of his fishing-boat and it was he who originally had the nickname of ' *'O Malommo'* which came from his long and bloody struggles with the tuna fish in the bay of Naples.

the age of 15, he already had his own street-gang. But, as his older brother, Carmine, (also alias *O' Malommo*) was making a name for himself as a tough young *guappo,* Antonio joined his gang.

In 1945, after his brother's murder, he inherited Carmine's role and nickname, *O' Malommo,* restored the family's honour, following the dictates of Camorra tradition, by murdering Giovanni Mormone, his brother's murderer. He was sent to prison for 12 years[7] at the age of 21 in 1947 where he became a powerful, prestigious and generous criminal setting up a prisoners' self-help system (finding lawyers, providing financial support, etc) in the same vein as the traditional 18th century Camorra, thus deserving the label of "the last real *guappo*" (E. Perez, 1996[8]).

He remained faithful to his nickname and was sentenced to a further 9 years after a violent brawl among inmates in Procida prison. But he also acted heroically during a thunderstorm in Florence gaol in 1966, saving the life of the prison director's daughter and prisoners for which he was released early. He returned to Naples in 1970 and 'officially' worked in a jewellery shop. This was the period of the Sicilian - Marseillais smuggling war; Antonio had close contacts with the Sicilians. It has been been suggested that he was heavily involved in smuggling tobacco and drugs since on the 5 March 1971 he was involved in the murder of his friend Gennaro Ferrigno, an Italo-Peruvian drug dealer.

Having fled to America in April 1976 to avoid prosecution, he was asked to return in 1977-8 and again in 1981 by the NF bosses who thought that his prestige and methods would be useful in peace negotiations with the NCO. But Spavone's methods, inspired by the traditional *guappo's* values, were unsuccessful as the young warring factions resorted to more and more violence. This was the end of the

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[7] For his first murder, 9 for his second (in Procida prison), and 11 for his third: a total of 32 years.

[8] Interview with *Il Mattino* reporter, Enzo Perez - 6 September, 1996, Naples.

Spavone era.[9]

The impact of a traditional street education in reproducing the old system of rules and resources and the urban ethos was still visible in the case of **Pio Vittorio Giuliano**[10] (1928/9 -). Yet, the new demands of the economic system forced him to adopt new rules and resources in particular to begin organising an urban criminal structure: in the late 1960s and early 1970s, he became the boss (*capo clan)* of an important Camorra 'family', which controlled the districts of *Forcella, San Lorenzo* and *Vicaria* in Naples. He was one of the first criminals to lay the foundations of a strong city clan which his sons reinforced. The clan's structures and activities were fully organised by the second generation in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as was the case for many other families (for example, the Mallardo and the Gionta clans).

Pio Vittorio Giuliano, alias *Don Vittorio* or *O' padrino* (the godfather), was born in the heart of Naples. He was the oldest of 15 children, left school at 11 and like Spavone joined the boisterous gangs of *'scugnizzi'* in the streets of *Forcella,* learning the skills of survival in a deprived environment together with an attitude of defiance towards the police.

All through the 1950s, his criminal activities ranged from 'ordinary' crimes (receiving illegal goods, robbery, forging false papers) to more Camorra-like activities. In the expanding area of smuggling foreign cigarettes and selling petrol on the black market, he became a *protégé* of Spavone. In the 1960s, he was promoted to a 'managerial' position[11] overseeing the work of the smugglers' blue motorboats in the Bay of Naples. This was the stepping stone he needed to expand his clan, his activities (drugs and kickbacks) and his

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[9] In 1978, he was condemned to 28 years for the murder of Ferrigno. On appeal in 1979, he was cleared of this murder and declared not guilty of involvement in the disappearance of Pupetta Maresca's son Pasqualino Simonetti. He settled in South America in the 1980s. No Spavone clan exists in Naples today.

[10] His father, Luigi was a carter and petty criminal in the district of Forcella, but not a *guappo* (*Il Mattino*, July 1998).

[11] Described by a local newspaper as: "the administrator of cigarette smuggling in the old city centre of the town "(*Il Mattino*, of 27 February, 1982, in *Rassegna Stampa Sulla Camorra).*

role as a boss. He enrolled his 5 sons (Luigi, Gugliemo, Salvatore, Carmine and Nunzio[12]) in the family business and used the *Forcella* district as a pool of employment in the illegal economy, thereby intertwining his clan into the social fabric of the *quartiere*, constructing a network of solidarity, reciprocity, protection and also of control and power over a set urban zone.[13]

The new rules and the expansion of the smuggling of foreign cigarettes and drugs, both key factors in the development of the Camorra during the 1970s, began to appear in the 1950s when contacts between Neapolitan criminals and the Sicilian and American Mafia were made. One gangster who it is said played an important part in the modernisation of the Neapolitan Camorra is **Salvatore Lucania**[14] (1897-1962) alias *Lucky Luciano* or *Charley Lucky*. His case-study is less directly linked to Naples but nevertheless important.[15] Instead of settling down in Sicily when he was expelled from the United States and Cuba, he chose Naples and lived there from 1948 to his death in 1962.

During this period of great confusion in Naples with the simple black market and basic smuggling trade, he managed to set up an intricate international drugs ring which included North Italian

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12 See Picture 4 for family tree in Chapter Eight.

13 The same happened for example in the *Spanish Quarter*, in the *Sanità* district of Naples and in the *Dei Carcerati* district of Torre Annunziata.

14 As he has become a myth and film legend (see Francesco Rosi's *'Lucky Luciano'*, 1973 and the American film *'The Mobster*) many apocryphal stories have circulated about Luciano but his role in helping to modernise Neapolitan criminals must not be underestimated.

15 Although Lucky Luciano, as a native of Sicily, had been used by the American Allies during the Liberation of Sicily in 1943 for his contacts and knowledge; he was nonetheless expelled from the USA and Cuba because he was an important 'boss', il capo dei capi (the leader of all leaders), the head of the Genovese family and the criminal brain behind the American Mafia's modernisation process. He not only kept the traditional values of self-assistance, introduced the rationalisation of the family system with a board of directors, the Cupola, which he would explain to the Sicilians (Buscetta in Arlacchi, 1996) but he also developed the drugs trade ("[...] the Narcotics Bureau thinks that a world-wide dope ring allegedly run by Luciano is part of the Mafia" (Bell, 1967:139) and all the illegal deals that accompanied it (arms, money) but had also developed a relationship with the politicians in New York. Daniel Bell points out: "The criminal world of the 1940s, its tone set by the captains of the gambling industry, is in startling contrast to the state of affairs in the decade before. If a Kefauver Report had been written then, "names" would have been Lepke and Gurrah, Dutch Schultz, Jack "Legs" Diamond, Lucky Luciano, and reaching back a little further, Arnold Rothstein, the czar of the underworld" (1967:130-131).

industrialists, thus leading the American detective Charles Siragusa to define him as "the king of the drug dealers and at least a member of its Royal family[16]" (*'in* doc XXIII, 2:343). In 1954, he was banned from visiting the races because he was considered 'socially dangerous' together with 11 other criminals, such as Catello di Somma and Salvatore Zaza (*Il Mattino* p. 19 and *Il Roma* of 20 November, 1954). However, Naples proved ideal for him and its tolerance of illegality must explain why he lived in full immunity, was never officially charged or put under surveillance and was even issued a passport (much to the Americans' disgust), despite the fact that it was clear that business trips and visitors were all connected to the international drugs trade (doc XXIII, 2:343). To the Neapolitan smuggling groups, he provided a model of efficient worldwide organisation which was to inspire them (doc 1032:1694). He died in 1962 and his body was shipped back to the USA, but there is no doubt that he left his mark on the Camorra's development.

7.5 Nine Representatives of the Rural Camorras

Contrary to the Mafia which was essentially based in the *latifondi* of rural Sicily, the Camorra originated in the city (Marmo, 1990) and expanded slowly into the rural zones of Campania at the beginning of the century. In the immediate post-war period, this primitive type of organisation consisting of gangs roaming the countryside and committing petty crimes was already present and had probably matured during the fascist period (Sales, 1988). Now, they racketeered in milk, meat, fish and agricultural markets, for example, poisoning food and burning crops to extort money from farmers. They also stole and sold stolen goods and they were also involved in all kinds of illegal deals (Guarino, 1961) However, they were never organised on a larger scale and never attempted economic expansion. Contrary to the Mafia, this criminal activity was not based on the great rural

[16] Buscetta recalled how in 1957, Lucky Luciano went to Palermo's *Albergo dei Palmi*, and explained to *Cosa Nostra* the efficient American organisation with a board of directors (a Commission or *Cupola*). *Cosa Nostra* soon adopted this model.

estates but on the economic activities which took place in the small hinterland communes (Sales, 1988).

This primitive form of criminality was organised but only in very basic terms, methods and objectives. It was a simple form of association, not definable as 'Camorra' since the crimes were almost spontaneous and the main aim was mere survival through the use of intimidation and violence. The gangs were armed but only as an intimidating device. They had leaders, for example, Antonio Aprovitola, alias *'O bosso di Marano'* ('the boss of Marano') (1907 -†?), who terrorised the local population with his impulsive and threatening behaviour. The gang also started to act as a collectivity: the members slept in the same house before their operations, discussed their projects, shared out their loot and even, when necessary, expelled accomplices (CD'A4).

Besides these gangs, there was some strong individuals who made a business of imposing themselves for profit by whatever means necessary - threats, intimidation, arson, etc - as 'mediators' between suppliers and sellers of farm produce. As a result, they soon established a monopoly over the territory, terrorising farmers and controlling prices and were able to move from the rural zones where this took place into the urban network of the market place. There, not only did they control prices and supplies but they made large profits, expanding and diversifying their activities in the urban areas. Contrary to their city counterparts, Sales (1988) argues, their activities were more 'legal' and respectable.

The life stories of the nine rural *camorristi* selected for the 1950s illustrate the various phases of the emerging rural Camorra. They were similar and different at the same time. While they differed in their approaches and methods, some being more prepared to cheat, to use fear, violence and ruthlessness for the achievement of their projects of making money at all costs, they shared the old traditional criminal rules and resources: the code of honour, respect, family, survival, help of others, cunning, violence only for set means and all belonged to the

same agricultural background. **Luigi Mallardo**[17], (1924 - ?) alias '*O figlio 'a nera*' or '*O figlio d'a nera*' ('the son of the dark woman), an illiterate agricultural worker, was part of the Aprovitola band who ran wild in the Giugliano area. According to his police file (CD'A4:61/57), his career began in 1948 when he was condemned to 1 year and 4 months and fined 8.000 lire for aggravated burglary. By 1953, he was part of a 'gang' who specialised in stealing cattle and chickens but also shoes, fabric and clothes. On one occasion, they stole a cow and murdered the farmer (*Il Mattino* of 12 April 1953). The presiding magistrate noted that, "apart from their criminal activities, they have created above all an atmosphere of terror in the zone in which they operate and therefore represent a serious danger to the public" (CD'A4: 29). He served six years and was released in 1962.

Giuseppe Pedana[18], (1918 - 1979) alias '*Peppe 'e braciola*' ('Joe Big arms'), was a similar type of criminal but on a larger and more sophisticated scale. Although he reminds us of a traditional 18th century style *guappo* by being the law-giver of the community and protector of the poor, by his death in the late 1970s, he was an established racketeer, extortioner (for example in 1979 he threatened to burn down a factory if the owner did not pay up ten thousand pounds) and killer (in 1947 he shot his rival Paolo Di Bello, in the early 1960s his brother and finally a *carabiniere,* Raffaele Fede, in 1963). His methods made him the fearsome super-boss of the Casertano (Villa Literno, San Cipriano d'Aversa and Casal di Principe),much respected by the modern younger bosses of the late 1970s; Cutolo, the NCO boss, is reported to have attended his funeral (Perez in *Il Mattino* of 16 September 1992).

The next case-studies illustrate a much more organised stage of development of the rural Camorra, still clinging to values of the past but also clearly heralding the future. The life-stories of Antonio Esposito, Pasquale Simonetti and Alfredo Luigi Maisto as well as those of Raffaele Baiano, alias '*Papele 'e paci-paci*' , 'Raphael, son of Fatty' or

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17 This case-study is based on trial material, police reports and newspaper articles

18 This case-study is based on newspaper articles and interviews.

'Papele 'e Marano' ,'Raphael of Marano' and Gennaro Boccia alias *'O bello a vera'* ,'the handsome real son', are closely interlinked as they were business partners and rivals. They were all born and brought up in the rural hinterland of Naples in the prewar years and are emblematic of a new type of criminal, the emerging rural businessman-guappo.

Antonio Esposito, (1917-1955) alias *'Totonno 'e Pumigliano'* (Tony of Pomigliano) and **Pasquale Simonetti** (1924-1955) alias *'Pascalone 'e Nola'* , Big Pascal of Nola) or *'Pasqualone O guappo'*, Big Pascal, the *gangster* (CD'A2:298) were born in the hinterland east of Naples at the foot of Vesuvius, in Pomigliano d'Arco and Palma Campania respectively while Alfredo Maisto came from a small town north of Naples, Giugliano di Campania.

Esposito's and Maisto's families were linked to agricultural activities: Esposito's well-to-do father dealt in agricultural products and owned several businesses, in particular a factory which employed 50 people, while Maisto inherited with three of his brothers a mill and some land (*Il Roma* of 26 June 1976). Both had prosperous lawful businesses at the beginning of their careers, whereas Simonetti had nothing (his mother was a housewife and his father was a carter).

By the 1950s, all three were heavily involved not only in agricultural racket - as 'mediators' - but also in illegal deals. They had an *entourage* of 'lieutenants' and their own *chauffeurs.*[19] They were well-connected, having started alliances with other *guappi* and, more importantly, with politicians who protected them. As an observer said: *"There was already some kind of organisation but only of small groups headed by men who knew how to behave in business and were willing to use violence; violence as an instrument to achieve their own objectives but never violence to kill" (P, 14-1-98[20]).*

As far as can be ascertained, Esposito was already involved in serious criminal activities during the 1940s (murder, robbery, GBH, extortion), but by the 1950s, he had taken over his father's business

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[19] Pasquale Simonetti had many drivers (among which Alfonso Jervolino) to drive him from Palma Campana in the hinterland to Naples.

[20] Interview on 14 January, 1998, Naples.

and was trading in agricultural products, mainly dried fruits. His older brother, Francesco was blind and his younger brother, Giovanni, expected to become an accountant, so he was in charge of the family business, *Fratelli Esposito* and was very successful: "with a sharp business sense and an 'unorthodox' approach, he managed to increase his father's wealth. As his views were that it was not always possible to keep one's hands clean when one wanted to make serious money, [...] it is clear that his approach included a certain amount of '*guapperia*' which he wanted to keep to himself (*Il Mattino* of 5 October 1955). This '*guapperia*' consisted of the introduction of a new dimension to the respectable trade of buying and selling agricultural products: resorting to illegal activities and violent means in order to make money and gain power: "Antonio kept to his ideals as ever and went on dealing in onions, in tobacco but also in other drugs [...]" (*La Stampa* of 5 April 1959). It has been suggested *(ibid)* that he used his legal business to recycle goods and money, a primitive form of organised crime in which a legal business hides illegal deals. He was criminally intelligent and understood how the different legal and illegal systems worked but perhaps he also had the right friends (see Enzensberger, 1998:117).

Simonetti's criminal career[21] began in a very small way in the 1940s when he falsified ration books to obtain food which he sold on the black market at a profit (P, 1998[22]). He then went on to deal in agricultural products where he was often referred to as the *'President of prices'* because of his bargaining skills. What made him an imposing criminal was his great charisma and physique.[23] Everybody commented on his size: "*Pascalone* was tall and strong. In the criminal world of *la*

[21] Francesco Rosi's film *"La Sfida"* (1959), is said to be based on Pasquale Simonetti's dramatic and eventful life. It shows in clear terms how one could succeed in the developing Neapolitan criminal world in the 1950s.

[22] Interview on 14 January, 1998, Naples.

[23] *"He had the physique, 'le physique de l'emploi', first of all, he was big, tall and strong. [...] therefore, he could impress in that kind of environment, that of the underworld because he was a dealer in agricultural products and was born in Palma Campania into a modest family, [...] it was his physique that helped him to be admired in the local underworld. But, to tell you the truth, he also had great charisma. He was generous, he offered his services to all his friends, to all his countrymen/neighbours to help them in any way he could. He frequently invited lots of people to lunch with him "* (Interview on 14 January, 1998, Naples).

malavita he had a prestigious position which kept improving every time he became involved in some criminal activity" (*Paese Sera of* 6/7 October 1955). He used this to his advantage and soon became a law-giver in his zones as the old traditional urban *guappi* had done. In this way, he became the reference point in the community to whom all turned when they encountered problems; he was, to a certain extent, an alternative to the State authorities[24] which seemed to be absent. This is one of the reasons why he was considered a traditional criminal who lived according to the code of honour, almost of a bygone era. But what was more important, and the great innovation for a *guappo* at that time, was that he began to get involved in the distribution of smuggled cigarettes. By 1955, he was a well-established 'businessman'.

In contrast to the *'guappo gangster'*, as Sales called Simonetti, Esposito had developed more into a *'mafioso gangster'* (1988:124) more unscrupulous, and more prepared to cheat and betray his own friends to further his business aims. In the early 1950s, he had become one of Simonetti's business partners. When in 1953 Simonetti was imprisoned for 8 years and 3 months[25] for the attempted murder and a shoot-out over territorial supremacy against a band of criminals led by Alfredo Maisto, Esposito "immediately took over control of all the illicit dealings which took place under the cover of trading ('*Il Segreto del Sangue*', *Paese Sera*, of 6/7 October, 1955)" and betrayed his friend: "he promised Simonetti's allies that he would keep a percentage of the profit for Pasquale Simonetti, but he did not keep his promise (De Jaco, 1955 in De Jaco, 1982.). When at Christmas 1954, Simonetti came out of prison, after serving two years of his sentence, he sought to regain his lost prestige and activities. Although his criminal activities slowed down under the influence of his new young wife[26], Assunta

[24] See Appendix Five for stories about him.

[25] He and his friends were also accused of starting a prison riot by setting mattresses alight while in the prison of Poggioreale in 1953, but this was never proved (*Il Mattino* of 7 April, 1954).

[26] His wedding was a big affair: there were a lot of guests, a lot of food and even his rivals:"The Maisto, the Nappo, the Orlando, the Esposito [...] the homage of nearly all the general staff, the general staff of crime to the supreme leader and his happiness" ('*Il Segreto del Sangue di Corso Novara*', Oct 1955).

Maresca, he still helped his friends organise a fierce war against Esposito: "there was bad blood between them" (*Paese Sera* of 6/7 October, 1955) as jealousy and fierce competition grew with "both believing that they ruled over the market district of *Il Vasto*" (*Il Mattino* of 5 of October, 1955).

This rivalry climaxed on 16 July 1955 when Simonetti was murdered by Carlo Gaetano Orlando and Gaetano Nuvoletta[27] (Guarino, 1955:85): "In any case, it is certain that it was Antonio Esposito who wanted Pascalone murdered, and the Police could not but be aware of this (*Paese Sera* of 5/6 October, 1955). However, Esposito was never arrested as the instigator of the murder but Orlando, the killer, was. Simonetti's pregnant widow, Assunta Maresca, took justice into her own hands[28] and murdered Antonio Esposito in October 1955 in broad daylight in Corso Novara: "she had to vindicate her husband's murder" (Scarpino, 1995:64). This was a classic Camorra murder, visible and public, one of the last of its kind (Guarino, 1961; Sales, 1988).

Our fifth case-study of the rural Camorra in the 1950s is **Alfredo Maisto**, (1918-1976) Don Alfredo, the target of Simonetti's bullet in May 1952 (CD'A2). His life story represents a combination of both Esposito's and Simonetti's, that of a *guappo mafioso* mixing traditional values and activities with more 'modern' ones (violence, utilitarian ends, calculated risks). From the age of 19, he was involved in crime from petty theft to serious gun fighting and was "believed to be one of the most "feared" bosses of the underworld which operated in and round Naples during the 1950s (*Il Mattino* of 26 June, 1976:6). By then, Don Alfredo, a thirty year old criminal, was typical of many of the emerging *camorristi* of the time, he sought power not only in his semi-legal business activities (mediating in agricultural products, running a garage and smuggling cigarettes and petrol) but also in imposing his own will on the territory of the Giuglianese and in Naples by using fear and intimidation (see CD'A2:297-8). And if this did not work, he would

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[27] See Nuvoletta clan in Chapter Eight.

[28] She was convinced that the police were not interested in arresting those truly responsible and thus felt she had to take things into her own hands.

not hesitate to resort to violence. He used guns as threatening devices, for instance shooting in the air and at times remained very old-fashioned in his choice of weapons (clothes hangers, hat pins or a mere slap![29]).

He soon established a flourishing business and forged for himself an important reputation[30] which gave him power and status in the community:[31] "but, Don Alfredo remains in the memory of the inhabitants of the zone, the real *guappo*, the man who repaired the insults to a girl by organising the wedding and if the young man could not afford it, he would provided the money for the ceremony" (*Il Mattino* of 8 February, 1992). Thus, the "uncontested patriarch of the Giuglianese Camorra until 1976" (*Il Mattino*, *ibid*) became " 'a real boss' who had obtained respect by his actions" (Faenza, 1993:15-6) and his contacts with the DC party. He had many friends (Vittorio Nappi alias *"'O studente"* was "his friend, adviser and a dangerous delinquent" (CD'A2:288) and enemies (Simonetti and Baiano[32]).

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[29] Once in 1952, he intervened in a sale between an acquaintance and two businessmen friends of Simonetti, the Troncone brothers from Fuorigrotta:
"Maisto, had off his own initiative, decided to threaten these businessmen" (CD'A2:5).

[30] Indeed, the story goes that Don Alfredo had enough power and prestige to save someone's life: in the late 1940s or early 1950s an ambitious *guappo* had slapped Lucky Luciano in public at the races in Agnano, by this act seeking to become someone important. Lucky Luciano, reacted by pulling out from his jacket a white handkerchief with an L on it, while his bodyguards pulled out guns. Although this episode is attributed to both Pasquale Simonetti and Alfredo Maisto, it was in actual fact one of don Alfredo's followers, Francesco Pirozzi known as *Ciccillo 'o francese* (for the way, he pronounced his soft rs like the French) and it is said that Don Alfredo saved by intervening in the incident. This is now a famous episode which is often recounted.

[31] Raffaele Cutolo recalls that as a young boy, he went with his father to see *Don* Alfredo to ask him for help: they wanted him to intervene on their behalf because there was an aggressive person who was bothering and harassing them. They did not go to the police but to *Don* Alfredo who acted as a law giver and made sure that this person left them alone, he used his own famous reputation and imposed his private retribution to do so (Marrazzo, 1985:24-25).

[32] They, together, undertook aggressive and intimidating acts, forms of extortion, against people and businessmen who did not keep their word. In this way, they invented for themselves the roles of law givers and law imposers. He also had arch rivals like **Pasquale Simonetti** who sought to undermine Maisto's dominance in the Giuglianese:
"[...]a rivalry between Maisto and Simonetti for the dominance of the agricultural products" (CD'A2) existed.
And **Raffaele Baiano**: "Maisto, indeed, had become the fierce enemy of Baiano because he had been slapped by him in his garage in Piazza Vittoria, a significant act in the criminal underworld and which needed to be vindicated in order to regain the lost honour with a blood act" (CD'A2:293).

During the late 1950s and early 1960s, his criminal career took a completely different orientation. He met a *mafioso* sent to Campania for a *'soggiorno obbligato'* ('internal banishment'), Francesco Paolo Bontade (*Nord e Sud*, 1982). They first became friends, and then business partners, an important step forward for Don Alfredo and his clan who thereby established solid Mafia connections at a time when the Mafia was expanding (see Arlacchi, 1984 and Falcone, 1993).

Don Alfredo was no longer a traditional *guappo.* First, he had a well structured clan around him composed of his three sons Luigi, Antonio and Enrico) and ambitious cousins Iacolare[33] and the Sciorio brothers (*Il Mattino* of 21 August 1967) as well as the Nuvoletta brothers, Lorenzo and Ciro, and some Sicilians based in Naples. His clan was further strengthened by criminal intermarriages.[34] Secondly, his frequent contacts with the Sicilian Mafia had taught him 'the Mafia method' which he famously applied in 1966 during the first so-called 'American-style crime' (*Il Mattino* of 19 August 1967), Domenico Mallardo's murder in Giugliano which recalled "the worst forms of American gangsterism of the 1930" (*Il Mattino* of 4 August 1967). Until his death[35] in 1976, his clan controlled and monopolised all illegal activities in Giugliano, despite numerous trials which limited his own direct participation.

Don Alfredo Maisto's life shows the capacity of the criminal agent to take up the right opportunities and adapt to changing times: in the 1950s he was an ambitious criminal who respected traditional rules and codes (rules of diplomacy, punishment, obedience, law of the strongest, setting the agenda). By the 1970s, he was at the head of one of the most powerful clans in the hinterland of Naples, controlling a vast territory and handling large sums of money: the statesman of criminality in the shape of the *Napoletano* who had adapted to the

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33 See life story in Chapter Eight.

34 One of his sons Enrico married Rosa Orlando (related to the Nuvoletta clan) and one of his nephews also married an Orlando. See picture 5 in Chapter Eight.

35 He differed from Esposito and Simonetti as he was "[...] one of the few men of the criminal underworld who died in his own bed" (*Il Mattino* of 9 February 1992; Faenza, 1993)!

modern Sicilian times.[36]

A similar transformation can be seen in the life story of **Assunta Maresca** (1935-) alias *Pupetta* (dolly), who from her vendetta murder in 1955 and the title of *'Vedova di Camorra'* '(Camorra widow') (Beneduce in Faenza, 1993a) graduated to the illustrious *'Madame Camorra'* in the 1980s (Faenza[37]), leading accomplice of a drugs baron, Umberto Ammaturo, who represented a new form of Camorra. In some aspects, her life can be considered emblematic of the post-war transformation.

She came from no ordinary family; the Marescas from Castellammare di Stabia (known as the *'Lampetielli'*), had a long tradition of petty crime, mainly threatening behaviour, verbal abuse and receiving stolen goods. She followed the path of many Southern women by leaving school at 11 and learning the skills of an accomplished housewife, *una donna di casa*, *una femmina d'onore* (De Gregorio, 1983:35) in the expectation of a husband. She was a very attractive woman when at the age of 19, she married the important *guappo Pascalone 'e Nola* (Pasquale Simonetti) in April 1955; it was like a fairy tale[38]: "the wedding in 1955 was a grand affair with 500 guests and the whole town turned out to wish them well. Most people gave them the traditional envelopes stuffed with money, others brought jewels for the princess" (Longrigg, 1997:2).

Their house in Palma Campania was the centre of the community for those who needed help and she excelled in her role as the wife of a powerful *guappo*. We know what happened to Pascalone and the action she took to revenge his death. During her trial in 1959, she

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[36] The Maisto clan had disappeared by 1992 at the end of a bloody feud with the new rising Mallardo clan: Luigi Maisto was murdered in 1979, Antonio in 1987 and Enrico in 1992.

[37] Interview of 13 June 1997, Naples.

[38] *"[...] He came out of prison on the eve of Christmas in 1954 [...]And his mother had recently passed away and therefore, we wanted to accompany him home to Palma Campania [...] but instead, he wanted to go to Castellammare. And this was a surprise for us because we did not know [...] So, we went to Castellammare; in Castellammare, he told us the road to take and where to stop and then asked us to inform Mr Alberto Maresca [...] that there was Pasquale who had come out of prison and who wanted to say hello to him. [...] we were very well received and at a certain point, while we were talking, Pupetta appeared, thus we understood, there was a beautiful young woman"* (P, interview of 14 January, 1998, Naples).

pleaded self-defence but was sentenced for 14 years where her son, Pascalino was born (see Longrigg, 1997) to be separated from her three years later. She came out of prison in 1963-4.

The latter part of her life exemplifies a development in Camorra activities. She became the companion and associate of the emerging drugs baron Umberto Ammaturo[39] who with the rise of the NCO in the late 1980s, joined *la Nuova Famiglia* together with her younger brother Ciro, to protect their criminal activities. After Ciro survived an ambush from the NCO, she called a press conference to warn Cutolo off her family, thus allowing Ciro to get away (see De Gregorio, 1983).

Another episode indicates her involvement in the murder of a Roman criminologist, Aldo Semerari. Ammaturo escaped to Africa and then to South America (with a new girl friend) while she remained in Italy to face the charges and served four years for this crime between 1982-86. She was acquitted on appeal in 1989 for lack of evidence - although Ammaturo as a *pentito* has now confessed to this crime. She had a number of shops in Naples and in Castellammare and now seems to be leading a regular life, although she still has sympathies with the Camorra.[40]

So far, we have dealt with major figures of the rural Camorra who had caught the media's attention. It is usually more difficult to find information on secondary figures but in the case of **Carlo Gaetano Orlando** who has written his autobiography and has an important criminal record, we get an insight into a "loyal and caring devotee" (*Il Roma* of 31 March, 1959[41]), an active though minor member, often

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39 *"[...] Assunta Maresca came out of prison in 1964, 1965, immediately we met (at) the Judge of Surveillance's office in Naples' tribunal and started having a relationship [...]"* (Ammaturo, CD'A19d:69-70).

40 For example, in 1998 she was called to testify against her brother Ciro but found all sorts of excuses not to do so. The police had to bring her to the court room by force.

41 "*Tanino 'e bastimento* has an important penal record, but this is not enough to make him an illustrious *camorrista.* [...] Gaetano Orlando was seeking his revaluation, staying in the shadow of Totonno 'e Pomigliano of which (as one of Esposito's brothers made clear in a letter) he was not a 'compariello' in the strict sense, because he had not been baptised by him, but he was a loyal and caring devotee [...] next to *Totonno 'e Pomigliano* he undertook all the jobs,even the most modest and he was without money" (Francesco Canessa in *Il Roma* of 31 March 1959).

considered an 'insignificant person' (*Il Roma, ibid*) of Antonio Esposito's *entourage,* one of his hired hands.

In his youth, Carlo Gaetano Orlando (1930-1998), alias '*Tanino 'e bastimento'* (Tony, son of strong arms) used violence as a resource to resolve his problems (defend his father and protect himself) and thus became a violent small time criminal. By the early 1950s, he was involved with Antonio Esposito and carried out the execution of Pasquale Simonetti (see above). This was his moment of glory not only as a criminal, being the person who "murdered *Pascalone 'e Nola*", but also as a soldier demonstrating his loyalty, devotion, and gratitude to his boss.

As a result, he spent the next 17 years in prison (1959-1971). When he came out, as his patron Esposito had been shot in 1955 by Pupetta Maresca, he, together with his son, seem to have become involved with his cousins, the Nuvoletta clan[42] in the same capacity as before (kidnapping people and hiding illegal weapons). Although he has always denied being a member of the Camorra, he has clearly been associated with Camorra bosses and until his death in 1998 he enjoyed a kind of respect in the community normally showed to *camorristi.* This case-study gives some insight into the role of many petty criminals who gained social prestige by being associated with emerging *guappi* to whom they gave loyalty and service.

An example of a true *guappo* who never really sought or managed to modernise is that of **Catello di Somma**, alias *Don Rodrigo* (1906-1984), from Castellammare di Stabia. He was a traditional postwar hinterland *guappo* who organised the racket of fruit and vegetables, milk and meat. He also dealt in smuggled cigarettes and was once caught with 5000 cigarettes (See R8). His main characteristic was his free use of violence and his attitude of self-righteousness: he imposed his will on others and if they did not accept he intimidated, threatened or even kidnapped them. In the early 1950s, he, together with other emerging criminals, was considered "socially dangerous" and banned from the race course. In 1955, he was sent *al confino,* to

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42 See Lorenzo Nuvoletta in Chapter Eight.

the frontier, for bad behaviour. He had threatened among others the local politician and his family, Silvio Gava whom he appeared to be on friendly terms with.

He did not remain long in Ustica, at the frontier, and was soon back on the mainland, where he stayed two and a half years before returning to Naples. He made a considerable amount of money from his different activities which he invested in a luxurious hotel in Castellammare. Moreover, it is interesting to note that although he clearly violated the law with his criminal activities, he was twice found guilty but never sent to prison.

His political contacts are typical of post war *guappi*: it would appear that, although he lacked respect for Silvio Gava at times, he was a *gran elettore* for Silvio Gava (see Chapter Eleven). His popularity and respect in the local community can be seen by the number of people (more than 5,000) who came to the funeral of his nephew in 1975. The case-study of Di Somma shows the violent nature of *guappi* who took the law into their own hands and acted as the state.

Domenico Mallardo, (1918-1967) *Don Mimi* aka *Mimi 'e Carlantonio* (Mimi, son of Charles-Athony) from Giugliano is the ninth representative of the rural Camorra. He was a small time criminal in his youth (intimidating behaviour, carrying illegal weapons, robbery, violence and illegal brewing of alcohol) as well as a deserter in 1941. In the 1940s and 1950s, his activities were varied but, contrary to Esposito, Simonetti and Maisto, he was never an agricultural mediator-racketeer.

Although he was often seen as a threat by other older *guappi*, he was still steeped in traditional ways. By 1958, like many of his city counterparts she was fully involved in the smuggling and distribution of cigarettes and petrol in the Giugliano area for which he was arrested and tried in 1958 and 1960. When he was released after a short prison sentence he "enjoyed an important reputation" (*Il Mattino* of 21 August 1967) although he was not a leading smuggler. The police placed him under special surveillance in 1965-66 and when he was shot

dead in August 1967 by the Maisto clan[43], he was again under investigation. His 'American style' murder was unexpected and shocking since it indicated that normal illegal business activities could now be part of a more violent sphere of criminality.

Domenico Mallardo's life incorporates the old traditional values of respect, honour, trust and faith with the new illegal post-war business activities and opportunities which were expanding in Campania at the time. But it demonstrates also that the Camorra based in the rural hinterland was modernising and competing with the urban Camorra in terms of activities and violence.

7.6 Conclusion

Within the theoretical framework, these case-studies indicate that the rules (code of honour, respect, loyalty) and resources (surviving, cunning, ruthlessness, violence) present in the 1950s were still to a great extent those of the past. The simple social-criminal practice which was establishing itself still had the socially useful aspect of replacing the state authorities where they failed the community; and the actors to a large extent were charismatic, old fashioned gangsters. Their practices were more often than not spontaneous and undertaken within the general framework of survival. Nevertheless, within the context of continuity there are signs of modernisation, of the adaptation of criminals to new market-forces and opportunities. This is evident in the case of Pio Vittorio Giugliano and Alfredo Maisto.

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[43] This murder marked the beginning of a 25 year bloody feud between the Maisto and Mallardo clans.

Chapter Eight
The Camorras in the 1980s

'Apart from Michele Zaza'

8.1 Introduction

During the early 1980s, among the many clans, families and gangs, two prevailed in their visibility and violence, so different as to be able to talk of 'two Camorras': "[...] the *Nuova Famiglia* [NF] and the *Nuova Camorra Organizzata* [NCO], [...] structurally different - as well as hostile" (Tranfaglia, 1992:306).

By 1983, the NCO and its leader, Raffaele Cutolo, had been defeated by the Sicilian influenced NF clans during 'the First Camorra War' (1978-83). The winning alliance, whose unifying aim had been to eliminate the NCO, duly disbanded and its two leaders, Nuvoletta and Bardellino, formed rival factions which fought 'the Second Camorra War' (1984-86) (Feo, 1989:30-1). Nuvoletta was beaten and Bardellino murdered, but his young ally Alfieri formed a post-NF Camorra, the 'Third Camorra', 'a New Campanian Mafia' (1983-93[1]). These three Camorras had their own specific history, leaders, ideology, members, structures, activities and political-business relationships.

Material has become available through the revelations of *pentiti* which document the lives of important *camorristi*, their different alliances and the role of subordinate *affiliati*, in various zones of the Campania region. The case-studies which follow refer back to the previous chapter and also bring out the transformation in rules and

[1] These dates show the period of existence of these alliances. It does not mean that they disappeared afterwards just that they are no longer controlling and dominating the region as was the case with the NF alliance - each clan went their own way and are still dominant in their own territory.

resources which took place through the 1980s.

8.2 'La Nuova Camorra Organizzata': The Mass Camorra

The NCO was a rigorously hierarchical and strictly local Camorra which flourished in the Campania region between 1977-83 (see Map 7). It modelled itself on the *Bella Società Reformata* for rules and regulations; at the height of its power in 1981, it was estimated that it provided "a living for at least 200,000 people in the Neapolitan area alone" (Jacquemet, 1996:1); had an important membership;[2] and controlled a vast territory with Ottaviano as its headquarters. Raffaele Cutolo, who founded it in 1970, played a key role in the development and orientation of the Neapolitan Camorra[3]: a first step towards modernisation.

8.2.1 The Leader

Raffaele Cutolo[4] (1941 -), alias *'O' prufessore'* (the professor), *'O Saggio'* (the wise one), *'O Principe'* (the prince), *'O Sommo'* (the supremo), *'O Zio'* (uncle) (see S1[5]), was born in Ottaviano, the youngest of three, to a peasant family. After a happy childhood, he lost his father prematurely in 1953; as Michele Rosa, an old man from his town, explained "[...] this turned his world up side-down and then he killed

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[2] See Picture 1 for structure of association and relationship of the different case-studies chosen.

[3] He argues that he has never been condemned of 'Camorra Association - law 416 bis and therefore strictly speaking he cannot be considered 'a *camorrista*' (Letter 5).

[4] His life story has been recounted in a book, *Il Camorrista, vita segreta di Don Raffaele Cutolo*, by Giuseppe Marrazzo, (Napoli: Economica Pironti, 1985, 2nd edition) which was then transformed into a film with the same title directed by Giuseppe Tornatore (Italia, produzione Tilanus, 1986)

[5] Other names used to refer to Raffaele Cutolo include: Compare, Padrino, Vangelo (Marino, 1986:637). Also 'Gesus', 'San Francesco' (Di Pietro, interview of 5 August 1999).



Map 4:The NCO's control of the region (1977-83)

: control
: Ottaviano=headquarters

155

Picture 1: The NCO's structure and our case studies



that boy" (Rossi, 1983:20[6]).

This murder led to his incarceration in Naples prison, Poggioreale, in 1963. There, he realised[7] the potential that lay in such an environment: by helping young prisoners and their families with protection, money, legal aid and social assistance, he could create a pool of grateful and loyal followers[8], inside or outside prison (Marrazzo, 1984). On the surface, this project had the old-fashioned appeal of the 19th century *Bella Società Reformata*: to fight social injustice, "a revolution against injustice" (letter, 6:3). Cutolo wanted to be the Neapolitan "Robin Hood" (Marrazzo, 1981 in *Rassegna Stampa sulla Camorra, vol 1*). But in reality, he was to set up a criminal organisation based on mass recruitment which broke new ground by reducing "[...] the traditional gap between common delinquency and organised crime" (Sales, 1988:154).

He was released in 1970 and had contacts with smuggling Calabrian *'Ndrangheta* gangs. This inspired him as they named him *'capo società'* for Campania, head of the Neapolitan Camorra. After being rearrested in 1971, he began to implement his criminal project: he recruited and trained young delinquents who, once released, served the organisation. They had to abide by strict affiliation rituals and rules[9] in a rigid hierarchical structure while maintaining *omertà*: Cutolo remained the leader, even while in prison,[10] and had *capi zone* (zone

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6 He did well at primary school and was a altar boy. His father died when he was still only twelve; this event may explain his future troubled and criminal life as his elder sister, Rosa, became responsible for him and his education:
"Rosetta bought Raffaele up as her own child, she made a man of him" say those who lived in Ottaviano. When their father, Giuseppe, died many years ago, the future "Godfather of the Camorra" was no more than a boy and Rosa, the of first three [...] felt she had to act as "father" for Raffaele who was the youngest. After all, Carolina, their mother was already too old to look after the family. Her strong and decisive personality was to emerge over the years" (Marco Pellegrini, *Il Mattino* of 12 Sept 1981).

7 He recalls how "my only 'tutor' (*'mastro'*) was don Vittorio Nappi from Scafati of the old Camorra" (Letter, 5:1).

8 Some people tell the story that while in prison at this time: he studied Antonio Spavone also in prison at the time, with all his benefits and one day even slapped him publicly in order to gain respect from inmates and create his criminal reputation (see Marrazzo, 1985, chapter 4).

9 One of these rules was also the setting up of a tribunal which would judge members' behaviour (see Gay, 1998128).

10 He maintains that once he was in prison, it was not he who commanded the organisation but rather people on the outside like Enzo Casillo (letter, 1:2).

leaders), in each town across the territory to represent him. This gave members a great sense of collectivity, loyalty and commitment.

The NCO's economic activities were robberies and extortion of businesses which were coordinated from Cutolo's home in Ottaviano and centralised for efficiency's sake: a percentage of the criminal profit for Cutolo and a monthly tax (500.000 lire) was collected from each zone to feed a solidarity fund for members and buy necessary items. In February 1978, he escaped from Aversa prison-hospital and challenged rival smuggling clans by demanding a levy on their activities[11]. This provoked the First Camorra War. He was rearrested in 1979 and the NCO was heavily defeated in 1983[12] after great violence (between 1977 to 1983, 1,500 people were murdered see Appendix Six) because its enemies had assistance from the Sicilian Mafia.[13] At the height of his 'career' in 1981, he played a major role in the Cirillo Affair[14] as he had political contacts. Between 1982 to 1988, he was put into solitary confinement in Asinara island-prison and since 1988, he has been in Belluno prison where he is serving seven life

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11 Rosanova junior has suggested that the real reason was that Cutolo did not want the Sicilians taking over in the region (CD'A17x+y).

12 The NCO's defeat was due to a combination of police investigations (the first maxi trials with a maxi blitz. This was the Tortora trial when many NCO *camorristi* including a famous TV presenter were arrested and accused of Mafia association and drug dealing, for more information about this trial, see Jacquement, 1996, who refers extensively to it) and the violence of the NF family clans. There had been an attempt at a compromise in 1979: the NF families would control Naples city and Cutolo the province, but Cutolo soon violated this pact as he wanted full control and domination of the region. Cutolo was placed in isolation for six years from 1982 to 1988 to break down the channels of communication with his members and weaken his leadership. It is interesting to note that he did try and establish contacts with other international criminal organisations but failed to develop them. In 1978, while on the run, he met some bosses of the American Mafia who refused serious contacts with him because 'business is business' and the Sicilian Mafia and its allied in Campania were better organised, on a more international scale (De Gregorio, 1983).

13 The Sicilian Mafia adopted a double tactic towards Cutolo: Buscetta recalls how in the 1960s, the Sicilians had tried to recruit Cutolo without success. In the 1980s, they then sought to eliminate him by ordering a killing squad yet again without success (see SO10).

14 See Appendix Eight.

sentences and refuses to become a *pentito.*[15]

His social-criminal practice marks a new departure in the history of the Camorra: "Cutolo's Camorra beyond, the superficial similarities of affiliation and initiation rituals, has little to do with the old Camorra. It is somewhat more complex: a centralised organisation, using urban gangsters and violent young delinquents, exploiting their social aspirations, a *crime-show* with political links (Tranfaglia, 1992:309). Yet, it failed, to go beyond the old Camorra's simple social activities and racketeering. As a leader, Cutolo tried to modernise the Camorra. He had the foresight to understand the need for political and business complicity in order to 'launder 'illegal money in the legal economy through public contracts: "he was very attentive to the influx of public funds and created his companies primarily to recycle illegal profits. He obtained public contracts and bribes on them" (Gay, 1998:128). But his project remained too local and too centralised to compete with other criminal groups when he started to seek total dominance.

8.2.2 The Accomplice

In the shadow of the NCO boss, there was a woman, his elder sister: **Domenico Rosa Cutolo,** aka *Rosetta,* (1937 -) who acted as deputy leader and *alter ego* while Cutolo was in prison. Her case-study is interesting in two respects: as a woman and as an accomplice.

The interpretations of her as a *woman*-accomplice show a degree of ambiguity. Cutolo himself said "Rosetta has never been a *camorrista* [...] she only listened to me and sent a few suitcases [of money] to prisoners as I instructed her to do (*Il Mattino* of 4 November 1992). So did Pasquale Barra, his right hand man "what has Cutolo Rosa got to do with it, what have *women* got to do with the Camorra?" (S1:384). Or the Neapolitan writer Raimondino "the women

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[15] It is said that he is much respected in the prison community for not having become a *pentito.* He is very sceptical about *pentiti* considering them liars: *"Believe me, they tell the truth i have nothing against these pentiti"* (Letter 4). Indeed, If he was to talk, he would reveal a lot of intricate secrets especially about the Cirillo Affair. The NCO has disappeared but its members are still prosecuted. In December 1990, his son was murdered and his wife's family have been murdered.

of the Camorra are no longer colourful things as Pupetta Maresca was at the time of her trial, but grey and sad women like [....] the sister of Cutolo" (1991:23). On the other hand, judges have demonstrated that she played a much more important role in the organisation "the situation of La Cutolo has undoubtedly been influenced by her brother's way of life [...] which by no means excludes the determination and excellent skills which she deployed in the realisation of the NCO's projects" (S1:394).

Not only was she a model of loyalty but, also a highly skilful, efficient and cunning *accomplice.* Apart from the routine activities of coordinating the organisation, collecting and distributing the solidarity fund and dealing with lawyers, she helped in Cutolo's escape from Aversa hospital prison in 1978 and avoided arrest during a *maxi blitz* on her home in 1981. She was on the run from 1981 to 1993[16] and was one of the key negotiators during the Cirillo Affair. It is clear that she was very active on behalf of her brother but that she never tried to usurp his power, remaining a devoted accomplice.

8.2.3 Prison Lieutenants

One of the NCO's differences from the *guappi* of old was its sense of solidarity, organisation, and also its systematic recourse to violence and therefore, to many killers. Many of the high ranking NCO *camorristi,* at the *santista* rank (second-in command[17]), undertook this role. A well-documented case is that of **Pasquale Barra** (1945 -), alias *"O nimale'* (the animal), *'Alias'*, *'locchio di ghiaccio'* (eyes of ice) from Ottaviano, one of the first members of the NCO.

Barra was a violent young man who joined Cutolo in prison where their friendship and criminal project flourished. He helped Cutolo set up the NCO and was "from the very beginning a faithful follower" but preferred to take a secondary role, "reinforcing all intimidation,

[16] It has been suggested that she enjoyed solid political and criminal protection during this time even once the NCO was defeated. She gave herself up in 1993 on the request of her brother and was released at the beginning of 1999 after having served her time.

[17] See picture 1.

extortion, and racketeering activities within their territory" (Jacquemet, 1996:67-8). During the first Camorra War, he specialised vicious killing inside and outside prison, where he committed many murders, even of friends. His *titre de gloire* as a 'man of honour' was that he never killed anybody in the back, but it is said that he ate the heart of one of his victims! Eventually, fearing for his life and afraid that Cutolo no longer needed him, he became a *pentito* in 1982.

In his evidence, he stressed the vulnerability of criminal friendship and his position as there was no shortage of killers in the NCO. There had been an escalation of violence as a means of becoming indispensable, but there was the underlying fragility of a highly centralised organisation based on 'contracts' between unrelated criminals.

Pasquale D'Amico, aka *O' Cartone* (The Cardboard) (19?? - ?) was another high ranking *camorrista* who was recruited in prison in 1976. As Cutolo's cell-mate, he became his PR man distributing orders to the organisation. A strong friendship developed between them, which may explain why D'Amico was allowed autonomy to recruit new members, order murders and expand economic activities (Jacquemet, 1996). He escaped in 1981 but was soon re-arrested. The information found on him confirmed the organisation's existence and structure. It was his disillusionment with the organisation's easy use of violence which led him to become a *pentito* in 1983.

8.2.4 Second-in Command in Civil Society

With its boss continuously in prison from 1967 onwards the NCO needed strong and committed lieutenants outside prison to take command. They had to be loyal to the boss as well as capable organisers. Such were **Corrado Iacolare** (1941-) and **Vincenzo Casillo** (???? - 1983).

Corrado Iacolare, originally a car dealer, met Cutolo in prison[18]. He joined the NCO in 1978 (S1) and, once released became *capo zona*

[18] He was involved in the Mallardo murder in 1967 (see Chapter Seven).

in the Giulianese. His intelligence and skills promoted him to the rank of second in command outside prison, a position which he shared with Vincenzo Casillo. As such he played a pivotal role in the activities and conflicts of the organisation. Responsible for economic activities, extortions in particular, he also had good diplomatic skills: he acted as mediator between Casillo and the boss Nuzzo during a racket dispute, took part in peace negotiations during the first Camorra War and also accompanied and advised Rosetta Cutolo during the Cirillo Affair. He clearly established himself as a man of ideas and business.

However, he could also use violence when necessary: he was involved in the murders of the lawyer Cappuccio, Antonio Mottola, and Vincenzo Casillo's partner, Giovanna Matarazzo. To avoid death and prosecution after the NCO's elimination[19], he fled to the USA, Argentina and settled in Uruguay in 1987. He was arrested in 1991 but escaped in 1992 returning to Uruguay. In 1998, he was arrested and deported to Italy.

Vincenzo Casillo[20], aka *Lorenzo*, Enzo *'O Nirone* (the black one) was a small businessman[21] who sought protection from Cutolo and became his second in command, organising and developing the organisation's activities; extortions in particular, the profit from which was invested in other illegal and legal activities. He was a shrewd criminal who not only kept the organisation going, but also participated in peace talks with the NF in 1981-2 and was involved in the Cirillo Affair. It is said that he developed contacts with other criminal groups and the Secret Services and even murdered the banker Roberto Calvi in London for the Sicilian Mafia. He was murdered by Pasquale Galasso in Rome in 1983 using a car bomb, although Cutolo let it be known that it was he who was punishing his man.

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[19] He testified against Antonio Gava in the Maglio trial in 1994 from Uruguay and in July 1998, was arrested and extradited by the Italian authorities as one of the last free *Cutoliani* (*La Repubblica*, Naples pages of July 1998).

[20] From the important business family, the Casillos, his uncle, Gennaro Casillo had an important grain merchant based in Foggia. Gennaro (now dead) and his son, Pasquale, are implicated in the Maglio trial and have other trials pending for Camorra involvement.

[21] He had a jeans factory in his home town, San Giuseppe a Vesuviana.

8.2.5 The Soldiers

Among the army of anonymous soldiers recruited in prison by Cutolo some names have emerged; in particular **Antonio Cuomo** (1951-1980), aka *"O Marangeiello'* (little angle) who was to be Cutolo's chosen heir and whom he had trained him in prison. However, because of his premature death, he retains the image of the faithful and energetic soldier who believed in the NCO's cause. Many *pentiti* have talked about him, especially after he had been liquidated by his own boss for betrayal. They all praised his loyalty and commitment to Cutolo: *"Cutolo educated him [...] he gave him a few million lire and exploited the boy's courage and charisma"* (CPA1.1:49).

He became *capo zona* of Castellammare di Stabia and sought to organise extortions there. He helped in Cutolo's escape from Aversa hospital but, it seems as if he 'gave' up his boss on the run, in order to save him from being murdered by rival gangs. For this, Cutolo ordered his murder. He is representative of the mass of young, uneducated, small-time criminals who joined the Camorra as a job and were given a sense of identity. His criminal path and promotion to *capo zona* shows the NCO as a big family business giving opportunities to unemployed young men. He was murdered by Barra on Cutolo's orders in Poggioreale prison in 1980.

8.2.6 The 'Businessman'

One of the less developed aspects of the NCO, compared to the later Camorras, was its relationships with the business and political worlds. However, certain contacts did emerge under Cutolo, for instance with businessmen such as **Alfonso Rosanova** (1924-1982).

Don Alfonso was a shady character from Sant'Antonio Abate, involved in a wide range of activities: smuggling and the black market in the 1940s, subcontracting pinball and slot machines with Lucky Luciano in the 1950s (Caputo, 1998:9), construction companies and the food process industry (tinned tomatoes and meat) during the 1950s-

1980s.[22] His reputation and fortune made him a respected local figure[23] well-connected among businessmen and highly placed DC politicians (Francesco Patriarca and Antonio Gava[24] used him as *capo elettore* for Sant'Antonio Abate, see chapter eleven). But, his activities were all on the margins of legality. He had many friends among *camorristi* (for example, Ciro Maresca, the Nuvolettas and Salvatore Zaza) and above all while in prison for suspected arson in 1969, he became the friend, and then mentor of Cutolo as well as his financial adviser on investing NCO money. As his son explains: *"at the beginning, my father had a soft spot [for Cutolo] and introduced him to businessmen, industrialists, and various people from the Castellammare di Stabia area"* (CD'A17x:6-12). All this made him invaluable to Cutolo. He was murdered in his hospital bed by the Alfieri gang in 1982.

Alfonso Rosanova represented a new class of businessmen who appeared in the 1960s ready to dirty their hands and deal with the Camorra *(businessmen camorristi[25]).*

8.2.7 NCO Conclusion

These case-studies suggest that, contrary to previous gangs, the NCO was a specific criminal organisation with a large membership and a rigid structure. Its rules on the whole retained many characteristics of the earlier social-criminal practice (especially racketeering) but its new resources (easy access to violence and money) clearly showed the beginning of a rapid modernisation process.

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[22] In 1982, he had legal construction business which employed 350 employees.

[23] Thanks to his reputation he could help Pasquale Galasso when he went to prison in 1975. He asked his friends and Cutolo to leave him alone; thus Galasso came under his protection.

[24] His son, Rosanova Ferrara junior, has recalled many meetings between the two men especially in Rome. Gava would allow Don Alfonso, who was on the run at the time, to use his office (telephone, fax, etc) in piazza Nazionale. This shows the initimate relationship they had; he had also such an intimate relationship with Senator Franceso Patriarca.

[25] As opposed to the *camorristi businessmen* which appeared in the 1980s who were *camorristi* who went into business (both legal and illegal).

8.3 *La Nuova Famiglia*: the Business Camorra

The NF alliance (1978-83) which won the first Camorra War against Cutolo was composed of different families and clans (see Map 5 for the NF's control of the region). Some were under the influence of the Sicilian Mafia (the Giuliànos from Forcella, the Vollaros from Portici, the Zazas from Santa Lucia, Antonio Bardellino from the Casertano, the Nuvolettas from Marano) and formed what can be called the 'Mafiarised Camorra' or 'Sicilian Camorra'. Others remained autonomous and have been referred to as 'the New Campanian Mafia' (the Alfieri, the Galasso, the Moccia). Tensions between groups led to the Second Camorra war (1983-88) and the victory of the 'New Campanian Mafia' led by Antonio Bardellino and Carmine Alfieri.

8.3.1 The Sicilian-influenced Families: the Drug Experts

The 'Mafiarised' Camorra[26] was a hybrid organisation with both Camorra traditions and Sicilian organisation and methods. Its most influential members were affiliated to the Mafia. The head of the Neapolitan 'family' Lorenzo Nuvoletta was closely associated to the Corleonese family headed by Toto Riina and his leader Luciano Liggio, Michele Zaza was associated to Tommaso Spardaro and Antonio Bardellino to the Bontade, Baldamenti and Buscetta clans. These three Neapolitans were all regional representatives of the Mafia and were all represented by Michele Greco on the Mafia's central Commission, *La cupola*. Below them were local representatives, *capo decina* (for example, the **Gionta**, Gallo and Limelli families from Torre Annunziata and the D'Àlessandros from Castellammare) who were leaders of their own zone, with their own lieutenants and advisers (**Salvatore Migliorino, Antonio Tarallo**) but who were subordinate to the heads of the family in Naples. At the lower level, were local men, foot-soldiers, who were not affiliated to the Mafia (for instance, **Gerardo Intagliatore**).

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[26] See Picture 2, for structure of organisation and relationship between different case-studies used.



Map 5: The NF's control of the region (1978-83)

: control (Nuvoletta, Bardellino, Zaza, Alfieri clans etc)

: alliances/influence.



Picture 2: The Nuvoletta clan's structure and our case studies

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Judge Falcone (see Pr15 and Pr16).

It is clear that Nuvoletta by the early 1970s, had established strong business relations and friendships of his own with the Mafia. These ties were reinforced during the Franco-Sicilian War of 1971-74 and it was at this time that he was co-opted to *Cosa Nostra* by the *Corleonesi* as a regional representative. This gave him a great deal of power and prestige; he was in fact accused of mafia-type criminal association (*associazione per delinquere di stampo mafioso*) by the Palermo judges in 1974. On the demise of the Maisto-Sciorio clan in the early 1970s, he became a boss in his own right. He controlled an important territory "Marano, Calvizzano, Qualiano, Giugliano in Campania, S. Antimo, Mugnano di Napoli and various centres in the Caserta region" (see Map 6).

When the Sicilians developed the cocaine and heroin trade at this time, they used the same route as for the cigarettes and the same collaborators: important mafia bosses such as Rosario Riccobono and Toto Riina stayed in Nuvoletta's house both for business and pleasure (CD'A14:18) and received telephone calls from another important *mafioso* Luciano Leggio.[30] The Nuvoletta clan was by then fully involved in the distribution and financing of drugs in Campania. They made huge profits which allowed the clan to expand, diversify and invest: "On the criminal market, [the Nuvoletta clan] occupies a central role in the control of the drugs trade for heroin and cocaine. [...] For this clan, the drugs trade is only a way of making money and a lot of it, as only a small quota needs to be reinvested to sustain criminal activities" (Lamberti, 1992:116-7)

This is the crucial moment in the history of the Camorra when a criminal organisation specialising in racketeering and smuggling becomes a 'capitalist enterprise' (McIntosh, 1973). In our model, this is the moment of transformation from a social-criminal practice as undertaken by the NCO to an economic-criminal practice as

[30] Hierarchy of the Sicilian Mafia in the 1970s: Michele Greco the leader, then the Corleonese family headed by Luciano Leggio with Salvatore Riina as his right-hand man.

Picture 3 : **The Nuvoletta-Orlando 'Family'**



Note: the names highlighted are those who according to Police records worked in the 'family business' in the 1980s.

: Clan leader and second in command.



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Map 6: The Nuvoletta (NF) clan's control of the region (1984-93)

: control

: alliances

undertaken by the 'Sicilian' NF.

According to McIntosh, a racket develops into a 'capitalist enterprise' when a criminal group (the NF Nuvoletta clan in this case) has established a monopoly position in the illegal market by neutralising victims and subverting state authorities. From activities such as extortion or the provision of illegal services and products (in this case drugs) the organisation moves into the legitimate economy because of its accumulation of capital and starts controlling this new market.

This financial accumulation is recycled, 'laundered', into a variety of legal sectors, while the illegal activities took care of themselves by self- financing. The spreading of illegal capital into civil society is a complex phenomenon during which it becomes difficult to distinguish between what is legal and what is illegal: "the Mafia's infiltration into the legal market, accompanied by a reduction in criminal actions, at least of the most violent kind [...], in spite of the obvious benefits, represents, I repeat, a highly disturbing phenomenon. [...]the *mafioso* who has grown rich on illegal earnings and has entered the legitimate business world [...] is a sign of the absorption and dissolution of the Mafia into honest society" (Falcone, 1993:121). Once started, the mechanism snow-balls. As Judge Mancuso points out "the entrepreneurial sector has been used [...] not only with the aim of recycling illegal money ('money laundering') but also in order to identify productive investment sectors from which more profits can be made" (SO3:29).

This is exactly what the Nuvoletta clan did. His chosen area for recycling money, like many other clans, was the construction industry. This included supplies (cement companies) and machinery, all supposedly owned by 'clean' front men (*prestanomi*) who could deal with banks and escape police attention. By infiltrating the market place, he distorted and controlled it either through bribes, blackmail or intimidation: "with his own construction companies he takes part in the competitive tendering procedure, always introducing a mechanism of distortion; moreover with his own building supply companies he

imposes on other companies his own contractors, forcing them the recruitment of his own workers and the purchase of old stock at prohibitive prices" (Lamberti, 1992:118).

By the mid-1980s, he had an important business empire. From 1980, he was on the run but remained in control of it: this was the golden age for the Camorra as the 1980 earthquake struck Campania giving rise to a massive reconstruction programme during which Nuvoletta strengthened and developed as a '*mafioso* businessman, using more and more shady business to help in the hijacking of state funds and in the management of legal companies.

Indeed, we may note two things about this 'Mafia method'. The first point to make is that organised criminals come to dominate and infiltrate the Political world (local and national), public administration, banks, (credit institutions), legitimate companies and trade unions because of two important resources which they possess. Firstly, they have large sums of money available allowing them to take over companies, corrupt officials and gain credit from banks. Secondly, they have freely available the resource of violence. Thus, they can resolve their problems through the use of violence (Mancuso, SO3: chapter 1). This was particularly helpful in enabling them to infiltrate the massive post-earthquake reconstruction programme.

The second point to make is that this 'mafia method' takes hold because trade unions are weak and businessmen are either passive or co-opted into corrupt Camorra deals because of the lack of business ethics that exists in Campania. In this way, Nuvoletta (like Alfieri and Galasso later) was a '*mafioso* businessman' (*mafioso imprenditore*): "he converts himself, acquiring the necessary economic means, to a business activity in which he can invest his illegal profits made from crimes" (SO3:23) which was different from a 'businessman *mafioso*' (*L'imprenditore mafioso*) who was already an established businessman and became part of the Camorra in order to help to 'launder' the organisation's illegal profits in the legal economy (SO3).

As far as internal politics were concerned, Nuvoletta had also

adopted a Mafia approach: he was always very ambiguous,[31] in his alliances, often acting with duplicity to preserve his own interests. He was "an ally of Raffaele Cutolo" (Mancuso, SO3:20) and at the same time a leading member of the anti-Cutolo camp, NF, always trying to maintain a neutral position: "the role of the Nuvolettas was all the stronger because they sought to be the 'mediators' in the conflicts between the different Camorra families" (CD'A17:16) thus, never taking a clear position in the First Camorra war.

In the ruthless pursuit of economic domination, he declared war in 1983 on Bardellino[32] and Alfieri with his ally Gionta: "they did not wait long to gang up against each other in order to split the different spheres of influence and all the deals, first of which was the drugs trade (CD'A14:16). The Second Camorra war was fierce with massacres at the Nuvoletta house in Marano and in Torre Annunziata. Alfieri and his clan won[33].

When he died in prison, in 1994, although it is believed that his younger brother Angelo[34] had already long taken over the clan, he was still a 'super boss', 'a charismatic leader', 'the boss of two Mafias', 'the real leader'. He had managed "to unite the old to the new: the agricultural products to building developments" (*La Repubblica* of 8 April 1991). He adapted Neapolitan organised crime to the Sicilian method, with its emphasis on rational, functional strategies. He was

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31 Indeed, many *pentiti* have pointed out that they saw Rosetta visited the Nuvolettas and that they help hide her while she was on the run in the 1980s. It has even been suggested by some that during the first Camorra war the Nuvolettas never killed directly any of the NCO members.

32 Nuvoletta moved to remove his ally Bardellino so that he would be the dominant force and sole Mafia representative in Campania; thus Bardellino's closest ally and fellow *mafioso*, Raffaele Ferrara was murdered on 10 of December 1983. This was a clear aggressive move against Bardellino and it is said that he was already considered dead by Riina. Bardellino together with Alfieri went on the attack against Nuvoletta and his allies: in June 1984, Ciro Nuvoletta was murdered during an attack on the family home where Lorenzo was the target and in August 1984, there was a massacre against the Gionta clan (*Strage di Torre Annunziata)*, close allies of Nuvoletta who were also involved in their deals and murders.

33 It is argued that Antonio Bardellino was killed by his own men in South America in 1988.

34 It is interesting to note the intermarriages that have taken place within this clan. For example, one of Lorenzo's daughter, Rosa married the son of another local boss, Raffaele Lubrano; his uncle Armando Orlando's daughter married an important Sicilian-Camorra boss: Luigi Scorio; his oncle Antonio Orlando's daughter Rosa married Enrico Maisto, the son of Don Alfredo Maisto (see Picture 3).

thoroughly dedicated to the Mafia as the *pentito* Migliorino recalls *"Lorenzo Nuvoletta was a very charismatic man [...], a person of few words, of very few words, but he had a way with words when he talked about Cosa Nostra which was very persuasive, he talked about his youth, about his ideas, about Cosa Nostra and its ideals which were fundamental to him [...] (B:65).*

8.3.3 The*Capo decina*

To help the Mafia tighten its control over the territory, the Nuvolettas recruited many of their more reliable allies: "in Torre Annunziata from the early 1980s, there was one single clan, with Gionta Valentino as its leader, which incorporated the Gallo group and the Limellli clan; the Nuvoletta family, represented by Angelo and Lorenzo Nuvoletta exerted complete hegemony over this clan" (CD'A14:15).

Valentino Gionta (1953 -) gave continuing proof of his unconditional loyalty to the Nuvolettas. At the time of the smuggling boom, he made a lot of money not only out of cigarettes but also out of drugs, following in the footsteps of one his uncles, Pasquale Marano, '*O' Nonno*' (the grandfather). And like many other small bosses of the time, he moved into more secure sectors, by investing his illegal profits into legal activities: the fish and flower markets of Torre Annunziata: "the control of the markets, especially the fish market but also shops, was achieved through a more subtle system compared to the classical violent extortions, through that form of tacit intimidation which was possible because Gionta was well-known by then and feared for his powerful organisation. Therefore he was able to achieve his aims without explicit threats or coercion" (CD'A14:14). The Gionta clan was extremely violent. On one occasion, for instance, they raped a woman whom they believed was about to talk (see S10). Moreover, they violated all rules of the Camorra as well

as of the Mafia.[35] But what is most striking was its extreme loyalty to the Nuvolettas.

One of the prime examples of this attachment is provided by the Siani murder in 1985. In an article, Giancarlo Siani, a young reporter of the Neapolitan daily *Il Mattino*, had suggested that Gionta's arrest in Marano, on safe Nuvoletta territory, implied that the Nuvolettas had abandoned him and helped the police because they wanted to break up their alliance. The Sicilians and the Nuvolettas felt insulted and ordered Siani's murder; at first Gionta refused because of the bad publicity it would bring to his territory but in the end he agreed as long as it was carried out outside his zone. The clan and the Nuvolettas were finally condemned in 1997, after more than ten years investigation by judge D'Alterio.

While this example illustrates the great loyalty which existed between allied clans, it also shows the complex nature of the different rules regulating this hybrid organisation. It is further interesting to note that the Gionta clan has the classic criminal family structure with the main family and extended members involved in Camorra activities: the children, the wife, even Gionta's father, Aldo, were arrested in 1997.

8.3.4 The Lieutenant

Besides the boss, there were many advisers: referring back to him for major decisions, they had a powerful position and important responsibilities. **Salvatore Migliorino** was one of them (1956 -). He was recruited into the Mafia which gave him added strength and prestige in the clan. He is now a *pentito* and has given full details not only about his own life and the activities of the Gionta clan, but also

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[35] In particular, allowing Di Ronza, a key member of the group to become a *mafioso* even if his father was traffic warden, a representative of the State. This is forbidden by Mafia rules (see Falcone, 1993:88).

about the activities of *Cosa Nostra* in Campania during the 1980s[36].

He is representative of the many young delinquents who grew up in the streets of Torre Annunziata, in families who were *"on the margin of the legal and illegal worlds"* (B:1), with no formal education, totally dependent on their peer group, gangs of young men living in and off the streets, in a culture of illegality where Camorra and Mafia values were dominant and human life of little value. He himself has stressed the level of deprivation of his environment and the lack of parental support.

Through his life story, we can follow the development of the Gionta clan and the expansion of its activities. In 1975, when he went to prison for murder for the first time, he was already involved in smuggling, but he said: *"let's say that in Torre Annunziata there did not exist a complete organisation, there were only isolated people but nothing concrete"* (CPA2:1). When he came out in 1984, the clan was a fully-fledged organisation, able to give him £5,000 while in prison and £2,000 on release. He was immediately recruited into the clan and also the NF, and soon after into the Sicilian Mafia (April 1984).

By late 1984, the clan became a branch of the Sicilian Mafia (with Toto Riina from the Corleonesi and Marano Agate from Mazano del Vallo as its reference points), subordinate to the Nuvolettas who had affiliated them: "*From that moment on, we always considered ourselves as mafiosi [...] I believed myself to be, like the others, "one and the same thing"* with the Nuvolettas from Marano and also *"one and the same thing" with the other friends of the Gionta clan. [...] We formed a group with precise rules, a common kitty and an equal share-out of all our profits and with Valentino Gionta as our leader* (B:8).

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36 Salvatore Migliorino is today a "[...] state-turned-witness, [who] is absolutely and intrinsically believable, seeing that he offered his collaboration, admitting to have committed (in the first person) very serious crimes, even murders, when he had served nearly all his sentence for these crimes. The important role he had in the Gionta clan is highlighted by his sentences, in the marriage certificate of the daughter of Valentino Gionta at which he was a witness; by his own admission and external confirmations the role of mediator with local politicians; participating in extortions and taking part in important criminal acts for the clan which show him determining strategic choices" (SO10:6). Salvatore Migliorino is an interesting character for he is one of the first *mafiosi* from the Gionta clan to have collaborated with judges and explained some of the criminal mysteries that occurred in Campania in 1980s.

He 'fought' in the Second Camorra war against Bardellino and Alfieri[37] and went to prison for one of these murders in 1984. When he was released in 1986, he became the leader of the clan in Torre Annunziata because the majority of its leaders were in prison. He was arrested in 1992 and became an important *pentito* as his declarations led to the solving and trial of the Siani murder in 1996-7.

In Migliorino's evidence, we may note the attempt of the clan to 'clean itself into the legal economy' by undertaking legal activities but also traditional features: self help, close brotherhood, all living in one building *Palazzo Fienga*[38], and not extortion of the locals. Members of the clan have argued that to avoid social unrest the clan did not racket local businesses, only 'foreign' ones.

Migliorino's roles are described in other legal documents and testimonies (see S10) progressing from smuggler to *mafioso*, from extortionist and killer to political and business mediator for the negotiation of subcontracts with important local politicians *(il capo clan del settore appalto* as Judge D'Altiero has called him*)*. It is in this last role that he made his reputation as he obtained important contracts (for instance, building a School) and made considerable profits for the family.

8.3.5 The Political Mediator

One of the important characteristics of the 1980s Camorra (Mafiarised or not) was its relationship with the local and national political elite (see chapter eleven). **Antonio Tarallo** was one of the political mediators of the Limelli family.[39]

[37] Migliorino in June 1984 as part of the second Camorra war murdered two allies of Bardellino: Mario and Antonio Verde. He was arrested and released in 1986.

[38] Judge Annunziata describes the headquarters of the Gionta clan:
"as the residence of many of the accused [...] as the *Quartier Général* of the clan containing doors and hideouts where arms and protector jackets are kept. In addition, a television security system was discovered to control outside activities for defensive reasons and, as will be seen for offensive reasons" (S10:7). Expressions used by inhabitants to describe the defensive roccaforte that is Palazzo Fienga: "they were all closed in" "I told them [...] if they believe they can, they must come and shoot me in my quarter" (S10).

[39] The Limelli clan in the 1980s orbited both in the Nuvoletta-Sicilian faction and also the Alfieri confederation. Here, we are considering it part of the latter faction.

Born in Torre Annunziata in 1955 in an unstable family situation, he was sent away to the American Evangelical college in Portici until the age of 12. He went back to his home-town and started to keep bad company. He was arrested in 1982 for possessing fire arms. On his release in 1984, he joined the Limelli clan which was already affiliated to *Cosa Nostra* through the Nuvoletta clan. He became a member of *Cosa Nostra* in 1986; this was, he said, *"an important moment because not all members of the clan became members of Cosa Nostra"* (Pr6:27/2). Retrospectively, this affiliation can be seen as a classic calculative manoeuvre on the part of the Mafia to prevent the Limelli clan from striking up an alliance with the Alfieri confederation, the Nuvolettas' rivals in the second Camorra war, as the alliance was never really activated.

Between 1987 and 1992, Tarallo progressed and, like Migliorino, looked after the clan's local contacts with the political and business worlds[40]. Although, he had less political clout than the rival Gionta clan, he still managed to win some important public contracts for the Limelli clan. In 1992, Luigi Limelli distanced himself from Tarallo who quickly understood that he (and Migliorino) were the price for peace between the two clans. This led him to become a *pentito*. Contrary to Migliorino, he only looked after the political and business contacts and never actually murdered anyone. He used his criminal brain and was a thinking man rather than a man of action.

8.3.6 The Bodyguard

One of the intriguing characteristics of the hybrid Mafiarised Camorra was that its foot-soldiers were not affiliated to the Sicilian Mafia, a clear indication that the lower ranks of the clan were considered as mere mechanics not that committed to the 'cause' (there are exceptions such as that of Fernando Cataldo, who was a ruthless killer but also became a *mafioso*). They were often in the front

[40] He earnt 150 milion a year. He received 4, 6 milion a month until December 1992 as a contribution from the gang.

line, not only in terms of physical executions but also as bodyguards and skilled hands.

Gerardo Intagliatore (1963 -) was recruited from micro-delinquency for his skills and courage. He is emblematic of the many petty criminals who were recruited into organised, structured Camorra groups[41]. They were often illiterate young men who took up small time crime to survive and were recruited for their skills, courage and criminal appetite but also for their discretion and respect of the hierarchy. In the case of Intagliatore, apart from his criminal skills (spotted by a *camorrista* for his expertise in burglaries), he was a good bricklayer and carpenter (fixing doors and making hideouts, all of which were strategically helpful and put to good use by the Gionta clan).

As the group developed, so did his responsibilities. He 'was promoted' to armed bodyguard and driver of important members (Eduardo Di Ronza or Ernesto Gionta) as well as procuring the right equipment (guns, getaway cars, motorbikes), getting rid of incriminating evidence and distributing wages to other members. But he always remained a humble foot-soldier: he insisted that *"when Donnarumma* [a *camorrista-mafioso* from Gionta clan]*spoke with Angelo Nuvoletta, I would move away not to overhear what they said"* (CD'A18c:53). He was never recruited as a *mafioso.* He became a *pentito* in 1995 because he wanted to change his life and the future of his children.

8.3.7 The City Allies

One of the key elements of the Nuvoletta clan's strength - as was true of Alfieri's as well - was its ability to forge alliances. It had solid alliances with some groups and pacts of nonaggression with others. As the clan was based in Marano, with its territory spreading north

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[41] Another example is Pasquale Di Napoli from Torre Annunziata who after being a car thief and a smuggler of cigarettes became a drug dealer for a clan. These are often the first to be killed in conflicts. Di Napoli was murdered in 1997 (*La Repubblica*, 15-4-97).

west of Naples, it was important for them to have strong links with the more urban clans of the centre of Naples. For example, at the time of the expansion of the smuggling trade in the 1960s, it was useful to have an alliance with another mafiorised clan, the **Zaza** family of Santa Lucia and, at the time of the first Camorra war, they had an agreement with the **Giuliano** family, from Forcella, which produced peaceful cohabitation afterwards. These two families had similar origins and were both based in the city, but played different social roles and had different economic activities.

Michele Zaza (1945-95), aka *O Pazzo'* (the Madman), head of the Zaza-Mazzarella family[42] was, like Lorenzo Nuvoletta, an important *mafioso* and a regional representative.[43] He is an interesting case-study for he demonstrates how important the illegal economy is to fuel the legal economy, and how important it is for a criminal organisation to develop and expand.

He was born to a fishing family in Procida, the second of three brothers, and had, like many of his peers, a troubled adolescence (involved in burglaries, fighting, and even attempted murder). It was in his early twenties that he distinguished himself as an emerging smuggler, "*un contrabbandiere*": he had had the foresight to use all the opportunities available (Greek contacts with a base in Corfu, motorboats and a healthy market) to set up an extensive smuggling ring. During the 1960s, besides the Maisto clan, he was the leader of the other predominant[44] smuggling group in Campania.

He was so successful that he was recruited by the Sicilian Mafia in the mid- 1970s. Once again the Mafia's economic logic was correct: it was to its economic and territorial advantage to co-opt Zaza into its organisation. The relationship also had benefits for him: in exchange for his allegiance and loyalty, it would protect him, in exchange for a cut of his profits, he would have access to more markets, and thus ultimately to the legal economy. He recycled his profits from his drug-

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42 See Appendix Six.

43 There were only three criminal with such an important role: Lorenzo Nuvoletta, Michele Zaza and Antonio Bardellino.

44 He controlled the zones from San Giovanni a Teduccio to Santa Lucia (Perez, *Il Mattino* of 20 June 1982 in *Rassegna Stampa sulla Camorra* vol 1).

trade into his brother's construction business (*'Lloyd centurato'*) (De Gregorio, 1983).

The Sicilian Mafia thus enabled Zaza to transform himself into a big businessman, strong enough to act independently of the Mafia. In fact, he left Naples and moved to the South of France until he was arrested in 1994. Financial success through the drugs trade in the 1970s therefore allowed him to move beyond the traditional boundaries of the *quartiere* (both for territory and *main d'oeuvre* - although he still controlled it from afar) and to "modernise" his rules and resources: more money in particular. His successor at the head of the clan, his nephew, Ciro Mazzarella, reinstated traditional urban methods and remained in Naples to control the territory in line with most unmafiarised families (Giuliano, Contini, Liccardi). Zaza died of heart disease in prison in France in 1995.[45]

The Giuliano family was also a important member of the NF alliance against Cutolo although it never joined the Sicilian Mafia. Don Vittorio Giuliano's elder son[46], **Luigi Giuliano** (1949 -), aka *O' Lione* (the Lion), in the 1980-90s represented in Forcella the typical Camorra city boss sharing the territory of Naples with the Mariano of the Spanish Quarters, the Contini and the Liccardi of Secondigliano, the Alfano of the Vomero, etc, controlling drugs, cigarettes, arms, together with clandestine lottery, prostitution, extortion and burglaries. Although the clan[47] was violent towards its enemies, it was very present in the *quartiere* and played an important role in the lives of its citizens, both as work provider and protector, two activities which the State authorities should supply. In exchange for these services, citizens strictly followed the rules of *omertà* as well as protecting criminals on the run and obstructing the police from arresting them as was the case in 1998. **Luigi Giuliano** and his

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[45] The clan has survived under the leadership of Ciro Mazzarella although in the late 1990s it is locked in a camorra war with the powerful Secondigliano Alliance (Contini-Liccardi clans). Ciro Mazzarella was arrested in Nice in July 1999, very ill awaiting an operation.

[46] See Picture 4 for Family Tree.

[47] See Appendix Six for details about the clan.

Picture 4: The family tree of the Giuliano clan



Il Corriere del Mezzogiorno,
10-7-98

brothers followed in their father's footsteps but adapted to modern times while keeping a strong foothold in civil society. By respecting traditional methods, this clan in comparison with the more dynamic clans, made less money.

8.3.8 NF Conclusion

These case-studies of 'Mafiarised *Camorristi*' show that they are different from the Camorra of the 1950s and to some extent from the NCO. Based on the Sicilian Mafia model, this Camorra was rigidly organised, seriously motivated by profit, with good local, national and international members and loyal and well-placed political friends. The economic activities (clans based in the hinterland) were sophisticated: from the smuggling of cigarettes to the international drugs trade, to the infiltration of the legal economy to recycle its 'dirty' money, through the use of its legal and respectable companies (in construction companies, cleaning companies and agricultural businesses).

While, the city-based families, involved in the local social fabric, were less economically advanced than the hinterland families and they still invested in the illegal economy, the traditional Sicilian Mafia's values and codes of behaviour were respected and followed (and in this sense it was more traditional than the NCO). It had important political contacts which protected it to a large extent.

The rules and resources were a mixture of both Neapolitan and Sicilian values, methods, attitudes and techniques. The rules were formal rules of behaviour for the group and individual: the strict code of honour which needed to be formally respected. The resources were derived from those commodities illegally traded in the region (smuggled cigarettes and drugs) but were greatly enhanced by investment in legitimate businesses. The 'Mafiarised' Camorra was a well organised criminal organisation which no longer undertook purely a social-criminal practice but which developed and progressed into a

more complex criminal-economic practice.[48] This practice involved both criminal acts but also more intricate economic activities and transactions. It had political contacts but these were still casual and spontaneous.

8.4. The Alfieri Confederation

The outcome of the second Camorra war in the mid 1980s was the victory of the Bardellino-Alfieri alliance. After Bardellino's supposed murder in 1988, **Carmine Alfieri** became the all-powerful leader of the dominant Camorra (see Map 7).

From 1984 to 1992, his confederation infiltrated all strata of civil society and the state apparatus and became the dominant force in the vast area of the Napoletano and Salernitano. This was the period when the Camorra worked extensively at the level of subcontracts and built a solid relationship with businessmen and politicians becoming a criminal organisation involved in political-criminal practice. The main bosses[49], **Carmine Alfieri** and **Pasquale Galasso**, some independent ones (**Mario Pepe**) and others from the lower ranks (**Domenico Esposito** and **Andrea delli Paoli**) have since all become *pentiti*. Therefore, the case-studies are not only based on secondary sources (police, judiciary and the CPA reports) but also on their detailed confessions.

8.4.1 The Leader

Carmine Alfieri, (1943-) aka *'O' ntufato'* (the fat man) or *'Carminuccio'* (little Carmine) was born in Saviano, east of Naples, and was undoubtedly the architect and uncontested leader of the Camorra and criminal-political-business collusion which imposed itself in Campania between 1984-92. Although unique many of his life

[48] We may note that by qualifying it as a criminal organisation which undertakes a criminal-economic practice, this does not mean that it does not do other things but that this is its main activity.

[49] See Picture 5 for the structure of the organisation and the relationship between the different case studies.



Map 7: The Alfieri Confederation's control of the region (1984-93)

: Control.
: alliances/influence.

Picture 5: The Alfieri Confederation's structure and our case studies



experiences reflect more generally the mentality of the emerging *camorristi.*

Like many, Carmine Alfieri grew up in an environment which valued violence, revenge, respect and honour; his *"family had old Camorra traditions"*, said Galasso (16-3-93:3) thus, when his older brother, Salvatore, murdered his father's murderer[50], they gained respect, admiration and a positive reputation within the local community. He felt powerful and 'special'.

In the 1970s, he had a furniture and meat business, he sold land and reinvested the profits in various businesses as well as lending money at interest rates varying from 15%, (less than a bank) to 50% (Pr8:18-2-94:2). He used his intelligence, business logic and *shrewdness* to become an established semi-legal businessman, with important profits and social recognition.

In 1976, he murdered a smuggling-businessman rival, Glorioso and was sent to Poggioreale prison. Prison played its usual role on this twenty-five year old shady character. It provided him with the opportunity of making solid friendships within the criminal community between 1976 and 1978: he met and socialised with his future advisers and partners in crime (Pasquale Galasso, Angelo Moccia, Marzio Sepe, etc). Prison friendships would be one of the keys to his unique organisational structure as these loyal friends from so many areas, would form the reliable and loyal *'direttivo'* (board of Directors) of the confederation, able thus to control a vast territory, criminally, economically and politically.

It also provided the opportunity to study at close quarters the organisation of the existing Camorra groups: Cutolo on the one hand and Nuvoletta on the other; both of whom sought his allegiance. Rejecting Cutolo's advances, he put himself under the protection of the Nuvolettas, who seemed the more rational preference because of

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[50] According to him, the cause was a "stupid argument" (lite banale, Pr8:22.04.94) for the culprit was never arrested. Thus, his older brother, Salvatore a teenager of 17, six years after his father's murder revenged his father's death and killed Notaro. As a result, he went to prison for ten years coming out in 1965.

their Sicilian alliance;[51] as he explains *"practically, we were convinced that by putting ourselves under the umbrella of protection of the Nuvoletta, Cutolo would leave us alone"* (Pr8:22.04.94:22).

When Alfieri's gang triumphed in 1984 - after the two Camorra wars and the defeat of the NCO and Nuvoletta clan - its organisational structure did not appear to follow the rigid, Sicilian hierarchical model. Rather, *"Carmine Alfieri and I [Galasso] never became members of the mafia. This choice was determined by a series of practical considerations, it did not suit us for a number of reasons"* (S7d:3). Indeed, his organisation had more a confederational structure, less rigid than the Sicilian Mafia with different bosses controlling their zones autonomously with their set interests, projects and relationships, though ultimately being subordinate to Alfieri and his close advisors; this *"[...] organisational model was based on reciprocal friendship without any specific ritual, where everyone controlled their own zone[52]"* (Pr8:18-2-94:3). Alfieri and his advisors, (*"il gruppo direttivo"*[53]), all had their own zones and as prestigious bosses protected their smaller allies. This is a modern criminal model, comparable to the Sicilian mafia but more flexible, where 'the directing group' behaved like the board of directors of a legal company; the different local leaders controlled their territory (politically, socially, criminally and economically) but referred back to Alfieri, the managing director, for advice and help more out of respect than out of

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51 *"In 1981, there were many meetings in Marano, in the house of Nuvoletta, who had behind them the weight and strong support of Liggio, Riina, Bagarella and the whole of the Sicilian Mafia"* (Galasso in P5.1).

52 He controlled all the *Nolano* region with the help of Peppe Ruocco, Geppino Autorino, Marzio Sepe and also the Russo brother (Pasquale and Salvatore). And his men were Pasquale Galasso in Poggiomarino and surrounding areas through, Enzo Moccia in Afragola and surrounding areas, Ferdinando Cesarano in Pompeii and Ponte Persica, Angelo Vicciano, Luigi De Martino in the area of Boscoreale, Giovanni Pecoraro in Battipaglia, Giovanni Maiale in Eboli, Mario Pepe in Nocera, Pepe Olivieri in Pagani, Pasquale Loreto in Scafati, the Fiore brother and Luigi D'Avino in Somma Vesuviana and Pasquale Galasso's cousin Domenico Galasso and Gennaro Brasiello, Catello Di Riso and others in Sant'Antonio Abate (see Map 7). He also had Antonio Malventi in Naples in Fuorigrotta before his murder.

53 This is the term used to describe the most important members of the extended Alfieri confederation, its board of directors. For this reason this organisation could be compared to a business but we will that it is much more than that. One of its main aims was to make money but it also was fully involved in civil society and the state.

necessity. In 1988, Alfieri's own loyal family was composed of 21 members in 1988 with an average age of 42. No women were part of the family (see R2).

Alliances beyond the confederation were another key factor in Alfieri's logic of expansion and survival. Through different alliances he controlled an important territory, the whole of the Napoletano and Salernitano (see Map 7). Some rival bosses were not so keen on this logic and rejected it as was the case in 1989 when the fierce Naples city clans (Licciardi-Contini-Mallardo as well as Bardellino's heirs, the Iovine, Schiavone, Bignotti and Verde clans from Casal di Principe) refused to join. Indeed, these different clans would prove to be the next Camorra generation, of leading more violent *camorristi* and cunning than Alfieri, but not as politically astute.

Personally, Alfieri seemed to value friendship: he admired and revered the Neapolitan *mafioso* Antonio Bardellino but in the criminal world, it is a precarious value ("business is business") and he ordered the murders of many of his close friends and allies when they endangered his organisation. Survival was the key.

The use of violence was still a crucial ingredient and used excessively especially during the Second Camorra war. The attacks on the Nuvoletta house in Marano and on the fish market in Torre Annunziata in 1984 are both examples of military and terroristic violence used to eliminate rivals. Alfieri explains that, *"killing our rivals was a necessity dictated predominantly by the need to survive and also of maintaining control of the territory to avoid being eliminated by other organisations"* (Pr8:18-2- 94:2). But killing was also used to avenge as previously and to warn off rivals: in particular, Alfieri needed to eliminate all those he suspected of his brother's murder, and therefore murdered Vincenzo Casillo, second in command of Cutolo,

with a car bomb in 1983. This was an explicit warning to both Cutolo[54] and the ruling political elite that he was now the dominant criminal force in Campania.

Alfieri was on the run between 1982 and 1992. Like many other *camorristi,* he managed to hide locally and thanks to well-placed spies among the Police, he was fairly safe and protected. He became the top boss of the Camorra during this period, controlling magistrates and the political-business elite, not only because he was intelligent, understanding how the different relationships should work[55] but also because he had a vast criminal network across the territory[56] with well-placed accomplices, and because local and national politicians needed his help to drum up electorate support which he provided in the communes of Saviano, S. Giuseppe, Nola, Boscoreale, Somma Vesuviana, Ottaviano, Trecase, Pompeii and others (Pr7:17-03-93).

In terms of economic activities, the Alfieri confederation's illegal activities included clandestine lotto, drugs and arms traffic but were mainly focused on extortion. Alfieri also adopted the much developed 'capitalist enterprise model' but contrary to the Nuvoletta clan, his confederation had many more legal companies and political scouts to help achieve access to state funds.

Indeed, Alfieri's Camorra, like that of the Nuvolettas, had set up with the local and political elite an illegal system which was mutually beneficial and difficult to discover due to the Camorra's presence as legal companies: for example with the complicity of businessman Matteo Sorrentino, they won in 1984-5 a subcontract for *Acquae Piovane* worth 200 milion lire, in 1987-89 the building of a 100 flats for

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54 As Galasso explains:*"[Alfieri] had decided to use a bomb, explosives to give Cutolo in the name of and for the institutions who were connected to him, a last message: "you are nobody, you are finished, it is better for you to shut up about the Cirillo Affair" [...] The idea of using a bomb was thus that of convincing Cutolo to remain silent forever and never pull out the documents, this is what he seems to have decided. At the same time, with this explosive criminal act, Carmine Alfieri would also show everyone that he was Gava and all his other political allies' new contact"* (Pr8:12-3-93:13).
Thus, this action had a clear symbolic criminal and political meaning, Alfieri was now the dominant leader in the region, the clear reference point for all.

55 For example, in 1981, he refused to take part in the Cirillo Affair because he felt that politicians would take advantage of him.

56 He controlled a much more vast territory than the Nuvolettas. The Schiavone gang also controlled an important territory. See Maps 6 and 7.

which they received a further 150 milion lire. This full symbiosis between the Camorra and politics meant that it was no longer merely a economic-criminal practice but a political-criminal practice undertaken by an association, a business group.

In 1992, his reign came to an end when he was arrested on the information provided by his faithful follower Pasquale Galasso who had become one of the first *pentiti.* Some months later, Alfieri also became a *pentito*[57] after ten years of dominance of the criminal underworld.

8.4.2 The Charismatic Lieutenant,*Capozona* and Banker

If Alfieri's confederation lasted for such a long time, it is because he had loyal, competent and efficient advisers who made up the general 'managing group' and who ruled in their different zones. One such *capo zona,* but also one of Alfieri's right hand men, was **Pasquale Galasso**[58] (*'Pasquale was like a son to me'* Pr7:04-05-94v). The case-study of Galasso will help to explain the role of advisor and his different roles which ranged from killer to businessman and from extortionist to 'political agent' and election decider.

Pasquale Galasso (1955-) was born in Poggiomarino into an 'apparently' well-off family, as he explains *"in immediate post-war period, my father*[59] *[...] initially was a grain merchant. Then, with his own work, speculative deals, with property investments, he made a fortune which permitted us to live comfortably"* (CPA1.1:14). His father made his fortune from marginal and illegal activities and there is no doubt that this influenced his five sons. But, he wanted them to better

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[57] It is suggested that he knows a lot more than he is prepared to reveal , in particular, that he did personally meet Antonio Gava and others to decide how to 'cut up the cake' but he has never really gone into this.

[58] Although many in this confederation followed Galasso and Alfieri, there were still important members of this 'managing' level who rejected their decisions, men like Marzio Sepe, Ferdinando Ceserando, Angelo, alias Enzo Moccia.

[59] "GALASSO Sabato, founder of the family, appears to be the most important adviser to his sons, united with and with the help of other members of the clan, using their reputation as violent and domineering people, creating panic and fear in the population with threats and reprisals, has managed in a short period of time to create an important economic empire" (R3).

themselves and to have a solid formal education *"unfortunately, I have to say, I only realised today, that my father wanted me to have a degree. Unfortunately, I became a criminal"* (CPA1.1) Pasquale did not complete his medical studies as he became involved in violent Camorra conflicts to protect his father.

Prison yet again played its usual role. Instead of reforming Galasso, Poggioreale goal, provided a course in crime during which he felt he changed and was influenced by *"the criminal gotha of Campania of that period, from Mr Cutolo to the major mafiosi references in Campania at that time who managed all the illegal deals of the mafiosi. These people were: Michele Zaza, his brother Salvatore, the Nuvolettas, the Sciorios, the Maistos"* (CPA1.1:9). When he came out, he not only became involved with the Alfieris to protect himself and his father's FIAT showroom, but also in the first Camorra war against Cutolo. He carried out 10 aggressive murders and personal vendettas (in retaliation for the murder of his brother, Nino on 21 January 1982 and Salvatore Alfieri in 1981) in the early 1980s.

After Cutolo's defeat, Galasso became a charismatic, well dressed, handsome, aggressive and violent criminal who demanded and commanded respect in his zones (Poggiomarino, San Valentino, Sarno, San Marzano, Scalfato, Boscoreale). Mario Pepe, a member of Alfieri's clan, noted his free use of violence: a person *"was murdered because he'd had an argument with Galasso [...] this person did not respect Galasso, it was a question of prestige"* (S7e:28). In the mid 1980s, these criminals became so powerful and feared that they could basically do what they liked. On may occasions they freely distributed sanctions to resolve problems which citizens asked of them and took the law into their own hands. This happened because people felt they related more to the local *camorrista* than the state authorities which remained ineffectual and remote.

What is interesting in the case of Galasso is his multifaceted nature: a ruthless killer but also a legal and efficient businessman and a refined political mediator. As a zone leader and businessman, he was also the local political organiser, which made him an important

reference point in the community with solid contacts. In 1984, he distanced himself from the criminal organisation and concentrated his efforts on his legal and semi-legal business empire. In 1987, Alfieri asked Galasso to be his banker which Galasso accepted as he saw this as a guarantee of survival and a way of expanding his legal activities. Galasso's business empire was acquired illegally through mafia techniques: either corruption of politicians and businessmen (he acted as a bank and protector for businessmen in return for involvement in the company and money) or through violence (he would take over companies which interested him by using force, threats or extortion).

A clear example of Galasso's business dealings can be seen in his setting up of the cement consortium PRO.CAL in 1988. The consortium, of which he was a director was organised with the help of politicians and businessmen to offset the fall in business. The Camorra and politicians provided social, legal and political protection to the businessmen as well as furnishing materials in exchange for a percentage of the profits (for example, 2.000 lire per cubic metre of cement). They were inspired by the Casalesi clan (see page195-6) in the developing of this model but it was so successful that it became a model for other city Camorra groups (such as the Licciardi, Mallardo and Contini clans) which were even more greedy and wanted a higher percentage. Subcontracts were so abundant in the post-earthquake decade that the organisation could survive purely on this activity alone without needing to take part in other illegal activities such as drug-trafficking. Here we see the transformation of the Camorra from an economic-criminal practice to a political-criminal practice.

The case-study of Galasso is particularly interesting for it illustrates the different and dangerous qualities that a boss must combine to make huge sums of money, to become a vital part of the economy and civil society and to become a fundamental ally for politicians who needed social consensus in the region.

8.4.4 The Drug Dealer

Once the NCO was defeated, many of its allies went over to the new dominant clans of the NF,[60] as was the case, for example, of Nicola Nuzzo, *'O Carusiello'* from Acerra who joined the Alfieri clan, or of Carlo Biino, Carmine Costagliola and Salvatore Di Massa who joined the Giuliano Clan (see CD'A9). These moves were clearly undertaken for strategic reasons, involving survival as well as economic calculations. During this exodus, the Alfieri confederation provided a natural home; it was better than that of the Nuvoletta clan, because it was much more flexible, tolerant and economically successful.

Domenico Esposito, (1959-) alias *"Mimi 'O Blindato'* (Domenico, the armoured one), shows this logic at work for he, like many others who were not in a rigid organisation, sought to join the emerging Camorra groups. He was born in San Felice a Cancello in a modest agricultural family and became a sales representative for the company *"Fratelli Salviato"* in Caserta. His was not a Camorra family but he became involved when he avenged his father's murder.

In 1984, he joined the Nuzzo clan (an ex-NCO clan from Acerra which sought NF alliances) and its leader Nicola Nuzzo helped him to organise his own group of 20-25 men. His activities were extortions and the racketeering (of agricultural products; mainly potatoes). As Nuzzo was still considered an NCO representative, Esposito understood that his alliance with Nuzzo was dangerous so he distanced himself and sought to ally himself with Alfieri.

His case-study also illustrates the violation of rules that occurs at the lower levels of the organisations. Not being able to get into contact with the top man Alfieri, he became involved with one of his advisers, a dangerous and ambitious *camorrista* called Pasquale Russo, who was in Esposito 's words *"an arm of the [Alfieri] clan"* and this made Esposito *"an arm of the arm of the [Alfieri] clan"* (A:29). Russo set him up in the drugs business, even if it was officially forbidden by Alfieri who saw drugs as a potentially serious social problem for the local community, the Camorra's natural ally.

[60] There is the odd example of *camorristi* also moving in the other direction as was the case for Armandio del Giudice who moved from Alfieri's clan to the NCO.

Esposito was able to buy cocaine from Naples and then sell and distribute it freely from his 'internal banishment' location *al confino*, Cattolica near Rimini as there was no clear police control of his activities. This episode highlights yet again the police's inefficiency in fighting such a phenomenon. We must stress the ambiguous role that drug-trafficking plays for Camorra groups. Whereas Nuvoletta and Bardellino clearly made money from drugs, Cutolo and Alfieri had a moral dilemma about drugs. Even, if they officially forbade them, it is clear that many of their most intimate associates were important drug-traffickers (in Alfieri's case, the Moccia clan).

Having made a lot of money from extortions and drug-trafficking, when Esposito returned to Campania he tried to take the next step and move into the legal economy through subcontracting. But, he never really succeeded due to his lack of connections and of organisation. In 1992, he was arrested for extortion and became a *pentito*.

8.4.5 The 'Loyal' Criminal

Mario Pepe provides a further interesting case-study because he illustrates not only sincere loyalty in a cruel and violent world but also the different variety of people involved in the Camorra. Its members are not only violent criminals and petty thieves, but also so-called 'legal' businessmen.

Mario Pepe (1949 -) was born in Pagani in a poorish family and became a cabinet maker, then had a car showroom while also becoming involved in petty crime such as smuggling and carrying guns which he defines as non-Camorra activities. Galasso contradicts this, however, *"All the old Cutoliani Camorra groups (the Maiale from Eboli, the Forte from Baronissi, Salvatore di Maio from Nocera Inferiore, Pepe Mario from Salerno, the Marinelli brothers from Avellino, the Graziano from Quindici, the Maisto from Giugliano and others) tightened their relationship with our organisation"* (Pr8:12-3-93:1). His life story shows the progression from petty criminal to bodyguard-soldier, and

eventually he sought independence in his zone of Nocera Inferiore in the early 1990s. It was through his friendship with Antonio Sale[61], alias *'l'ingegniere'* (the engineer because of his profession as a land-surveyor) and Gennaro Citarella, a builder and cement seller, that he met Carmine Alfieri. At first, he accompanied and became the bodyguard of the main bosses (Galasso, Cesarano, Moccia, Russo etc) but because the organisation was flexible, he and his two businessmen friends soon found the space and territory for their own activities which meant that they could become more autonomous. This also indicates the extent of their self-confidence and their wish to act on their own.

This group was dynamic and successful as Sale and Citarella had good business and political contacts and thus could make some profitable deals (in particular, on the Nocera-Caserta railway in the late 1980s). Alfieri used Sale and Citarella while they were useful to him and his organisation, but once they started to gain too much independence in the Nocera Inferiore region, they were eliminated (Antonio Sale in September 1990 and Gennaro Citarella in December 1990).

This episode illustrates the precarious and fickle nature of 'friendship' in the Camorra and also the leader's need for power and control at all cost. Nevertheless, Pepe defied this and became an autonomous boss in Nocera Inferiore in 1990, dealing in both legal and illegal activities. He became a *pentito* in 1991 after he felt that he was in personal danger. The remaining bosses, in particular, the Moccia brothers, sought to punish him as a *pentito* and murdered his brother in 1993.[62]

Mario Pepe's case-study demonstrates the ruthlessness of the Camorra world, and the difficulty of managing relationships within it.

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61 Sale treated Alfieri as a brother and was the only one who was apparently allow to shout at him (see S7e).

62 There has been a military attack by different Camorra clans against *pentiti* and their families: Mario Pepe lost his brother, Antonio, in 1993 and Umberto Ammaturo also lost his brother, Antonio, in 1993 (CPA1:4). Carmine Alfieri's son was kidnapped and some of his relatives have been murdered.

8.4.6 The Killer

The whole confederation was extremely flexible and allowed its members to act independently: local clans recruited young members who were free to go. **Andrea delli Paoli** (1958 -) is an example of such a delinquent who made his way up the criminal ladder becoming more and more independent.

He was born in Caviano in the expanding suburbs of Naples, where there was high unemployment and crime-rate. His childhood was difficult; he spent a long time in borstal in Naples (*il Filangieri)* and became involved in small-time crime, micro-delinquency before being recruited into the Moccia clan as a protective measure (the NCO had tried to murder him). Once a member of the Moccia clan, his main role was as a soldier, bodyguard and NCO killer in the Afragola, Caviano, Casoria, Arzano and Frattagmagiore zones carrying out extortion and murders. He distanced himself from the clan when they did not want to cooperate in a murder. He became a *pentito* in 1992.

8.4.7 The Important Allies

Finally, if Alfieri was able to become the dominant force in Campania in the 1980s and winner of the Second Camorra war, it was thanks to his alliance with the Neapolitan *mafioso* Antonio Bardellino who was extremely cunning and had great criminal vision; he was perhaps a criminal genius.[63] Bardellino was an important criminal during the 1970-80s not only because he was a representative of the Sicilian Mafia but also because he was particularly admired and respected by his peers among whom were Umberto Ammaturo and Carmine Alfieri. These two groups (the clan from the Casertano and that of the international drugs baron) were thus indirectly Alfieri's allies, although with the disappearance of Bardellino in 1988, they soon distanced themselves from the Alfieri clan. We believe it is important to look at these two criminal groups because they are yet again

[63] A lot of political scams were put into place by him and it would appear that he started this form of political-criminal practice.

different forms of Camorra with clear rules and resources.

The *Casalesi*, the Schiavone clan, from Casal di Principe provide a good example of internal fighting and violence. It illustrates clearly the violent dialectic which ruled these organisations whereby friends and brothers killed each other for money and power. Francesco Schiavone, alias *Sandokan*, started out as driver and bodyguard of Umberto Ammaturo, then as the old bosses (Bardellino and Iovine) and potential younger leaders (the Bidognetti, the De Falco, and the Verde) disappeared in the space of seven years, it was his turn to become the boss of the clan in the 1990s as he was the strongest and most cunning of this new generation. This clan was the descendent of Bardellino's which may explain why it was one of the most modern clans in Campania whose business and political activities were in the vanguard and copied by many, the Alfieri confederation in particular.

This clan dealt in traditional extortion of agricultural businesses in its rural territory, but also in much more up-to-date profitable activities such as drug-trafficking, EC frauds, public subcontracts and recycling nuclear waste. EC frauds, which were also carried out by the Nuvoletta clan in the 1970s, consisted of setting up scams with legal businesses receiving EC money for declaring overproduction of agricultural products which did not exist. It was in the extortion of agricultural cooperatives, dealing in drugs and the winning public subcontracts that it set the trend. It also started recycling nuclear waste.

This clan carried out many extortions, but soon moved into more profitable activities in 1980 like drugs dealing where there was a high return on investment as they usually monopolised the market. Public contracts were won through collusion with politicians and their legal companies. Recycling nuclear waste consisted of importing nuclear waste from Eastern Europe and recycling it in the region and then in other regions. These activities were in stark contrast to the urban clans, like the Giuliano or the Mariano of Naples city which were very present in the community. This is illustrated by the clan's town of Casal di Principe which is not a small intimate town but one full of

bunker houses with high security systems to protect the different members.

The configuration of the Sandokan clan in the 1990s shows its tight-knit family structure. It was dominated by the Schiavone family, both in its criminal branch (*camorristi*) and its in socially respectable branch (doctors and businessmen). For example, **Carmine Schiavone** (1940 -), the cousin of the leader, was a violent young man (carrying fire arms, selling illegal goods, robbery, frequenting clandestine casinos where he met Bardellino) who joined the organisation with many of his cousins. By 1989, when Francesco Schiavone became boss, he nominated his close relatives to key posts, including Carmine Schiavone, as political adviser (he was already financial adviser) and members of the legal branch to the municipal council (see chapter eleven).

Although, this clan had been affiliated to the Sicilian mafia in 1981, it soon sought independence of all its affiliations and its alliances (including that with Alfieri). This gave it major flexibility and control over its activities. This policy enabled it to be at the forefront of the development of the Camorra in the early 1990s. A fundamental aspect of the Camorra's development in the post war period was its involvement in the international drugs trade in the 1970s. This major resource was a vital ingredient in the Camorra's transformation. Indeed, there is no doubt that its involvement in the drugs trade permitted its dramatic transformation: using the money made from its extortion activities it invested this capital (about 50%) into the drugs trade. Drugs allowed it to accumulate vast capital which it then could recycle into the legal economy, in building companies or the tourist business, for example. The greater the finance available to the Camorra the more organisation was required. When the Camorra became involved in international drugs trafficking, it had to organise and organise it did with international banks and scientists to set up refineries and locally distributors.

Umberto Ammaturo (1941 -) was an ally of Bardellino and brother-in-law of Antonio Malvento adviser of Alfieri. He is an

interesting character who began his criminal career in 1955-6 as a petty criminal, then a cigarette smuggler in the 1960s; in the 1970s he became a drugs baron; in the 1980s, he escaped to South America to set up some businesses; and in the 1990s, he ended up as a *pentito.* His activities covered the whole period we are studying and show clearly the development of rules and resources between the 1950s and 1980s. Moreover, since he became a *pentito* his statements, despite some reticence, provide useful information and insight into the transformation of the Camorra.

Umberto Ammaturo, alias *' 'O pazzo'* (the mad one[64]) was born in a large Neapolitan family which was economically and emotionally precarious: his father's wine business suffered from economic difficulties while he lost his mother at the age of seven. So, like many of his generation, he became a street urchin, *'guaglione'* of the street" (Perez, 1996[65]) where his criminal career began.

In the 1960s, he became involved in smuggling and was sent to prison in the early 1970s where he met the light-footed and modern Sicilians Gennaro Ferrigno and the Grieco brothers, who helped him become one of the most important drugs baron of his generation. Prison played a fundamental role in the development of Ammaturo's criminal career: in the mid-1970s, in Aversa goal he met the main local bosses Angelo, Ciro, Aniello and Antonio Nuvoletta as well as Raffaele Ferrara (a Neapolitan *mafioso*) when they were rising to power. In 1963, he became involved with Pupetta Maresca and in 1977, he was involved in a extensive cocaine deal with the Consul of Panama and Aniello Nuvoletta. He joined the NF alliance, when Cutolo started his offensive in 1981 and was heavily involved in the Camorra war together with Bardellino. Together, they murdered many NCO members. In 1987, he fled via Africa to South America to invest his money in the drugs traffic and hotels.

Ammaturo remained a loner and was the exception which confirms the rule: he had no territory, no family and specialised

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64 This nickname was adopted due to the fact that when he was in prison and faced trials he pleaded insanity, a well-known ploy used by criminals.

65 Interviews of 6 September, 1996 and 4 April 1997, Naples.

entirely in drug dealing. He had wealth and power and yet no social and even less political, control. He became a *pentito* in 1993 when he revealed important criminal secrets.

8.4.8 Alfieri Conclusion

The Alfieri confederation group can be seen as a clear evolution of both the NCO and the Sicilian-influenced Nuvoletta clan: its basic economic activities were the same as the NCO when it reached its maximum potential. But it was more Neapolitan and autonomous from the Mafia; it was less rigid and more informal than the NCO. It had no initiation rituals but was more specialised and more sophisticated; as will be seen, it had the opportunity to move into politics and took it.

In theoretical terms, it started out as an organisation, business which had undertaken a social-criminal practice like the NCO and an economic-criminal practice like the NF but then evolved into a political-criminal practice, in McIntosh's terms a 'political capitalist enterprise,' making money with political help, a sophisticated business which is an accumulation of all the Camorras and practices which have come before.

8.5 General Conclusion

In this chapter, we have sought to illustrate the transformation of the Camorra in the 1980s using the life stories of prominent *camorristi*. It is clear that between the 1970s and 1990s an extraordinary transformation took place: the characteristics of the different prominent Camorra gangs demonstrate this: from extortion (a social-criminal practice) to drug dealing (an economic-criminal practice) to public contracts (a political-criminal practice). Our three different Camorras clearly show these three stages of development. Now, we turn our attention to understanding how this occurred.

Chapter Nine
The Neapolitan Camorra's Post-War Transformation: Successful Modernisation

"Modernisation is a revolutionary process."
S.P. Huntington (1998:68)

9.1 Introduction

The previous two chapters have established that a complex process modified the Camorras from being, in the 1950s, loose alliances of criminal individuals who enacted a social-criminal practice; to in the mid-1970s, a more disciplined criminal organisation but still undertaking a social-criminal practice; to in the late 1970s and early 1980s, families influenced by the Mafia to undertake an economic-criminal practice; and finally, by the mid-1980s, a massive confederation, or cartel of criminal alliances involved in a political-criminal practice (the Alfieri confederation). In this chapter we endeavour to identify the reasons for such transformations.

9.2 Modernisation of Italy in the Post-War Period

The rebuilding of Italy after the Second World War involved thirty years of economic growth *('les trente glorieuses')* and the passage from an industrialising to an industrial society. This boom involved technical progress, development of scientific knowledge and industrialisation. It had wide political, social and cultural repercussions such as

urbanisation, secularisation, democratisation, education, consumerism and media participation. This multi-faceted transformation provoked in Italy, to use Martinelli's words, "a true social revolution" (1999:4) "involving changes in all areas of human thought and activity" (Huntington, 1968:32).

From a modernist, 'progressivist' perspective, this development can be interpreted as a positive experience and as the motor of change in the rest of society, encouraging social, political and cultural developments leading towards universal well-being and happiness (see Pinto, 1981) "a sort of utopic evolutionism" (Lash and Wynne, in Beck 1992:2). In a more skeptical 'regressive' perspective, the *pharmakon* of progress, as Agnes Heller (1999) pointed out, can be seen either as a medicine or as a poison: "a dark dimension" can be perceived to the process of modernisation, whereby "a set of risks and hazards, the likes of which we have never previously faced" (Lash and Wynne, *ibid*) appear. Already, in the nineteenth century, Marx and Durkheim had seen the dangers of so-called 'progress'.

Huntington (1968, 1998) also developed this 'regressive' position pinpointing in particular how modernisation breeds violence and corruption. He defined 'modernisation', which in Western Europe began at the beginning of the eighteenth century but was significant and rapid in the post-war period, "as a product of the tremendous expansion of scientific and engineering knowledge [...] that made it possible for humans to control and shape their environment in totally unprecedented ways" (*ibid,* 1998:68) and looks at its different aspects and how it touches every part of "human thought and activity". "Modernisation involves not just structural change" write Lash and Wynne, "but a changing relationship between social structures and social agents. When modernisation reaches a

certain level, agents tend to become more individualised, that is, decreasingly constrained by structures. In effect structural change forces social actors to become progressively more free from structure. And for modernisation successfully to advance, these agents must release themselves from structural constraint and actively shape the modernisation process" (in Beck, *ibid*). Huntington shows how it has an effect both on the agent at an individual level and on the collectivity at a mass level. At the psychological level, modernisation involves a change in values, attitudes and expectations: shifting from the micro (family, village-based framework) to the macro-level, of impersonal group ties, moving away from the individual to the universal. At the intellectual level, there are changes in knowledge, with an increase in literacy, mass communication and education.

At the social level, clear changes in patterns of life appear: longer life expectancy, more employment, geographical mobility, a population exodus from the rural countryside to the urban cities. The family is no longer the centre of the individual's life, as more secondary associations start to have varying and specific functions. At the economic level, there is a diversification of activity, more complex occupations and skills, capital intensive rather than labour intensive production and a decline of agricultural activities as more commercial and industrial activities expand. Thus, with modernisation, there is an expansion of the geographical scope of economic activities, which move away from the local to the national and more centralised level, to the national market with national sources of capital and this was expected to introduce increased economic well-being and reduce economic inequalities.

In Italy, this social change took the form of a drastic

transformation, as Martinelli highlighted, from a largely agricultural economy to a service-oriented economy with strong industrial foundations, from a self-reliant economy to a fast-growing, export-oriented economy, from an important demographic expansion to a zero population growth and a nuclear family base, from a labour-exporting country to a labour-importing country, from a largely peasant society to a mature, urban, informed society, from a simple social structure to a socially fragmented mass society, from a static social structure to a highly mobile population, from traditional consumer attitudes to individualistic, mass consumption patterns, from a fragmented society with different dialects to a unified society with one national language, from ethnically homogeneous regions to an ethnically heterogeneous national society, from family-based solidarity to a welfare system, from traditional power relations to organisational patterns, from subordinate home-caring women to liberated and autonomous working women, from a traditional, religious culture to a modern secular culture, from authoritarian regimes to representative democracy, from class antagonism to self employed versus employed workers and welfare versus private sector conflicts (1998:4-5). This concept of 'modernisation' by Martinelli only helps up until a point. This thesis will show that it is misleading for the South. Indeed, in the South this social transformation was not so clear cut (Allum, 2000). Borelli (1972) has argued that modernisation in Naples was too rapid and thus, produced a 'hybrid' society which was not completely industrialised containing elements of a pre-industrial traditional society and a modern industrial society.

Increased social mobilisation and economic development have an impact on politics and political institutions: rationalised authority and differentiated structures

with mass participation are the key characteristics of a modern polity. But Huntington argues that it is wrong to conclude that modernisation produces such characteristics; if anything "the gap between the two is often vast. Modernisation in practice always involves change in and usually the disintegration of a traditional political system, but it does not necessarily involve significant movement toward a modern political system" (1968:35). Thus, social modernisation does not necessarily produce political modernisation. But even more interestingly, it is not a peaceful process but a rather chaotic one: there are general radical cultural, economic and political changes in a society which remains in turmoil. Some situations retain normality and others do not: "modernisation thus tends to produce alienation and anomie, normlessness generated by the conflict of old values and new. The new values undermine the old bases of association and of authority before new skills, motivation and resources can be brought into existence to create new groupings" (*ibid*:37). In such a precarious situation, violence, corruption and organised crime groups are allowed to develop, precisely *because* modernisation produces a change in the basic values of civil society. Old values and norms are replaced by new comprehensive, merit-based norms, new loyalties and identifications, new criteria and standards: "the conflict between modern and traditional norms opens opportunities for individuals to act in ways justified by neither" (*ibid*:60).

Moreover, with modernisation comes the need to distinguish between public welfare and private interest in all realms of the social sphere. A greater divide between the public and private sphere is introduced with individuals turning away from the public sphere with its civic duty to the private sphere dominated by the family. In this way, rapid

modernisation with its search for economic equality and achievement based standards "may stimulate greater family identification and more felt need to protect family interests against the threat posed by alien ways (*ibid*:60-61).

Modernisation also produces new sources of wealth and power. Thus, new groups with access to new resources become important players in civil society and the political sphere. New wealth permits easy access to the centres of power for the first time, while the poor enfranchised classes can use their new voting power to gain jobs and favours. Lastly, modernisation, as rapid social and political change, has a direct impact on government output and "governmental authority" (*ibid*:61): government produces more laws, regulations, and directives in order to keep up with the growing needs and demands of civil society.

Following Huntington, I believe that Southern Italy adapted to post-war modernisation according to its historical codes, experiences and traditions. This produced conditions which were conducive to violence and corruption but also produced opportunities which encouraged the expansion of organised crime groups throughout civil society and the political institutions. The South's adaptability produced different 'political opportunity structures' (Kitschelt, 1986[1]) which politicians and organised crime groups have exploited.

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[1] To understand and define 'political opportunity structures' we use both Kitschelt's definition:

> "Political opportunity structures are comprised of specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents [...] for action" (1986: 58).

and Meny and Rhodes' explanation of the usefulness of such a theory:

> " it can be of use in explaining variations in the intensity and methods [...] by indicating the ease or difficulty of access to and exploitation of procedures and institutions in a given political system" (1997:100).

As Giddens explains "the development of modern social institutions and their worldwide spread have created vastly greater *opportunities*[2] for human beings to enjoy a secure and rewarding existence than any type of pre-modern system. But modernity also has a sombre side, which has become very apparent in the present century" (1990:7). Like Giddens, Beck saw these opportunities but defined them as risks and dangers: "in advanced modernity the social production of *wealth* is systematically accompanied by the social production of *risks.* [...] Risk may be defined as *a systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernisation itself.* Risks, as opposed to older dangers, are consequences which relate to the threatening force of modernisation and to its globalisation of doubt (1992:20-2).

9.2.1 Agricultural Rackets

The post-war economic boom had an important impact on Western Europe. It proved to be the motor of overall social, cultural and political developments, the catalyst for change, evolution and progress. However, even if it may have appeared so on the surface, this change was not consistent everywhere. In Italy, in the North there was a strong productive and industrial base whereas in the South there was only a strong agricultural base with intermittent industrialisation. In the Italian case, Schneider and Schneider (1973) talked of "modernisation without development", a process of modernisation without solid investment in a productive and industrial infrastructure causing unemployment and crime. Martinelli talked of "unaccomplished modernisation or more bluntly, of failed modernisation" (1999:16) which reminds us of Giddens's "discontinuities of modernity" (1990:4).

[2] My emphasis.

After the upheaval of the war and the economic confusion that followed (the economic crisis and slow recovery), the open air Neapolitan street market, stretching from *Corso Novara* to *Piazza Mercato*, was one of the biggest Italian markets. It represented a gold mine with a turnover of 28 *miliardi* of lire (over 10 million pounds in the 1990s [Sales, 1988:122]) and in 1955, horticultural exports representing 30% of the Italian national market (Guarino 1985:93[3]). Business exchanges took place in the chaotic and thriving market place where there were no strict nor formal rules: it was like a jungle where "the law of the fittest" predominated.[4] It became the target of aggressive individuals, *guappi*, who imposed their will on farmers and on these weak market structures. Forceful and menacing individuals, like Antonio Esposito, Pasquale Simonetti and Alfredo Maisto became 'mediators' between farmers and the market place, imposing prices both on producers and buyers. By using force they established a monopoly situation of certain products such as tomatoes and potatoes and therefore they set whatever price they wanted. This is why they were called *'the Presidents of prices'*.

It was relatively easy for them to establish an agricultural racket at the expense of the myriad of small peasant farmers from the hinterland who were too weak and disorganised to fight back. Small farmers were not well-equipped in front of a violent *guappo* who imposed his business conditions on the distributor and sale of the products at elevated prices in the city market while paying a miserly price to the former for them

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3 The Neapolitan street market was unique compared to many other regional markets which were seasonal, the Neapolitan market functioned on a permanent basis because Campanian agricultural productivity, thanks to the climate, ripen all the year round (Guarino, 1985:93).

4 Francesco Rosi's film *La Sfida* (1962 - which recounts the story of Pasquale Simonetti and Assunta Maresca in the 1950s) shows well this role of 'mediator', the rivalries between mediators and the weakness of the farmers confronted with these racketeers.

in the first place: for example, the *guappo* Pasquale Simonetti bought potatoes for 100 *lire* per kilo and sold them at market for 30-40.000 lire (Sales, 1988:123). If the farmer did not accept these conditions, he would be threatened or see his farm go up in flames. They also dealt with bigger companies like Cirio, the most famous tinned tomatoes company in Campania, mediating between Cirio and the farmers, setting the prices of the deals. This type of mediating activity developed in the immediate post-war period because of the nature of the market and the lack of modern market-structures. Mediators regulated the market where there was active production but limited demand, profiting from weak market structures to impose their own business rules and make money.

Although this act was a form of 'racket' as the agricultural mediator extorted from the farmer of his product and only gave him a small return, it was difficult to collect evidence to demonstrate its criminal aspect. It was for this reason that this activity was considered more legal than the activities undertaken in the city by their counterparts.

The role of agricultural mediator had many positive knock-on effects: it gave prestige and respect in the community as well as a step up the criminal ladder, providing also a good business cover for more shady activities, as was the case of Antonio Esposito.

> It was a delicate situation for a *guappo-camorrista*, who had to use intimidation to control these economic activities. Many market traders were armed. They were violent. It was not a place for the faint-hearted and violence calls for violence. Those who did business in these areas knew that, in the absence of law, only the strongest and most courageous survive. The Esposito family, owners of *'Esposito Brothers Company'*, members of the traders' association knew this. The one who knew how to make himself respected the most was Antonio, known as '*Totonno 'e Pomigliano'*. He was no angel. Already in 1930 he had been condemned for GBH (Di

Fiore, 1993:143).

A similar pattern applied to the more modern *camorristi* such as Lorenzo Nuvoletta who was "the heir of an agricultural family which was one of the first to start a fruit export-business" (*Il Mattino* of 11 December 1990). The Bardellino-Schiavone clans and the Nuvoletta clan organised, for example, with the complicity and collusion of local Camorra-sponsored businessmen and regional officials a successful agricultural fraud involving the mismanagement of EC funds: in 1992, the police denounced them for the falsification of bills and the use of illegal certificates produced by regional officials which allowed Camorra-sponsored businessmen to receive EC money illegally (SO13:257).

Such activities in the market place provided opportunities to develop friendships and working relationships with the Sicilians. Arlacchi and Pizzorno explain "The first economic exchanges between Mafia and Camorra groups date back to the immediate post-war period and were based around the commerce of horticulture products. Some Mafia leaders started to act as suppliers for the agricultural market of Naples and its province, establishing relationships with Camorra businessmen which were reinforced in the 1960s " (1985:27). This is confirmed by a Carabinieri's report on Mafia contacts in 1973 (see Doc 1029:2). It is from this time that the Orlando family established strong business links with the town of Trapani[5] and that Pasquale Simonetti had a working associate called *'Fifi, il siciliano'* (see CD'A2). This may explain how eventually the Neapolitan 'fruit exporter' Lorenzo Nuvoletta managed businesses which had been created by the Sicilian Luciano Liggio (Feo, 1989)

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[5] The case for the Orlando family business where Carlo Gaetano Orlando spent a few months in Trapani for his father's horticultural business.

9.2.2 The Smuggling Trade

Another economic decision which was to have an important long term impact on Italian organised crime groups was the reintroduction by the Italian government in the immediate post war period of a state monopoly in the tobacco industry to make money rather than levying direct taxes. The increasing demand for cigarettes in the immediate post-war period in Naples was such that state cigarettes could not satisfy it.[6] A black market developed around American and British troops who had vast supplies, especially of the popular American cigarettes[7], *'americane'* or *'bionde'*. But once the Allies had left in 1946 and closed their warehouses, the government was forced to ration cigarettes to a maximum of 30 cigarettes and 6 cigars per person as it could not satisfy the general demand - either with Italian or foreign cigarettes.

This measure, taken in 1946 and applied until 1948, sent the smuggling trade into crisis as there was tight control on activity by the local authorities. However, local *guappi* and bigger crime groups soon organised out of necessity. They used both the cheaper option of producing illegal cigarettes in local factories in Barra, San Giovanni a Teduccio and Gragnano from locally grown tobacco leaves, and also introduced new methods of smuggling cigarettes by sea from Marseille, Gibraltar, Nice and Tangiers (Figurato and Marolda, 1981). Importation of tobacco, American cigarettes due to the 'acquired taste' (Pall Mall, Marlboro, Kent, Camel, Chesterfield, Morris) proved easier because the foreign criminal groups

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[6] Arlacchi and PIzzorno noted that between 1951 and 1970, national consumption of tobacco increased from a value of 306 to 1.081 billion (today - 1984) and in 1963's terms it went from 393 to 1.018 billion di lire value. Between 1950 and 1970, State monopoly's profit increased by 100% (1985:12).

[7] At this time, one can read about many crimes involving American troops and cigarettes (see Sales, 1988:119, for descriptions of clever crimes where Neapolitans managed to steal train loads of cigarettes). They either brought or stole cigarettes from the American troops or their warehouses.

were highly organised and structured this activity.

The 1950s saw the smuggling of American cigarettes develop into a fine art: the main organisation was synchronised by foreign groups (the Marseillais, Corsicans, Sicilians) with radios based in the Vomero area: they coordinated the arrival of big ships and the pick-up by rapid blue motorboats in the Bay of Naples, while local *guappi* distributed the cigarettes used as *hommes de main*. Some of the more ambitious *guappi* took a pro-active role and became more involved: "on that occasion, it was established that many Neapolitans had invested considerable sums of money in the organisation. Always in 1955, following the requisition of the boat 'S.S.Calogero' connections emerged between the famous Alfredo MAISTO from Giugliano (NA), SPADARO Giuseppe, ADELFIO Salvatore, and SPADARO Vincenzo, and other Sicilians" (doc 1032, n 2, vol 4:1667). Others developed business contacts and solid friendships: "already in 1958, there was evidence of operational contacts in the smuggling sector between Antonino Camporeale, Tommaso Buscetta, Filippo, Gioè Imperiale and [the Neapolitan] Felice Malvento"[8] (Aa. vv, *Nord e Sud*, 1982:14).

In Naples in the early 1960s, these activities were controlled by the two major smuggling groups the Maisto-Sciorio and Zaza clans (*ibid*:13) but many other groups, the Giuglianos, the Vollaros, the Nuvoletta-Orlandos and Antonio Bardellino, soon joined them. From the 1970s to the 1990s, smuggling American cigarettes was still an important economic

[8] Felice Malvento was related to Umberto Ammaturo (see Chapter Eight for life story): his brother, Antonio Ammaturo had married Luisa Malvento. Therefore, these two criminal families were related. Moreover, another son of Felice Malvento, Antonio Malvento was a close associate of Carmine Alfieri.

activity for many groups.[9] This provided a living for many non-affiliated supporters which in turn produced a sense of loyalty as they felt grateful towards the Camorra groups who fed them. The social usefulness of this activity for the local community therefore makes the *guappi*'s practice a social-criminal practice.

An external political event precipitated the transformation of Neapolitan smuggling gangs from a social-criminal practice to an economic criminal practice: the closing of the free port of Tangiers in 1961. Until then, Tangiers with its status of 'free international city' requiring no visas or passports and very little bureaucracy[10] had been the natural choice by the main organised crime groups as the transit port for the illegal smuggling of goods in the Mediterranean. A *Customs and Excise* document pointed out that this changed the smuggling logistics in the Mediterranean: "after 1961, there was a profound evolution of the smuggling trade via the sea in the Mediterranean. As the Free Port of Tangiers, a smuggling restocking base, was closed, numerous warehouses were opened on the Yugoslavian and Albanian coasts" (doc 1032:1667).

The closure of Tangiers meant that Naples, with its ideal strategic position in the Mediterranean, its easy access to the Yugoslavian and Albanian coastlines, and as we have seen, its lack of coherent organised criminal groups, took over in the 1960s as the major transit centre for smuggled goods in the

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[9] A growing number of people were denounced for involvement in smuggling: 1852 in 1983, 1393 in 1985, 2838 in 1987, 5656 in 1989, 13271 in 1991, 13271 and 23574 in 1993 (Istat, 1994 - see Appendix Seven). This is based on the number of people denounced by the police and others. Obviously it is a vague indication of the numbers involved although one can assume based on these figures that there are several thousands that live off smuggling even in the 1980-90s

[10] Antonio Lovato in 1946 remarked about the Free port of Tangiers: "therefore everyone without distinction of race, profession, political ideas and religion, all can freely enter and leave to their hearts content without explaining to anyone" (Figurato and Marolda, 1981:18).

Mediterranean: the mother ships carrying the illegal goods would hide just behind Capri, a perfect camouflage for these large foreign tankers, and then at night small blue motorboats (*i blu motoscafi*) came to off-load the goods,[11] avoiding the Customs' officers: "the favourable characteristics of the low Campanian coastline which goes from Mondragone to Torre Annunziata facilitated the operations of off-loading important amounts of smuggled cigarettes " (Doc 1029:3).

The good on-land transport networks, well-connected to the rest of the peninsula and other countries, did the rest. All through the 1960s and the early 1970s, there was a boom of smuggling activities and Naples harbour became *the* landmark for illegal activities in the Mediterranean. Whereas previously the off-loading of 500 boxes per operation had been considered good, now it was possible to off-load 35.000-40.000 boxes at a time (Grasso, 1998:276).

As the Parliamentary Antimafia Committee stated: "from 1962-63, the role of Campania in the smuggling market became more and more central. The Neapolitan area, in particular, became "the clearing-house of nearly all the operations (relating to the Sicilian Mafia) linked to international traffics [...] Contrary to what happened in Milan, in Genoa or in Rome, the need of alliances and links with local criminality was, more than natural, it was essential: the protection of the off-loading points in Naples, the common defence against the 'Marseillais', were elements that sealed the convergence of interests and thus the alliance between Mafia and Camorra groups" (Arlacchi and Pizzorno, 1985:28). The Sicilian Mafia and the 'Marseillais' *milieu* fought a bloody war between 1971-74 for the control of this traffic (Figurato and Marolda 1981). The

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[11] Michele Zaza was a skilled *contrabbandiere* and an exception in the independence he maintained over his activities (see life story in Chapter Eight).

Sicilians won[12] because of their crude modern economic logic which has been confirmed in interviews by both *pentiti* Migliorino (1997) and Tarallo (1998). Migliorino explains *"you must understand there is one thing Sicilians place before feelings and blood feuds. They place before everything else business; that is if someone can help them make money, they will make a friend of him, but if he is not useful, they will have nothing to do with him"* (B:23).

So, many local criminals came into direct contact with the Sicilians who often needed their services and local know-how. In many ways, the Sicilians were the brains behind the operation and the Neapolitans furnished the arms. They introduced the Neapolitans to the economic thinking showing them how to access illegal markets and how to invest in different activities in the legal sector. At this basic stage, the Neapolitans invested their profits from extortion scams into the smuggling trade.

To rationalise the smuggling trade, the Sicilians not only co-opted Neapolitans into becoming members of *Cosa Nostra* (the Nuvolettas, Antonio Bardellino, Michele Zaza, Mazzarella, etc) but also set up a smuggling deal (*una società per il contrabbando*) with them which lasted from 1974 to 1979 when a new and more profitable one came into operation. The deal consisted of a rota of off-loading turns: 4 teams of off-loading turns made up of both Neapolitans and Sicilians, helped each other smuggle, off-load and distribute the goods. This rota made the off-loading of smuggled cigarettes more efficient and coordinated but also helped seal some solid business relations and friendships. It is through this activity for

[12] The Marseille-Sicilian war which lasted from 1971-74 marked the end of the French Mafia, the Marseille Mafia's presence in Naples and war with the Sicilian Mafia over dominance in Naples. The French *Mafiosi* were murdered in Naples and thus it was decided to back off, retreat. This meant that the Sicilian Mafia had a monopoly of activities in Naples and could do business in Naples with Neapolitan help in peace.

example, that the Gionta clan came into contact with the Sicilians for the first time. Unlike the Nuvoletta and Bardellino, which started with horticultural rackets, the Gionta clan started directly as a business, undertaking an efficient economic-criminal practice. In some cases, the Sicilians helped the clan to expand, in others they helped smuggling start as a clan's initial practice. There is no doubt that these contacts had a vital impact on Neapolitans gangs, marking the beginning of an efficient and lucrative relationship.

9.2.3 Hard Drugs

The Camorra's main expansion was linked to the increased demand for drugs during the 'crazy' 1960s when light and hard drugs came to play a more prominent role in citizens' lives as attitudes towards recreational drugs became more relaxed and tolerant: "the development of the international market of hard drugs is a recent phenomenon, linked to the increase in demand of heroin in the USA from the end of the Second World War to the 1960s and in Europe, in the Third World and the Socialist countries in the 1970s and 1980s next to the enlarging of the demand of cocaine by certain European and American middle-classes from the mid-1970s up until today" (Arlacchi and Pizzorno, 1985:7). The main heroin route was from Asia (The Golden Triangle and the Golden Crescent: Thailand, Burma, Laos, Vietnam and Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Mexico) to North America (Canada and the USA) via Europe (Naples, Sicily, Milan) while the main Cocaine route was from South America (Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Colombia and the along the Southern coastline of Caribbean) (Abadinsky, 1990) to Mexico, the USA and Europe.

Initially, the Sicilians adopted the same routes as the

"natural evolution of the smuggling trade. They used the same structures, stockists and international contacts" (Grasso, 1998:283-4) but the nature of the trade required more organisation, money and personnel: if they traded directly, they needed new distributors and if they made their own substances (morphine based heroin necessitating special refineries) they needed more specialised scientists. As the narcotics travelled through many countries, they needed contact with international banks and intermediaries who acted as front men in their dealings with foreign banks. These new operations included Naples and the old Neapolitan smuggling gangs. Indeed, Naples was yet again an ideal centre for the Sicilians, strategically placed either between the producing countries of Asia and the Sicilian and Spanish morphine-based refineries and the North American and Western European markets.

There had been an international drugs trade in the 1950s and 1960s but it had been undertaken in Europe essentially by individuals like Lucky Luciano rather than by the efficient organisations as of the 1970s. The Sicilians used their Neapolitan smuggling allies as *manovalenza*, as the workforce to distribute heroin, their main commodity, across Campania and Italy. The main smuggling families, Nuvoletta, Bardellino, Zaza became the drugs' families and monopolised the drugs trade in the region with smaller families (for example, the Cozzolino and the Mauro clans) organising the selling and distribution. In the mid-1970s, both the heroin and cocaine markets became one of the principal economic activities of the local families as Naples itself became an important market-place for drugs: the early 1980s saw the explosion of drug addiction in the region; in 1984 32 drug addicts died of an overdose, that is 8.6% of the number of such deaths in the

whole of Italy (Sales, 1988:136-7).

In the late 1970s, the Sicilians decided to pursue 'a division of drugs' policy, 'a twin track heroin-cocaine' policy, (*doppio binario eroina-cocaina)*, whereby "a rigorous logic behind the control of markets and a subtle strategic choice was made between the Sicilians and the Neapolitans" (Feo, 1989b:31): the Sicilians dealt solely in heroin providing it[13] to the American Mafia for the North American market and fighting off rivals (the Chinese, the Vietnamese, the Portoricans, etc). The Neapolitans were left to deal in and organise the cocaine traffic (although still distributing heroin locally). In this way, the Sicilian Mafia put in place a drugs traffic in which the Neapolitans played a crucial part: "the heroin arrived from Turkey or Lebanon, in exchange for cocaine, arms and God knows what else, before leaving for New York after making a stop in Milan and Naples, or it is produced in Palermo, Calabria or in the hinterland of Naples" (*ibid*:32).

The Neapolitans, even Cutolo,[14] divided up the South American cocaine market[15] up to control its production and commercialisation: the Zaza-Mazzarella clan controlled Colombia, the Ammaturo and Bardellino clans, Peru, the NCO and the Bardellino clan, Bolivia and Venezuela (*ibid*:56). They then bought it into Europe where it was sold at prohibitive prices: 6000 dollars on the South American market and 250.000-300.00 dollars in Naples (*ibid*:57) amounting for the Neapolitans to a business worth about 37 billion lire a month

[13] The Sicilians not only brought heroin from Thailand (via sea or air) but also brought morphine (from Bulgaria, Turkey and Albania) to transform it in their refineries in Sicily.

[14] Drugs provided the Neapolitan Camorra gangs with an important ethical dilemma as whether or not to deal and its potential social impact on members. Both Cutolo and Alfieri have argued that they pursued a 'non-dealing policy'. However, this is very difficult to prove as leaders may give one set of instruction while soldiers do as they please and deal in their districts.

[15] By the mid-1980s, the control of the markets were less rigid with the Sicilians starting to deal in cocaine and the Neapolitans in heroin.

or 4000 billion lire a year this meant about 10.000-15.000 billion lire of money circulating (Sales, 1988:139). Another example is provided by the Casalesi clan selling cocaine at five times the value it was bought at within 15 days: buying it 100 million lire and selling at 500 million lire after two weeks (SO12). This gave the Camorra, for the first time in its history, huge sums of money, much more than it had ever had through its rackets, extortion and smuggling activities or the clandestine lotto, robberies, etc: "this explains the revival, reorganisation and restructuring of [...] the Camorra in the last few years. [...] It is drugs which have made organised crime groups become so economically [...] powerful" (Feo, 1989b:11).

This new found wealth changed the Camorra's organisation, activities and relationships, into much more sophisticated international organised crime groups (G. Galasso[16]) equal to the Sicilian mafia in terms of power and wealth. It marked the transformation from a social-criminal practice to a economic-criminal practice. These gangs were no longer an association but a business undertaking an economic-criminal practice. With these new sums of money, the Camorra clans adopted the Mafia method of investing and recycling their 'dirty' money in legal and illegal ventures becoming a *camorra di impresa (*a Camorra business): "as one can imagine it is these profits which have profoundly modified the Camorra, as they have modified the Mafia. But for the Camorra, the transformation was much more important and qualitative" (Sales, 1988:139).

In other words, the international drugs trade gave Camorra gangs not only the opportunity of setting up new legal companies and in this way, infiltrating the legal economy but also gave them power to become useful to politicians. This proved to be the case for clans such as the Nuvoletta,

16 Interview of 18 September, 1996, Pozzuoli, Italy.

Bardellino-Schiavone, the Zaza-Mazzarella, and the Gionta clans which were very successful at it. Other clans (the Cozzolinos, the Mauros) in the late 1980s did not use the drugs trade for its transformative capacity but specialised in it to make money and distribute it to other clans. The culture of illegality and tolerance helped criminal gangs to do this as the local authorities and public opinion showed a certain indifference.

The *pentiti* explained that many Camorra groups did not deal in drugs in their own zone to avoid creating a social problem and conflict with the local community but as Robb explains, "the old camorra [NF] was threatened by Cutolo at the very time it was tapping into huge new wealth derived from heroin. Cutolo had forbidden the New Camorra to traffic in heroin, having the intelligence to see it would most damage the very social stratum that had empowered him. Later, when Cutolo's NCO found itself overextended and in difficulty as a result of its rapid growth, he may have changed his mind" (1998:203). Despite these moral reservations, heroin became a lucrative commodity and thus a serious social problem. In 1984, there was an estimated 17.000 heroin addicts in the Campania region which represented 111 billion and 420 million lire of which 32 billion ended up in the hands of four and five clans (Arlacchi and Pizzorno, 1985).

9.2.4 State Policies towards the South

In 1950, in response to the South's wartime hardship and its underdeveloped rural economy and industries, a specific economic policy was decided by the central government in Rome. This special public intervention *('l'intervento straordinario')* was adopted with the aim of bridging the gap

between the industrial North and the so called 'rural' South[17] and of "giving a fatal blow to the structural causes of the South's backwardness" (Sales, 1993b:44).

A special fund was set up, *La Cassa del Mezzogiorno,* to fund various infrastructural and industrial projects in the South, hoping that this would lead to further regeneration and development. This programme was conceived in two phases: the first, from 1950 to 1957, concentrated on agriculture (land reform) and infrastructure (communications) while the second (*'il secondo tempo')* from 1958 to 1973 sought to help the process of industrialisation in the South through the use of state incentives. Public funds were heavily pumped into any company or public works which relocated and developed in the Mezzogiorno region (as was the case for the Alfa Sud car factory).

In this way, it was hoped that a productive base would provide jobs and launch building programs. Although this policy had some short-term positive results, on the whole, its results were according to Trigilia (1995) "contradictory" had "severe limitations" (Ginsborg, 1990) while according to Sales they not only caused the Northern League phenomenon of the 1980s in the North, but also created: "in the South a political and social block hostile to its productive and industrial growth" (1993b:44).

Trigilia attributes part of the failure to mistakes made in the investments: the *Cassa* encouraged investment in the giant projects (steel works, petrochemical and mechanical plants, electronics) with a large-scale investment of state capital for a low return in terms of employment and wealth. This had negative effects: it destabilised the already existing productive

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[17] With a population equal to 37% of the national population, the South contributed about 15% of industrial income. In the mid-1950s, investment in industry in the South was equal to 10% of national investment (Trigilia, 1995:745).

system (pushing up prices and the standard of living) but did not stimulate any new effective production. In fact, it did not achieve the stable productive base which the government had hoped for.

Ginsborg points out other limitations: the first phase dedicated to agriculture and infrastructure was too short-term; the jobs that it produced were in many cases temporary. During the 1950s and 1960s, 12% of the *Cassa del Mezzogiorno*'s budget was for industrial projects which also benefited Northern industries since they provided the raw materials. And more importantly for our study the fact that both the land reform and the *Cassa* produced new types of politicians: '*mediatori*', middlemen (Gribaudi, 1980). This also coincided with the renewal of the DC's personnel that as we have already mentioned, brought in a new ambitious political elite holding government positions and distributing Public funds from the *Cassa* to their local constituencies, thus mediating between central government and the local community: "instead of installing an independent model of economic development, [it produced] a system of power" (Barbagallo and Bruno, 1997:418) based on traditional clientelism.

Although the reform was adopted with the intention of industrialising the South and therefore unifying Italy in economic terms, this never happened: the first oil crisis in 1973-7 marked the end of '*les trente glorieuses*' and the government's major economic initiatives towards the South. The government had to help the industrial North, to restructure to cope with the crisis, leaving the South to its traditional resources (small family businesses and public funds) and abandoning the industrialisation programme (factories closing down, Bagnoli deindustrialising, etc).

This change of policy took its toll on the South and had long term effects: it became entirely dependent on the state for funding and dependent on the North for consumer goods (Sales, 1993b). The *Cassa* became the only source of funding for the South's economy until 1992 and as, a consequence, those who managed it or had access to it became important politician: *patrons* distributing favours, from the Cassa to their local constituencies, to reinforce their local electoral networks. They wielded enormous power and money which they used to guarantee reelection as well as starting to deviate public funds to their friends' businesses and their own.

The Southern policies of different DC governments have been described both by economists and political scientists, as examples of *'malgoverno'*, economic mismanagement which caused social and political stagnation while allowing the Southern political elite and Camorra to make money at the expense of the population. They gave the Camorra one of its most important opportunities, that of taking over an already well established clientelistic system.

In this way, the traditional clientelistic system developed and adapted by 1950s politicians was transformed into a more sophisticated model: the terms of exchange were no longer jobs, pensions, favours for votes and support but 'social opportunities' in the business sector (ie planning, building and land speculation). Bogus planning projects, building programmes or land development for example were set up by politicians to obtain state funding which would then be diverted to 'friends' or 'clients' in the client-patronage relationship in exchange for votes and political support. This was a complex financial operation which involved a lot of proactive planning on the part of the politicians and important sums of public money. Any excuse or justification was used to

deflect public money into private pockets. This is what Sales called the 'opportunity economy' (*'l'economia dell' occasione'*) which used any opportunity to apply this "modern form of clientelistic management of public money" (Barbagallo and Bruno, 1997:418-9). Thus, the South experienced 'modernisation without development' (Schneider and Schneider, 1973) where modernisation gave the Camorra the possibility to infiltrate different sectors of society and politics.

9.2.5 Changes in Civil Society

During the postwar period, the gap between civil society and the state became wider. The State, with its government instability, bureaucratic inertia, lack of concrete help and traditional clientelism for many citizens, appeared all the more remote and distant. Local criminal gangs, on the other hand, with their new values appeared friendly and available to citizens and their problems. Indeed, more often than not, local criminals helped the local community by providing goods and services which the State did and could not. Thus, the new values of the local gangs were acceptable, complied with and even protected.[18]

Another important factor was the lack of modernisation of the Italian legal penal code which meant that in the post-war code, there were still remnants of the old fascist code in the form of 'internal banishment' (*soggiorno obbligato*). This was implemented and meant that many dangerous *mafiosi* were sent to Campania in the 1950s and 1970s. This helped[19] the

[18] We have many examples of this for example, when the Police presented itself at the house of a *camorrista* to arrest him, the local community started a riot to allow the *camorrista* to escape. People in the street would throw dishes on the heads of policemen and even physically obstruct policemen from doing their job.

[19] Many of the important bosses of *Cosa Nostra* such as Stefano Bontade, Vincenzo Spadaro, Gaetano Riina and Salvatore Bargarella were 'banished' there (see also Lorenzo Nuvoletta in Chapter Eight).

Camorra to learn at close hand Mafia techniques and methods.

9.2.6 Changes in Local Politics

Another change which created long-term opportunities for the Camorra was the national reorganisation of the Christian Democrat party, initiated by the national General Secretary, Fanfani between 1954 and 1958. This had a greater impact on the local party in Naples than in the North (see Allum, 1997a) and would prove the move which allowed a certain type of politicians to appear and dominate the local party.

In the 1940s, the DC recruited old Southern Notables who enjoyed local social prestige to attract votes for the party. However, in the mid-1950s[20], Fanfani's reform, as Tarrow notes, "undermined the old notables and replaced them by provincial political machines, controlled by a new leadership group of local and regional bosses, based on systematic clientele networks (1967:312). In this way, the party renewed its local leaders with politicians who would provide the basis of the new DC political machine. These were a new breed of politician who lacked social prestige of their predecessors and thus had to cultivate votes and create consensus in any possible way.[21] Of course, the old patronage system still worked, distributing favours, privileges, jobs in exchange for votes; especially as some of these 'new' politicians were rapidly appointed to government office where they acquired considerable new powers and resources which at local level they used to create new extensive 'private clientelistic fiefdoms'. At the centre of this new fiefdom was a new form of patron, the DC boss,

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[20] The calculation was that more candidates would be needed for the 1948 general election, more candidates than had been necessary for the 1946 Constitutional Assembly.

[21] Examples: Clemente, Servadio, De Feo, etc.

hungry for power; of which Silvio Gava was an early example (see Allum, 1973 and 1997a). There are other significant more recent examples, such as Paolo Ciro Pomicino and Alfredo Vito, both ambitious DC politicians who saw politics as a money-making business and not as representative democracy.

These ambitious new DC bosses were more interested in creating consensus by distributing public resources, along local patronage networks than discussing ideology and policies. As the DC's hold on national government weakened in the late 1970s and early 1980s, this new political elite needed to ensure access to powerful positions which managed important State resources, thus becoming intermediaries or 'political middlemen' between central government and their local clientelist networks (Barbagallo and Bruno, 1997). Camorra bosses formed an important part of this local support system as casual electoral agents as was the case for Pasquale Galasso and Carmine Alfieri who supported Francesco Patriarca in 1972 before their sophisticated Camorra careers or that for Angelo Nuvoletta (brother of Lorenzo) who told Alfieri to vote for Gava in 1979 (Pr8).

However, in 1975, the situation became more pressing for the local DC political machine as it suffered a crisis when the PCI became the largest party in local elections in Naples and was well supported in the region. This signalled to the local party that it had to modify its social consensus-building machine in order to gain more local support. The convergence with the Camorra was thus inevitable as it had a large social base which would be useful to the local party. The DC's need for votes and support presented the Camorra with the ideal opportunity to become a vital and systematic part of its electoral-clientelistic network.

What is important for us to note here is that the new

political elite present in the DC and PSI from the late 1950s and dominant by the early 1970s was prepared and willing to enter into any kind of alliance to ensure reelection, protection of their access to public funds and strengthen its clientelistic base. As far as it was concerned 'politics was a business' and business deals could even be undertaken even with the enemy. This attitude meant that these politician had no scruples about dealing with the Camorra (see Aa. vv, 1988) when necessary and make a profit from this relationship at the same time. Della Porta and Pizzorno have labelled these kind of politicians 'businessmen politicians' (1996). Moreover, another example of the DC's close and unscrupulous relationship with the Camorra was the Cirillo Affair in 1981. After the kidnapping of DC regional councillor, Ciro Cirillo, by the Red Brigades, the local DC did not hesitate to contact the local Camorra for his release (Aa. vv, 1988). This affair made politicians grateful to the Camorra and at the same time, widened the Camorra's future opportunities.

Decentralisation was implemented in the early 1970s under the influence of left-wing parties who were proposing a more consensual and participatory model of local and regional government: fifteen ordinary regions were established in 1970. Regional government gained limited legislative powers (Art.117[22]), new administrative responsibilities (areas of health and transport) and financial powers (law 281 of 1970; funds for special activities). Among the most important new powers of regional government was the possibility of deciding the agricultural and industrial policies and more interestingly

[22] The region may legislate on: municipal boundaries; urban and rural police forces; fairs and markets; public charities, health, and hospital assistance; vocational training and financial assistance to students; local museums and libraries; urban planning; tourism and the hotel industry; regional transport networks (excluding railways); regional roads, aqueducts, and other public works; lake navigation and ports; mineral and spa waters' extractive industries; hunting; inland fisheries; agriculture and forestry; and artisanship (Hine, 1993:266).

handling more money from special funds.

In a similar way, changes were introduced at the municipal level. The 1970s was a period when the Left, which was gaining electoral support, and the new social movements demanded increased local services (More specifically, in the public provision of services). As a result, all private bodies and companies involved in local services were "nationalised" or "municipalised" (eg. rubbish collection and garden services). This strongly politicised local services and transferred managerial powers to elected officials and/or to a new class of political appointees. It was also proposed that public services should be free. As a consequence, the financial burden on local councils increased greatly which meant that, in turn, the national grant had to be increased (Dente, 1991:111).

Therefore, in the 1970s, local councillors became important players in the local economy as they started to manage important budgets and to make important decisions; therefore they became easy prey to manipulation and corruption. As far as we are concerned, municipalities became more important targets for the Camorra in its overall money-making strategy whereas in the 1950s, having had no such powers, they were less useful for the *guappi*.

The government's decision to implement decentralisation was on the surface of it a political decision to introduce democracy at local level, allowing people to have more control over their own lives. Unfortunately, this reform coincided with the introduction of a new political elite, ambitious business-orientated politicians, who used clientelism extensively including their public roles and funds to guarantee its power base. By increasing the powers of local councillors and state agencies, these local political reforms gave this new political elite power to control the public authorities and

reinforce its support. It also made local political decisions - especially financial ones - more accessible to the Camorra, where it could, with its different resources (violence or money), infiltrate local administrations and gain direct access to the local decision making centres and more importantly, the financial deciders whereas previously it had only had access, on a casual basis (providing votes at times), to national MPs locally elected with no great hope of substantial return.

9.3 Conclusion

In the post-war period, the South adapted to modernisation in its own way and this produced opportunities for organised crime gangs to develop. For example, new values (such as greed, money, selfishness, individualism) replaced old traditional values in the South (community, family, spirit and solidarity) thus allowing more efficient clans to infiltrate politics and undertake a new political-criminal practice.

Our analysis has shown that modernisation produced clear opportunities structures for *guappi* who adapted to these new local, national and international environments. While retaining great flexibility and autonomy of action contrary to the centralised Sicilian Mafia, the Camorra clans took the opportunities offered to transform themselves from associations enacting a social-criminal practice to businesses enacting an economic-criminal practice. Ultimately, they cooperated to forge a cartel enacting a political-criminal practice.

PART FOUR: THE CAMORRA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH POLITICS

Chapter Ten
Change in the Neapolitan Political Sub-system in the Post-war Period

"Central to any understanding of [organised] crime is the political set up of a city"

Bell (1967:193).

10.1 Introduction

In Part Three of this thesis, we alluded to the Camorra's relationship with politics. Indeed, the Camorra has long had contact with the political elite. In the past, as Roberti indicates, "it was tolerated and in some cases even 'used', as was the case in 1860, when the Prefect of Police, Liborio Romano, fearing public disorder during Garibaldi's arrival in Naples, had recruited *camorristi* to guarantee public order and prevent crimes" (1995:106). In Part Four, we will address my last research question: the nature of the relationship between the Camorra and politics during the 1950s and 1980s. What was its rationale, logic and type of exchange? Who controlled its dynamics and why? Or, to use the interaction model, how did the social, economic and political systems (and their agents) come together? What recurring practices did their interaction produce? And to what ends?

Incorporating elements of a diachronic analysis should help to define the changing terms of 'the mutual solidarity pact' ('*patto di mutua solidarità')* (RA:24) established between the Camorra, politicians and businessmen (what we have called 'an exchange'), since the 1950s. In this chapter, we will look at the changing nature of the Neapolitan political system in the post-war period in order to be able to understand the different types of politicians who developed a relationship with the Camorra in our study.

10.1.2 Review of the Literature

Prior to the 1980s, the American literature is replete with studies which analyse the relationship between gangsters and political machines in urban centres during the early decades of the century. These studies (Merton, 1968, Gosnell, 1968, Whyte, 1981, etc) concentrate on the organisation and the collection of votes by precinct captains and ward leaders. They examine the role of precinct captains and ward leaders, who acted as mediators between politicians and civil society, and gangsters, who sought favours in return for their votes. All these studies look at Italian and Irish inspired political machines and show the type of exchange which was created between the candidate and his constituency (and gangsters in particular). They show the simple exchange of votes for protection and impunity which operated. In Gosnell, the intricacies of the organisation of the political machine (1968) are examined whereas W. F Whyte (1981) describes the different techniques used on election day to cheat the system. Many of these studies adopt a functionalist approach and show how the political machine integrated the local community into the political process.

Italian literature on this topic flourished after the first wave of *pentitismo* in the mid-1980s when it became possible to understand the dynamics behind the Mafia's relationship with the political elite. The Parliamentary Antimafia Committee produced reports in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s (see CPA4); those of the 1990s described the intricate relations and exchanges which took place between DC politicians and the Mafia; this relationship resembled the one described in the American literature in terms of the type and nature of the exchange. The 1993 Antimafia Report is devoted specifically to the Camorra (CPA1). Based largely on Sales's important book, *La Camorra, Le Camorre* (1988) and the *pentito*, Pasquale Galasso's testimonies (CPA1.1 and CPA1.2) to the Committee in 1993, it gives an accurate picture of the state of the Camorra in the 1980s and 1990s and some indications of its relationship with the political elite. In particular, it concentrates on the Camorra's relationship and

exchanges with the political elite in the Commune of Sant'Antonio Abate. It shows how politicians were not passive partners but fully and consciously involved in these corrupt exchanges, especially when it was a question of the distribution of the earthquake reconstruction funds.

Pizzorno and Della Porta (1996a, 1996b) and Della Porta and Vannucci (1999) analysed these exchanges theoretically showing the importance of the type of politician involved: a new type of politician appeared in Italy in the 1970s, 'a businessman politician', ambitious and money-orientated, "with little sense of civic morality" (Della Porta, 1996a:353) and no scruples in engaging in corrupt activities, either in the North, with extensive corrupt business exchanges, or in the South, with organised crime gangs.

Another interesting approach was adopted by Piselli (1995) and others who used the concept of social networks to explain these exchanges and political relationships. They adopted a 'social network' analysis inspired by the Manchester School led by J.C Mitchell (1969). Brancaccio (1996) used this approach to study local politics in Bagnoli between 1980 and 1992 and showed that important social networks could explain the way different political parties gained and used support: the DC was flexible and manipulated the different networks whereas the PSI was more rigid and could not use the networks so successfully. Zaccaria (1997) also used this approach. Both these studies show the flexibility of this approach and how it incorporates many different aspects of social (personal views, family relations, opportunities and subjective capacities), economic and political life which are usually considered contrasting. These are stimulating approaches which are incorporated in our own systems analysis: new 'businessmen politicians' are in the political sub-system of the 1980s and 'social networks' are resources which have been present in the internal structure from the 1950s to 1980s. Thus, we have sought to use the latest and most challenging concepts in this field.

10.1.3 Theoretical Reminder

In this part of the thesis, the Camorra is examined as a sub-system which interacts with other sub-systems. This serves to show the development of a clear and functional exchange of resources, commodities, services and favours between *camorristi* and politicians. In particular, we draw out the differences between the interaction and exchanges of the 1950s and 1980s. The aim is to understand the dynamics of such relationships and who dominates them.

To do this, it is necessary to start by examining the representatives from the political sub-system and in particular, the political parties and their changing nature in the post-war period which led to the establishment of links and pacts with Camorra groups.

10.2 Changing Nature of Political Parties in Naples in the Post-War Period

In Chapter Four, we noted that the political system instituted in the 1940s was a republican multi-party parliamentary system which resembled the French Fourth Republic, with a Figurehead president, weak and Prime Minister-led unstable governments and a weak parliament with strong parties. The governments were considered 'weak' because they gave too much power to political parties and allowed personalities to dominate. This can be explained by both the Cold War dynamics and the electoral system (the list-PR system with a preference-vote) which was adopted. In Naples, this electoral system played a fundamental role in permitting widespread patronage, clientelism and personality politics to be revived.

Mass organised parties with a national identity and agenda on the Duverger model (1951) took a long time to establish themselves in Naples; politics was "characterised [...] by the formation of various blocks and organisations of power" (Allum in Galasso, 1978:243) as was already the case in the pre-fascist years: "the old pre-fascist notables, often placed in positions of responsibilities by the Allies, were busy reestablishing their old arrangement - electoral links with

old friends and 'clients' - in the hope of replacing the fascists who had monopolised local power for twenty years. They did not organise parties because parties were alien to their mentality; they reorganised their old electoral machines under the generic names of 'movement' or 'alliance'" (Allum, 1973a:277-8).

Whereas in North and Central Italy in the early post-war period, pro-constitutional parties, *L'Arco Costituzionale*, set the political agenda and constructed democratic political institutions, in Naples, politics was controlled by old notables "of varied formations belonging to the political universe of the Right" (Minolfi, 1993:5). Their presence reintroduced in the political arena their traditional methods and techniques of securing support through the use of clientelism.[1]

The practice of clientelism or 'ideology' as Signorelli (1983) defines it, is a traditional form of social and political relationships which has developed and existed in very different kinds of political systems across the centuries: from the late feudal and early liberal systems (e.g England in the mid-eighteenth century [Scott, 1972:32]) to Twentieth Century Mediterranean, African and Asian countries including democratic systems (Heidenheimer, Johnston and LeVine, 1989). The existence of this practice tells us much about the nature of the relationship between citizens and the decision-making centre. In our case, clientelism was rife: this reflected, in part, the fact that Italy was unified late (in 1861) and that the political system and its leaders had to combine both local and national demands.

In its early form in traditional and economically diversified countries, for example in eighteenth century England, it was called 'patronage' and represented a simple exchange where landlords in their local communities became the *patrons* of their tenants farmers (providing help, favours or food) in return for loyalty and legitimacy. This exchange modernised as society industrialised and universal suffrage was introduced, developing into 'clientelism': "a personalised, affective, and reciprocal relationship between actors, or sets of actors, commanding unequal resources and involving mutually

[1] See the polemic between Guido Dorso and Silvio Gava in 1945 (details in Allum, 1978: 24-5).

beneficial transactions that have political ramifications beyond the immediate sphere of dyadic relationships" (Lemarchand and Legg, 1972:151-2).

'Clientelism', based on the same premise as 'patronage', was a 'lopsided' exchange of different resources between social actors in a modern state. Notables were replaced by the modern day politician who was in a position of power and had special access to resources to which citizens aspired. The politician, thus, became the 'middlemen' (Gribaudi, 1980) between the state's resources and the citizen. He would use his power of distribution to become a *patron,* because he had access to specific resources (jobs, favours, money), which were useful to citizens who thus became his *clients.* As a result an exchange or transaction took place: the *patron* provided recommendations, jobs, favours and money in exchange for votes and electoral support from citizens, his *clients.* In this way, the politician built up a *clientele,* a loyal and faithful following, which reinforced his electoral base while he looked after them. These relations were called 'patron-client' ties (see Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984).

Clientelism in the last century was perceived as a negative and detrimental form of political arrangement since "it is an obstacle to the legitimation of institutions because they make loyalty depend only on the pragmatic satisfaction of material interests. It impedes the establishment of political identities based on the promotion of collective interests or group solidarity" (Briquet, 1998:16). In some cases, it also blocked the establishment of representative democracy and developed into a corrupt and "ubiquitous system of payoffs and favours, back-scratching, stealing, campaign contribution and personal aggrandisement (Chambliss, 1978:x). Such was the case in post-war Italy, which has led some to speak of a 'clientelistic state' (Briquet, 1998:32), completely foreign to the modern representative democratic model.

However, it is important to note that functionalists (Merton, 1968; Bailey, 1969) have emphasised the positive aspects of clientelism in so far as they highlighted the fact that political machines in American

cities in the 1920s and 1950s, with their clientelistic and corrupt practices, tended to fulfil important functions which other official structures neglected (Ben-Dor, 1974): "in our prevailing impersonal society, the machine, through its local agents, fulfils the important social *function of humanising and personalising all manner of assistance* to those in need" (Merton, 1968:128). In this way, it is argued that American political machines integrated local communities into the wider national political community in a way that no other system was able to do, thus linking the representative of the machine to local voters and transforming politics into a personal matter about relations and ties (Merton, 1968).

In the post-war period, we have identified three different forms of clientelism which evolved with the development of political parties. In the 1950s, the state and political parties established a political system based on patron-client ties which has been described by Graziano (1978:2). This system was then transformed into a system in which 'party-directed patronage' prevailed (Weingrod, 1968:385), especially, the DC's political machine of the 1960s and 1970s. By the 1980s, this DC system had metamorphosed itself into a "politico-criminal machine" (Allum, 1997:41). With this transformation of power relations came new politicians. In the 1950s, rich 'notables', in the 1960-70s, traditional middlemen (*mediatori*) between state and civil society (Gribaudi, 1980) and in the 1980s 'businessmen politicians' (Della Porta, 1996a; Della Porta and Pizzorno, 1996b): "'young Turks', 'on the make', 'not overtly scrupulous', 'out for 'personal gain' or 'power for its own sake', 'ambitious professionals'" (Della Porta, 1996a:353) were attracted by power where they could "line their pockets through bribery and the exploitation of their political power in other activities, particularly where the power gave them an edge over competitors" (Della Porta, *ibid*).

This periodisation does not include the years 1975-83 when the Italian Communist party controlled Naples city council on the basis of the national 'historical compromise' (1973) as it would appear that the Camorra did not seek direct contact with the PCI at that time. During

this period, the PCI tried to establish a different pattern of power, the "power of participation" (Allum in Galasso, 1978:243), which retrospectively had an inverse effect in so far as this defeat forced the Neapolitan DC to reorganise as a modern and efficient political machine. We do not deal with this period nor with the Camorra's relationship with the PCI, as it would appear that the Camorra concentrated on building relationships only with parties involved in national government. The PCI, for the most part, could not prove useful in this way especially as many of its militants and activists energetically campaigned against the Camorra.

The post-war period in Campania witnessed the transformation of clientelism from a simple political strategy to a set of methods used by corrupt politicians, administrators and businessmen, where "everything goes" (Bell, 1967:128) and then to a fully fledged illegal and criminal exchange where "organised crime and organised political corruption have formed a partnership to exploit for profit the enormous revenues to be derived from lawbreaking" (Landesco, 1968:189). The three different phases of clientelistic transformation are now examined as the premise of a more detailed analysis of the Camorra's exchange in Chapters Eleven and Twelve.

10.2.1 Achille Lauro, 'the City Boss' (1952-1962)

The first phase, the early 1950s, was dominated by Neapolitan notables, both at local and national level, of whom Achille Lauro, the city boss, became the main representative at the head of the *Partito Nazionale Monarchico* (PNM) and then, his own party *il Partito Monarchico Popolare* (PMP). The "Lauro phenomenon" (Zullino, 1976:49) or Laurism is important because it illustrates well the social, economic and political conditions as well as the mood of the city in the 1950s and above all, the clientelist system characteristic of Neapolitan politics.

Achille Lauro (1887-1982) was the fifth of six children of a small ship owner from Sorrento. He went to sea at an early age and, at

eighteen, on the death of his elder brothers and his father, took over the family business which he managed to rescue and expand. He thus became the head of one of the most important shipping lines in the world, *La Flotta Lauro*. This allowed him to diversify into other businesses, such as newspapers and football and to come to symbolise the 'self-made man' *par excellence* (see Allum, 1973a; Zullino 1976).

His business prosperity coincided with Mussolini's fascist regime and it has been suggested (Fasano in Allum, 1973a:275) that his business benefited enormously from the regime. In fact, he joined the Fascist party in the 1930s and as Allum makes clear, "as a result of his party connections with the Ministers of Defence and Mercantile Marine and the party hierarchy, not only were his ships not requisitioned, but he was given transport monopolies and favours which enabled him to become one of the biggest Italian ship-owners by the end of the war. He was given further monopolies: the passenger line to Italian East Africa; advantageous contracts for cargoes to Northern Europe and the Far East" (1973a:275-6). This relationship had important implications for Lauro in the immediate post war period as he was identified with the regime and a "fascist past" (Zullino, 1976:50): not only was he sent to a concentration camp for twenty-two months by the Allies when they liberated Naples, but the DC repeatedly refused him membership in the 1940s and 1950s.[2]

As representative democracy was being established in Italy in the late 1940s, Lauro, the successful and charismatic businessman that he was, became interested in politics: he "immediately had the intuition that with the new regime, to get into serious money, you needed to be in politics, you had to find a political space and keep it" (Zullino, 1976:50). His decision, like Silvio Berlusconi's in the 1990s, was to

[2] Gava recounts: "in the 1950s, he [Lauro] often told me that he would happily have joined the DC but I advised against it because a democratic and popular party like the DC would not have fitted his authoritarian character and because allowing himself to be involved in the party would not have been convenient for someone like him who, as I explained to him , did not have a true vocation for it "(1999:246-7). Others have suggested that the reasons for the DC's refusal was fear of Lauro's economic power which meant that he would be independent and politically uncontrollable (see Allum, 1973a:307-8).

'enter the field of politics'. He was 58. After the refusal of the DC and the disintegration of the *Uomo Qualunque*[3] movement (Allum, 1973a; Zullino, 1976), in an act of typical pragmatic flexibility, he chose to join the Monarchist par*ty, il Partito Nazionale Monarchico.* It "was the obvious choice for him in the circumstances: Naples had shown that it was the most monarchical big city in the 1946 referendum" (Allum, 1973a:282). Indeed, in the 1946 referendum[4], 76.5% of the electorate in Campania had voted in favour of the Monarchy. It was even more in the city of Naples with 79.9% compared to the national figure of 45.7% (Allum, 1978:40).

The PNM already existed before Lauro joined in 1948 but it was a little-known party, despite a Monarchist as mayor of Naples. By joining it, Lauro gave it a new dynamic identity, well-needed funds and political representation in Parliament: in 1948 it won 13% of the vote in the Naples-Caserta Constituency which gave it 4 MPs; nationally it won 2.8% and 14 MPs. Lauro was elected mayor of Naples under this banner in 1952. This did not last long as he spilt with the PNM secretary, Covelli, and established his own party, *il Partito Monarchico Popolare* in 1954 (Galasso, 1955).

His post-1948 allegiance[5] to the monarchist's cause must be set against the background of a pragmatic political attitude, "pragmatic in the full meaning of the word" (D'Avino in D'Ascoli, 1974:357), being rooted in his prewar business ventures. He perceived politics as a business and his use of politics was to advance his and other businessmen's interests; "it is clear that the basis of Laurism was immediate profit and booty from political activity" (Allum, 1973a:309).

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[3] The *Uomo Qualunque* movement was a right-wing movement founded in 1945 by Giannini. It was an anti-party movement. For more information see Allum (1973a) and Pasquino (1995).

[4] Institutional Referendum 2 June 1946:

	Italy		Naples-Caserta	
Republic	12,717,923	54.3%	241,973	21.1%
Monarchy	10,719,284	45.7%	903,651	78.9%

(Allum, 1973a)

5 He financed the Uomo Qualunque Movement in 1945; however, after a dispute with the leader of the movement, Giannini, about supporting De Gasperi's government in 1947, he withdrew his finance and it subsequently disintegrated (see Allum, 1973a: Chapter 9).

By the mid-1950s, Achille Lauro and the PMP were local and national actors who played their part in both political arenas.[6]

When Lauro became leader in 1954, the Monarchists in terms of political organisation were under-developed. It had no set ideology, no political programme and no permanent party secretariat or formal permanent structure. It was thus very easy for a charismatic personality like Lauro to construct around him 'a movement' which promoted the ideas and the projects of its leader and of his friends. Lauro was the organisation: a network of friends, of relatives, of followers, of associates, his clique who undertook the necessary tasks (Allum, 1973a). The movement did not need mass membership as it was directly funded by Lauro as were its electoral campaigns: "the electoral machine requires important sums of money and Lauro can claim, better than anyone else, that the money used is exclusively coming from his own shipping activities" (D'Avino in D'Ascoli, 1974:349). Consequently, the organisation remained almost exclusively Naples-based with some alliances and support in the wider region: "a typically southern-based protest phenomenon, feeding on anti-Rome feelings [...] which degenerated into the super power of one single city boss (Roberto Gervaso in *Il Mattino* of 4 August 1998). One of the main official activities of Lauro as mayor was to promote and defend Naples and Neapolitan traditions taking the title of the 'Viceroy of the South' and fighting the monarchical cause with simple emphatic rhetoric (Allum, 1973a). In reality, as can be seen in the new districts of the Vomero, Fuorigrotta and Posillipo he embarked on a massive speculative building programme so accurately evoked by Francesco Rosi in his film, *Mani sulla città* (1963).

Laurism was a system based on the extensive and almost exclusive use of one resource: clientelistic methods. Lauro was a rich *patron* who distributed favours and goods, to *clients*, who were obliged to return loyalty; in particular at election time. This method of 'doing politics' may have been at odds with the democratic project of post-war Italy, but in the South and, in particular, in Naples, this simple

[6] In the national arena, the Monarchist parliamentarians were an important factor in the centrist majorities in the decade from 1953 to 1963.

form of 'patron-client ties' was very easy to operate as the tradition of the old influential 'notables' was still alive. Moreover, if we assume like Weingrod that it is the presence of 'gaps' in a political system which gave rise to a category of 'middlemen' or *patrons*, we may conclude that the Italian state at this stage was sufficiently underdeveloped in terms of representation as to allow a small number of people, local 'notables' or *patrons*, to bridge the gaps between local and national instances: "patron-client ties can be seen to arise within a state structure in which authority is dispersed and state activity limited in scope, and in which considerable separation exists between the levels of village, city and state" (Weingrod, 1968:381). It was these clientelistic methods which made Lauro the mayor into the "big city boss of Naples." Not only was he personally wealthy, spending money to create his electoral base, but he received a lot of funds from central government (Naples's special law of 1953) to reconstruct Naples which he could use for "the interests of a specific economic group, the building entrepreneurs" (Allum, 1973a:399).

It is interesting to compare the case of Lauro with the 1920s American city bosses. In a city like Chicago (Gosnell, 1968, Merton, 1968), the political machine was made up of different precinct captains representing their districts and supporting the political boss. In Naples, it was the same. Lauro had in each *quartiere*, loyal supporters, in particular *capi elettori*, *grandi elettori*[7] and even, as we shall see later, *guappi* who acted as 'precinct captains'. Brogan says that the main characteristic of these 'precinct captains' was that "he must get out the vote; [...] He buys votes in many ways, but above all by services" (1957:131-2).

This applied to Lauro: he bought votes in all possible ways[8] and provided services such as planning licences, jobs, houses, etc. But his

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[7] Allum defines *grandi elettori* as "the more important local persons who were active in the DC [party] cause, who controlled local clientele networks: mayors and municipal councillors, communal party secretaries, but also members of the liberal professions (GPs, lawyers)." *'Capi elettori'* were "often difficult to distinguish from the *grandi elettori*. They were activists who were part of a social network, whether familial, territorial, professional or artisanal (buidling, petty commerce, etc.)" (1997:33).

[8] See Chapter Eleven.

support was not organised in a systematic way compared to the cohesive American political machine. He played on populist themes, direct action and attracted a wide range of clients ranging from the subproletariat to important businessmen. His movement has been described by Zullino as "the party of those without a party" (*partito dei senza partito*[9]) (1976:57) because it was clear that in his network of clientelistic exchanges everybody was after their own self-interest. This business-like approach to politics explains why Lauro had no appeal among the aristocracy and the upper classes.

Lauro's political movement was "of some consequence in Naples only so long as it controlled the municipality" (Allum, 1973a:310). He had tried to gain bargaining power at national level with the DC but he lost power when the DC finally organised at local level, challenged his movement and forced him to withdraw from local politics by not standing in municipal elections in 1964.[10]

10.2.2 The DC Political Machine (1962-73)

The second phase which we have identified as the 1960s sees the development of a more sophisticated form of patronage in Naples, a party based political machine. In the early 1950s, the DC was not yet an organised mass party. In an attempt to compete with the cohesive PCI, Fanfani as General secretary of the party launched a reform of the party in 1954. This had significant consequences in the South and in Naples in particular: it undermined the old notables and replaced them by provincial political machines, controlled by a new leadership group of local and regional bosses, based on systematic clientele networks (Tarrow, 1967 in Allum, 1997a:30). It developed the DC into what Pizzorno called "a syndicate of provincial political machines" (*ibid*:31).

Moreover, one of the DC government's most important decisions in the 1950s for Neapolitan politics was to develop the state sector of

[9] Incidentally, this is also Giannini's definition of his *Uomo Qualunque* Movement in the 1940s.

[10] His power was weakened and he was marginalised but managed to get re-elected to Parliament in 1968 as *capo lista* (number one) of the Monarchists (Allum, 1973a:289). On his relations with the DC, see also Gava (1999:243-252).

the economy; it gave the ruling DC party direct access to the country's economic development funds and therefore, greater power in civil society in so far as it controlled the distribution of resources. It is easy to see how the interpenetration of civil society and the state by the ruling DC had an enormous impact in Naples where the clientelistic system of Lauro could be hijacked by a more efficient and systematic party machine and developed into formidable "party-directed patronage" (Weingrod, 1968:385). This was a new power system.

The electoral efficiency of the DC party machine was probably due to its reliance on faction and faction leaders which made it a highly 'oligarchical' party. Dominant factions decided internal policies and appointments locally and nationally, and within government during the Christian Democrats rule between 1948-92.

In order to become the leader of a national party faction, it was necessary to have a solid local base. Through clientelistic networks, ambitious politicians obtained support from local party sections which was vital for electoral purposes. This gave them the means to progress in the party hierarchy nationally. Once they had reached a position of power in Rome they could then use public resources (jobs, favours and money) to feed back into their local stronghold. This all-important role of the party and of the political machine at the centre of all social, political and economic activities in civil society became the main feature of Neapolitan politics during the second phase.

Moreover, because of the emphasis on personalities in Naples, the place of the charismatic Lauro had to be taken over by other powerful personalities. It fell to an emerging DC boss based in Castellammare di Stabia, Silvio Gava (1901- 1999) and later to his son, Antonio (1930 -), to lead Naples through these periods. While Lauro was dominating local politics, Silvio Gava became a national politician[11] and a leader of the '*Doroteo*' faction which took charge and controlled the party and the Italian State, for twenty to thirty years. Thus, control of the '*Doroteo*' faction implied control not only over the

[11] A summary of Silvio Gava's political career: 1949-53: junior minister in De Gasperi's government; 1953-57: minister; 1960-69: Leader of DC senatorial group; 1969-74: Minister; 1948-76: Senator.

party but also over the state apparatus which the party governed.

Gavism was in many ways a continuation of Laurism but in a more successful form. Lauro and Silvio Gava were different in styles but very similar in substance: Gava was more interested in *control* than in *votes* but he used similar strategies and business connections to win the same electorate (Allum, 1973a). He managed to link national and local politics where Lauro had failed to do so because he had the political party machinery behind him as well as control over many social and economic activities in civil society: he placed his followers in important political and economic positions. By the 1960s, he controlled crucial positions both within the party and in the city. In this way, he was able to organise the defeat of Lauro in the 1964 municipal elections and marginalised him thereafter.

Silvio Gava's political career spanned three decades from the 1940s to the 1970s where he occupied a variety of ministerial positions from 1953 to 1974. At the height of his political career in the 1960s, he became *the* 'boss' of the Neapolitan DC political machine who used his powerful national political position, in particular ministerial positions in successive governments, to reinforce his clientelistic local base. His son Antonio was able to use his national position to launch a political career of his own which led to his domination of Neapolitan politics in the third phase.

During this phase, the old traditional ingredients of the personalised patron-client type of exchange developed into an 'artisanal' political machine (Allum, 1997a), still based on highly personalised exchanges but already dealing in national currencies. Silvio Gava introduced a new power system based on control, indirectly of civil society, the economic system and the political system.

10.2.3 The Neapolitan DC Political-Criminal Machine (1981-93)

During the third phase of the analysis, 1980s to early 1990s, another transformation of the clientelistic system took place: from a

well oiled political machine, which the Neapolitan DC was under Silvio Gava, it became a very efficient and lucrative operation under Antonio Gava and his associates, Armando De Rosa, Francesco Patriarca, Vincenzo Meo, Raffaele Russo and Alfredo Vito. Having suffered an electoral defeat in 1975 with the relative successive of the PCI in the city elections, the Neapolitan DC reorganised its political machine with much more zest.

Gava jr and the '*Doroteo*' faction reinforced its control over its local clientelistic support system to guarantee reelection. To achieve this they had to control, first and foremost, the local party apparatus, both formal and informal structures: on the one hand, the local sections which managed local procedures and oversaw key local party nominations and on the other, the multifarious networks of informal party activities (associations, circles etc) which fed and strengthened the clientelistic support system.

The main formal party structures which Gava jr controlled were the local party sections and their secretaries as they played a central role within the party: they controlled the recruitment of members locally and also had a significant input into all the local selection processes (such as choice of mayor and composition of the local party lists). It seems that Silvio Gava had already started this process but the testimony of Alfredo Vito (Pr10:27-4-93) confirms and highlights very precisely the extent to which Antonio Gava consolidated and exploited the local sections in the hinterland during the 1980s.

These local sections, especially in the smaller communes in the hinterland, were ideal targets for the systematic development of clientelistic electoral networks (Pr8:27-4-93). Local sections were constituted by party card-carrying members (*tesserati)* and at the top, an elected executive committee (*un direttivo sezionale*) led by the secretary (*segretario*). The latter had a disproportionate amount of power in the smaller communes: *"The party had structures across the territory: the main one was the section. Each of the major parties had sections in each of the communes of our country; in the larger*

communes they had several. [...] Every year the section recruited party members [...] Among whom were section representatives who were elected every two or three years [....] In the big towns these did not count much but in the smaller communes they counted a lot because it was at section level that political, local issues and the party's political projects for that commune were discussed" (CD'A17v).

Each year the provincial Federation sent them a document (*un tabulato)* laying down the exact number of members required in each section (Pr10:27-4-94:3-4). Vito indicates that it was normally 50% of the local electorate. If there were not enough members, the secretary found ways of recruiting supporters: he recruited members who were sympathetic to his faction, blocking those who were not by closing the office or refusing to accept their application forms, giving more than one card to one person and also by inventing names or taking them from the telephone directory (CD'A17v).

This kind of manipulation became visible at election time when there was a discrepancy between the votes expressed (which corresponded to the actual number of members) and the official membership figures: a section secretary could be in an embarrassing position *"because if he said that he had 200 paid-up members and the candidate they supported received only 100 votes, it is clear that this figure of 200 was"* (*ibid*) manufactured. Vito justifies the corruption which took place in the DC at this level by saying that it was general practice in Italy: *"In Italian political parties, controlling the recruitment process has always been a way to manage internal disagreements and to organise leading factions; it is an unofficial practice"* (Vito, *ibid*).

Another important form of control exerted by section secretaries was the drawing up of the party lists and consequently, the choice of mayor since the mayor was chosen by the elected councillors (Pr10:27-4-94; see also Barbi, 1985). It was inevitably the faction to which the section secretary belonged which had control over these procedures and *"once a certain faction had gained a majority in a local section, it was very difficult for it to lose it and very easy for it to keep it"* (Pr10:27-4-94:4). During the 1980s, *"in the majority of communes, the*

compositions of the local lists was largely determined by the 'Doroteo' faction which then controlled access to local political life and to the city council" (*ibid*). Antonio Gava confirmed this by his very presence at the close of every election campaign in the communes of Sant' Antonio Abate, Castellammare and Gragnano: *"as these communes constituted the hard core of his power system, [...] it was traditional for him to deliver the Friday night speech in one of these communes"* (Pr10:7-5-93).

Another example of close control by national politicians of the territory was the placing of their allies in key local political positions. Carmine Alfieri recalls how Gava and his faction supported the nomination of Mario De Sena as mayor of Nola:

> *Towards the end of the 1980s, there were the elections for the municipal council of Nola; I understood that Meo and Gava were manoeuvring so that the General Mario De Sena became mayor. They had not chosen De Sena by chance. Indeed, he was General Manager of the water company Condotte d'Acqua, which was part of the IRI group. At that time in Nola, they were going to start important public works, for some billions of millions for the construction of Aeritalia and Iterport. Therefore, it was necessary that the future mayor of Nola, be at the same time a faithful follower of Gava and Meo [...] and personally interested in these contracts. In fact it was the company Condotte d'acqua which won the contract from Aeritalia (Pr8:2).*

Thus, as a boss of a political machine, it was fundamental for Gava jr to place his men in important decision making positions which gave him personal power and control over large sums of public funds, contracts and territory. Among these positions were the very lucrative posts of regional directors of public services. The most notorious example was that of the health service (USL) where the director of the USL was responsible for the national health service and therefore received a lot of funds to allocate in the region. In a large number of communes, the management committees of the USL, which were elected, were made up of Gava's friends (CD'A17v:7). People like Luigi Riccio, who was both mayor of S. Paolo Belsito and director of USL 34, as well as Raffaele Boccia and Pasquale Catapano. It appears that these people often misused their public position by distributing

favours and public funds to friends and relatives in this way guaranteeing their reelection and popularity.

More specifically clientelistic was the establishment of informal associations, *cooperative*, at election time to reinforce the candidates electoral support. For example, the local DC in Naples set up the Metropolis Cooperative for young unemployed Neapolitans. The real purpose of this association was to campaign for the DC candidate Alfredo Vito: if the young people voted 'correctly' they would get a job as parking attendant. We have a detailed description of this practice in a police report because it went wrong: Vito was elected with a very high preference vote which gave him the nickname *Mister Cento-mila voti,* but the 40 jobs promised were never delivered. Instead, the young people were solicited for a second campaign, the local elections a month later, as long as A and B were elected. *"During one of the meetings of the Coop when half the members were present as well as the organisers, we were informed that there were only 10 jobs and only if candidates A and B were elected. We refused to vote and campaign for these candidates because they had not kept their original promises"* (SM:1-2).

Another example of informal associations and clubs set up for propaganda purposes was a front organisation, *'Mezzogiorno nell'Europa'*, a so-called DC research centre, *un Centro Studi Cattolici Democristiani*, set up in Sant'Antonio Abate in 1986. The official aims of the organisation were to be *"non-profit making, to foster civic awareness and democratic practices in the town, to promote social and educational activities, to encourage participation in community-projects and to further the exchanges of ideas, experiences and knowledge in order to improve working and living conditions across the territory"* (P11:126). But, in reality, as Vito recalls, it was *"an anti-D'Antuono space"* (Pr10:7-5-93) organised by Gava's secretary, Antonio D'Auria, on his behalf purely to campaign against D'Antuono, the mayor and rival DC, in the 1988 local elections.

It is interesting to note, that as well as imposing clientelistic methods on civil society, the *'Doroteo'* faction also imposed its will on

the economic community. For example, in 1974, the Italian government introduced a law on the public financing of parties (Melchionda, 1997). However, the '*Doroteo*' faction to finance its electoral campaigns sought donations from citizens and powerful businessmen. Lauro had not required such sums as he had had his own personal fortune but the Gava clan did: *"economic difficulties increased at election time (municipal, provincial elections), we were, thus, forced to ask for external contributions from friends and even DC businessmen, using them unequally and solely for electoral ends"* (Meo, letter, P5 + P5.1:28-02-95:3). Alfieri recalls how a businessman friend of his, Giuseppe Apreda, "had to give a donation of 300 milioni to Antonio Gava" (Pr8:02-11-94:2). This kind of donation was not merely a friendly contribution by businessmen as they started to expect some kind of positive return for their money in the form of public contracts. Thus, politicians and businessmen started to develop a very intimate relationship which would also be helpful for the Camorra's exchange.

We can conclude that Antonio Gava and his '*Doroteo*' faction's control of local party sections in the hinterland of Naples gave it significant power over the party apparatus at regional and national level. This was a clear and efficiently structured power system where local power reinforced the national leader. The latter's power system was based on the indirect control of social and political networks. This was now a modernised clientelistic system, or as Sales (1985) calls it 'distorted' clientelism, which was controlled by Antonio Gava and his network of front men.

Moreover, in the mid-1980s, a new kind of politician more greedy and ambitious than Antonio Gava, appeared on the Neapolitan political scene. These were 'businessmen politicians' who used politics purely to make money. The two prime examples of these 'businessmen politicians' are Alfredo Vito of the '*Doroteo*' faction and Paolo Ciro Pomincino of the Andreotti faction. Although they and their practice became prominent in our period, they did not manage to supersede completely the old traditional politicians, but learnt their trade and activities from these old masters, *la vieille école*, and became more

ruthless and malicious in their ways. The main difference was that while Antonio Gava sought power to control the region, this new generation was interested in power solely to make money. For this reason, they were more dangerous.

As Ginsborg (1990) and Allum (1997a) have pointed out, the Gava clan did not invent anything by installing this modern clientelistic system because all the elements of this clientelistic business exchange have always been present in southern Italian politics including corruption. But what the DC and the *'Doroteo'* faction did "during its long years in power was to compound them while increasing its control over the state apparatus and the public sector of the economy" (Allum, 1997:46). What also happened by the early 1990s was that the old personnel of the party with traces of the old traditional patronage system began to decline and a new generation of politicians came to the fore. They no longer spoke of values and ideology but engaged in lucrative money-making schemes where the profits were very substantial. It was not only the '*Doroteo*' faction which developed these practices, other factions as well as the minor government parties (PSI, PLI, etc) also became involved (for example, Mastrantuono, a PSI deputy).

10.2.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, we have identified the three main phases of political power in Naples in the post-war period. We did this in order to understand the kind of politician which Camorra bosses would have to deal with but also the nature of the corrupt-clientelistic exchange which politicians had set up and dominated until the 1980s. We can now turn our attention to the type of exchange which existed between *camorristi* and politicians in the 1950s and 1980s and the kind of goods and services which they traded.

Chapter Eleven

The Camorra's Exchange During the 1950s and 1980s

R - Il mio cavallo è ..... Ti faccio vedere che il mio cavallo arriva prima del tuo [...]
D - Gava di chi era il cavallo ?
R - Un po di tutti quanti....
R. Palmieri (CD'A17p:70)

11.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the Camorra's relationship with the political elite in the 1950s and 1980s is examined to see how its exchange has evolved and developed (see Figure 11.1). In particular, we want to study the different kinds of exchanges and the commodities, services and favours the Camorra provided in both periods.

Figure 11.1: The Camorra's Exchange



11.2 The Camorra's Exchange at Local Level in the 1950s

In the immediate post-war years, the traditional clientelist system of Lauro used some of the important city *guappi* of the time for the social respect that they commanded in the community. The old traditional city *guappi* and the ambitious rural businessmen-*guappi* took on important roles at election time and became what Allum has

described as *capi elettori* (1973a, 1997). They became very active as political agents and efficient as vote collectors because of their social networks and prestige. Indeed, Ricci has argued that outside election times, the social role of the traditional city *guappi* was of relatively minor importance *('elementi trascurabili')*(1989:117).

From our evidence, it is because of the social standing that they had within the local community that they were useful political instruments. As Landesco writes: "What needs to be appreciated is the element of genuine popularity [of the man] homegrown[...], idealised in the morality of the neighbourhood" (1968:169). The politicians played on that popularity, in the same way as they played on the respectability of doctors, lawyers and professors who campaigned on their behalf in their own professional circles. This was part of the traditional Neapolitan clientelistic framework but it was certainly the *guappi* who were the most successful political agents because in their circles of the urban sub-proletariat, it was easy to satisfy basic demands against the promise of a vote.

From our theoretical point of view, the Camorra's relationship with politicians in the 1950s was a two-way functional, but casual exchange between two agents, the individual *guappo* and the politician, respectively from the social and political sub-systems. It consisted of a simple interaction between two agents who individually enacted their different recurring practices (the politician, a political practice and the *guappo*, a social-criminal practice) and who came together in a casual, unsystematic and informal way. Indeed, it was because of its ambiguous and informal nature that it was not an important and dominant characteristic of the *guappo's* practice; that is why the *guappo's* practice can only be defined as a 'social-criminal practice'. Thus, this political exchange was a relationship between individuals who worked out a functional exchange between themselves, exchanging basic commodities, services, reciprocities and obligations (see Figure 11.2).

The examples are well known: Lauro's monarchist party distributed tokens for Easter cakes, *dei buoni per la Colomba di*

Figure 11.2: The 1950s Political Exchange between Individuals



Pasqua (Macciocchi, 1969) as well as packets of pasta and odd shoes, one before and one after the election (Ricci, 1989:114; Gava 1999:249) and the DC distributed packets of spaghetti (see Figure 11.3). One could say with Macciocchi that it was not a question of explaining political manifestoes but merely of buying votes (1969:114), but it would be a simplification as the myth of the Monarchy and the anti-Rome feelings were also part of the electoral mobilisation.

In this respect, the role of the *guappi* must be divided into categories. Most of them carried out their electoral duties in good faith and campaigned as political agents for Lauro and the Monarchists out of political conviction. Their political involvement was sincere: they believed in Lauro's message, agreed with his political agenda for change and improvement for Naples and also with his position of protest against the existing regime. They, too, evoked the glorious past of the Monarchy. Some *guappi* even took their political conviction so seriously as to form political associations to support Monarchist politicians. This was the case, for instance of Paschialone who set up 'the Monarchical Alliance for the South', *(Alleanza Monarchica del Sud)* which supported Lauro in his campaigns in the early 1950s (Ricci, 1989:115).

One of the best known pro-monarchist *guappi* was Giuseppe Navara (Isabella, 1980:210-11). He had made his fortune as a deep sea diver in Marseille during the 1920s and had gained social respectability and prestige not only by frequenting the American allies during the 1940s[12] but also by bringing back *'the Treasure of San Gennaro'* (a holy treasure of gold) from Rome to Naples in 1947 (Marotta, 1995:53). He was known as *'il Re di Poggioreale'*, 'the king of Poggioreale', because Giuseppe Buonocore, the Monarchist Mayor between 1946-1948 had appointed him 'Vice-Mayor' of his district. This nickname fitted him well: sitting on a throne, like a king, he ruled over the zone with style and held audiences at his home. People came to see him to ask for advice, help and assistance; in return he would distribute

[12] The American General at the time called him *'The king of Poggioreale'*. He was the first person in Naples to be granted the right to carry arms legally in occupied Naples (see Isabella, 1980).

Figure 11.3: The 1950s Traditional Clientelistic Exchange



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

A casual, unsystematic clientelistic exchange

goods, food and recommendations.

His regal behaviour reminds one of Lauro and his associates, combining "ideological mobilisation on the myth of the Monarchy, [...] with common forms of clientelism and paternalistic assistance" (Galasso, 1978:245). The social prestige he had in the local community was transformed into political clout out of conviction and to increase his own social prestige. He was particularly active during the Neapolitan election campaigns in 1952 and 1956 as a political agent for the Monarchist party: he distributed electoral propaganda in the streets of Poggioreale and gave electoral speeches to the crowds from the balcony of his house (Gribaudi, 1998).

Another example is that of *Don Vincenzo 'O Franfelliccaro*. He was a well-respected carter and shop-keeper who had a great reputation for courage and severity in the community. He campaigned for Lauro during the 1956 municipal election in the central districts of *la Sanita*, *Vicaria* and *Borgo Loreto* (Ricci, 1989:114).

In contrast, other *guappi* considered their political role merely as a job. They provided political influence within the clientelistic framework but expected something concrete in return for their services. The drawback was that sometimes politicians underestimated the work of their political agents. Ricci recalls the case of *Zi Pitone* and *Giovanni 'O 'Nafferrabile* who had 'worked' together for a candidate, Cascinelli, and had promised him many votes. But the politician refused to pay them arguing that *Zi Pitone* had been ineffective in his district (1989:115). In some extreme cases, the *guappi* resorted to kidnapping the reluctant politician to obtain satisfaction: *Vincenzo l'Americano* kidnapped MP and city councillor, Mario Ottieri for this reason (Ricci, 1989:115). In some cases, the men never reappeared. The famous disappearance of the mayor of Battipaglia, Lorenzo Rago, in 1952 or that of the vice-mayor of Sant'Antonio Abate, Andrea Galasso, in 1954 was rumoured to be due to *guappi* involvement (*Il Mattino* of 11 April 1954 and *Paese Sera*, 11-12 April 1954).

Outside election time, political *guappi* were of course less visible

and therefore, their role is much more difficult to assess. However, some famous incidents allow us to conclude that some *guappi* remained useful to politicians by intimidating or threatening unsympathetic parties. In 1954, the notorious *guappo, Ciccio l'Acquaiolo,* attended a city council meeting to intimidate the opposition by shouting insults at them. The precise motives for his action can only be speculated about but it is known that Lauro himself had to intervene in person to restrain this energetic participant (Guarino, 1965:89).

While Lauro used *guappi* in Naples city, Silvio Gava was using the same techniques in the hinterland. Silvio Gava was a lawyer and used his profession as one way of making contacts and befriending powerful *guappi.* As the journalist Ottone emphasised: "politicians should fight and destroy the Camorra. Instead, they defend it as lawyers. And then, people are convinced that they are defending them all the time, even as local concillors" (1965:685[13]). This appears to be the case with Catello Di Somma, a *guappo* from Castellammare di Sabia, who despite being taken to court and sent on 'internal banishment to Ustica, supported Gava. Indeed, the psychology professor Giuseppe Lavitola, a friend of the Gavas, has recalled that "during the election campaign of 1958 (or maybe 1953), Silvio Gava [an established politician and and senior minister[14] walked around Castellammare, arm in arm with the old *camorrista* Catello Di Somma" (P5:29-11-93:2). This apparently open parade of affection could only have one political aim: that of signalling to the local population whom Di Somma supported and how they should vote.[15]

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[13] Ottone also mentioned in his article that Gava's son Roberto "participated as a defence lawyer into the famous Maresca trial" (1965:686); Silvio Gava in a letter (12 October, 31 October 1964) replied that "his highlighting the really important news that my son Roberto was a defence lawyer in the Maresca trial raises the suspicion that I might have some link or contact direct or indirect with the Camorra". In his response Ottone wrote "it is not sufficient to fight the Camorra, as Senator Gava claims to have done. It is also necessary to demonstrate clearly to public opinion that one is fighting it" (1965:728).

[14] Silvio Gava has published his memoirs in 1999, where he refutes his relationship with Catello di Somma explaining that he was the first Neapolitan politician to fight the Camorra.

[15] Silvio Gava wrote today "after that [ie the Court Case] he continually offered me votes and services which I regularly refused [...]" (1999:147).

We have other evidence of Silvio Gava's close relationship with Di Somma and in particular of its clientelistic nature. Antonio Gava evokes an episode which shows how interlinked and unique their relationship was: during a trial Silvio Gava had dared taken one of Di Somma's family to court; Di Somma retaliated by slapping Gava's father-in-law in his absence. This slap was interpreted as a clear message provoked by "*the betrayal of a non-written pact of reciprocal respect and solidarity, believing that the politician was in debt to him because of the electoral support he guaranteed him*" (P5:scheda 26:5/4). Silvio Gava ,according to Galasso (Pr7:21/22-12-93v), appears to have entertained relations with many other prominent *guappi* of the different zones in the hinterland to strengthen his political power: from Catello Di Somma in the Stabiese and Vesuviana region to the Orlandos and then from the Nuvolettas in Marano to the Gaudinos in Poggiomarino. On the whole, the *guappi's* relationship with politicians at local level was casual, uncoordinated and entirely controlled by their *patrons* within their clientelistic framework, either patron-client or party-directed patronage. They were in a subordinate position and never had their own independent political agenda.

As a national politician, Silvio Gava seems in the company of other DC politicians to have used the services of prestigious hinterland *guappi* (see Tarrow, 1967). Yet again, the social prestige of these *guappi* transformed into political support which was used by politicians as an electoral commodity to secure election. Antonio Gava, in a conversation with professor Lavitola, recalls how his father made use of these *guappi: "Peppino, you've been in politics and have used these people like me. I used them like my father did"* (P5:29-11-93:2).

By the 1960s, in comparison with Lauro and the PMP, the DC was an efficient political machine. and could provide some solid political favours and rewards (in other words, politicians had obligations) for the *guappi*, in the 'party-directed patronage' model (see Figure 11.4). Thus, during general election campaigns, *guappi* campaigned and

Figure 11.4: 1950-60s DC Party-directed Patronage



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

organised the vote for the party. It would appear[16] that various DC politicians during the 1950s and 1960s also used *guappi* for their electoral campaigns as *capi elettori*. Catello di Somma, Alfredo Maisto and Antonio Esposito were used and manipulated for their social and criminal prestige in the local community. They supported and formed part of an exchange system which was fairly unsophisticated. However, the main difference between Lauro's exchange and the DC politicians' exchange is that the latter, once national political Figures, had access to public funds and thus, put into place a system of 'party-directed patronage'.[17]

11.3. The Camorra's Local Exchange During the 1980s

The changing fortunes of the local DC in 1975 forced a radical reorganisation of the party's electoral strategies. Antonio Gava, who succeeded his father as an important Neapolitan factional leader, and his men had to find an efficient way of winning support to replace the disappearing traditional electorate. So, within the traditional clientelistic framework, they turned to new sections of the local community, in particular to some of the people who counted, the young new gangsters. The latter themselves were obviously attracted by power-seeking politicians who could provide legal help and political protection. In fact, Alfieri and Galasso were already DC supporters in the 1972 general election (Pr8:14-2-94) as were the Nuvolettas (Faenza, 1990; Pr8:*ibid*). Galasso recalls his father taking him to an election meeting already in 1973 where he met the local DC mayor, Francesco Liguori, as well as Antonio Gava and Francesco Patriarca (later MPs) (Pr7:12-3-93).

The DC's reorganisation at local level coincided with a period of turmoil for the Camorra - the first Camorra war broke out in 1977 with Cutolo seeking dominance (see Chapter Eight). There was a greater

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16 I use the word 'appear' as the well informed sources I have spoken to would not confirm what they said but suggested that what these were very strong rumours.

17 Interview with dott. De Mare, 1997, thanks to dott. B. Passaro of Piano di Sorrento see b. Passaro (1990).

need on both sides for support in their respective empire-building efforts. The two winning alliances, Gava on the one hand and Alfieri on the other, were thus on equal terms.

The basic two-way exchange of the 1950s became a three-way exchange in the 1980s. The terms of the 1950s clientelistic exchange were now modified and 'modernised': firstly, patrons and clients were now equal partners; up to the mid 1970s the *camorristi* had been subordinate political agents. Secondly, *camorristi* now had a more dynamic role as 'political sponsors' (see Figure 11.5 to understand how the Camorra controlled votes in the local community).

Moreover, the clientelistic exchange was no longer an exclusive dyadic but a triadic relationship, with the introduction of big business as the third term of the equation, completing a triangular exchange between sub-systems[18] (see Figure 11.6). The new agent was the 'businessman' from the economic system; this presence added a new logic to the exchange as well as new resources. It was the Camorra which brought in this new element during the 1970s through its need to 'launder' money. Businessmen were thus co-opted by force, intimidation or agreement to become the 'respectable' face of legal Camorra activities. In this way, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as the Camorra's relationship with businessmen changed from casual acquaintance and small-scale corruption to a fully involved partnership 'laundering' illegal money, the businessmen were drawn into the Camorra's political relationship. Indeed, politicians also had close business links, which helped make the emerging three-way relationship a natural development.

The new exchange was a triangular or tripartite agreement where

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18 A DIA report explained the functionality of this system:
"- the corrupt institutional agent manages both the financing and distribution of the public contract, as a 'mediator' between the company, always seemingly a national company from the North and the Camorra. This type of mediation is generally a bribe, a kickback, paid in advance, to him or other local politicians and the distribution of subcontracts to companies directly controlled by the Camorra.
- in the case of the distribution of contracts to local companies, this would be managed directly by a business committee comprising politicians, businessmen and camorristi, all on an equal basis.
- the company undertaking the work must pay another bribe,or kickback to the clan leader who controls the zone where the work is to take place" (R6:19-20) and see RA.

Figure 11.5: A Camorra boss's control of the vote in the 1980s



Figure 11.6: The 1980s Political Exchange between Sub-systems



each agent represented different systems, collectivities, organisations or institutions, and had different dynamics, aims, resources and agendas. Thus, it was effectively a three-way functional interaction but also a business exchange of commodities, services, goods, reciprocities and obligations between representatives of three different systems: the *camorrista,* a member of a criminal organisation (a sub-system of civil society) which has its own set of rules and resources and its own aims (to protect its members and make money), interacted both with politicians (agents in the political system whose objectives were vote-maximization and winning office) and businessmen (agents from the economic system whose goals were financial). The new exchange was thus, a functional and profitable partnership in which each actor was pro-active with a set political agenda and clear aims and objectives.

In effect, these actors, representing their different systems and monopolising control, power and money between them, operated 'a cartel arrangement', the common goal of which was to divert public funds and make huge profits. In theoretical terms, this exchange can be analysed as a symbiosis between the three different sub-systems (see Figure 11.7).

Questions of detail remain: what commodities were provided by the Camorra and what were the dynamics behind this modified exchange between *camorristi,* corrupt politicians and big business post-1983? *"I must add that Cirillo and Cutolo were also on excellent terms with the Christian Democrat mayor of Ottaviano, Felice Iervolino, who was elected with the votes and the support of the NCO; it is in fact obvious that in a town such as Ottaviano which is totally controlled by the NCO, you cannot be elected without the approval and support of this organisation"* (Pr11b:2-3). This remark by one of Cutolo's lieutenants establishes the correlation between the two partners of our traditional exchange. The zones controlled by the NCO clan, by the NF clans and later by the Alfieri Confederation, corresponded to the zones of influence of the DC and its allies, the PSI-PSDI. All the legal and police documentation has demonstrated that the Camorra controlled

Figure 11.7: The 1980s Sub-system Interaction, Overlapping



electoral consensus by, firstly, organising the electoral campaign; and secondly, getting out the vote on polling day. This was a traditional commodity provided by the Camorra in the 1980s as it was by the *guappi* in the 1950s. But, the power of the organisations and the radical means used were of a totally different nature and reminiscent of the methods described by Gosnell in 1920s Chicago (1968) and Whyte in 1930s' Boston (1981): canvassing and fixing, distribution of favours and services; ballot-box stuffing; alteration of tally sheets and ballot erasures, display and threats of violence. In other words, the political role of the Camorra was now more blatantly coercive, intimidating and corrupt than hitherto.

At this point it is helpful to discuss some specific well-documented examples of local election campaigns in which the Camorra clans demonstrated their capacity to influence and control electoral consensus; they include[19]: Torre Annunziata, Marano di Napoli, Poggiomarino, Casal di Principe and Sant'Antonio Abate in the 1980s and early 1990s.

Torre Annunziata is a former medium-sized industrial town in the Bay of Naples which, despite six years (1970-76) under a left wing administration (PCI-PSI-PSIUP) had a 65% unemployment-rate in 1981 and endemic social degradation. This run-down urban community with mass unemployment was, as judge D'Antonio wrote: "plagued by utter deprivation, ancient layers of criminal subculture and marginality [...] which reduced drastically the possibility of action by public agencies; the state was always felt to be weak and far away" (CD'A14:13). This socioeconomic situation was fertile ground for Camorra activities. The town's two dominant Camorra clans at that time were the Gionta and Limelli-Vangone clans. Electoral campaigning was of vital importance to them: by providing votes to the local patrons, they were

[19] Between 1990 and 1993, 32 councils were disbanded for Camorra infiltration in Campania. The whole list is: -in Naples' Province: Acerra, Casamarciano, Casandrino, Casola di Napoli, Ercolano, Marano di Napoli, Nola, Poggiomarino, Pomiogliano d'Arco, Quarto, San Giuseppe Vesuviano, Sant'Antimo, Sant'Antonio Abate, Torre Annunziata; Avellino Province: Pago del Vallo di Lauro, Quindici;- in Caserta's Province: Carinola, Casal di Principe, Casapesenna, Cesa, Frignano, Grazzanise, Lusciano, Mondragone, Recale, San Cipriano d'Aversa, Santa Maria La Fossa, villa di Briano;- in Salerno's Province: Nocera Inferiore, Pagani, Sarno, Scafati (CPA1:160-1).

guaranteeing for their clan political protection, judicial immunity and profitable business deals.

One of Valentino Gionta's right hand-men, Salvatore Migliorino emphasises that, *"it was useless for an honest politician to organise an honest electoral campaign, promising things that he could not deliver as he was not really able to resolve the city problems"* (B:78). The clans, however, could provide short-term solutions: *"we replaced the state: we promised work, we distributed money, a family would come to us and say 'my son needs work'. We would answer 'Go to that building site and tell them that we have sent you'. [...] With promises, with a couple of thousand lire, with small jobs, with a bit of help to find accommodation. [...] We bought the votes of the population. [...] In the 1980s, 70% of the vote was ours"* (*ibid*:79-88). A population in need was more likely to vote for the clan's preferred candidate, in exchange for help and support.

The Gionta clan in particular had enormous influence in Torre Annunziata. They usually did not intervene directly, but used "clean and respected people from outside the clan, friends, relatives and acquaintances who took the message to the people; it was enough for the people to know whom we wanted to be elected for them to vote the right way "(*ibid*). The smaller Limelli clan, on the other hand, intervened more directly as Tarallo recalls: *"for the 1985 provincial election, we were asked to procure votes for Bertone. [...] We distributed propaganda, [...] put up electoral posters and indicated clearly to the people the number of the list and the PSI logo"* (Pr6:20-1-91:13). We must remember that about 5% of the town's voters were still illiterate. Like most Camorra clans, the Gionta and the Limelli clans sponsored the politicians who would be most useful to them and their deals in the long term. They may have used money during their canvassing but they were never actually paid for their electoral support.

During the 1980s, the politician who was the most useful was Domenico Bertone. He was the PSI candidate who represented the DC-PSI national governing alliance. An ex-trade unionist, he was mayor of Torre Annunziata between 1981 and 1985. He and his political friends

(about 25% of the councillors[20]) enjoyed the support of both clans. A police inquiry investigating the election results in 1981 and 1985 pointed out the exact correlation between high preference votes for Bertone in the 1985 municipal and provincial elections and the geographical zone of influence of the Gionta clan (D'Alterio, 1996:183-4). It is very difficult to assess the exact electoral weight that these clans represented, but looking at the number of preference votes for the candidates who have been named by judges in connection with the Camorra, one can surmise that the clans probably controlled between 600-1000 votes in their geographical zones since even the candidates not elected but whom the Camorra supported received a relatively high number of preference votes.[21]

This example shows the political power which Camorra clans exercised over their territory; but we must bear in mind that the clans became involved to varying degrees in electoral campaigns according to their size and social influence in the local community. Incidentally, it

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[20] In 1985 we identified 11 out of 40 councillors who were involved in Camorra collusion.

[21] On the basis of legal documents we are assuming that these candidates had links with the Camorra:

Non-elected Camorra sponsored candidates: local election 6 May1990

Emidio De Pamphilis	(PSI)	565 preference votes
Salvatore Scarpa	(DC)	529 preference votes
Salvatore Capasso	(DC)	906 preference votes
Gennaro Orofino	(PSI)	920 preference votes
Italo Gordano	(PSI)	568 preference votes
Pasquale Visiello	(PSI)	884 preference votes
Nicola Carillo	(PSI)	549 preference votes
Giampiero Nitrato Izzo	(PSI)	832 preference votes

· The lowest number of preference votes for non-elected candidates being 209 and the highest being 980 for the DC list. For the PSi list, the lowest number of preference votes is 53 and the highest is 976 preference votes.

Elected Camorra sponsored candidates: local election 6 May1990:

Antonio Carotenuto (PSI)	1885 preference votes
Sergio Gargiulo (DC)	1138 preference votes
De Leo Carmine (PSI)	1953 preference votes
Antonio Elveni (PSI)	1130 preference votes
Michele Savino (DC)	1564 preference votes
Esposito Muchele (PSDI)	1493 preference votes
Antonio Irlando (DC)*	1455 preference votes
Umberto Caliendo (PSDI)	1245 preference votes
Beniamino Verdezza (PSI)	1116 preference votes
Liberato Cafiero (PSI)	983 preference votes.

(Source: *Ministero dell'Interno, Direzione Generale dell'Amministrazione Civile, Servizio Elettorale, Divisione Organizzazione dellle Consultazioni Elettorale:, Torre Annunziata, 6-5-90*)

also highlights the total lack of local democracy in Campania during the 1980s.

We find the same pattern in **Marano di Napoli** as in Torre Annunziata. Marano is a small town to the North East of Naples. Forty years ago it was a pleasant agricultural market town but with the intensive building speculation of the 1960s and 1970s, it became part of the outskirts of Naples with all its accompanying features and problems: "46.165 inhabitants, 5 primary schools, 3 junior schools, one secondary school, no hospital, one police station, 2 cinemas - closed five years ago. No real economic activity to speak of, as those who are employed work in Naples" (Martano, 1993:58). As in Torre Annunziata, the general run-down nature of the zone made it an easy prey for the Camorra. The dominant local clan is the Orlando-Nuvoletta-Polverino family which already in the 1970s, according to Antonio Ammaturo[22], head of the *squadra mobile*, "was able to mobilise thousands of votes for certain candidates" (Faenza, 1990:133).

It was a DC politician, Raffaele Credentino, who became mayor with sponsorship of the clan in 1980-84, but what is of particular interest is the fact that in this case we can clearly quantify the weight of the preference vote and therefore of the clans's influence since two newcomers (Francesco Santoro and Raffaele Orlando) with no political past but Camorra support in the 1990 local elections, obtained a very large number of preference votes (respectively 1,768 and 1,743), overtaking all the well-established local candidates "especially in the polling stations of Via Merolla (polling stations 24 and 25), Via Mallardo and Guglielmo Pepe (polling stations 30-40) and Poggio Vallesana where the influence of Nuvoletta's men was absolute" (*Il Mattino* of 9 December 1989). The newcomers' presence on the DC list increased the DC's vote from 9,879 in 1985 to 15,971 in 1990 (*Ministero dell'Interno, Servizio Elettorale, Commune di Marano di Napoli, Elezione del 6-05-1990*). This example not only demonstrates

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[22] *Capo della Squadra mobile* 197 -82. He was murdered by the NCO in 1982 as a favour to the Red Brigades. It is believed that he was getting very close to the truth about the criminal activities of many of the Camorra clans in Campania.

the Camorra clan's control of the electoral process but also indicates a new development: the placing of 'its' own men, usually family members, on the Town Council to guarantee the direct representation of its economic interests.

Another well documented case is that of Pasquale Galasso's fiefdom, **Poggiomarino**. In his deposition to the Parliamentary Antimafia Commission (CPA1.1 and 1.2), Galasso explained in great detail the promises and exchanges of favours which took place during the election campaign as the clan sought votes: *"Someone who had problems with the VAT inspector, the Inland Revenue or the local authorities, who needed planning permission or a building licence came to us for help. Services rendered tied him to us and therefore to "our" candidate"* (CPA1.2:2749). If and where the support was not naturally forthcoming, *camorristi* canvassers did not hesitate to resort to violence, intimidatory action and even to murder. Evidence of this can be found in nearly all the communes in Campania: for example, Acerra, Torre del Greco, Pomigiliano d'Arco: burnt cars, gunshots, shops and offices set on fire, etc (Faenza, 1990) as well as three killings in a fortnight during the election campaign of April 1990 in Poggiomarino.

In **Casal di Principe**, the Schiavone clan organised an 'efficient' electoral campaign: "members of the organisation went to every house: sometimes with threats, sometimes with compromises, they were able to produce good results" (SO12:100). In this Commune, the electoral staff of one of the DC candidates was composed of his *camorristi* cousins, in particular, the violent clan boss, Sandokan: "*they undertook door-to-door canvassing, asking for votes. For those who did not agree, threats were made against them, their properties and their businesses*" (SO12:102). With these violent tactics, the clan was able to increase the DC's vote from 30% to 50% in 1982. The examples of Poggiomarino and Casal di Principe highlight the pervasive and violent measures which Camorra clans were willing to resort to to impose their political will. It also illustrates the Camorra's fierce and totalitarian nature.

In **Sant'Antonio Abate**, the stronghold of the '*Doroteo*' faction

leader, Antonio Gava, electoral campaigns were always tense and often violent, and candidates could easily be beaten up in the main square (Mario Saverese in P11:69). The day of reckoning was election day. Galasso recalls how in Poggiomarino the absolute loyalty of the clan was tested: *"you could count on the 200 votes of your family"* (CPA1.1:2748) as well as the local community which can help explain how a candidate he supported obtained 1.055 preference votes out of 1.406 total votes for the party list (Faenza, 1990:132). But the Camorra also used every possible trick to make sure that it got the vote out. Votes which had not been won by persuasion were either seized by fraud or force.

In December 1990, a judicial inquiry into the May 1990 local elections found voting irregularities in seven constituencies in Campania indicating clearly that ballot papers had been stuffed into the ballot box since there were more votes than the number of people on the electoral register (Behan, 1996). In Castel Volturno, a local bar was the residential address for more than a hundred electors (Faenza, 1990) and in Casal di Principe, a polling station was conveniently set up in the house of a local boss!

Migliorino insists that his clan never used violence or intimidation during elections in Torre Annunziata. But, we have the evidence of Francesco Donadio, a PDS councillor (1985-90), who recalls an episode during the local elections of 6 May 1990 in Torre Annunziata: *"the secretary of my party had to go to the Police Station to inform them of the presence of alarmingly violent men outside polling stations"* (SO3:94).

The use of *camorristi* and their violence by politicians was not restricted to elections. There are many interesting examples where *camorristi* were called in by politicians to resolve their political 'complications'. In this respect, politicians still saw themselves as *patrons* and *camorristi* as subordinates obeying orders. This arrogant attitude, however, declined during the 1980s as *camorristi* grew in importance. Antonio Gava, in particular, frequently used the Camorra in this way, much like his father is claimed to have done. Moreover like his father, Gava jr never sought direct contact with *camorristi* but

always did it indirectly through his lieutenants.[23]

Two clear examples show how he expected the Camorra to use violence to help him resolve his political conflicts, where ultimately the ends justified the means; in his case, power and domination of the '*Doroteo*' faction. Both examples took place in Antonio Gava's political heartland and in Carmine Alfieri's centre of operations. After the 1985 municipal elections in Poggiomarino, Gava contacted Pasquale Galasso, the local boss, through his political lieutenants and asked him to force a successful independent DC candidate into joining the '*Doroteo*' faction so that it could become dominant on the Council. It is clear that by asking a *camorrista* to intervene, Gava was making use of the reputation of a violent and feared boss. Galasso at first refused, but his leader, Alfieri, intervened: *"He asked the reasons for my refusal, he confirmed that Gava was our friend and that I could not refuse this favour. I thus met with Sangiovanni [DC candidate] in my hide-out in Sarno and transmitted the request [...]. It was impossible to distinguish between my criminal reputation and the influence which derived from me being on the run. Sangiovanni in this way was convinced and supported Gava"*(Pr7:19-03-1993).

In the other case, *camorristi* were used once again to physically eliminate political rivals to reestablish the 'proper' DC '*Doroteo*' dominance on the local Council. This took place in Sant'Antonio Abate in 1988 and has been well-documented (CPA1.1 and Behan, 1996). In this commune, the local DC had split because of different sponsors: the traditional DC list backed by Fantini and Andreotti was sponsored by the old NCO clans (Rosanova and Abagnale) and the new Civic list was backed by Gava and was sponsored by the Galasso-Loreto clans. When the traditional DC won the majority on the council: *"it was clear that Gava was losing power in Sant'Antonio Abate whereas Fantini had constructed, with Giuseppe Abagnale, after the concession of the public water purifier, a very strong electoral base"* (P11:106-7). The Galasso-Loreto clans took direct action to redraw the political balance in

[23] In this way, legally, Antonio Gava has been able to argue that he did not have anything to do with *camorristi* or the Camorra. Much of his defence is based on this attitude; for his father ,see Gava (1999).

favour of the *'Doroteo'* faction: they killed their rival political sponsors (the Rosanova brothers) to make the message clear to the other DC politicians. Ferrara Rosanova recalls

> *We [the Rosanova clan] had supported the DC list led by Giuseppe D'Antuono and Giuseppe Abagnale, which had won this election with 15 councillors. The Civic list, led by Tonino D'Auria and supported by Pasquale Galasso and Pasquale Loreto, had in actual fact, lost the election, obtaining only 13 councillors. The murder of my brothers provoked political turmoil and the seizing of power by the Galasso-Loreto clan. Indeed, while Geppino Abagnale left the political scene and hid out of fear of being killed, three elected DC councillors (Diodato D'Auria, Ciro Mascolo and Salvatore D'Antuono) followed after a while by Bozzatore, brother-in-law of Agostino Abagnale, all supported the civic list and formed a majority allowing the constitution of a municipal Junta* (CD'A17x).

Gava jr, as a politician, indirectly played a part in this episode although he has argued that he was not directly involved and the different political dynamics had nothing to do with him (OM).

Politicians who were discarded by one clan sought sponsorship from other clans. This was the case in Torre Annunziata, when a DC politician, Salvatore Capasso, who was not sponsored by the Gionta clan, turned to the Limelli clan. As Tarallo recalls:

> *I met Capasso in 1987. He was still Mayor. [...] I remember that a couple of months after this meeting, Carotenuto [the Gionta-sponsored politician] replaced Capasso as Mayor. The meeting was organised by Trotto who was friendly with Capasso. Trotto told Giovanni Annuziato that he had organised a meeting with Mayor Capasso who wanted to meet us. I made it clear that the meeting had not been called by us. At the house of Trotto's relative, Trotto Pasquale did the introductions. Capasso straight away started to flatter Limelli saying that, compared to the Gionta clan, he and his group were different, superior and he made himself available to us. Later on, taking into account the fact that within the space of a couple of months, Capasso was replaced by Carotenuto, sponsored by the Gionta clan, I t thought that he [Capasso] had come to us because he was aware of his political decline and of the rise of Carotenuto, backed by the Gionta clan. During that first meeting, Capasso t talked to us about what he was going to do for the territory; he spoke as if he were at an electoral rally. It was clear that he was able to look after our interests [...]. Limelli replied that he trusted*

> *him, that he was a serious and well balanced person [...]. He told him that on our side, there was all the good will in the world to support him. We did not talk about votes because there was another two years before the next election campaign (...)* (Pr6:26-8-94:25-6).

Other politicians refused contact with many Camorra clans to protect their already established exclusive links. For example, Antonio Carotenuto, a Gionta sponsored PSI councillor, refused contact with the Limelli *"not to betray the Gionta clan"* (Pr6:26-8-95:11).

It is clear from this evidence that the Camorra clans took part willingly and efficiently within the traditional clientelistic framework, at times using 'middlemen' to deal with politicians in the 1970s (Faenza, 1996). But in the 1980s, they went beyond this to become pro-active in the exchange and started to infiltrate both political parties and, as a result, the local municipal councils to influence political and economic decisions directly.

As already pointed out, two of the determining factors that precipitated this evolution were the 1980 earthquake and the huge amounts of money controlled by local councils and on the other, the Cirillo Affair (see Appendix Eight). In many Italian studies of the modern Camorra, one finds the expression *"inquinamento camorristico"*, pollution by the Camorra. This, indeed, seems the best way to describe the phenomenon of Camorra infiltration, penetration and collusion by which a party machine, in particular the DC, was invaded and taken over by Camorra elements who connived to gain access to the decision-making centres. Then, they either intervened by proxy or personally entered the political arena; in the municipal Councils, for example, they fully participated in making decisions and laying their hands on reconstruction funds.

In a way similar to the take-over of the party section by the *'Doroteo'* faction, the criminal gangs engaged in taking over the local DC, PSI and PSDI party sections and administration. For example, in Poggiomarino, in the late 1970s, as Pasquale Galasso recalled, the NCO's Alfonso Rosanova, with the help of his front man, Avv.

Giuseppe Caso, *"had succeeded in obtaining [...] the control of the DC and therefore of the local administration"* (P10:77). The Camorra clans were taking power either by agreement with corrupt politicians or by being elected themselves. In this way, they were becoming a 'legitimate' part of the political process. The main parties which were targeted by the Camorra and which responded, needing the resources that they could offer (violence, social networks and money), were the ruling majority parties, the DC ('*Doroteo*' faction in particular), the PSI and the PSDI. It was very easy for local gangsters and local politicians to establish contacts at this level as they had grown up together. Vito explains that: *"in many cases, there were family links or friendships between us so exercising influence was a very smooth process"* (CD'A17v:60), or again, the mayor of Poggiomarino was the local doctor of the Camorra clans and therefore became imperceptibly involved with them. Friendship and social acquaintance gave both *camorristi* and politicians special access to each other and their resources *"Alfieri's strategy was to have electoral control over the territory he controlled criminally. Having thousands of votes at his command, due to his control of the mayors of Saviano, S. Giuseppe, Nola, Boscoreale, Somma Vesuviana, Ottoviano, Trecase, Pompeii and other towns [...],he determined the election of the politicians supported by him"* (Pr7:1). But there were exceptions such as the Communist businessman and town councillor sponsored by the Gionta clan in Torre Annunziata (Antonio Carpentieri [D'Alterio, 1996:196]).

Alternatively, a number of 'clean' members of the Camorra gangs (doctors, lawyers, teachers, etc) were encouraged to take up a career in politics by their Camorra cousins. In Aversa, Marano, Casal di Principe and Quindici among others, gangs actually placed their men on DC, PSI and PSDI lists and they became town councillors and mayors: the brother of the gangster Antonio Bardellino, Ernesto, became the Socialist mayor of San Cipriano d'Aversa in 1981-84; four close relatives of Lorenzo Nuvoletta were elected DC councillors in Marano in 1990; two cousins of the gangster Francesco Schiavone, became mayor and finance *assessore* in Casal di Principe in 1985. The

mayor of Quindici was the brother of the local boss. It is surely reasonable to suggest that they could only achieve this result by influencing, in some way, the local party section and secretaries.

Thus, the collusion between local councillors and the Camorra was the result of different strategies, often difficult to document. But defining these strategies in terms of exchange is much easier: social networks and violence were the resources provided by the Camorra to local politicians and administrators which, within the framework of the traditional clientelistic framework, allowed *camorristi* to be more and more involved in the political process. Faenza highlights the following relationships during the late 1980s: Cardito: 6 PSDI candidates and one elected, sponsored by NCO-Moccia clan; Casandrino: 4 DC and 2 PSI candidates and all elected, sponsored by the Verde and Puca clans; Marano: 3 DC and 3 PSI candidates and all elected, sponsored by the Nuvoletta clan; Acerra: 5 DC, 1 PSI, 1 PSDI candidates and all elected, sponsored by the Nuzzo clan; Brusciano: 1 DC and 3 PSI candidates and all elected, sponsored by the Nuvoletta clan; Torre Annunziata: 1 DC sponsored candidate and elected by the Cavalleri clan (1991:139-40). Between 1990 and 1993, 32 local councils were officially disbanded because of Camorra infiltration and replaced by government representatives who sought to eliminate these corrupt relationships.

The main reason why organised crime groups sought influence and control over politicians and their economic agenda was the access that these had to decision-making centres and to the distribution of public resources. In the 1950s, Lauro and his friends provided small favours; by the mid-1980s, the DC and PSI had control over the state apparatuses and resources,[24] and had direct access to public funds. The 1980 earthquake further increased the resources available as the state embarked on a massive 'reconstruction programme' in the region.

[24] There is an interesting discussion about this relationship in Katz and Mair who talk about the emergence of a 'cartel party' as"being characterised by the interpenetration of party and state" (1995:17) and in Allum (1997a) in particular in relation to the DC.

These investments provided a powerful incentive for the Camorra to step up their infiltration of local Councils and become major players in the local economy. Until the 1960s, emerging *camorristi* had used local businesses as a base for their rackets, intimidation and casual contacts with politicians. By the early 1980s, we can distinguish between two different strategies. On the one hand, the NCO's became involved in the businesses which it had once racketeered by buying them out and therefore gaining access to the legal market, while continuing their traditional rackets. These activities were concentrated in the construction industry. They had businessmen who helped them in their transformation especially where important public contracts were at stake. Such was the case of the 'legitimate' businessman, Matteo Sorrentino,[25] who acted as the middleman between the clan and large Northern building contractors working in the Campania region who had to pay bribes (3-5% on the work undertaken) in return for guaranteed good working-conditions and no trouble on the building site. He also imposed suppliers and subcontractors who were protected or owned by the NCO. This system was described by Carmine Alfieri as "the Cutolo model": Cutolo invested only in the companies which he had racketeered and in which he had accumulated capital. But he remained at the first stage of investment in the market[26] (Sales, 1988:201).

On the other hand, there was the strategy of the NF clans. The smuggling clans of the NF, which became involved in the international drugs trade in the 1970s, needed to 'launder' their 'dirty' money through legal businesses and thus approached legitimate businessmen to become their front men in this operation. But, in many instances, using the names of their wives, mothers or daughters, they also

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[25] Other businessmen who acted as mediators between the NCO and business were Luigi Romano, Gennaro Citarella, Alessandro Nocerino. In some cases, the common town and socialisation of *camorristi* and businessmen led to close friendships and functional relationships. This was particularly the case with Carmine Alfieri in the late 1980s.

[26] Sales suggests that the only NCO *camorrista* who invested his money in the legal market was Cutolo's right hand man, Vincenzo Casillo (see Chapter Eight), who expanded his activities to Rome and managed to control the Italian National Lottery, the *Enalotto*, across the whole of the country (1988:201).

became legitimate businessmen with businesses in the legal economy (in vast areas from agricultural products to tourism and all forms of commerce - clothing, carpets, jewellery, etc) and thus, becoming *'camorristi* businessmen' (*l'imprenditore camorrista).* In the post-earthquake economy, this was very useful because it allowed the NF clans to become fully involved in the distribution of public contracts; whereas Cutolo's NCO was ill prepared to meet the business challenge and had just started this three-way exchange when it succumbed to the combined action of the police and the NF clans in 1983.

Thus, when the earthquake occurred in November 1980, the different Camorra clans in their various legal guises were ready to compete for a place in the reconstruction programme. The kidnapping of the DC regional councillor Ciro Cirillo in April 1981 and the crucial role of Cutolo in his liberation (see Vasile, 1993) officialised and formalised the relationship between politicians, *camorristi* and businessmen in a triadic exchange in which the Camorra became *the* controlling force setting the political and economic agendas.

The first well-documented example of such control of the economic agenda in the post-earthquake era appears in a judgment of the Avellino tribunal in July 1984 (see S2) which condemned Stanislao Sibila, an NCO building contractor, for repeated extortion; this described in great detail the intricacies of the Camorra's power. In December 1981, Avellino City Council put out to tender a contract for the construction of 1,000 prefabricated houses for the homeless. In February 1981, nine national companies submitted tenders and two were finally retained for technical and budgetary reasons: *Volani Sud* from Rome for 50% of the work and *Feal Spa* from Milan for the other half. However, in the following month, some irregularities in the legal position of the *Volani Sud* company were discovered and *Feal Spa* was offered the whole contract. From that moment onwards, the judicial documents become a Kafkaesque story of intrigue and kickbacks. At the centre of the story was Stanislao Sibila. First, the Milanese company, *Feal Spa* was forced to pay 3% of the whole contract in cash

under the table to Sibila and three local builders to guarantee good working conditions on the building sites. Not only were these local builders imposing their services on the Northern company but they were also racketeering it.

Secondly, Stanislao Siblia together with his NCO associates, Roberto Cutolo and Vincenzo Casillo, managed to recover 40% of the total work for *Volani Sud* with the informal agreement *('trattativa privata')* of some local City councillors and *Feal Spa*. In return for this favour, *Volani Sud* had to pay 5% of the cost of the work undertaken (half a million pounds), give all subcontracts to Camorra sponsored companies[27] and use Camorra suppliers (in particular, a company called *Beton*). *Volani Sud* could only work under these conditions as the NCO specified "that there would be no problems of any kind" as long as they paid up. This shows us three aspects of the business Camorra: firstly, the extent to which the Camorra became involved with local businessmen, who acted as vital mediators in the exchange; secondly, the way the Camorra could violate legal procedures and establish illegal agreements as the norm; and thirdly, how the Camorra used the political sub-system (for example, corrupting local councillors) so linking the three sub-systems (political, economic and social)

This basic type of exchange became a template for other emerging Camorra groups: the NF families and the Alfieri Confederation built upon and perfected the NCO model. The Camorra provided good working conditions, companies for the subcontracts and supplies for the work (cement, tools, diggers, bulldozers, etc) in return for 3-5% of the contract. Two types of companies took part in this exchange: the legal Camorra companies which won the contracts and sometimes never completed the work, and the Camorra-sponsored companies which received the contracts and accepted to work under the conditions imposed by the Camorra and politicians.

This model was activated with relative ease during the 1980s at local level by the majority of Camorra clans. First, they applied it to

[27] Some of these companies were formed for the occasion like COMACOS which also had to pay 4% of the cost of the work which it undertook to the Camorra.

the earthquake reconstruction contracts (*'appalti eccellenti'* or major construction projects in the hinterland) and then, the new clans (such as the Bardellino, Schiavone and Alfieri clans) adapted this model to all municipal contracts with the complicity of local politicians, administrators and businessmen. Thus, it became the norm.

When the Camorra clans could not set the economic agenda, they became violent and started to eliminate reluctant politicians. Numerous cases of political murders have been well-documented for the period: Marcello Torre, DC mayor of Pagani in December 1980; Domenico Beneventano, PCI local councillor of Ottaviano in November 1980 (CPA1:20); Alfredo Mundo, ex-DC mayor of Marigliano in April 1981; Eugenio Torrese, independent left-wing town councillor of Torre del Greco; Giugliano Pennacchio PSDI local councillor of Giugliano in July 1982; Giuseppe Caso, DC local councillor of Poggiomarino in August 1982; Francesco Giugliano, PSI mayor of San Gennaro Vesuviano in October 1982; Francesco Buzziti, local *assessore* of Lusciano in February 1983; Crecenzo Casillo, mayor of Casoria in December 1983 (Feo, 1989:40-2) and the murder of 5 Council Committee chairpersons. Similarly, there were many cases of intimidation: 17 bomb attacks between April 1982 and March 1983 against local councillors (such as the one against the municipality of Parete in March 1982); 5 attacks against trade union offices, 16 assaults on trade unionists and 14 attacks on local councillors (Behan, 1996:137).

There were also cases of kidnapping such as that of De Lorenzo, public works *assessore* in Casandrino in January 1987, whose release was conditional on the resignation of the council: "the council resigned eight days later" (Martano, 1993:47); or again, in Torre Annunziata, the direct action of the Gionta clan against the the DC mayor, Capasso to force him to stand down. As Tarallo explained: *"Capasso stood down because he had been threatened by Pasquale Gallo [a member of the Gionta clan], who told him to resign, to let Carotenuto be elected in his place. He told me that 3 or 4 politicians from Torre Annunziata had also been contacted by Gallo Pasquale to have Carotenuto Antonio*

appointed as mayor" (Pr6:12-3). In Quarto, the Nuvoletta clan went as far as bombing the mayor's car and that of another senior council official in late 1982 when the Town Council was on the point of refusing the clan building contracts; the Council subsequently resigned and the new administration agreed to the building contracts (Behan, 1996). It is clear that during this period of great Camorra expansion, the ends justified the means more than ever as the stakes were very high.

In conclusion, the examples presented here illustrate the development of the Camorra's political exchange in three phases: (1) the traditional clientelistic exchange where the Camorra provides votes and campaign assistance; (2) the gradual infiltration of the party machine, placing its 'own' men in political positions; and (3) setting the political and economic agenda, thus, taking over the corrupt clientelistic exchange to produce a new modern exchange with new rules.

11.3.1 The Camorra's Exchange at National Level in 1980s

At national level, a similar pattern of functional exchange reproduced itself, as Pasquale Galasso has stated: *"it is all too obvious that at election time, this privileged relationship between the political electoral network of a politician and the criminal organisation transformed itself into votes"*(Pr7:22-12-92).This is particularly clear in respect of the local DC leader, Antonio Gava and his men, although Gava jr has fiercely denied all the *pentiti's* allegations, accusations and evidence against him of Camorra involvement (OM). His lawyers have defended him using two important arguments: firstly, not one *pentito* can give clear evidence of having had direct contact and dealings with Antonio Gava. Therefore, his involvement is difficult to prove. However, it can be argued that this was typical of Gava's power system and way of 'doing politics'; Antonio Gava remained in control of social and political networks. His lieutenants, such as Vincenzo Meo, Raffaele Russo, Alfredo Vito and Francesco Patriarca, had direct

dealings with *camorristi,* but he managed to remain aloof and got his lieutenants to do the ground work.[28] Secondly, his lawyers argue that the *pentiti* made some serious mistakes about details such as election dates. It is clear that there are often mistakes of memory of this kind; even so, it would appear that both the versions of *camorristi pentiti* and the politician *pentiti* (especially Alfredo Vito) do largely correlate and confirm each other. Thus, we believe in general that the *pentiti's* stories do give us an overall picture of the modern clientelistic system.[29]

Although, in the 1970s, there were some simple, casual and unsystematic relationships similar to those of the 1950s (see Figure 11.8); in the 1970s, it was the combination of the DC's loss of local power in 1975, the 1980 earthquake and the Cirillo Affair in 1981 which forced a new dynamic relationship between politicians and the NCO and the other smuggling Camorra families at the national level. Indeed, the Cirillo Affair[30] marked a turning point, as the NCO played a pivotal role in its *denouement.* Not only was it *"the opportunity for Cutolo to consolidate the relationships that he already appeared to have had with DC politicians in the years 1977-8"* (C. Alemi, 1996[31]), but it also marked "a watershed" (Bassolino, 1993:IX) in the development of the Camorra's exchange with politicians.

The evolution of the Camorra's relationship with politicians at national level, especially with Antonio Gava, are clearly seen through the three Camorra gangs: the NCO had a simple relationship; the NF-Nuvoletta had a more complex relationship; and the Alfieri confederation had an intricate and systematic relationship.

The NCO was an electoral machine. Alfieri recalls how *"a good number of Campania politicians, especially those that I have indicated as "Dorotei", protected CUTOLO because of the fact that he could exert*

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[28] The industrialists Bruno Brancaccio, closely linked to the *'Doreteo'* faction, has stated that: "Gava, moreover, never acted personally in the collection of bribes *(tangenti),* in contrast to other political actors, entrusting this task to his lieutenants" (Pr16).

[29] For the problems posed by the pentiti's evidence and the judges's approach see Gribaudi and Musella (1997) and Chapter Three, section 3.3.

[30] See Appendix Seven.

[31] Interview of 10 September 1996, Caserta, Italy.

Figure 11.8: The NCO and the 1970s DC Political Machine: A classic clientelistic Exchange



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

military control over the territory and therefore, the strong electoral consensus which this produced" (Pr8:18-2-94). Cutolo confirmed this when he emphasised that *"my townsmen, friends of [DC politician] Scotti, told me that SCOTTI was the emerging DC personality and thus, could one day be useful. I remember that on that occasion, at election time, Scotti received 100.000 votes more than Gava, which I believe was due to my support"* (Pr11:4-6-87:1-2). Cutolo's men became capable *capi elettori*, electoral agents producing votes immediately (see Figure 11.9), as Judge Alemi explains: *"there appears to have been active campaigning by Cutolo to get these people elected [...] so much so that in the moment in which Cutolo said in 1978: "we will no longer vote for Y but for X", X for the first time has more votes than Y who was number 1 on the DC list. Therefore, this support was efficient and concrete"*[32] (10-9-96:2). The NF-Nuvoletta gangs also campaigned and provided votes for Gava, as Alfieri recounts

> *[...] Antonio Malventi had told me that the Nuvolettas had organised a meeting with Antonio Gava, which according to Don Lorenzo, we should not miss for all the world. It was due to be held on a Sunday about twenty days before the election. I could not attend because I had a cold and told Antonio Malventi to go as my representative. The next day, Malventi brought me the electoral propaganda that had been distributed during the meeting and told me how it had gone. [...] There were about one hundred people there, for the most part representatives of the Neapolitan and Casertan underworld.[...] Antonio Gava made a speech on the need to strengthen the DC, the type of speech that politicians make. After his speech, according to Malventi, Gava left the room with Don Lorenzo and Angelo Nuvoletta and others* (Pr8:14-2-94i:2-3).

At the same time, the Nuvoletta clan also gave political orders to their allies: Alfieri recalls how in the late 1970s, when his clan was under their protection, he was told how to vote in the 1979 general elections: *"Sica [Salvatore Sica, DC politician close to Gava] was presented to me by the Nuvolettas [...]. I remember that Angelo Nuvoletta together with*

[32] A letter was found in 1976 in Cutolo's sister's house on Parliamentary headed note paper which read: "sincerest thanks for your contribution to my re-election", signed Francesco Patriarca (documents attached to P10 on the subject of F. Patriarca:4).

Figure 11.9: The NCO in the 1980s: An attempt at modernising the Classic Clientelistic Exchange



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

three or four people from his clan accompanied the solicitor Sica to my house in Piazzolla di Nola and asked me to support him in the electoral campaign. Effectively, I campaigned for Sica" (Pr8:15-2-94:1). There exists other evidence of links between Gava and the Nuvolettas: not only was a letter found in Nuvoletta's house from the lawyer Palumbo asking them to support Antonio Gava, but also Domenico Di Maro, an important businessman close to the Nuvoletta clan, when stopped by the police had Antonio Gava's visiting card on him (Faenza, 1990:133). This relationship was a traditional clientelistic exchange based around 'vote exchange', votes for political protection and impunity (see Figure 11.10).

With the disappearance of the NCO and decline of the Nuvoletta clan in the mid-1980s, the Alfieri confederation took over the territory not only in terms of social, criminal and economic activities but also in its exclusive political relationship with the DC/PSI as Alfieri explains (see Figure 11.11): *"as we took over the territory, we also took over all the relationships with the political and business representatives who had had relations with Cutolo"* (Pr8:18-2-94).

This meant that Alfieri became Antonio Gava and the local DC's main electoral agent, as a legal document stressed: *"Carmine Alfieri, who had decapitated the NCO with the murders of Rosanova and Casilllo and, on the other hand, Antonio Gava, who had taken control of the Neapolitan DC and who had obtained a personal electoral success in the 1983 general election"* (P5.1:scheda 60). The dominance and control of Gava and his '*Doroteo*' faction in Campania corresponded to Carmine Alfieri's rise to Camorra dominance: *"they were all simultaneously Gava and Carmine Alfieri's men"* (Pr7:12-03-93).

The Alfieri confederation provided the DC with two types of commodity: votes and financial help in their electoral campaigns. In the 1987 general election Antonio Gava and his lieutenant Raffaele Russo received 1.600 preference votes in Poggiomarino, Pasquale Galasso's fiefdom. But, sometimes *camorristi* had to split their votes among different faction representatives which could also be problematic for them as Galasso explains: *"he [Miranda - a Gava man]*

Figure 11.10: The Nuvoletta clan, the Business Camorra and its links with Politics



Figure 11.11: The Alfieri Confederation, the Political Camorra in the 1980-90s



insisted instead that I guarantee him the entire 1500-2000 votes that Gava had always received in that Commune. Miranda insisted for a long time that I should have received Gava during a meeting at my home, but I refused to avoid a clear backing for one or the other [...]. In that general election, I supported more Gava than Pomincino (he received a few hundred votes less than Gava), especially because I was attached to Sangiovanni, but I also helped Lettieri so that I did not lose my relations with Pomicino"(Pr7:19-3-93). The dominant logic which prevailed in their political choices was not ideological but functional. Thus, when they targeted Alfredo Vito as a DC politician to sponsor, they did so because *"he would be a useful politician for his political power as an exponent of the 'Doroteo' faction and was very close to Antonio Gava*" (Pr7:19-3-93:5). So, the Alfieri confederation distributed its votes tactically: Galasso developed a relationship with Paolo Ciro Pomincino and Senator Bargi while Alfieri had relationships with the '*Doroteo*' faction.

The second commodity which the Alfieri confederation provided in particular for parliamentary elections is difficult to document: the financing of election campaigns. Although parties were publicly financed, extra money was always useful and the Camorra had an abundance of money which it could provide. Electoral campaigns had over the last thirty years become more and more sophisticated using different propaganda techniques and as a consequence, campaigns had become a costly affair. Although in Naples, the candidates tended to come from high social-economic status (see Allum, 1973a; Mindolfi and Soverina, 1993) their personal fortunes had never been comparable to the wealth of a Lauro.

The demands on political parties and politicians were such that they needed to seek financial support from elsewhere. During the 1980s, politicians turned to both the business and criminal community. Politicians received money from businessmen in exchange for promises of public contracts. It was in particular, the new 'businessman politicians', such as Vito and Pomincino, who set up such a system to finance their political careers. They also turned to

the Camorra: Alfieri recalls Pomincino asking for money for his campaign (Pr8) while Galasso describes the financial backing he gave to Senator Bargi in he early 1990s in Somma Vesuviana (Pr7:19-4-93:15). Much of the resources provided by the Camorra was similar to the Sicilian and American Mafias: the Stern syndicate of Wincanton in the 1950-60s, "financed the election campaigns of tolerant candidates" (Gardiner in Gardiner and Olson, 1974:117) to be able work in peace and make money.

The coming together in an 'iron pact' of political corruption between the DC and the Alfieri confederation, in a functional exchange was probably inevitable because of the three factors they had in common. Firstly, they had common territories and centres of power: Alfieri's criminal territory coincided with Gava's political territory: *"the commune of Sant'Antonio Abate, together with Castellammare and Gragnano constituted the heart of his power system"*(Pr10:07-05-93).

Secondly, there were existing relationships based on a corrupt clientelistic exchange. Even before Carmine Alfieri's rise to criminal power, the Alfieri family as well as the Galasso family and others were *capi elettori* for the DC, thus the final transition from simple *capi elettori* to Camorra *grandi elettori* and controllers in the 1980s was very simple. Thirdly, they had common friends, usually businessmen because they were from the same zones. This reinforced their relationship and these friends became their middlemen, people like Francesco Catapano (*"for many years DC general secretary of the zone and friend of Carmine Alfieri"*, P5.1:scheda 60) or businessmen Elpidio Rondone and Francesco Alfieri.

11.4 Conclusion

The 1980s proved to be the era of the Camorra's 'take over' of the exchange with corrupt politicians. This chapter has furnished the documentation of the different commodities, resources, services and favours which it provided politicians and businessmen. In the next chapter, we look at the favours and rewards which politicians and

businessmen had to provide in return in their lucrative relationship with the Camorra.

Chapter Twelve
Political and Business 'Obligations'

"Gava.... vi dico: per sua grande intelligenza, almeno negli ultimi anni, non credo che Gava per la sua intelligenza andava a fare riunioni con dei camorristi"

Pasquale Galasso, (CPA1.1:142)

12.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, we examined the services provided by Camorra gangs; in this chapter, we consider the other components of this corrupt exchange (see Figure 12.1): what politicians and businessmen must provide in return.

Figure 12.1: Political and Business Reciprocities



The clientelistic exchange analysed hitherto creates a framework of reciprocal obligations: criminal, political and economic. In this chapter, the focus is centred, firstly, on the favours and rewards provided by politicians. W. F. Whyte (1981) has labelled these 'political obligations': "the nature of the obligations existing between politicians and their

constituents [in our case *camorristi*] depends upon whether the services performed on either side are paid for or furnished free of charge. [...] The politician has obligations to particular people, and he maintains his organisation by discharging a certain number of these obligations"(1981 (1955):240-246). Whereas the resources which the Camorra provided came from its domination of civil society, the 'obligations' and favours which the politicians had to fulfill in return came from their role within the political system and from the privileges that they derived from it.

We will then look at the new business favours, obligations which appeared in the 1980s. Business obligations emanated from the businessmen's position in the economic system and their potential to be manipulated and provide cover for illegal activities and 'laundering' of money.

12.1 Political 'Obligations' in the 1950s

In the 1950s, political favours and rewards were fairly basic. They consisted of general favours, legal help and what Bell has called 'political accommodation(1967:193) in other words, political protection either by allowing *guappi* a certain amount of freedom of action or by having a general attitude of tolerance towards their illegal activities.

Lauro was able to provide money and goods from his own fortune while other politicians started to distribute favours gained from their privileged position. For example, the widow of the notorious businessman *guappo* Antonio Esposito was "[...] able to obtain a job in the Prefecture"(Ottone, 1965:685). Indeed, Esposito appears to have been rather 'well-connected'[33] as "[...] at his funeral, 12 MPs sent their limousines and many bouquets". (Enzenberger, 1998:117). When il *guappo* Giuseppe Navara, *il re di Poggioreale*, was due to pay at least 40 milion lire in taxes on his numerous business ventures, he was able to reduce the sum simply by protesting heartily

[33] It is suggested by some that Antonio Esposito was the *capo elettore* of Giovanni Leone, the DC deputy from Pomigliano D'Arco and later, Prime Minister and President of the Republic.

(Isabella, 1980:212).

Another political service which politicians provided was legal help. Many lawyers (both penal and civil) who defended *guappi* were also potential candidates and in some cases local councillors and MPs; thus the client-lawyer relationship was no ordinary relationship, it went beyond the purely formal professional relationship and became a friendship based on kindness and reciprocity. Both parties could expect something in return and the lawyer/politician who had enjoyed Camorra support had to do a good job in court not only in terms of clever legal argument but also by seeking to apply informal pressure on judges. There are many examples of this complex and precarious relationship: during the famous 'Orlando-Maresca trial', Pasquale De Gennaro, vice-mayor of Naples and liberal DC local councillor (1946-60) defended Pupetta Maresca and Roberto Gava appeared as *parte civile* for the Simonetti family while Senator De Marsico, Giuseppe Di Giovanni, provincial councillor and Nicola Foschini, Monarchist MP defended the Esposito family (*Il Mattino* of 4 April 1959).

The last favour politicians provided the Camorra is probably the hardest to detect; that is, political protection. Indeed, "the gangster depends upon *political protection* for his criminal and illicit activities" (Landesco, 1968:183) and politicians could impose, on the public authorities they influenced, a tolerant attitude towards the *guappi's* illegal activities.

Two good examples of this are Catello Di Somma and Alfredo Maisto. Catello Di Somma, a notorious *camorrista* from Castellammare di Stabia, was sent into 'banishment' on the island of Ustica as punishment, but left the island, being sent first to Vibo Valenzia (for health reasons) and later to Acquaviva delle Fonti (Ba); his banishment was reduced and he only served half the original sentence (*Questura di Napoli*, telegram n.0293505 of 12 September 1957[34]). This episode suggests that Di Somma had a high level political protection. Alfredo Maisto also enjoyed a permanent state of immunity throughout his criminal career: "Maisto was never found guilty; often he was freed

[34] In 1973 Catello di Somma after an active criminal career of forty years only had two convictions, both remitted on his police record (see R8:1).

with the all too-easy, 'doubtful insufficient evidence' verdict and many grave suspicions of the crimes which he executed but for which he was never condemned" (*Il Mattino* of the 26 of June 1976). This may be explained by the fact that he was said to be the *capo elettore* of an important DC deputy in the 1960s.

12.3 Political 'Obligations' in the 1980s

By the mid-1980s, the scale of political exchange had changed and the Camorra's demands became more and more important. The mechanism of political favours and obligations have begun to come to light now that the circle of protection and immunity has finally been broken and the actors have begun to talk. The simple 1950s clientelistic framework was no longer sufficient for all the business deals which had developed and its simplicity cannot account for the complexity of the exchange. After the 1980 earthquake and Cirillo Affair, the politicians rendered a mixture of old and new services: traditional immunity and political protection with new large-scale business and irregular deals.

During the 1970s, politicians provided traditional clientelistic services. For example, those which the politicians provided the NCO were still very basic, although after the 1980 earthquake and the Cirillo affair, a change took place in the nature of these services and they became more sophisticated for all Camorra groups.

The basic political 'obligations' which politicians, both national and local, provided, once involved with the Camorra, were threefold: political protection; legal immunity; and favours. As Faenza has explained "to believe the words of the first Camorra *pentito*, Antonio Galluccio, Cutolo has contacts with a Senator from Sorrento who procured him many special favours - including that of transferring prisoners from one prison to another". The boss - explained the *pentito* - even managed to get the three year sentence in a work house of a friend from Casal di Principe reduced to conditional freedom *(sorveglianza speciale).* The *Carabinieri* checked the details and

discovered that it was true (in Aa. Vv, 1988:119-120). This is only one example of what was suspected, and now proven, to be the case in the whole of the Campania region for Camorra groups in the late 1970s and 1980s: the opportunity for certain people to break the law without the fear of ever being prosecuted. When there was a prosecution or a trial against Camorra clans, powerful politicians exerted pressure on the judges to favour Camorra groups: "*the judiciary was controllable*" has claimed the *pentito* Pasquale Galasso *"through political and Camorra channels"* (Pr7:18-03-93:4). The *pentito* Carmine Alfieri has revealed how in 1976 he contacted the DC politician Francesco Patriarca to ask him to intervene in his trial for the murder of a rival, Glorioso (Pr8:14-2-1994:1); or again Pasquale Galasso who explained how he contacted the DC politician Alfredo Vito to ask him to fix his trial for *Camorra Association* in 1988. During the Torre Annunziata Massacre trial (*la strage di Torre Annunziata)* Alfieri contacted Vincenzo Meo, lieutenant of Gava: *"I wish to stress that my request for intervention was fully legitimate as our organisation had provided constant electoral support for the 'Doroteo' faction and therefore, I believed I had the right to ask Gava for his help, especially after he had become Minister of the Interio*r" (R4).

The Torre Annunziata Massacre trial is the most blatant example of 'trial-fixing' and was only possible thanks to judge Armando Lancuba[35] *"who was a Christian Democrat close to Gava and Scotti and who could be contacted through them"* (SO9). Indeed, Lancuba's *"availability was well-known to the prison community"*. Many *pentiti* have now confirmed how he helped to 'fix' many of their trials, in particular for the Alfieri confederation as well as the Vollaro, Gionta, Ammaturo, Mariano clans. This legal immunity, a clear political service, guaranteed politicians solid Camorra contacts.

The same traditional resources were provided for all gangs as politicians sought to guarantee their dominance. Antonio Gava and his DC political machine according to the *pentiti* (see CPA1) had a variety of Camorra contacts with rival gangs; thus both the NCO and the

35 Other judges, such as Lamberti, demanded money and goods in return for favourable decisions (CPA1.1).

Nuvoletta enjoyed these traditional legal and political protections, as Pasquale Galasso has recalled: *"the same Lorenzo Nuvoletta [...] told us that he was operating through his friendship with Antonio Gava MP to favour the release of Luciano Liggio, using a medical certificate"* (Pr7:22-04-93). Many *camorristi* were very suspicious of the fact that the Nuvoletta gang organised such important criminal summits without police control. This was put down to the political protection provided by Antonio Gava as Pasquale Galasso, Corrado Iacolare and Carmine Schiavone all have confirmed :

> *the relationship between Nuvoletta and Gava was obvious. For example, I remember that in those days the pressure that the police exerted on us was enormous: given the hundreds of murders that had already been committed, we would be subjected, one day yes one day no, to raids in our houses . Whereas during the course of these meetings when many cars came to the Nuvoletta's ranch, we were never disturbed. Indeed, some Carabinieri's cars could even be seen at the Poggio Vallesana's gate"* (*ibid*).

> *We thought that Lorenzo Nuvoletta must have contacts [...] which explains why nobody troubled them [...] It was believed that it was because he was protected"* (Pr1:11-2, 282).

> *I knew that Gava had good relations with the Nuvolettas. For example, I can cite various episodes which I personally witnessed during meetings held at Poggio Vallesana, the Nuvoletta ranch. During these meetings, many armed criminals met and yet the police and Carabinieri never intervened ; I noticed that police cars which were patrolling the area never intervened, never took the cars' number nor identified the criminals. I believe that this was a direct consequence of the political protection which the Nuvolettas enjoyed in virtue of the support which they received from Gava and other politicians* (Schiavone, 17-12-93 in SO12).

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, as a trial document made clear: *"the feeling between Gava and the Nuvolettas was solidly based on a functional exchange of electoral support - guaranteed impunity"* (P5.1:scheda 26:40).

Another form of political protection and leniency can be seen in

Antonio Gava's behaviour while Minister of the Interior in 1989-90. He made a speech in the Chamber of Deputies on 'Criminality in Campania' in which he discussed the situation and activities of the different Camorra gangs in great detail but failed to mention the activities of the two most powerful and dangerous clans of the time: the Alfieri confederation and the Fabbrocino clan (Pr7:21-3-94:1) clearly fulfilling his obligation towards them.

The third form of traditional political obligations were favours and in particular, jobs. Both national and local politicians could easily provide these by manipulating rules or contacting the right people: for example, Antonio Gava during the time he was Post Office Minister, appointed 3,808 people from the Province of Naples (almost 20% of all Post Office staff [P11:272][36]) or again securing a job for a friend's daughter in a local newspaper. Local politicians were also well placed to distribute jobs in municipal offices. Indeed, many Camorra gangs expected this political obligation since it was rather easy for politicians to provide it. Thus, in many communes, many employees were either related to local Camorra families or had penal records. For example, in a small town like Pagani in the Province of Salerno, 34 municipal employees had criminal records or were involved with the Camorra in the early 1990s (Prot. n. 12B.1.851/Gab).

As we have already seen, the 1980 earthquake and the Cirillo affair changed the nature of the terms of the Camorra's exchange with the politicians. A modern exchange with new terms and new political obligations developed due to the huge sums of money which were flowing into the region. It was an elaboration and sophistication of the traditional obligations and took the form of the development of a new functional business exchange based initially around the earthquake funds and then around all local public contracts. Politicians became important targets for Camorra gangs as they had access to public money,a resource which provided the basis of new political 'obligations' which were fully developed by the Nuvoletta clan and the Alfieri confederation.

36 His political secretary during the same period also appointed 40 'disabled' people from his home-town (*Ibid*).

The two new key political 'obligations' pinpointed here were interconnected and directly linked to the politicians' access to public funds: firstly, they provided privileged information; and secondly, they influenced decisions which allocated state contracts to Camorra companies. *Camorristi* thus sought and demanded these political 'obligations' "*in order to bring water to our mill*" (Pr6: 8-8-94:2) and put into place *"an efficient 'drinking fountain' for the mechanism of the distribution of public contracts*" (Pr7).

Although it might seem an obvious political favour, privileged information about municipal business deals was an important service as it enabled Camorra gangs to use this information and to be one step ahead of their rivals in their economic activities and planning. In other words, it enabled Camorra gangs to be ready to take advantage of any economic opportunity which came along. This privileged information, a collusive act, distorted both the local market and the democratic decision-making process and meant that Camorra gangs had total control over decisions and a monopoly on all economic activities. Good examples are contracts for the construction of the water purification plant in Pompeii or the coastline motorway from Sorrento to Amalfi.

There are also instances of privileged information being used for other types of crimes such as extortion: Antonio Tarallo, for instance, used such privileged information to promote an important extortion in Torre Annunziata. On behalf of the Limelli clan, he had established contacts with Umberto Caliendo, a PSDI town councillor who was responsible for the municipality's finances and with whom the clan organised a three-way functional exchange; but Caliendo also gave Tarallo privileged information regarding companies which the municipality dealt with so that the clan could go and extort them .As the Court made clear: *"we only need to recall that Caliendo gave Tarallo information about the dates when companies were paid by the town-hall, thereby enabling [the clan] 'to go and ask for the money' only when the companies had some"* (P7:5). Caliendo knew exactly what he was doing and what the clan was doing with his information *"I must*

admit that I knew perfectly well what they were using the information for, I knew what they could do with it and the use they could make of it" (P7:6).

The second kind of new political 'obligation' is, however oblique and indirect, the most significant one for the Camorra, since it enabled it to make inroads into the legal economy and become legal while making huge profits. It consisted of giving public contracts to the Camorra via sponsored Camorra companies. This took place both at national and local level but became predominant at local level where it was easier to openly contravene regulations on a smaller scale: local politicians were in a position to control the whole public tendering process and thus could distribute public contracts as they wished, without public accountability by private citizens or the opposition parties.

Many examples of this practice occurred in the Commune of Sarno which was the fiefdom of the Galasso clan in the 1980s and early 1990s. The case of Sarno is emblematic of many of the Municipalities of Campania which have either been disbanded for Camorra infiltration or suspected of it. Between 1984-90, Sarno was dominated by a DC *junta* which was very close to the local Galasso clan and it has been established that that politicians provided clear and precise political favours in the form of public contracts, Council concessions, grants, permits, supplies and services.

The allocation of a public contract for the supply of food and general goods to school canteens in the Commune, for example, shows how the collusion between politicians and *camorristi* functioned, how the former broke all the rules in favour of the Camorra clan to meet their political 'obligations'. The competitive tendering appears on the surface to have been done correctly. The administration seems to have followed the right rules and regulations; however, on closer inspection it is clear that "there was a clear decision to favour 'friendly' companies imposed from the outside" (*Prefettura di Salerno,* 1993:4). Indeed, even when there were about 100 companies for the local Council to choose from, the number was

always reduced to a few, among which the winner was clearly identifiable from the contacts it had with the local Camorra clan. Politicians would violate all the necessary rules to make sure that their political 'obligations' were fulfilled. For example, the *Junta* frequently used the less democratic method of tendering, the 'private deal', *la trattativa privata*[37], to pick and choose the companies which it wished to win the contract. In some cases, legitimate companies that wanted to participate in the competitive tendering process were discouraged from doing so by local criminals and officials. If 'unfriendly' companies won, they would have to offer a huge bribe both to politicians and the local Camorra clan.

Another example is highlighted in a Prefectural document on the tendering for the supply of bread to schools in Sarno: although there was initially competitive tendering with 94 companies invited to compete, only one participated (offering a price of 3, 500 lire per kilo of bread). The *Junta* decided that this deal was not satisfactory and on the same day a 'private deal' was employed to pass the contract to another company; it later claimed that it had contacted four companies by phone and accepted the one which offered the lowest price (2, 200 lire per kilo); although witnesses suggest that in fact only one company was contacted. What is interesting to note here is that the deal offered to the new company was different from the one offered for competitive tendering. It was no longer a four-month contract for the school term but a contract for an unspecified period. This new deal was much better for the company. Thus, politicians not only violated administrative rules and procedures in favour of Camorra-sponsored companies but also manipulated the situation so that the latter got very favourable deals.

Often, in these tendering processes, many decisions were 'predetermined' and 'conditioned' in favour of Camorra gangs and

[37] The *'trattativa privata'* is a way of using a private deal for the distribution of a public contract. It takes place when the *Junta* decides that the open public tendering competition has not produced a satisfactory result. The *Junta* therefore decides to undertake a private deal and asks directly a company to accept the terms or may negotiate new terms. The point is that there is no democratic procedure and that the *Junta* can decide to give the contract to the company of a friend without having to justify the choice to anyone.

their economic activities. In other words, politicians in the *Junta* were not acting as democratically elected representatives of the people but as 'economic agents' for the Camorra, fulfilling their political 'obligations'.

A major area of local Council business where the corrupt influence of politicians' was important was the housing sector (*edilizia)* of Sarno. All building construction was decided by a 'Building Committee', which was formed unelected members appointed by the local Junta. By choosing business representatives or friends of the local underworld, politicians provided favourable conditions for the Committee to favour the powerful Camorra clan. Indeed, these unelected members violated rules and procedures. For example, they held meetings infrequently (see table 12.1); and when these were held, they voted for the projects that their friends had interests in, either as owners, constructors, planners or middlemen. No one objected and the Galasso clan profited from the political services rendered.

Table 12.1: Number of Meetings of the Building Committee in Sarno 1988-92

	Meetings called	Meetings held	Meetings not held
1988	22	6	16
1989	30	17	13
1990	44	15	29
1991	117	11	106
1992	77	2	75

Source: *Prefettura di Salerno* (1993:10).

Last but not least, is the case of the Urban Development Plan (*piano regolatore*). In any commune, it is the biggest business affair as it outlines the various future planning projects. In Sarno in 1992, local politicians were either passive or actively involved in helping the Galasso clan to impose its agenda in terms of urban development. Indeed, the initial project was modified to include expansion and development of residential areas in the town centre to be managed by

estate agencies close to the Galasso clan, as well as new roads specifically serving local officials' houses. As the official Prefectoral document stated: "the plan was entirely conditioned to favour the Galasso clan and the personal family interests of the local councillors or groups of businessmen close to one or the other" (*Prefettura di Salerno*, 1993:24).

This case-study illustrates how politicians provided political favours and services in different forms either through the supply of privileged information or through influencing the awarding of public contracts. The same analysis can be applied to Communes such as Casal di Principe, Quindici, Nocera Inferiore, Pagano, Sant' Antonio Abate, Poggiomarino, Nola, Marano di Napoli, Acerra, etc.

This pattern reappeared at national level for substantial construction or infrastructural projects in the region. MPs provided the same modern political services in terms of privileged information, influence, pressure and public contracts. In this cartel arrangement, there was a clear coming together of traditional forms of corrupt clientelism and organised crime, but at the same time politicians gave *camorristi* and their economic activities a certain amount of social legitimation and prestige in the community.

12.4 Business 'Obligations' in the 1980s

The new aspect of the Camorra's relationship with the political elite in the 1980s was the introduction of the business class. During the 1950s, the *guappi* had relationships with businessmen, as was the case of *Pascalone 'e Nola* who was friendly with a building constructor Troncone, but not as part of a three-way relationship with politicians. In the 1980s, instead, businessmen formed a fundamental part of the Camorra's modern triangular three-way exchange, since their presence provided the Camorra with the excuse for the exchange as well as easy access to the legal economy.

The business sector was chosen not only because of the sums of money it controlled but also and, most importantly, because of the

special relationships which it had developed with both politicians and *camorristi.* Businessmen had developed a close relationship with politicians because of similar political convictions whereas with the Camorra, their relationship was based on economic interests and the Camorra's ability to subvert, corrupt, infiltrate and penetrate business. Investigating magistrate Mancuso (1990) has explained that this was possibly due to the lack of a solid business culture in the region. In the 1970s, businessmen were only used as middlemen and front men but in the 1980s they became directly involved.

We may note that there were two types of businessmen who became involved with the Camorra and provided business obligations: ordinary businessmen and businessmen *camorristi.* Ordinary businessmen were usually co-opted through the use of violence and intimidation, when they really had no choice in the matter. These tended to be companies from Northern Italy which accepted that contacts with the Camorra were part of the 'local' conditions and therefore paid the bribe.[38] For example, the Cooperatives from Bologna, which helped build the Sarno Canal and 653 houses in Boscoreale and 1590 in Ponticelli (*La Repubblica*, of 16 December 1994) paid the Alfieri confederation for the right to do so.

Camorristi imposed themselves on businessmen or bought bankrupt companies thus becoming Company Directors in legitimate businesses. These *camorristi* were '*camorristi* businessmen' as in the case of Pasquale Galasso's cement company PRO.CAL. There was also another type of businessmen who could be called 'businessmen *camorristi*'; they were businessmen who knowingly became involved with *camorristi* and their criminal projects, befriending different Camorra groups and their accomplices in the triangular exchange with politicians. This happened both for the Supermarket CIS di Nola and the high speed train (TAV) link from Naples to Rome in the Casertano, where many companies which won public contracts had Camorra

38 For a literary account which anticipated this development, see Carlo Bernari's novel (1964), *Era l'Estate del Sole Quieto* (Milano: Mondadori).

contacts and accomplices[39].

Both these types of businessmen provided the same services and resources for Camorra gangs but such a relationship also conferred on the Camorra a certain amount of social legitimacy and, more importantly, loyal front men and access to the legal economy through their legal businesses. This was a significant aspect of the Camorra's relationship with businessmen as it enabled Camorra gangs to penetrate civil society and legal markets to such a point that it became difficult to distinguish between 'clean' and 'legitimate' businesses and 'shady' ones.

The main 'obligation' which businessmen had towards Camorra gangs was to hand over a percentage of the money emanating from the public contracts it won thanks to Camorra intervention. In criminal terms, this was a subtle and new form of extortion but in business terms, it was as a cartel deal distributing public funds among the different partners. Indeed, businessmen gave money both to *camorristi* and politicians: this was usually 3-5% of all the work done to the Camorra and 5% to politicians; therefore huge sums of money. Indeed, Pasquale Galasso, has argued that his clan's major economic activity was extortion and public contracts rather than drugs (CPA1.1) because of the huge sums of money that it could make in this way. For example, the Schiavone clan asked for 10% on road constructions, 5% on houses and 2-3% on big works (SO13:236).

Another aspect of this business obligation was giving the smaller sub-contracts to legal Camorra companies and using Camorra suppliers and services. There are many examples of this: for example, Camorra companies would demand that their cement be used as well as their lorries and diggers.

We should not underestimate how fundamental the link businessmen provided in the three-way functional Camorra exchange was. It was a necessary and indispensable element for the Camorra as it provided the excuse, the very reason and means by which the whole

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[39] Typical examples of these business accomplices were Bruno and Matteo Sorrentino, Antonio Agizza, Giovanni Punzo and Luigi Romano (see SO10 and E). Businessmen who have been prosecuted for their involvement with Camorra gangs.

of the functional Camorra exchange could take place: without business being the receiver of public funds, the Camorra could not have appropriated public funds. It would not have been possible to do this without business providing an ideal cover and being a key accomplice in the exchange. In these conditions, the Camorra's activities and identities were concealed, allowing organised crime to advance in civil society and the legal economy without being detected.

12.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, we have sought to identity at the micro-level the political and business 'obligations' which were given to the Camorra as part of the three-way functional exchange. From this analysis, it is clear that political 'obligations' have dramatically changed: in the 1950s, it is not clear whether what the politicians provided could actually be called 'obligations' or rather favours in the normal wider clientelistic framework. In the 1980s, however, politicians provided clear 'obligations' in new modern conditions and no longer just simple favours. Politicians were now taking more risks to fulfil their 'obligations' which went far beyond the traditional clientelistic framework; they became involved in a criminal project to deviate public funds to organised crime groups, businessmen and themselves and thus, acted undemocratically both in politics and in the market place.

Moreover, business 'obligations' were an innovation in the modern 1980s exchange. From the evidence available, there may have been some friendly contacts between *guappi* and businessmen in the 1950s; but this relationship became formal and solid during the 1970s when Camorra groups turned to businesses to help 'launder' their drugs money. By the 1980s, many businessmen had become close to Camorra groups and this helped when, in the mid 1980s, the three-way, triangular functional exchange was put into operation by Camorra groups. Businessmen were threatened, or asked to play a part in this exchange and they supplied a significant element of legitimation and

money.

12.6 General Conclusion

In this part, we have analysed the Camorra-politics-business exchanges of the 1950s and 1980s at a micro-level. By doing this, it has been possible to show the clear differences between the two types of exchange: in the 1950s, it was an unorganised, casual, informal and unsystematic exchange between individual agents and was dominated by politicians. In the 1980s, it became an efficient, systematic and effective money-making exchange between systems and dominated by the Camorra clans and there was a new dynamics behind the exchange. By the 1980s, the Camorra had taken over, had brought in businessmen as the justification for the deviation of public funds and come to dominate the politicians' corrupt clientelistic exchange. Their economic interests were in complete symbiosis; their exchange was an 'iron pact' between systems. But, the Camorra dominated this exchange very much because of the money and violence that it could freely use to manipulate and intimidate the exchange.

This intimate money-making exchange lasted for more than a decade (1980-93), until the balance of the different systems was broken; in particular when the DC machine lost its grass-root support and could not count on Camorra support alone. Thus, when one of the representatives of the different systems changed, the exchange lost its dynamic and the Camorra needed to rebuild and find new representatives.

Chapter Thirteen
Conclusion

"Why should a political scientist study a bunch of gangsters?"
(Anon)

The initial and primary aim of this thesis was to analyse the relationship between the Camorra and Neapolitan politicians of the 1950s and the 1980s to see whether and how it had changed over the four decades. Its most challenging objective was to try and understand the dynamics of change both theoretically and empirically: who were the actors? Where did power lie? How did the different types of exchange in this relationship develop? how was the shift in power, if any, to be explained? Why did this change, if any, occur when it did? With hindsight, we can say that it was not an easy task as it involved, in particular, asking a number of preliminary questions regarding the social and economic aspects of the Camorra.

Initially, parts two and three, examining Camorra membership and its transformation, were meant to be necessary preludes to the central themes which were discussed in part four. But they became significant in themselves, providing, at the empirical level, an insight into the mentality of *camorristi* and, at the theoretical level, an exploration of the concept of 'subject' or 'agent'. To try and disentangle the complicated puzzle of the Camorra, we adopted an interactive model, which helped elaborate the argument that the Neapolitan Camorra of the 1950s consisted of isolated criminal agents undertaking simple social-criminal practices, whereas in the 1980s, it was first an association undertaking a social-criminal practice (the NCO), then a business engaged in an economic-criminal practice (the NF-Nuvoletta clan) and finally, a cartel pursuing a political-criminal practice (the Alfieri Confederation). We also sought to understand the relationship of the Camorra with politics and its development from a simple clientelistic type of exchange between individuals in the 1950s to a more sophisticated exchange between

systems in the 1980s.

As we saw in Part Two, the agent's criminal value did not fundamentally change but gradually evolved between the 1950s and 1980s, parallel to society becoming more violent, assertive, aggressive and precarious, less loyal and more money-oriented. What did change dramatically though was the role of the family. In the 1950s, it was practically insignificant; in the 1980s, on the other hand, it had become a strategic and functional value: the members of the clans used the members of their family as front-men, accessories or protectors.

It was, however, the macro-environment which changed more radically. In the 1980s, it was a definite motivating factor for a young man to become a *camorrista*: changes within the context, the state, the family and the Camorra itself were all external factors pushing the agent towards specific life-choices. Within these macro-environmental changes, it was the Camorra as a social institution which played the most pervasive and powerful role in influencing the agent. It acted, in fact, as a well-established institution which in some cases was much more effective and powerful than the public authorities in the everyday life of citizens. We reached the conclusion that in the 1950s, the individual was the most important motivating factor whereas in the 1980s, it was the structure which prevailed.

Part Three explains the interaction between the micro- and macro-structures which produced the Camorra and its activities and traces its transformations during the post-war period using an adapted version of Giddens's structuration theory. Our interaction model tested and confirmed the hypothesis that the Camorra's practice changed from a simple recurring social-criminal practice to a complex recurring political-criminal one. The case-studies illustrated the nature of the changes - social, economic and political - which took place during the last thirty years' modernisation process. Using these case-studies to pinpoint the factors which were vital in the Camorra's transformation (smuggling, international drug trafficking and a new class of politicians), we concluded that modernisation in Southern Italy, with its unique characteristics, produced political opportunities

which organised crime groups seized upon and exploited to the full. The South adapted to 'progress' as it could, with its own values, means, traditions and resources; this produced specific conditions, both economically and politically, for organised crime gangs. It was both the combination of general economic modernisation and specific Southern modernisation which enabled the Camorra to transform itself from a mass Camorra into a business and then a political Camorra.

Part Four explicitly addresses our central research question of the relations of the Camorra with politics. We adopted a systems analysis approach inspired by Easton (1965) which was used in conjunction with the interaction model to study the nature of the political exchange between the criminal groups and the politicians in the 1950s and in the 1980s. In the 1950s, there was a simple clientelistic exchange of votes for favours between powerful politicians and individual *guappi* as well as ordinary law-abiding citizens. This was a simple classic two-way system of political exchange similar to that employed, for example, by the American political machines of the 1900s. It was not necessarily illegal and formed part of a social interaction between individuals belonging to a given political system.

We found that, by the 1980s, the dynamics of this exchange had changed, like politics, society and the Camorra itself. The Camorra was no longer a loose network of individual *guappi* acting in the social system but a coherent and organised sub-system of this same social system. Within this criminal sub-system, we established that the Camorra had transformed itself from a rich, powerful and highly organised association into a business and then a cartel, in the late 1970s, taking advantage of the fact that its political counterparts, allies and partners were losing power, support and votes. Thus, at that time, the Camorra was ready to take over the simple clientelistic political exchange of the 1950s and transform it into a functional, hugely profitable and successful three-way exchange. Votes were exchanged for legal favours and protection, money and public

subcontracts, businessmen being introduced as a third component in the equation and guaranteed public contracts and peaceful working conditions in exchange for perceptual commissions and extensive use of Camorra companies for subcontracts. Corrupt businessmen were brought in as an excuse for the appropriation of public funds, but at times it was the ambitious politicians themselves who invented the excuse to embezzle the funds.

By using original sources (both oral and documentary), we were able to identify more precisely the different services, favours and goods exchanged between *camorristi*, politicians and businessmen. What appears clear from the analysis was that power changed hands over the period. In the 1950s, it was in the hands of the politicians; in the 1980s, it was in the hands of the *camorristi,* as they controlled what the politicians needed: money, votes and if, and when things got out of control, free use of violence.

As well as producing important conclusions, our interaction model enabled us to elaborate and investigate the concepts of 'rules and resources', which was extremely useful, the 'general structure', 'system-interaction' and of course that of 'agent'. We cannot but note at this point how exciting it was to discover, in the course of this research, the potential of the model and not only the extent of its applicability to other fields of social, economic and political behaviour, but above all to realise how important it is, as a political scientist, to be flexible, to cross the boundaries of disciplines when necessary.

The concepts of rules and resources (structuring properties) were important to the analysis as they enabled us to connect the agent and the macro-environment. The agent assimilates internal and external rules and resources through the 'general structure' and transforms them into agency. These concepts are simple and easy to use as they can apply to many different forms of behaviour. By analysing the different rules and resources of any given agent, one can understand and explain the elements which contribute to action and

also to long-term change, as we have tried to do with the Camorra.

Closely related to the concepts of rules and resources, is Giddens's concept of 'structure'. We adapted it for our own use and it became the 'general structure', in which we incorporated both the micro-level of the agent's perspective (internal structure) and the macro-environment (the precise context made up of different systems producing the external structure) which represented the external input into agency. The 'general structure' represented for us the point of interaction between the agent and the macro-environment, after internal and external influences. This interaction produced 'agency', in our case the Camorra and its activities ('agency' being the output of the system).

The most original concept used in this thesis was that of the 'agent'. The 'agent' has the transformative capacity for action but it is only through the 'general structure' that this takes place. This notion was particularly relevant to the type of documentation collected as it enabled us to evaluate thoroughly the role of the 'Camorra agent' but, even more importantly, to analyse the subjectivity of the criminal. This is quite an innovative step in the field of study, as organised crime studies are usually limited to using legal and judicial documents which are for obvious reasons very one-sided. Thus, we were able to enter into the 'discursive consciousness' of the agent, at least, and to get a clearer picture of his possible motives for action.

There are more general lessons to be learnt from this study as regards civil society, organised crime and democracy, in Naples and elsewhere. Our conclusions, for instance, enable us to tackle some of the questions addressed by Putnam in an important book, *Making Democracy Work* (1993) relating to Southern Italy, and suggest our own answers. In linking empirical data to a historical perspective, Putnam asked whether traditions of association and civic engagement affected political behaviour. Studying the historical development of institutions in Northern and Southern Italy, he came to the conclusion that Southern Italy was prey to civic incompetence and therefore to a lack of civic involvement because of the lack of social capital,

whereas in the North, where social capital flourished, democracy thrived.

From what we have seen in this study of the private and public spheres in Naples, we can say that the absence of civic capacity in the public sphere is more a by-product of a certain form of politics and the role of politicians who have adapted to modernisation with their traditions, means, resources and service and thus contributed to distancing and alienating citizens, more than to institutions *per se.* Moreover, the investigations of *Mani pulite* in the North of Italy have established that the phenomenon of political corruption and organised crime are not limited to Southern Italy, as Putnam's analysis implies.

Our conclusions also lead us to consider more generally the relationship between politics, organised crime and democracy. Our study confirms the thesis put forward by Siebert (1993, 1996) for example, that such organisations as the Mafia are mortal enemies of democracy but flourish in democratic spaces (1996:9-15). It shows how organised crime needs democracy and a democratic political system to prosper, thus posing a serious danger for democracies in the world and not only in Italy, or Southern Italy in particular. It also shows that, when politicians accept and tolerate the existence of organised crime or enter into pacts with criminals, a new style of democratic politics may become operational, "democracy, criminal style", in which it becomes impossible to distinguish between the lawful and the unlawful, the honest, and the dishonest and who is really in power.

Finally, what is the future of organised crime in Campania, in Italy and in the world? Five years ago, there were high hopes that both the Camorra and the Mafia had seen their day. The Italian authorities seemed to have organised an effective and focussed effort against organised crime. But five years is a long time for organised crime gangs under pressure; they have had time to consider their mistakes, reorganise and recreate new links with the 'new' politicians. With both Andreotti's trials concluded and Andreotti acquitted of 'Mafia

conspiracy'[1] on a verdict of 'unproven' and the Gava trial soon likely to come to a similar conclusion, many former politicians are beginning to argue that the accusations against the DC of 'Mafia conspiracy' were politically motivated. However, "there is no smoke without fire" and as Pasquale Galasso pointed out (CPA1.1:142), Antonio Gava never dealt directly with the Camorra; he was not that stupid; he acted through middlemen, his faithful lieutenants.

Moreover, it was virtually impossible for the Courts to judge the politicians on the basis of the *pentiti's* declarations for the simple reason that the evidence was often indirect and confused. These politicians should have been judged by their peers and eventually by their fellow-citizens in the wake of a thorough debate. But the politicians have always refused such a debate and left it to the judges who did not really have appropriate instruments - only the *pentiti,* often reticent and ambiguous - to accomplish this task satisfactorily. Somehow the public authorities seem to have lost their bite in the fight against organised crime, or is it, as Tommaso Buscetta recently claimed, that "the Mafia has won" ? (1999). As far was we are concerned, we can only suggest that the politicians seem not to know how to change systems.

The future looks bleak and it would be easy to become cynical like Tommaso Buscetta, who observed: "I see an old story destined to repeat itself and this is why I am so pessimistic: I have the sensation that in Italy, there is the desire, at all cost, day after day, to close the chapter on the Mafia with the aim, certainly not declared, of ending the state's fight against the Mafia. Why is this happening? I ask myself this question often" (1999:146). But it is to be hoped that by continuing, steadily and methodologically, to uncover the "poison" in our advanced democracies, one may heighten the political scientist's awareness and sense of responsibility. In the words of Agnes Heller (in her 1999 PSA keynote address): "Let us not forget that we are in charge".

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[1] The crime in Italian is *"associazione a delinquere di tipo mafioso"*, article 416 bis of the Criminal code.

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Appendices

Appendix One

Historical Development of the Neapolitan Camorra

The Neapolitan Camorra's history is not linear but more cyclical and its origins are unclear. Faenza (1997) has pointed out that the first time the Camorra is mentioned and identified historically is in 14th Century as 'a trade group' (see *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, Economic Organization and Policies in the Middle Ages,* 1965). However, this is the only evidence that we have for suggesting so early an existence.

More generally, the Camorra's origin is dated from around 1800 when it was a secret criminal organisation (known as *la Società d' omertà*), the direct expression of the pleb's interests and its only form of control, which dealt in petty crimes, prostitution, gambling, smuggling, extortions, etc. It was predominately a city-based phenomena which used prison as a recruitment centre and controlled the plebs' behaviour so efficiently that in 1860, the Bourbon police chief asked it to police to city when Garibaldi entered Naples.

Between 1861 to 1900, the Camorra expanded and changed. The extension of the electoral suffrage (1882, 1889) and the beginning of an administrative economy gave the Camorra the opportunity to move from the lower classes into the political and business worlds. After the Saredo Inquiry into corruption in 1901 the Camorra started to decline. The factors which explain this are: (1) the strong flux of immigration out of Naples towards the Americas; (2), the slight improvement in living standards; and (3) new and alternative forms of organising pleb interests, such as political representation and trade unions appeared. The *guappo* (delinquent) and *guapperia* (delinquent gang) survived these changes as a form of popular resistance to the initial attempts at integrating the Neapolitan popular classes into the modern social system. The more organised form of the Camorra existed in the city (and became known as *La Bella Società Reformata*) while in the hinterland, the individual *camorristi* became the new kind of violent mediators in business transactions.

Mussolini and the fascists (1922-45) sought to eliminate all forms of organised crime. This era thus, marked a low for both Mafia and Camorra's activities. The post-war period, however, witnessed the expansion for both these criminal organisations. The Mafia developed and expanded rapidly in the early years due both to its pre-war organisational structure, the business and political contacts it made during the war and its contact with the American Mafia.

The Camorra's development, on the other hand, was slow and is examined in this thesis. It was dominated by *La Nuova Camorra Organizzata* [NCO] led by Raffaele Cutolo which appeared in the mid-1970s. This organisation, which sought domination of over the region and all criminal activities, provoked the gangs close to the Sicilian

Mafia, who became known as *La Nuova famiglia* [NF], into a bitter turf war between 1979-82. *La Nuova Famiglia* triumphed but then started a second war in which the Alfieri confederation conquered the region and all business activities.

adapted from Sales (1988).

Appendix Two

List of case-studies used in Parts Two and Three

Case-studies 1950s:

Antonio Spavone
Assunta Maresca
Antonio Orlando
Francesco Fabbrocino
Alfredo Maisto
Pasquale Simonetti
Antonio Esposito
Pio Vittorio Giugliano
Catello di Somma
Carlo Gaetano Orlando
Vincenzo Esposito
Salvatore Lucania
Luigi Mallardo
Giuseppe Pedana

Case-studies 1980s:

Domenico Galasso
Salvatore Rosa
Mario Pepe
Federico Giovanni
Umberto Bernasconi
Domenico Esposito
Carmine and Salvatore Alfieri
Angelo Moccia
Luciano Aviello
Carmine Schiavone
Luciano Fiorillo
Gerardo Intagliatore
Piero Pugliese
Salvatore Migliorino
Antonio Tarallo
Ciro Martusciello
Rosa Cutolo
Alfonso Rosanova jr
Luigi and Fiore D'Avino
Corrado Iacolare
Giovanni Labonia
Antonio Cuomo
Michele Guardato
Giuseppe Palillo
Andrea Delli Paoli
Mario Fenga
Aniello Prudente
Pasquale Galasso
Stefano Reccia
Giovanni Ferraro
Gennaro Brasiello
Raffaele Palmieri
Rosario Giugliano
Oreste Lettieri
Antonio Gaglione
Pasquale Loreto
Costantino Laiola
Pasquale Frajese
Martino Galasso
Gabriele Donnarumma
Pietro Pianese
Alfonso Annunziata/Domenico Cuomo

Appendix Three

Picture of Pasquale Galasso's house in Poggiomarino.

source: *La Repubblica* photographic archive, Naples.


GERARDO
IVECO

Appendix Four
Extract from Interview with Salvatore Migliorino (22-9-97)

R: Salvatore Migliorino
D: Felia Allum
L: Lawyer.

Salvatore Migliorino recalls how, when he was insulted by a local criminal, he had to defend himself and his honour and thus to murder the offender:

R - Ma guarda per me era un smacco nel senso un smacco come come figura, portarmi lo schiffo a casa, perché io frequentavo delle persone che retenevamo per la nostra mentalità,
L - respettato per il vostro ambiente?
R - per il nostro ambiente era un fatto....
D - La vendetta era un fatto normale e razionale?
R - Come?
D - Per la vostra mentalità la vendetta era una cosa razionale?
L - un codice?
*R - Ma diciamo...**ecco più un codice** però ecco c'erano anche delle cose dove si potevano anche survolare.*
D - Cioè?
*R - Cose lievi così però **una figuraccia del genere** che poi si poteva ripercuotere nel tuo camino quello che ha avuto gli schiffi da tizio e si e' stato zitto va be è un uomo di niente, non vale niente. Ecco questo era una cosa che mi poteva assillare per tutta la vita. Pero io mica pensavo che mi poteva assillare, non ho pensato solo "Come si è permesso di schiaffegiarmi". Ecco dovevo andare li nel mio combattimento, per la mia mentalita di dare quello schiaffo in un altro metodo. Solo così io potevo rivalutare quella imagine che stavo creando. Ma non che mi stavo creando io che ormai ci avevamo creato con quel gruppo (B:19).*

Appendix Five
Stories about Pasquale Simonetti

Episodes recalled by Arch. Aldo Loris Rossi, who met *Pascalone 'e Nola* in his student days, underline his role as a traditional *guappo*:

"I have a friend who has a restaurant in Via Firenze where Pasquale Simonetti was murdered. So, Pasquale came to eat there nearly every evening. He was a tall man, nearly two meters, a gigantic man who always had a way of behaving, a '*guappaesica*' way of doing things, a self-assured man. So, I sometimes spoke to him as I was still studying at the time, he called me *'O studente' 'O' prof'*. Then one day, as I always heard that he slapped other *camorristi* I was curious and asked him: "Excuse me Don Pasquale, why is it that when you slaps these people nobody ever reacts?" So, he gave me an answer which made me understand a lot about what we are/were dealing with and said "Professore, I slap those who deserve it" those who deserve it in the sense that the person who had done something he should not have done expected it and accepted it because in the code of honour there are those who don't deserve it and react. Instead he had the intuition to say "I slap those who deserve it" (interview of 22 January 1998).

"I remember that at the beginning of the 1950s, we were burgled where I lived, where my father had his business. So burglars stole whatever they wanted, it thus was a problem of getting these goods back, you could not get them back if you went to the Police and reported it, you'd never get anything back. If on the other hand, you'd put yourself in touch with this person (Pasquale Simonetti), there was some hope because he would call the burglars that were around, the burglars would be given a percentage and they would give the stuff back. This could be useful for them, these people who stole something when they needed to sell them, they would sell them at a now price so the burgled is ready to pay more to have it back. So, my father got in touch with Pasquale Simonetti and we got the stuff back and paid a certain amount" (interview, *ibid*).

Appendix Six
The Anatomy of Camorra clans in the 1980s

Naples City (1988)

Name: Alfano Clan (with Vigilante clan)
Geographical zones: Napoli-Arenella.
Activities: **legal:** None.
illegal: Drugs, clandestine lotto and extortions.
Links with other local clans: alliances with the Lo Russo clan from Secondigliano, i Vigilante and the Cocozza clan from the Campi Flegrea zone.
Links with other Campania clans: part of the Nuova Famiglia, loyal to the Nuvoletta clan.
Links with Sicilian Mafia and 'Ndrangheta: None.
International Links: None.
Links with terrorist groups: None.
Internal/external Conflicts: Fighting against the Bardellini clans, D'Ausillo, Cavalcanti and Grimaldi, in the Flegrea zone.
Political Links: None

Name: Vigilante clan (with Alfano clan).
Geographical zones: Napoli-Vomero and Napoli- Pianura alta.
Activities: **legal:** building construction.
illegal: drugs, extortion and clandestine lotto.
Links with local clans: alliances with the Lo Russo clan from Secondigliano, the Alfano clan from the Vomero, the Lago clan from Pianura and the Cocozza clan from the Alta Rione zone.
Links with other Campania clans: part of the Nuova Famiglia, loyal to the Nuvoletta clan.
Links with Sicilian Mafia and 'Ndrangheta: None.
International Links: None.
Links with terrorist groups: None.
Internal/external Conflicts: Fighting against the Bardellini clans, D'Ausillo, Cavalcanti and Grimaldi, in the Flegrea zone.
Political Links: None.

Number of members: 22 (1988), 104 (Alfano, 1993), 49 (Alfano, 1995)
Average age: 33.
Sex: All male.
In prison: 7.

Name: Ammaturo-Maresca.
Geographical zones: Napoli-Fuorigrotta, Castellare di Stabia, Capri.
Number of members: 11.
average age: 41.

Sex: 1 woman, 10 men.
In prison: 3
On the run: 1
Activities: **legal:** clothes shops, building, and hotels.
illegal: drugs (cocaine from South America), stealing TIR (lorries) and illegal loans.
Links with local clans: alliances with other Bardellini clans (Malventi-Cavalcanti-D'Ausillo-Baratto) and the D'Alessandro clan from Castellammare and the Fabbrociano clan from Pomigliano clan.
Links with other Campania clans: part of the *Nuova Famiglia*, business links with the Zaza and Bardellino clans, cooler relations with the Nuovetta clan.
Links with Sicilian Mafia and 'Ndrangheta: None.
International Links: A base in Peru for its cocaine trade which it also distributes to other Neapolitan clans.
Links with terrorist groups: None.
Internal/external conflicts: Part of the NF in the war against Cutolo's NCO. Then. with the Bardellino alliance in the Second Camorra war with an independent position.
Political Links: Contacts with the bank, Cassa Popolare Stabiese, which gave it mortgages without when there was no permission/guarantee.
Other: Linked to the murder of criminologist Aldo Semerari who worked for Cutolo and established that he was insane.

Name: Baratto.
Geographical zones: Napoli-Fuorigrotta.
Number of members: 18 (1988), 68 (1993), 14 (1995).
average age: 36
Sex: All men.
In prison: 3
Activities: **legal:** None
illegal: drugs (cocaine from South America), stealing TIR (lorries) and illegal loans.
Links with local clans: alliances with D'Ausillo, Cavalcanti, Malventi, Crimaldi, Ammaturo clans.
Links with other Campania clans: part of the *Nuova Famiglia*, Bardellino faction.
Links with Sicilian Mafia and 'Ndrangheta: None.
International Links: With South America for Cocain through the Malventi and Ammaturo clans.
Links with terrorist groups: None.
Internal/external Conflicts: At war with loyal Nuovetta clans in the Flegrea zone, especially with the Cocozza clan.
Political Links: None.

Name: Bardellino.
Geographical zones: Province of Caserta, low Lazio, and Naples province.
Number of members: 484
average age: 34.
Sex: 14 women, 470 men.
In prison: 213*
On the run: 15


Antonio Bardellino

Activities: **legal:** building and selling houses (*compravenita di beni immobili.)*
illegal: drugs (cocaine from South America), arms trade, kidnapping stealing TIR (lorries), extortion, robberies, laundering 'dirty' money, exploitation of prostitutes.

Links with local clans: the clan with the largest control across the territory:
De Angelis clan (Lazio), Esposito clan (Sessa Aurunca), La Torre clan (Mondragone), Iovine clan (Castelvolturno), Delli Paoli-Piccolo clan (Marcinise), Mirra Clan (S. Maria La Fossa), Busiello clan (Parete, Cesa, Lusciano, Gragnano, S. Arpino), Bovenzi clan (Capua), Delli Paoli (Caivano), Schiavone (Casal di Principe), Moccia clan (Afragola), Nuzzo clan (Acerra), Puca-Verde clan (S. Antimo, Frattamaggiore), Iacolare-Maisto-Do Girolamo (Agro Giuglianese aversano), Mercurio clan (Torre Annunziata), Losco clan (Torre Annunziata), Cavalcanti-D'Ausillio-Malventi-Baratto clan (Flegrea zone).
Links with other Campania clans: Normal relations with the Zaza-Mazzarell clan, the Vollaro clan, the Fabbrocino clan, the Alfieri and D'Alessandro clan.
Links with Sicilian Mafia and 'Ndrangheta: Member of Cosa Nostra. Strong links with Palermitan Mafia because of the trade of hard drugs and also with the Calabrian 'Ndrangeta with which it manages the kidnapping of people.
International Links: Contacts with Cosa Nostra and with South American and Spanish organisations through the international drugs trade.
Links with terrorist groups: None.
Internal/external Conflicts: Splits with Mario Iovine (b. 1938) although not yet degenerated. War against the Nuvoletta clan.
Political Links: Strong links with many politicians in the Caserta province who have favoured all the legal activities of the clan.
Other: The Main leaders Antonio Bardellino and Mario Iovine are on the run. The strength of the clan is to have recuperated from the NCO many important camorristi: Carmine Di Girolamo, Corrado Iacolare, Antonio Maisto, Nuzzo Nicola, Giuseppe Puca, Anna Mazza, etc. Antonio Bardellino is believed to have been murdered in Brasil in 198*

by Mario Iovine who was also murdered in Spain. The Schiavone clan rook over the space left by the decline of this clan after internal fighting.

Name: Cavalcanti
Geographical zones: Napoli-Rione Traiano.
Number of members: 18.
average age: 36
Sex: All men.
In prison: 3
Activities: **legal:** None
illegal: drugs trade, arms trade, clandestine lotto and extortion.
Links with local clans: alliances with Mario Savio
Links with other Campania clans: part of the *Nuova Famiglia*, Bardellino faction.
Links with Sicilian Mafia and 'Ndrangheta: None.
International Links: Contacts with South America with the Mercurio clan from Torre Annunziata.
Links with terrorist groups: In the past, Giacomo Cavalcanti supplied arms to left wing terrorist groups in the Neapolitan region.
Internal/external conflicts: At war in the second camorra war with the Lo Russo clan from Secondigliano, the Cocozza clan, the Alfano-Vigilante clan from the Vomero-Arenella districts, the Grimaldi and D'Ausilio-Malventi clan.
Political Links: None.
Other: Members of this clan form part of Bardellino's most ferocious killers in the Neapolitan region.

Name: Cocozza
Geographical zones: Naples-Fuorigrotta, Traiano, Bagnoli.
Number of members: 22 (1988), 34 (1993), 9 (1995).
average age: 30.
Sex: 4 women, 18 men.
In prison: 5.
Activities: **legal:** None
illegal: drugs trade, extortion and clandestine lotto.
Links with local clans: alliances with the Lo Russo clan from Secondigliano, the Alfano clan from Arenella and the Vigilante clan from the Vomero.
Links with other Campania clans: part of the *Nuova Famiglia*, Nuvoletta faction.
Links with Sicilian Mafia and 'Ndrangheta: None.
International Links: None
Links with terrorist groups: None.
Internal/external conflicts: At war with loyal Bardellino clans in the Flegrea zone, the D'Ausilio clan, the Cavalcanti clan and Grimaldi clan.

Political Links: None.
Other: During the first Camorra war, it had a close alliance with the Giuliano clan from Forcella. In the second Camorra war, it had to become an ally of the Nuvoletta clan, as a result of many losses.

Name: Contini (Bosti-Botta - 1993).
Geographical zones: Naples, Rione Vasto, Arenaccia, San Carlo all'Arena, Borgo Sant'Antonio, San Giovanniello
Number of members: 15 (1988), 335 (1993), 111 (1995)
average age: 37
Sex: 2 women, 13 men.
In prison: 2.
On the run: 1.
Activities: **legal:** Commercial services in the clothes business.
illegal: gambling, smuggling of foreign cigarettes, drugs trade, extortion, clandestine lotto, robberies,
Links with local clans: alliance with the Lo Russo clan from Secondigliano, and through this clan is linked with the Nuvoletta clans from the flegrea and Vomero-Arenella districts.
Links with other Campania clans: part of the *Nuova Famiglia*, Nuvoletta faction.
Links with Sicilian Mafia and 'Ndrangheta: None.
International Links: None
Links with terrorist groups: None.
Internal/external conflicts: At war with the Giugliano clan from Forcella as it took over some of its territory. Undertakes war between Nuvoletta and Bardellino clans in the Flegrea zones.
Political Links: Eduardo Contini's acquittal when he was arrested during a Camorra summit is very surprising. He has been prosecuted for mafia association as part of of the international drugs trade
Other: The Contini clan's territory is very wealthy as it is characterised by small businesses and clothes shops (subjected to extortions).

Name: Danaro
Geographical zones: Naples, Santa Lucia, Greece-Pireo.
Number of members: 3 (1988).
average age: 50
Sex: All men.
In prison: None.
On the run: 1.
Activities: **legal:** Hotels (in Greece)
illegal: smuggling of foreign cigarettes, international drugs trade and arms trade.
Links with local clans: Works closely with the Potenza-Egizzo-Postiglione clan which is subordinate to the Zaza-Mazzarella clan and

Perrella clan.
Links with other Campania clans: part of the *Nuova Famiglia* but maintains independence
Links with Sicilian Mafia and 'Ndrangheta: Strong links with the Catanese and Messinese Mafias
International Links: the clan's organisation base is in Pireo (Greece) from which it has business links with the Turkish Mafia for morphine restocking and arms from the Middle East.
Links with terrorist groups: None.
Internal Conflicts: None
Political Links: None.
Other: The Danaro clan is an important reference point for all camorra and mafia families interested in the smuggling, drugs and arms trade in eastern Mediterranean.

Name: D'Ausilio (with the Malventi clan)
Geographical zones: Naples-Fuorigrotta and Bagnoli.
Activities: **legal:** Food businesses - but relatively small.
illegal: drugs trade, clandestine lotto and extortion.
Links with local clans: alliances with the Baratto, Malventi, Grinaldi and Ammaturo clans.
Links with other Campania clans: part of the *Nuova Famiglia*, in the Bardellino faction.
Links with Sicilian Mafia and 'Ndrangheta: None.
International Links: with South America for the drugs trade (cocaine) through the Malventi and Ammaturo clans.
Links with terrorist groups: None.
Internal Conflicts: In clear contrast with the loyal Nuvoletta clans in the flegrea zone; in particular with the Cocozza clan.
Political Links: None.
Other: None.

Name: Malventi (with the D'Ausilio clan).
Geographical zones: Naples-Fuorigrotta.
Activities: **legal:** different businesses/commerce and buildings.
illegal: drugs trade and clandestine lotto.
Links with local clans: close alliances with the D'Ausilio and Ammaturo clans.
Links with other Campania clans: part of the *Nuova Famiglia*, in the Bardellino faction.
Links with Sicilian Mafia and 'Ndrangheta: Close connections with the Sicilian Mafia and other Mafias for its international drugs trade.
International Links: constant contacted with South America and provides cocaine for its allies.
Links with terrorist groups: None.
Internal/external conflicts: In clear contrast with the loyal Nuvoletta clans in the Flegrea zone; in particular with the Cocozza clan.

Political Links: None.
Other: Aggressive acts are usually undertaken by members of the D'Ausilio and Grimaldi clans.

Number of members: 29 (1988), 85 (1993).
average age: 37
Sex: 2 women and 27 men
In prison: 9
On the run: 1.

Name: Esposito Enrico
Geographical zones: Naples-Chiaia and Loggetta.
Number of members: 7 (1988),
average age: 42
Sex: All men.
In prison: None.
On the run: None.
Activities: **legal:** ship building
illegal: smuggling of foreign cigarettes, the drugs trade and extortion and laundering money.
Links with local clans: the leader is specialised in the smuggling trade and is the main local distributor to all other clans.
Links with other Campania clans: part of the *Nuova Famiglia,* but maintains an independent position.
Links with Sicilian Mafia and 'Ndrangheta: For the drugs trade, this clan must have links with the Sicilian Mafia.
International Links: None
Links with terrorist groups: None.
Internal/external conflicts: Not interested/involved in the Nuvoletta versus Bardellino conflict.
Political Links: None.
Other: None.

Name: Giannuzzi.
Geographical zones: Pozzuoli, Bacoli, Licola, Lago Patria.
Number of members: 4 (1988).
average age: 34.
Sex: All men.
In prison: 2.
On the run: None.
Activities: **legal:** None.
illegal: Extortion, robberies, and clandestine lotto.
Links with local clans: alliance with the Lago clan
Links with other Campania clans: part of the *Nuova Famiglia,* Nuvoletta Faction.

Links with Sicilian Mafia and 'Ndrangheta: None
International Links: None
Links with terrorist groups: None.
Internal/external conflicts: Only marginally involved in the Nuvoletta versus Bardellino conflict.
Political Links: None.
Other: None.
Name: Giuliano
Geographical zones: Naples city (Forcella, and the harbour district)
Number of members: 164 (1988), 378 (1993), 132 (1995).
average age: 36.
Sex: 5 women, 159 men.
In prison: 46.
On the run: 4.
Activities: **legal:** many businesses kept under name lenders.
illegal: smuggling of foreign cigarettes, drugs and arms trade, extortion, robberies, kidnapping, gambling, managing micro-delinquency.
Links with local clans: operates in the harbour district through its zone leader (capo-zona) Antonio Capuano and through the Mauro family in the Market district.
Links with other Campania clans: part of the *Nuova Famiglia*, but remains autonomous.
Links with Sicilian Mafia and 'Ndrangheta: In touch with Palermitan Mafia through its members who manage the international drugs trade (heavy drugs).
International Links: None
Links with terrorist groups: helped the terrorists who murdered the Questore Ammaturo.
Internal/external conflicts: During the war with the NCO, it lost members and territory: Ciro Mariano from Spanish distinct gained his independence. It also lost control of the Vasto and Arenaccia districts to Eduardo Contini. At war, with Vincenzo Pisanelli, it also lost the Sanita district.
Political Links: The clan has a certain amount of political influence especially during the local elections because of the privileges it can distribute.
Other: None.

Name: Grimaldi.
Geographical zones: Naples, Traiano and Soccavo
Number of members: 19 (1988), 67 (1993), 17 (1995).
average age: 31.
Sex: All men.
In prison: 5.
On the run: None.
Activities: **legal:** some butchers.

illegal: drugs trade, clandestine lotto and extortion.
Links with local clans: alliances with the D'Ausilio, Mariano, Baratto, Malventi and Ammaturo clans.
Links with other Campania clans: part of the *Nuova Famiglia,* Bardelline faction.
Links with Sicilian Mafia and 'Ndrangheta: None.
International Links: Links with South America through the Malventi clan for the drugs trade.
Links with terrorist groups: None.
Internal/external conflicts: in war with loyal Nuvoletta clans, the Lago, Vigliante-Alfano and Cavalcanti clans.
Political Links: None
Other: Ciro Grimaldi is considered one of the most ferocious killers.

Name: Lago.
Geographical zones: Naples, Low Pianura and Soccavo.
Number of members: 9 (1988), 13 (1995).
average age: 29.
Sex: All men.
In prison: 4.
On the run: None.
Activities: **legal:** construction.
illegal: extortion, drugs trade and clandestine lotto.
Links with local clans: Operates with the consensus of the Vigilante, Alfano and Cocozza clans.
Links with other Campania clans: part of the *Nuova Famiglia,* Nuovetta faction.
Links with Sicilian Mafia and 'Ndrangheta: None.
International Links: None
Links with terrorist groups: None.
Internal/external conflicts: at war with Girmaldi clan (Bardellino faction) for supremacy of the Pianura-Soccavo districts. After this, its power is much reduced.
Political Links: None
Other: hit by judicial investigations which targeted illegal construction in the Pianura district which the clan used to launder money.

Name: Lo Russo
Geographical zones: Naples: Seondigliano, Miano and Marianella districts.
Number of members: 102 (1988), 190 (1993), 26 (1994)
average age: 33.
Sex: All men.
In prison: 36.
On the run: 3.
Activities: **legal:** al : washing up goods, butchers and transport - name lenders.

illegal: extortion, drugs trade, clandestine Otto, stealing lorries, bodyguards.

Links with local clans: alliances with the Nuvoletta clan from Marano, the Mallardo clan from Giugliano, Eduardo Contini from Vasto-Arenaccia district, the Afano-Vigliante clan from the Vomero-Arenella district and the Cocozza clan from Traiano. The Patriota clan is its subordinate.

Links with other Campania clans: During the first camorra war, it had to fight against the Maisto clan from Giugliano and the Puca clan from Sant'Antimo.

Links with Sicilian Mafia and 'Ndrangheta: None.

International Links: None

Links with terrorist groups: None.

Internal/external conflicts: is trying to expand into the Melito district and thus fighting against the Puca clan from Sant'Antimo. Supports the Nuvoletta clans against the Bardellino clans and the Contini clan against the Giugliano clan from Forcella.

Political Links: Some contacts as it seeks to infiltrate legal activities.

Other: Thanks to its alliance with the Nuvoletta clan, it has grown and expanded qualitatively and in terms of techniques and organisation. This has allowed the three groups (Lo Russo, Ricciardi and Patriota) to become a real Camorra clan.

Name: Mariano

Geographical zones: Naples: Montecalvario, San Giuseppe, Soccavo and Pianura districts.

Number of members: 116 (1988), 447 (1993), 44 (1995).

average age: 34.

Sex: 2 women, 114 men.

In prison: 63.

On the run: 7.

Activities:
legal: None.
illegal: extortion, robberies, smuggling of foreign cigarettes, clandestine lotto, drugs, gambling, managing micro-delinquency and exploiting prostitution.

Links with local clans: alliances with clans from the Pallonetto, the Santa Lucia district of Naples who are dominated by the Zaza and and Grimaldi clans.

Links with other Campania clans: born as part of the NCO and then at war with clans loyal to the Giuliano clan.

Links with Sicilian Mafia and 'Ndrangheta: None.

International Links: None

Links with terrorist groups: None.

Internal/external Conflicts :as the clan's major figures are in prison, this has left space for new clans to form in the same territory. Not involved in the war that opposes the Bardellino clan to the Nuvoletta clan.

Political Links: None.
Other: the detention of many of its mayor figures has meant that this clan has lost substantial territory and criminal prestige in Campania.

Name: Nuvoletta
Geographical zones: Mariano, Qualiano, Casoria, Naples-Chiaiano, Naples-Poggioreale and Naples-S. Pietro a Patierno.
Number of members: 120 (1988)
average age: 37.
Sex: 1 woman and 119 men
In prison: 31.
On the run: 7.
Activities: **legal:** building construction, commerce, businesses, horses.
illegal: drugs trade, extortion and laundering money.
Links with local clans: alliances with the Mallardo clan from Giugliano, Lo Russo clan from Secondigliano, the Contini clan from Vasto-Arenaccia, the Alfano-Vigilante clan from the Vomero-Arenella districts, the Cocozza clan from Rione Traiano, the Lago clan from the Pianura district and the Gionta clan from Torre Annunziata.
Links with other Campania clans: fought against the NCO in the first camorra war and major protagonist in the second camorra war as it fights/fought against the Bardellino clan from Cipriano d'Aversa, in the Casertano.
Links with Sicilian Mafia and 'Ndrangheta: Strong links with the powerful Greco Mafia family from Ciaculli and the Coreleonese family. Members of Cosa Nostra represented in Palermo by Greco Michele.
International Links: Lorenzo Nuvoletta, leader of the clan and on the run, deals personally with South America and the family's interests there, in particular the cocaine-heroin exchange with Cosa Nostra.
Links with terrorist groups: None.
External/Internal Conflicts: the Nuvoletta clan is all mighty and all its allies are fighting against Bardellino clans on all fronts: Torre Annunizata, Flegrea zone, Vomero-Arenella, Vasto-Arenaccia (Contini, Giuliano), Melito-Arzano (Lo Russo, Puca) Giugliano-Marano (Mallardo and Maisto).
Political Links: There is no doubt that the clan has contacts with the Neapolitan political class which has allowed it to have access to EU funds for agricultural products, to have loans from banks without the proper guarantees and public contracts where it can launder 'dirty' money.
Other: the clan's economic position is very strong. The clan appears to be implicated in the disappearance of the boss Vittorio Vastarella, his son and other members. In this way, the clan is adopting classical Mafia methods, '*lupara bianca*' (disappearance without a trace).

Name: Perrella.

Geographical zones: None.
Number of members: 14 (1988),
average age: 46.
Sex: all men.
In prison: 8.
On the run: 1.
Activities: **legal:** Import/export business managed by Renato Perrella.
illegal: smuggling of foreign cigarettes, drugs trade and laundering of money made from illegal money.
Links with local clans: contacts with the Zaza-Mazzarella clan and all clans involved in the smuggling trade.
Links with other Campania clans: Part of the NF, close to the Zaza-Mazzarella clan while maintaining a certain amount of autonomy (operational).
Links with Sicilian Mafia and 'Ndrangheta: direct links with the Sicilian Mafia and Cosa Nostra through Michele Zaza and Gennaro Giarra. It might also have contact with the Calabrian "Ndrangheta due to its off-loading on that coastline.
International Links: head quarters in Lugano (Switzerland), main meeting point for international organised crime.
Links with terrorist groups: None.
Internal/External conflicts: the clan has adopted a position of neutral in the second camorra war.
Political Links: None.
Other: over time, it has built up an important economic empire.

Name: Pisanelli-Misso.
Geographical zones: Naples- Rione Sanità.
Number of members: 49 (1988), 9 (1995).
average age: 36.
Sex: 1 woman, 48 men.
In prison: 25.
On the run: 1.
Activities: **legal:** businesses and leisure activities.
illegal: drugs and arms trade, extortion, robberies, exploitation of prostitution clandestine lotto, gambling and managing micro-delinquency.
Links with local clans: the clan was born out due to a spilt with the Giulano clan. Vincenzo Pisanelli is related to the Giuliano clan through family ties.
Links with other Campania clans: Part of the NF, but retains a neutral position towards the Nuvoletta and Bardellino clans.
Links with Sicilian Mafia and 'Ndrangheta: the bomb on the Naples-Milan trial showed that the clan had direct links with Pippo Calo, banker* of the Palermitana mafia.

International Links: many contacts with South America due to its international drug traffic.
Links with terrorist groups: Giuseppe Misso is considered an extreme right winger. Before the strage of Natale*, he set up a fascist-camorra group called 'Civiltà Nuova'.
External/Internal conflicts: after the arrest of Giuseppe Misso, the clan was under the sole leadership of Pisanelli who reelaborated ties with the Giuliano clan. Still at war with neighbours the Lo Russo clan (Secondigliano) and the Contini clan (Vasto-Arenaccia).
the clan has adopted a position of neutrality in the second Camorra war.
Political Links: None.
Other: involved in the 'massacre of Christmas' in 1984.

Name: Potenza-Egizzo-Postiglione.
Geographical zones: Naples- Santa Lucia.
Number of members: 18 (1988),
average age: 38
Sex: 3 women, 15 men.
In prison: 3.
On the run: none.
Activities: **legal:** fishing, public services, transport activities.
illegal: smuggling of foreign cigarettes, drug trafficking, exploitation of prostitution and managing micro-delinquency.
Links with local clans: alliance with the Perrella and Mariano clans.
Links with other Campania clans: is predominately subordinate to the Zaza-Mazzarella clan.
Links with Sicilian Mafia and 'Ndrangheta: None.
International Links: None.
Links with terrorist groups: None.
External/Internal Conflicts: Part of the FN, but not involved in the war between the Bardellino and Nuvoletta clans.
Political Links: None.
Other: smuggling activities (off-loading in particular) take place from the coastline of Brindisi, high Lazio and Domizio coastline.

Name: Savio
Geographical zones: Naples - Montecalvario
Number of members: 13 (1988), 49 (1993).
average age: 29.
Sex: all men.
In prison: 4.
On the run: 4.
Activities: **legal:** none
illegal: smuggling of foreign cigarettes and drug trafficking

Links with local clans: operates with the common consensus of the Pisanelli-Misso clan, the Giuliano clan from Forcella and Perrella clan from Santa Lucia.
Links with Sicilian Mafia and 'Ndrangheta: None.
International Links: None.
Links with terrorist groups: None.
External/Internal conflicts: rivals of the Mariano clan. The coexistence of the two clans is not clear and is still subject of debate.
Political Links: None.
Other: None.

Name: Zaza-Mazzarella
Geographical zones: Naples -San Giovanni a Teduccio, the provinces of Brindisi, Lazio and Lombardia.
Number of members: 216 (1988), 144 (1993), 28 (1995).
average age: 37.
Sex: 4 women, 212 men.
In prison: 46.
On the run: 7.
Activities: **legal:** national businesses and commerce.
illegal: international drugs trade, smuggling of foreign cigarettes, export, laundering money clandestine lotto and extortion.
Links with local clans: many clans and families are subordinate to this clan: the Barbarossa, Guida, Potenza, Egizzo, Postiglione, Adamo, De Gais, Presutto, De Crescenzo, Dannaro, Iengo, Russo, Mauri, Anastasio, Mollo, Belfiore clans.
Links with other Campania clans: within the NF it maintains a position of neutrality; has good relations with the Bardellino, Nuvoletta, Perrella, Ammaturo-Maresca, Vollaro and Leveque clans.
Links with Sicilian Mafia and 'Ndrangheta: relations with the American Mafia families, the Boni, the Enea, and Monti clans and *Cosa Nostra* families to launder drugs and smuggling money. Is represented by Michele Greco in Palermo.
International Links: The clan's activities are transnational: in Switzerland (Perrella Gennaro), Greece and the Middle East (Mazzarella Ciro and Danaro Adam), France (Barbarossa Nunzio), England (Cuntrera family), South America (Bardellino families), North America (Bonanno family) and Canada (Cotrone family).
Links with terrorist groups: None.
External/Internal Conflicts: has adopted a clear neutral position in the second Camorra War.
Political Links: None.
Other: thanks to the clan's smuggling and drugs trade, it has built up an important economic empire.

Raffaele Cutolo

Valentino Giorgi

Michele Zaza

Naples Province

Clan Name: Nuvoletta
Leader: Lorenzo (01-01-31).
Geographical zones: Marano, Calvizzano, Qualiano, Guigliano in Campania, S. Antimo, Mugnano di Napoli and various centres in the province of Caserta. Moreover, it has great influence over other clans in the rest of Campania.
Number of Members: 141 (1988), 78 (1995).
Sex: 1 woman, 140 men.
Average age: 36.
Activities: drugs trade, extortion, EC frauds.
Alliances: the Mallardo clan of Giugliano, the Lo Russo clan of Secondigliano. All clans at war with Bardellini clans, have the Nuvoletta clan as their ideological reference point. Alliances also with the Sicilian Mafia and the 'Ndrangheta.
External Conflicts: After war with the NCO, at war with its own ex-ally Antonio Bardellino, consequently at war with all his new allies. Very violent and bitter war.
Internal Conflicts: Lorenzo Nuvoletta's control over members is absolute: his charisma but also the fear of vendetta mean that tradimenti* or leaving the clan are practically impossible.
Political Links: Clear political links at local and national level. The clan controls a mass of local votes. This gives the clan access to EU funds and getting bank loans without guarantees.
Other: the clan employs district leaders to control different zones in the region.

Clan Name: Iovine, ex-Bardellino clan.
Leader: Mario (15-03-51).
Geographical zones: Giugliano, Villaricca, Marano, S. Antimo.
Number of Members: 45.
Sex: all men.

Average age: 35.
Activities: extortion, drugs and arms trade.
Alliances: alliances not clear after the murder of Bardellino. Necessary to find new alliances and reference points.
External Conflicts: part of the NF fighting against the NCO.
Internal Conflicts: a violent spilt with Antonio Bardellino. Mario Iovine is believed to have murdered Antonio Bardellino. Internal conflicts are vague and not confirmed.
Political Links: No political links in the province of Naples but does have some in the province of Caserta, especially in Casal di Principe, Aversa, and Caserta.
Other: the clan employs district leaders to control different zones in the region.

Clan Name: Mallardo.
Leader: Feliciano (20-11-51).
Geographical zones: Guigliano in Campania
Number of Members: 4 (1988), 73 (1995).
Sex: all men.
Average age: 34.
Activities: manages clandestine lotto, drugs trade, stealing TIR lorries, extortion, imposing illegal security on building sites.
Alliances: Lo Russo clan of Secondigliano and close and subordinate alliance with the Nuvoletta clan.
External Conflicts: with Antonio Bardellino and allies.
Internal Conflicts: None.
Political Links: the clan controls many votes at local level which are distributed among different parties.
Other: the clan makes most of its money from extortions from building constructors.

Clan Name: Puca
Leader: Pasquale (09-07-1964).
Geographical zones: S. Antimo.
Number of Members: 19.
Sex: all men.
Average age: 29.
Activities: drugs trade and extortion.
Alliances: subordinate to Mario Iovine's clan.
External Conflicts: conflicts with the Lo Russo clan from Secondigliano.
Internal Conflicts: None.
Political Links: the clan controls important local votes which gives it political influence in the communes of S. Antimo and Casandrino.
Other: none.

Clan Name: Lo Russo.
Leader: Mario (23-08-56).
Geographical zones: Melito, Naples-Secondigliano.
Number of Members: 19.
Sex: all men.
Average age: 35.
Activities: drugs trade and extortions.
Alliances: close alliance with the Mallardo clan from Giugliano and is subordinate to Lorenzo Nuvoletta.
External Conflicts: conflicts with Mario Iovine's allies.
Internal Conflicts: none.
Political Links: none.
Other: Secondigliano is its headquarters and has a *capo zona* in Melito.

Clan Name: Nappo.
Leader: Pietro (15-09-48).
Geographical zones: Giugliano and villaricca.
Number of Members: 13.
Sex: all men.
Average age: 40.
Activities: drugs trade, extortions, stealing TIR lorries and bank robberies.
Alliances: close alliance with the Lo Russo clan from Secondigliano.
External Conflicts: conflicts with Mario Iovine's allies.
Internal Conflicts: none.
Political Links: some contacts.
Other: A new clan which Nappo has set up with his brother-in-law.

Clan Name: Moccia.
Leader: Anna Mazza (28-02-37).
Geographical zones: Afragola, Casoria, Arzano, Formia (LT).
Number of Members: 52 (1988), 37 (1995).
Sex: 3 women and 49 men.
Average age: 32.
Activities: drugs trade, extortions, robberies, loan sharking, public contracts, selling of land.
Alliances: close to the Bardellino faction and has links with the Verde clan from S. Antimo, the Gaglione clan from Caivano, the Alfieri and Fabbrocino clans from Nola and Lo Russo from Secondigliano..
External Conflicts: the clan has been at war with the Magliulo clan and won this war.
Internal Conflicts: some internal conflicts as members are no longer considered loyal or want more independence.
Political Links: the clan has backed its 'own men' to enter politics: Salvatore Caputo (PSDI) and Augusto Iazzetta (DC).

Other: none.

Clan Name: Magliulo
Leader: Vincenzo (01-01-48).
Geographical zones: Afragola, Formia (LT) and surrounding communes..
Number of Members: 20.
Sex: all men.
Average age: 29.
Activities: business activities in the public and private construction sector, compravendita di terreni/ land. robberies and extortion.
Alliances: was protected by Antonio Bardellino and now seeking protection from the Nuvoletta clan after isolation due to war with the Moccia clan.
External Conflicts: war with Moccia clan. Defeated.
Internal Conflicts: none.
Political Links: the clan has numerous political contacts: Paolo Sibilio and Francesco Salzano (DC). The leader himself was once DC councillor in Afragola responsible for state services. Close contact with Manfredi Bosco, MP.
Other: Although many members have committed serious crimes, they have always managed to avoid prosecution.

Clan Name: Gaglione
Leader: Antonio (12-09-51).
Geographical zones: Caivano, Cardito, Crispano and Frattamaggiore.
Number of Members: 33.
Sex: all men.
Average age: 30.
Activities: selling drugs, extortions and robberies.
Alliances: close alliance the Moccia clan for whom it, together with the Verde clan from S. Antimo, undertakes the most ferocious criminal acts. Reference point: Antonio Bardellino and allies.
External Conflicts: none, did not participate in the Moccia versus Magliulo war.
Internal Conflicts: none.
Political Links: none.
Other: none.

Clan Name: Verde.
Leader: Antonio (14-01-60).
Geographical zones: S. Antimo, Casandrino and Grumo Nevano.
Number of Members: 13.
Sex: all men.
Average age: 29.
Activities: selling drugs, extortions, robberies and control of public contracts.

Alliances: close alliance with the Moccia clan from Afragola and Gaglione clan from Caivano. Reference point: Antonio Bardellino and allies.
External Conflicts: none.
Internal Conflicts: none.
Political Links: close links with the local DC.
Other: none.

Clan Name: Alfieri.
Leader: Carmine (18-02-43).
Geographical zones: Nola, Cicciano, Margliano, Miriglianella, Brusciano, Pomigliano d'Arco, Poggiomarino, S. Giuseppe Vesuviano, S. Gennaro Vesuviano.
Number of Members: 21 (1988), 54 (1995).
Sex: all men.
Average age: 41.
Activities: drugs and arms trades, extortions, managing clandestine lotto. Through name lenders, the clan manages butchers and meat selling of all kinds.
Alliances: close alliance with the Bardellino clan. It also has close links and works with Mario Fabbrocino. It also collaborates with the Nuzzo clan of Acerra, the Galasso clan of Poggiomarino, the Moccia clan of Afragola, the Ammaturo clan of Naples, the Langella clan of Boscoreale.
External Conflicts: at war with the Nuvoletta faction, in particular with the Gionta clan of Torre Annunizata and D'Alessandro di Castellammare di Stabia for the domination of illegal activities.
Internal Conflicts: none to speak of. Carmine Alfieri's power is absolute.
Political Links: no evidence of this but it is possible that it conditions local politics.
Other: Alfieri's criminal power goes beyond Naples and Campania. Carmine Alfieri has great prestige which makes him much respected in the local community.

Clan: Fabbrocino
Leader: Mario (05-01-43).
Number of members: 20 (1988), 35 (1995).
Average age: 30
Sex: all men
Geographical zones: S. Gennaro Vesuviano, Ottaviano, S. Giuseppe Vesuviano, Pomigliano d'Arco.
Activities: drugs trafficking, extortion, robberies, managing clandestine lotto.
Alliances: Bardellino faction, close collaboration with the Alfieri clan.
External conflicts: at war with Salvatore Foria from Pomigliano d'Arco and together with the Alfieri clan, at war with the Gionta clan.

Internal conflicts: None.
Political contacts: None.
Other: controls butchers and illegal meat selling.

Clan: Egizio
Leader: Antonio Egizio (19-0153).
Number of members: 19
Average age: 32
Sex: all men.
Geographical zones: Casalnuovo di Napoli, Acerra, Pomigliano d'Arco, Castello di Cisterna, Cercola, Volla e Brusciano.
Activities: drugs trafficking, extortions and robberies.
Alliances: after spilt with Salvatore Foria, has lost the protection of Carmine Alfieri and Mario Fabbrocino and has sought alliances with the Camorra from Marano and Giugliano.
External conflicts: at war with Salvatore Foria from Pomigliano d'Arco and Aniello Anastasio from S. Anastasio.
Internal conflicts: none.
Political contacts: the brother of a clan member, Giovanni Romano is a DC councillor of the comune of Casalnuovo while another member Gennaro Veneruso was a PSI councillor in the comune of Volla.
Other: the Egizio clan is seeking to make peace with Foria clan in order to avoid physical elimination.

Clan: Foria
Leader: Salvatore (05-01-54).
Number of members: 13
Average age: 33.
Sex: all men.
Geographical zones: Pomigliano d'Arco, S. Anastasia, Castello di Cisterna.
Activities: extortion, robberies, drug trafficking.
Alliances: alliance with Alfieri clan and collaborates with the Anastasio clan.
External conflicts: at war with Egizio clan from Casalnuovo from Naples.
Internal conflicts: none.
Political contacts: none notified.
Other: for certain activities, uses members from the Anastasio clan.

Clan: Nuzzo, aka Carusiello
Leader: Giovanni (01-10-54).
Number of members: 22 (1988), 22 (1995).
Average age: 27
Sex: all men.
Geographical zones: Acerra.
Activities: extortion, robberies, drugs trafficking.

Alliances: after the murder of Nicola Nuzzo in Roma and Raffaele in Acerra, Giovanni Nuzzo decided to form an alliance with the Egizio clan from Casalnuovo, losing some power.
External conflicts: at war with the Marinello, aka Amurristiello clan and also with the Sorrentino clan (which has remained loyal to Raffaele Cutolo).
Internal conflicts: two members Salvatore Andretta and Pasquale Scudiero would like to form their own new clan and therefore, there are certain tensions.
Political contacts: daughter of Nicola Nuzzo and niece of actual leader, Teresa Nuzzo is engaged with the son of Attilio Tortora, director of public works in the comune for the DC.
Other: none.

Clan: Anastasio
Leader: Aniello Anastasio (15-06-50).
Number of members: 23.
Average age: 31
Sex: all men.
Geographical zones: Madonna dell'Arco, S. Anastasia, Cercola, Pollena Trocchia.
Activities: international drugs trafficking, arms trade, robberies, extortion, clandestine lotto.
Alliances: alliances with the D'Avino clan from Somma Vesuviano, the Foria clan from Pomigliano d'Arco and the Ascione clan from Sebastino al Vesuvio.
External conflicts: at war with the Mauri clan for supremacy of the territory. Through its friendship with Foria, the clan also has contact with the Egizzo clan from Casalnuovo.
Internal conflicts: none.
Political contacts: none although the brother of the clan leader is a PSDI councillor on the council of S. Anastasia.
Other: its legal cover are car salons.

Clan: 'Cuniello Capasso'
Leader: Cuomo Grimaldi (29-09-54).
Number of members: 13.
Average age: 27
Sex: all men.
Geographical zones: Acerra
Activities: international drugs trafficking, robberies, extortion, clandestine lotto.
Alliances: Cuomo Grimaldi was Nicola Nuzzo's man (Caruzziello clan) but when this clan had internal conflicts, Grimaldi left with other associates to set up his own group. He is also subordinate to Mario Fabbrocino's can from S. Gennaro Vesuviano.
External conflicts: at war with Davide Sorrentino's clan as well as the

Camurristillo clan both from Acerra.
Internal conflicts: none.
Political contacts: none.
Other: trying to get to become close to the Nuzzo clan.

Clan: Sorrentino
Leader: Davide Sorrentino (15-03-61).
Number of members: 9.
Average age: 34
Sex: 1 woman, 8 men.
Geographical zones: Acerra.
Activities: extortion, robberies and international drugs trafficking.
Alliances: this is last NCO group remaining after the first Camorra war, close to Rosa Cutolo who is only the run. Its loyalty to the NCO does not appear to bother other clans otherwise it would have been destroyed a long time ago.
External conflicts: it is tolerated by the NF clans.
Internal conflicts: none.
Political contacts: none.
Other: will disappear with time because of its work methods and also because it is limited to work within a certain territory.
Clan: Russo
Leader: Luigi Russo (05-02-56).
Number of members: 12.
Average age:
Sex: all men.
Geographical zones: Marigliano, Mariglianella, Brusciano, Castello di Cisterna.
Activities: extortions, robberies and international drugs trafficking.
Alliances: alliance, in a subordinate position, with Carmine Alfieri from Piazolla di Nola.
External conflicts: at war with the Egizzo clan from Caselnuovo di Napoli.
Internal conflicts: none.
Political contacts: none.
Other: at the moment, the clan is interested in the public contracts for the realisation for the second track of the Circumvesuviana.

Clan: Camurristiello
Leader: Gennaro Marinello (05-04-51).
Number of members: 16.
Average age:
Sex: all men.
Geographical zones: Acerra.
Activities: extortions, robberies, international drugs trafficking and organising clandestine lotto.
Alliances: under the influence of Antonio Bardellino

External conflicts: was at war with the Nuzzo clan from Acerra. Now at peace but still at war with the Sorrentino clan.
Internal conflicts: none.
Political contacts: none.
Other: at the moment, the clan is rather limited in its activities as more than half of members are in prison.

Clan: Mauri
Leader: Vincenzo Mauri (22-01-53).
Number of members: 12.
Average age:
Sex: all men.
Geographical zones: S. Anastasia.
Activities: extortions, robberies, loan harking and international drugs trafficking.
Alliances: alliance with the Vollaro clan from Portici.
External conflicts: none.
Internal conflicts: none.
Political contacts: none. The clan has never had the means to influence local politics.
Other: at the moment, the clan is in decline as the leader and his bother are in prison and hospital.
Clan: Zaza
Leader: Michele Zaza (10-04-45).
Number of members: 10.
Average age: ?
Sex: all men.
Geographical zones: Portici, Naples-S. Giovanni, Torre del Greco, other regions in Italy.
Activities: smuggling of foreign cigarettes, clandestine lotto and international drugs trafficking.
Alliances: the clan operates beyond Naples and its province and has alliances with smaller clans such as the Anastasio clan of Anastasia, the Barbarosso, the Egizzo clan and the Adamo-Daiano clan. It also has close links with the Sicilian mafia (drugs and laundering money).
External conflicts: Neutral position in the second camorra war. A conflict with the Vollaro clan of Portici.
Internal conflicts: none.
Political contacts: none.
Other: although Michele Zaza is frequently being prosecuted and recognised as 'socially dangerous', he manages to be freed because of bad health and thus escapes.

Clan: Vollaro
Leader: Luigi Vollaro (05-02-56).
Number of members: 24 (1988), 62 (1995).
Average age:

Sex: all men.
Geographical zones: Portici.
Activities: extortions, clandestine lotto and international drugs trafficking.
Alliances: Bardellino sympathies.
External conflicts: conflicts with the Zaza clan.
Internal conflicts: none.
Political contacts: none.
Other: violent war with the Zaza clan.

Clan: Gargiulio
Leader: Eugenio Gargiulio (14-10-46).
Number of members: 17
Average age:
Sex: all men.
Geographical zones: Torre del Greco.
Activities: extortion and drugs trafficking.
Alliances: contacts with the Ascione clan from Ercolano and the Gionta clan from Torre Annunziata.
External conflicts: at war with the Mennella clan also from Torre del Greco.
Internal conflicts: none.
Political contacts: none.
Other: its development is parallel and similar to that of the Mennella clan. Both clans originated from the same clan and then split forming two separate clans.

Clan: Improta
Leader: Luigi Improta (04-04-54).
Number of members: 8
Average age:
Sex: all men.
Geographical zones: S. Sebastiano al Vesuviano.
Activities: extortion, clandestine lotto and drugs trafficking.
Alliances: alliances with the Anastasio clan from Anastasia.
External conflicts: none.
Internal conflicts: none.
Political contacts: none.
Other: in S. Sebastiano al Vesuviano, there was not one clear camorra clan but micro delinquency which undertook robberies and extortions. It is only recently that Luigi Improta with the help Gaetano Ascione has been able to organise a real camorra clan.

Clan: Ascione
Leader: Raffaele Ascione (29-01-54).
Number of members: 16 (1988), 99 (1995).
Average age:?

Sex: all men.
Geographical zones: Ercolano.
Activities: extortions, clandestine lotto and international drugs trafficking.
Alliances: collaborates with the Gargiulio clan from Torre del Greco and the Gionta clan from Torre Annunziata.
External conflicts: conflicts with the Ascione clan for control of the territory. The enemies of the Ascione clan and also enemies of the Esposito clan although this has not broken out into full blown war.
Internal conflicts: none.
Political contacts: the clan might have some contacts.
Other: none.

Clan: Esposito
Leader: Antonio Esposito (10-12-55).
Number of members: 23 (1988), 66 (1995).
Average age:
Sex: all men.
Geographical zones: Ercolano.
Activities: extortion, clandestine lotto and international drugs trafficking.
Alliances: alliances with the Mennella clan from Torre del Greco, the Vangone clan from Torre Annunziata and the D'Alessandro clan from Castellammare di Stabia.
External conflicts: problems with the Ascione clan
Internal conflicts: none.
Political contacts: none.
Other: none.

Clan: Abate
Leader: Filippo Abate *(o' Cavallaro)* (02-08-57).
Number of members: 14 (1988), 60 (1995).
Average age: ?
Sex: all men.
Geographical zones: S. Giorgio a Cremano.
Activities: extortions, clandestine lotto and international drugs trafficking.
Alliances: a working alliance with the Licciardi clan from Secondigliano and the Norcaro* clan from Naples-Barra.
External conflicts: the clan dominates S. Giorgio a Cremano completely , not allowing other clans to emerge.
Internal conflicts: none.
Political contacts: none.
Other: the local population is constantly terrorised by this clan as it is particularly violent and ferocious. Its leader, Filippo Abate was arrested in Spain in 1987.

Clan: Nappo
Leader: Salvatore Nappo (01-02-50).
Number of members: 10.
Average age:
Sex: all men.
Geographical zones: Volla.
Activities: extortions to building sites, clandestine lotto and international drug trafficking.
Alliances: alliance, although in a subordinate position, with the Anastasio clan from S. Anastasia.
External conflicts: at war with the Egizio clan.
and its allies.
Internal conflicts: none.
Political contacts: none.
Other: after the arrest of Salvatore Nappo, the leader of the clan, his brother-in-law, Lucano De Liguori became the leader. He was murdered on 14-11-88.

Clan: Troise
Leader: Luigi Troise (05-03-48).
Number of members: 13.
Average age:
Sex: all men.
Geographical zones: Cercola.
Activities: extortions, clandestine lotto and international drugs trafficking.
Alliances: alliances with the Anastasia clan from S. Anastasia and the Foria clan from Pomigliano d'Arco, although in a subordinate position.
External conflicts:
Internal conflicts: none.
Political contacts: previously, Camorra clans from this commune have had contacts with local politicians although for this clan it does not seem to be the case.
Other: its rivals are those of its allies, in particular, the Egizio clan.

Clan: Riccardi
Leader: Antonio Riccardi, (*o' nasone*) (big nose) (15-09-58).
Number of members: 6.
Average age:
Sex: all men.
Geographical zones: Pollena Trocchia.
Activities: extortions to building sites, clandestine lotto and international drug trafficking.
Alliances: alliances with the Anastasio clan from S. Anastasia and the Foria clan from Pomigliano d'Arco, although in a subordinate position.
External conflicts: it has the rivals of its allies, in particular, the Egizio clan from Casalnuovo

Internal conflicts: none.
Political contacts: none.
Other: none.

Clan: Mennella
Leader: Giuseppe Mennella (03-05-48).
Number of members: 19.
Average age: ?
Sex: all men.
Geographical zones: Torre del Greco.
Activities: extortions and drugs trafficking.
Alliances: alliances with the Esposito clan from Ercolano, the Vangone clan from Torre Annunziata and the D'Alessandro clan from Castellammare.
External conflicts: at war with the Gargiulio clan from Torre del Greco.
Internal conflicts: none.
Political contacts: none.
Other: in decline because of its war with the Gargiulio clan. During a massacre in Torre del Greco on the 1 April 1988, it lost 3 members.

Clan: Gionta
Leader: Valentino Gionta (14-01-53).
Number of members: 24 (1988), 59 (1995).
Average age: ?
Sex: all men.
Geographical zones: Torre Annunziata
Activities: clandestine lotto, smuggling of foreign cigarettes, international drugs trafficking, public contracts.
Alliances: Nuvoletta sympathies, working alliance with the Lo Russo clan from Secondigliano and the Cozza clan from the Flegrea area.
External conflicts: at war with the Leveque and Visciano clans. In the past at war with the Alfieri clan where it suffered a bad defeat especially after a massacre in Torre Annunziata in 1984.
Internal conflicts: none.
Political contacts: is in a position to influence politics and control the distribution of public contracts in the commune. The clan can control a certain amount of votes for their candidates.
Other: at the moment, the clan is interested in the flower markets of Pompeii and Castellammare, markets which are controlled by the Alfieri clan. This may be cause conflicts.

Clan: Vangone
Leader: Giovanni Vangone (19-09-52).
Number of members: 9.
Average age: ?
Sex: all men.

Geographical zones: Boscotrecase.
Activities: drugs trafficking.
Alliances: until two years ago, the Vangone clan formed with the Limelli clan, one clan. No alliances with other clans.
External conflicts: only maybe with the Limelli clan.
Internal conflicts: none.
Political contacts: not sought for.
Other: none.

Clan: Leveque
Leader: Ernesto Leveque (01-03-28).
Number of members: 11.
Average age: *
Sex: all men.
Geographical zones: Torre Annunziata.
Activities: extortions, international drugs trafficking, smuggling of foreign cigarettes, clothes and electrical appliances shops where the clan recycles its illegal earnings.
Alliances: Zaza sympathies because of its smuggling of foreign cigarettes.
External conflicts: conflicts with the Gionta clan for territorial reasons.
Internal conflicts: none.
Political contacts: none.
Other: its main activity has been the smuggling of foreign cigarettes although it has not tried to win public contracts within the Earthquake Reconstruction programme (law 219/81).
Clan: Limelli
Leader: Luigi Limelli (02-01-49).
Number of members: 11 (1988), 31 (1995).
Average age: ?
Sex: all men.
Geographical zones: Boscotrecase and Trecase.
Activities: extortions and international drug trafficking.
Alliances: working relationships with the Gionta and Leveque clans.
External conflicts: conflicts with the Vangone clan.
Internal conflicts: none.
Political contacts: none.
Other: the clan has been seeking to infiltrate itself into the business of public state contracts.

Clan: Galasso
Leader: Pasquale Galasso (17-05-55).
Number of members: 16.
Average age: ?
Sex: all men.
Geographical zones: Poggiomarino

Activities: extortions, clandestine lotto, international drugs and arms trafficking, building sector.
Alliances: alliance with the Langella clan from Boscoreale.
External conflicts: none.
Internal conflicts: none.
Political contacts: clear political influence due to its threats and presence.
Other: important members of the clan are under state arrest and have had their property sequestered.

Clan: Langella
Leader: Pasquale Langella (18-03-54).
Number of members: 11.
Average age:
Sex: all men.
Geographical zones: Boscoreale.
Activities: extortions, 'recycling' stolen cattle, clandestine lotto and international drugs trafficking.
Alliances: alliance with Pasquale Galasso.
External conflicts: none.
Internal conflicts: none.
Political contacts: none.
Other: none.

Clan: Pescane
Leader: Francesco Pescane (15-09-54).
Number of members: 10.
Average age: ?
Sex: all men.
Geographical zones: Boscoreale.
Activities: extortions and international drugs trafficking.
Alliances: alliances with the Langella clan.
External conflicts: conflicts with the Visciano clan for territorial reasons.
Internal conflicts: none.
Political contacts: none.
Other: the clan is rather less organised due to the fact that the leader, Francesco Pescane and his brother, Pasquale, are on the run.

Clan: Visciano
Leader: Angelo Visciano (02-09-48).
Number of members: 13
Average age: ?
Sex: all men.
Geographical zones: Boscoreale and Boscotrecase.
Activities: extortions and international drug trafficking.
Alliances: subordinate to the Alfieri clan.

External conflicts: conflicts with the Gionta clan for the monopoly of the drugs trade and with the Pescane clan for territorial reasons.
Internal conflicts: none.
Political contacts: none.
Other: the clan is also active in Battipaglia and Salerno.

Clan: N.C.O (Nuova Camorra Organizzata)
Leader: Raffaele Cutolo (10-12-41).
Number of members: 19 (1988)
Average age: ?
Sex: 3 women and 16 men.
Geographical zones: Ottaviano and other Vesuviani towns.
Activities: extortions.
Alliances: No real alliances. The only ally clan remaining is that of Davide Sorrentino from Acerra.
External conflicts: conflicts with the all clans which explains the formation of the NF.
Internal conflicts: not really as the clan is so small.
Political contacts: not really as it does not really have the power to do so.
Other: the fact that Rosa Cutolo, the boss's sister has been on the run for so long shows that she has some form of protection (arrested in 1993).

Clan: D'Alessandro
Leader: Michele D'Alessandro (24-05-45).
Number of members: 122 (1988)
Average age: ?
Sex: all men
Geographical zones: Castellammare di Stabia, Gragnano, Pimonte, Casola di Napoli, Sorrentine Coast.
Activities: extortions, drugs trafficking, smuggling, clandestine lottery, laundering money into building sector.
Alliances: No real alliances. Good relations with the Nuvoletta clan from Marano di Napoli and the Alfieri clan from Pizzolla di Nola.
External conflicts: conflicts with the Muollo clan which is also from Castellammare di Stabia. After a bitter war, the Muollo clan disappeared.
Internal conflicts: conflicts with Mario Imparato who became leader while Michele D'Alessandro was in prison. They became enemies because Imparato was unable to justify his use of the clan's money. The clan split forming two rival clans.
Political contacts: no clear contacts although with 120 members there is a great potential for electoral support.
Other: None.

Clan: Imparato

Leader: Mario Umberto Imparato (28-04-46)
Number of members: 29 (1988)
Average age: ?
Sex: all men.
Geographical zones: Castellammare di Stabia, Pimonte, Gragnano and S. Antonio Abate.
Activities: extortions and robberies.
Alliances: isolated position because of its principal rival the D'Alessandro clan which is very strong.
External conflicts: split with D'Alessandro clan for money reasons.
Internal conflicts: none
Political contacts: none
Other: Catello Fontanella is one of its members.
Clan: Saturnino

Leader: Catello Saturnino (08-09-45).
Number of members: 10 (1988)
Average age: ?
Sex: all men.
Geographical zones: Castellammare di Stabia.
Activities: extortions.
Alliances: none.
External conflicts: none.
Internal conflicts: none.
Political contacts: none.
Other: One two members are free. One of the last NCO clans and thus, does not really undertake serious criminal acts across the territory because it does not have the man power.

sources: R1 and R2

Camorra Clans in the 1980-90s

NAPOLI
Contini Eduardo (San Giovanniello-Rione Amicizia)
Mallardo Francesco (Vasto-Arenaccia-San Carlo Arena)
Giuliano (Forcella-Orefici-Porto-Via Duomo)
Mariano Ciro (Quartieri Spagnoli, zona alta)
Ranieri Antonio (Pignasecca-Rione Carità)
Misso Giuseppe (Sanità)
Guida (Sanità)
Malventi (Fuorigrotta)

PERIFERIA
Lo Russo/Pariota (Secondigliano-Rione 167-Miano)
Licciardi Gennaro (Piscinola-Marinella-Chiaiano)
Zaza Michele (San Giovanni a Teduccio)
Nuvoletta (Marano-Qualiano-Casoria-Chiaiano-Poggioreale-San Pietro a Patierno)
Zaza (San Giovanni a Teduccio-Brindisi prov.-Lazio-Lombardia)
Nuvoletta Lorenzo (Poggioreale-Cittadella-Arpino-Purgatorio)

PROVINCIA DI NAPOLI
Gionta Valentino (Torre Annunziata)
Alfieri (Nola-Cicciano-Marigliano-Brusciano-Pomigliano-Poggiomarino-San Giuseppe Vesuviano-San Gennaro Vesuviano)
Fabbrocino (San Giuseppe Vesuviano-San Gennaro Vesuviano-Nola-Ottaviano-Pomigliano)
Galasso (Poggiomarino)
Fabbrocino (Pomigliano)
Mallardo (Giugliano)
D'Alessandro Michele (Castellammare-Gragnano-Lettere-Penisola sorrentina)
Imparato Mario
Nuzzo Giovanni (Acerra)
Mariniello Gennaro (Acerra)
Poma Pasquale (Frattamaggiore)

CAMPANIA
La Torre (Mondragone)
Iovine Mario (Castelvolturno)
Schiavone (Casal di Principe)
Magliuolo (Afragola-Formia)
Moccia (Afragola-Latina)

Source: *Il Mattino*, 5-6-92.

Camorra Clans in the Province of Naples in the 1980s



Source: *La Repubblica*, 7-6-90.

QUALIANO
Mallardo

MARANO
Polverino (Nuvoletta)
Alleato Beneduce - Longobardi
di Pozzuoli

S.ANTIMO
Puca - Verde

ZONA VESUVIANA
Fabbrocino-Sepe
Autorino (Alleanza con
la mala salernitana)

AFRAGOLA
Mazza (All. Sepe
Autorino)

AGRO ACERRANO
De Sena - Nuzzo-Piscopo
Grimaldi

CAIVANO - FRATTAMAGGIORE
Gaglione - Del Prete
Mazza

Key:

: NF(Nuvoletta) clans.

: Alfieri Confederation clans.

S.SEBASTIANO al VESUVIO
Improta - Ascione

PONTICELLI
Sarno

S.GIORGIO A CR.
Abate

PORTICI-ERC.
Vollaro-Ascione
Esposito-Cozz.
Sasso

TORRE D. G.
Falanga - Gargiulo

TORRE ANNUNZIATA
Gionta - Gallo - Limelli
Levegue

Pompei
Cesarano
Langella

CASTELLAMMARE
Imparato - D'Alessandro

The Camorra in Naples city in the early 1990s

403

PROVINCIE DI NAPOLI, CASERTA E SALERNO:
SITUAZIONE DEI CLAN: 1994

Source: Ministero dell'Interno, Aprile 1994.



Persone denunciate ex art. 416 bis c.p.
(dati relativi al 1° trimestre per gli anni interessati)



I dati sopra evidenziati dimostrano come continua e pressante sia l'azione delle Forze di Polizia sul territorio.

PROVINCIA DI NAPOLI: CAPI CLAN

COGNOME	NOME	DATA (nasc.)	POSIZIONE	NUMERO AFFILIATI AL CLAN	CLAN	
ABATE	FILIPPO	3/8/57	LATITANTE	42	ABATE	
ALFANO	GIOVANNI	4/10/57	DETENUTO	56	ALFANO	
ALFIERI	CARMINE	18/2/43	DETENUTO	179	ALFIERI	
AMMATURO	UMBERTO	21/5/41	DETENUTO	35	AMMATURO	
ANASTASIO	MICHELE	23/4/53	LIBERO	80	ANASTASIO-FORIA	
FORIA	SALVATORE	5/1/54	DETENUTO	80	ANASTASIO-FORIA	
ANDREOTTI	ANDREA	13/6/51	MIS. PREV.	35	ANDREOTTI	
ANNUNZIATA	ALFONSO	1/1/56	DETENUTO	18	ANNUNZIATA-CESARANO	
CESARANO	FERDINANDO	26/8/54	DETENUTO	18	ANNUNZIATA-CESARANO	
APREA	GIOVANNI	1/7/68	DETENUTO	25	APREA	
ASCIONE	RAFFAELE	29/1/54	DETENUTO	95	ASCIONE	
AVERSANO	VINCENZO	27/6/58	LIBERO	18	AVERSANO	
BARATTO	RAFFAELE	14/10/52	LIBERO	48	BARATTO	
BARDELLINO	ANTONIO	4/5/45	LATITANTE	179	BARDELLINO	
BENEDUCE	GAETANO	1/1/52	LIBERO	60	BENEDUCE-LONGOBARDI	
LONGOBARDI	GENNARO	29/4/56	MIS. PREV.	60	BENEDUCE-LONGOBARDI	
CASCONE	GIUSEPPE	20/1/48	DETENUTO	48	CASCONE-MENNELLA	
MENNELLA	GIUSEPPE	28/10/57	DETENUTO	48	CASCONE-MENNELLA	
CAVALCANTI	GIACOMO	17/3/52	LIBERO	31	CAVALCANTI	
CAVALIERE	GENNARO	2/6/35	LIBERO	34	CAVALIERE	
COCOZZA	FRANCESCO	26/11/53	MIS. PREV.	26	COCOZZA	
CONTINI	EDOARDO	6/7/55	DETENUTO	89	CONTINI	
CRIMALDI	CUONO	25/9/54	DETENUTO	29	CRIMALDI	
D'ALESSANDRO	MICHELE	24/5/45	DETENUTO	284	D'ALESSANDRO	
D'AUSILIO	DOMENICO	17/12/51	DETENUTO	72	D'AUSILIO	
DEL PRETE	CIRO	17/1/44	DETENUTO	13	DEL PRETE	
EGIZIO	ANTONIO	19/1/53	DECEDUTO	60	EGIZIO	

ESPOSITO	SALVATORE	6/5/60	LIBERO	25	ESPOSITO	
FABBROCINO	MARIO	5/1/43	LATITANTE	81	FABBROCINO	
AMBROSIO	FRANCO	13/4/56	DETENUTO	81	FABBROCINO	
FALANGA	GIUSEPPE	28/6/53	LIBERO	19	FALANGA-DI GIOIA	
DI GIOIA	GAETANO	20/1/55	DETENUTO	19	FALANGA-DI GIOIA	
FORMICOLA	BERNARDINO	5/6/54	LIBERO	11	FORMICOLA	
GAGLIONE	ANTONIO	12/9/51	DETENUTO	30	GAGLIONE	
GALASSO	PASQUALE	17/5/55	DETENUTO	69	GALASSO	
GALLO	PASQUALE	14/3/55	DETENUTO	52	GALLO	
GARGIULO	EUGENIO	14/10/46	DETENUTO	53	GARGIULO	
GIONTA	VALENTINO	14/1/53	DETENUTO	124	GIONTA	
GIULIANO	LUIGI	3/11/49	MIS. PREV.	236	GIULIANO	
GRIMALDI	CIRO	26/10/59	LIBERO	54	GRIMALDI	
GUIDA	LUIGI	18/4/56	LIBERO	50	GUIDA-TOLOMELLI-VASTARELLA	
TOLOMELLI	VINCENZO	30/4/25	DETENUTO	50	GUIDA-TOLOMELLI-VASTARELLA	
VASTARELLA	RAFFAELE	1/10/32	LIBERO	50	GUIDA-TOLOMELLI-VASTARELLA	
IACOMINO	TOMMASO	31/5/47	MIS. PREV.	73	IACOMINO-COZZOLINO	
COZZOLINO	RICCARDO	6/8/50	LATITANTE	73	IACOMINO-COZZOLINO	
IMPARATO	UMBERTO MARIO	28/4/46	DECEDUTO	65	IMPARATO	
IMPROTA	LUIGI	4/4/54	LIBERO	12	IMPROTA-ASCIONE	
ASCIONE	CIRO	14/10/45	LIBERO	12	IMPROTA-ASCIONE	
LAGO	GIORGIO	8/6/53	LATITANTE	54	LAGO	
LANGELLA	ANIELLO	28/7/43	LIBERO	11	LANGELLA	
LEVEQUE	ERNESTO	1/3/28	LIBERO	14	LEVEQUE	
LICCIARDI	GENNARO	30/11/56	DECEDUTO	55	LICCIARDI	
LO RUSSO	SALVATORE	18/2/53	DETENUTO	176	LO RUSSO	
MAGLIULO	VINCENZO	1/1/48	LIBERO	39	MAGLIULO	
MALLARDO	FRANCESCO	1/4/51	DETENUTO	29	MALLARDO	
MALVENTI	FELICE	7/10/61	LIBERO	32	MALVENTI	
MARIANO	CIRO	21/11/52	DETENUTO	255	MARIANO	
MARINIELLO	GENNARO	5/4/51	DETENUTO	31	MARINIELLO	
MAURI	ANDREA	29/3/51	LIBERO	14	MAURI	
MAZZARELLA	GENNARO	25/9/49	LIBERO	128	MAZZARELLA	

MINICHINI	CIRO	15/2/62	DETENUTO	34	MINICHINI-NORCARO	
NORCARO	SALVATORE	23/11/58	LIBERO	34	MINICHINI-NORCARO	
MISSO	GIUSEPPE	6/7/47	DETENUTO	54	MISSO	
MAZZA	ANNA	28/2/37	MIS. PREV.	89	MOCCIA	
NAPPO	ANTONIO	7/10/43	LIBERO	17	NAPPO	
NEMOLATO	VINCENZO	9/4/53	DETENUTO	12	NEMOLATO	
NUVOLETTA	LORENZO	1/1/31	DECEDUTO	199	NUVOLETTA	
NUZZO	GIOVANNI	1710/54	LIBERO	31	NUZZO	
PAESANO	GIOVANNI	8/9/45	LIBERO	14	PAESANO	
PERRELLA	MARIO	3/9/61	DETENUTO	33	PERRELLA	
PESACANE	FRANCESCO	15/9/54	LIBERO	11	PESACANE	
POSTIGLIONE	MARIO	25/1/44	LIBERO	19	POSTIGLIONE-POTENZA	
POTENZA	MARIO	8/8/31	LIBERO	19	POSTIGLIONE-POTENZA	
PUCA	PASQUALE	9/7/64	LATITANTE	21	PUCA	
PUCCINELLI	SALVATORE	19/7/56	DETENUTO	41	PUCCINELLI	
RANIERI	ANTONIO	30/3/57	DETENUTO	52	RANIERI-CARDILLO	
CARDILLO	SALVATORE	21/9/58	DETENUTO	52	RANIERI-CARDILLO	
RINALDI	VINCENZO	11/2/56	LIBERO	62	RINALDI	
RUSSO	LUIGI	5/2/56	LIBERO	12	RUSSO	
SARNO	CIRO	31/3/59	DETENUTO	104	SARNO	
SASSO	GIOVANNI	5/11/55	LIBERO	8	SASSO	
DI BIASI	MARIO	2/10/58	DETENUTO	36	SAVIO-DI BIASI	
SAVIO	MARIO	18/2/54	DETENUTO	36	SAVIO-DI BIASI	
SCOTTI	PASQUALE	8/9/58	LATITANTE	26	SCOTTI	
SEBASTIANO	DOMENICO	15/4/59	DETENUTO	54	SEBASTIANO-BELLOFIORE	
BELLOFIORE	RAFFAELE	21/10/55	DETENUTO	54	SEBASTIANO-BELLOFIORE	
STOLDER	RAFFAELE	5/3/58	DETENUTO	45	STOLDER	
VANGONE	ANDREA	6/2/59	MIS. PREV.	84	VANGONE-LIMELLI	
LIMELLI	LUIGI	2/1/49	DETENUTO	84	VANGONE-LIMELLI	
VENERUSO	GENNARO	8/2/56	DETENUTO	12	VENERUSO	
VERDE	DOMENICO	9/7/51	DETENUTO	36	VERDE	
VISCIANO	ANGELO	20/9/48	DETENUTO	14	VISCIANO	
VOLLARO	LUIGI	18/12/32	DETENUTO	140	VOLLARO	

ZAZA	SALVATORE	5/11/25	DECEDUTO	179	ZAZA	

CAPI	TOT.
LIBERI	31
DETENUTI	44
LATITANTI	7
MIS. PREVENZIONE	7
DECEDUTI	5
TOTALE	94

NAPOLI
POSIZIONE GIURIDICA DEI CAPI CLAN: VALORI IN PERCENTUALE



PROVINCIA DI CASERTA: CAPI CLAN.

COGNOME	NOME	DATA nasc.	POSIZIONE	NUMERO AFFILIATI AL CLAN	CLAN	
AUTIERO	ANDREA	14/4/60	LATITANTE	24	AUTIERO	
BARDELLINO	ANTONIO	4/5/45	LATITANTE	24	BARDELLINO	
BARDELLINO	ERNESTO	13/2/43	LIBERO	24	BARDELLINO	
BELFORTE	DOMENICO	3/5/57	LIBERO	64	BELFORTE-BIFONE-MUSONE-LETIZIA	
BIFONE	ANTONIO	4/1/54	LIBERO	64	BELFORTE-BIFONE-MUSONE-LETIZIA	
MUSONE	VITTORIO	15/11/51	DETENUTO	64	BELFORTE-BIFONE-MUSONE-LETIZIA	
LETIZIA	BIAGIO	27/3/49	DETENUTO	64	BELFORTE-BIFONE-MUSONE-LETIZIA	
BENENATO	ROSARIO	29/8/55	DETENUTO	22	BENENATO	
BOCCOLATO	EMILIO	6/10/49	DETENUTO	11	BOCCOLATO	
CANTIELLO	ANTONIO	24/3/58	LIBERO	21	CANTIELLO	
DE FALCO	NUNZIO	19/3/50	LIBERO	23	DE FALCO	
DI PAOLO	MARIO	17/10/57	LATITANTE	54	DI PAOLO	
CARFORA	CLEMENTE	1/1/48	DETENUTO	54	DI PAOLO	
ESPOSITO	MARIO	27/1/59	LATITANTE	87	ESPOSITO	
GAROFALO	ROSARIO	20/7/12	LIBERO	6	GAROFALO	
GRAVANTE	VINCENZO	25/3/50	LIBERO	7	GRAVANTE	
GIUSTI	ALFONSO	12/6/27	LIBERO	4	GIUSTI	
IOVINE	SALVATORE	19/10/65	LIBERO	31	IOVINE	
IZZO	TOMMASO	28/6/35	LIBERO	8	IZZO	
LA TORRE	AUGUSTO	1/12/62	DETENUTO	96	LA TORRE	
LA TORRE	TIBERIO FRANCESCO	2/3/30	LIBERO	96	LA TORRE	
LUBRANO	VINCENZO	14/5/38	LIBERO	31	LUBRANO-PAPA	
PAPA	GIROLAMO	14/4/38	LIBERO	31	LUBRANO-PAPA	
MAZZARA	AMEDEO	29/3/48	DETENUTO	14	MAZZARA	
MILONE	GIOVANNI	25/5/53	LATITANTE	17	MILONE	
MORRONE	GIULIO	2/8/52	DETENUTO	22	MORRONE-LUISE	

LUISE	GIULIO	15/11/60	LIBERO	22	MORRONE-LUISE	
MUSTO	GAETANO	5/8/54	LIBERO	45	MUSTO	
PERRECA	ANTIMO	8/1/57	LIBERO	21	PERRECA	
PICCA	ALDO	17/11/56	DETENUTO	8	PICCA	
PICCOLO	ANGELO	21/5/51	DETENUTO	21	PICCOLO-DELLI PAOLI	
DELLI PAOLI	ANTONIO	2/1/50	LATITANTE	21	PICCOLO-DELLI PAOLI	
SCHIAVONE	FRANCESCO	3/3/54	DETENUTO	219	SCHIAVONE	
TAVOLETTA	ANTONIO	25/3/56	DETENUTO	57	TAVOLETTA	
TESSITORE	FRANCESCO	8/2/46	DETENUTO	12	TESSITORE	
UCCIERO	ADOLFO	5/8/63	DETENUTO	10	UCCIERO	
VENOSA	LUIGI	28/11/53	DETENUTO	50	VENOSA-CATERINO	
CATERINO	SEBASTIANO	8/11/55	DETENUTO	50	VENOSA-CATERINO	

CAPI	TOT.
DETENUTI	16
LIBERI	16
LATITANTI	6
TOTALE	38

CASERTA
POSIZIONE GIURIDICA DEI CAPI CLAN: VALORI IN PERCENTUALE



PROVINCIA DI SALERNO: CAPI CLAN.

COGNOME	NOME	DATA nasc.	POSIZIONE	NUMERO AFFILIATI AL CLAN	CLAN
DE FEO	PASQUALE	27/1/61	DETENUTO	34	DE FEO
DI MAIO	SALVATORE	22/6/58	LIBERO	63	DI MAIO-BENIGNO
BENIGNO	ANTONIO	1/1/37	DETENUTO	63	DI MAIO-BENIGNO
FORTE	ANTONIO	12/6/50	DETENUTO	19	FORTE
GENOVESE	FRANCESCO	27/6/65	LIBERO	32	GENOVESE
GRIMALDI	LUCIO	14/7/48	DETENUTO	94	GRIMALDI
MAIALE	GIOVANNI	25/1/53	DETENUTO	71	MAIALE
MARANDINO	GIOVANNI	5/11/37	DETENUTO	47	MARANDINO
LA BROCCA	CARMINE	16/7/47	MIS. PREV.	47	MARANDINO
MATRONE	FRANCESCO	15/7/47	DETENUTO	63	MATRONE-LORETO
LORETO	PASQUALE	18/4/61	DETENUTO	63	MATRONE-LORETO
PANELLA	AMEDEO	26/4/55	DETENUTO	51	MIRABILE-PANELLA
NOCERA	TOMMASO	1/6/49	MIS. PREV.	75	NOCERA
OLIVIERI	GIUSEPPE	10/12/46	DECEDUTO	84	OLIVIERI-CITARELLA
CITARELLA	GENNARO	29/8/41	DECEDUTO	84	OLIVIERI-CITARELLA
PECORARO	ALFONSO	30/11/61	LIBERO	89	PECORARO
PEPE	MARIO	26/5/49	DETENUTO	17	PEPE

CAPI	TOT.
DETENUTI	9
LIBERI	3
MIS. PREV.	2
DECEDUTI	2
LATITANTI	0
TOTALE	17

SALERNO
POSIZIONE GIURIDICA DEI CAPI CLAN: VALORI IN PERCENTUALE



Appendix Seven: Camorra-Related Activities in the 1980s

416 bis - Mafia Association



Murders 1975-92 in Campania and Naples Province



Number of Murders in Naples and Province 1975-92

Murders in Campania 1983-93



Number of murders in Naples province 1983-93



Drug-Related Crimes



Drug-related crimes denounced in Campania 1983-93



Drug-related crimes denounced in Campania 1983-93

People Denounced for Smuggling in Campania 1983-93



Number of People denounced in Campania



Number of Smuggling Crimes denounced in Campania 1983-93

sources: Rea (1994), Sales (1988) and ISTAT - *Annunario di Statistiche Guidizaria penali 1985/3-94*, Roma.

Murders in Campania (1981-94)



Dati aggiornati al 10 novembre 1994

Murders in Naples and Province (1981-94)



Dati aggiornati al 10 novembre 1994

Appendix Eight: Antonio Gava and The Cirillo Affair

Antonio Gava has been a major DC player in Neapolitan and national politics in the post-war period following in his father, Silvio Gava's footsteps (see Chapter Ten). During the 1980s, he held a number of important ministerial posts including that of minister of the Interior. Ciro Cirillo's kidnapping was potentially dangerous for him as Cirillo was his right-hand man and knew all his political secrets, especially those about his clientelistic deals.

Ciro Cirillo, a DC regional councillor in charge of the Earthquake Distribution Fund, was kidnapped by the Neapolitan 'column' of the Red Brigades (BR) on the 27 April 1981. The local DC, in particular members of the *'Dorotei'* faction (Gava jr, Patriarca, Russo, Piccoli, realising that he be a victim of the Moro scenario contacted the Camorra. They believed that the Camorra could help them contact the BR and negotiate his liberation. Different Camorra groups were asked to intervene as Pasquale Galasso makes clear *"during the Cirillo kidnapping, I was contacted by Antonio Gava, MP, through Raffaele Boccia, his loyal representative in Poggiomarino, and he asked Boccia to ask me and the Alfieris whether we could do something to free Cirillo"* (Pr7).

The Alfieri confederation refused because it did not want to be used by the politicians; but Cutolo, on the other hand, saw this request as his opportunity to stabilise and consolidate his political influence as well as have access to a percentage of the Earthquake Funds (votes in exchange for political, social and business opportunities). Ciro Cirillo was freed on 25 July 1981, with the help of Cutolo and his NCO. He had calculated that this would increase his political returns, but, as his organisation was weakened in criminal importance, the DC politicians who had made the original promises, abandoned him for the new emerging Camorra. He was thus never really able to benefit from what he considered his due (see Chapter Twelve). This episode demonstrated that political contacts developed parallel to criminal power and that politicians sought contacts with the most powerful criminal gang in order to obtain what they needed. This untimely created intricate relations and exchanges.

It has been very difficult for magistrates to establish exactly what happened. But, investigating judge Carlo D'Alemi in his case was able to show that there had been quite clear links between the Neapolitan DC and the NCO. Judge D'Alemi was discredited for the conclusions that he came to in this case but they were later judged to be correct by the Appeal Court.

For more detailed explanations see Vasile (1993) and Aa. Vv (1988).